



**Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro**

**Centro de Ciências Sociais**

**Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas**

**Agossou Lucien Ahouangan**


**Conflict resolution and peacekeeping operation in Côte d'Ivoire: the  
UNOCI experience from 2004 to 2017**

**Rio de Janeiro**

**2021**

Agossou Lucien Ahouangan

**Conflict resolution and peacekeeping operation: UNOCI from 2004 to 2017**



Tese apresentada, como requisito parcial para obtenção do título de Doutor , ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais, da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. Área de concentração: Política internacional.

Orientadora: Prof.<sup>a</sup> Dra. Layla Dawood

Coorientador: Prof. Dr. Mariano Delgado

Rio de Janeiro

2021

CATALOGAÇÃO NA FONTE  
UERJ / REDE SIRIUS / BIBLIOTECA CCS/A

A286	<p>Ahouangan, Agossou Lucien. Conflict resolution and peacekeeping operation: UNOCI from 2004 to 2017 / Agossou Lucien Ahouangan. – 2021. 314 f.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Orientadora: Layla Dawood. Coorientador: Mariano Delgado. Tese (Doutorado) – Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">1. Nações Unidas – Teses. 2. Costa do Marfim – Teses. 3. Negociação – Teses. 4. Movimentos pela paz – Teses. I. Dawood, Layla. II. Delgado, Mariano. III. Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. IV. Título.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">CDU 341.123.042</p>
------	---

Autorizo, apenas para fins acadêmicos e científicos, a reprodução total ou parcial desta tese, desde que citada a fonte.

---

Assinatura

---

Data

Agossou Lucien Ahouangan

**Conflict resolution and peacekeeping operation: UNOCI from 2004 to 2017**

Tese apresentada, como requisito parcial para obtenção do título de Doutor, ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais, da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. Área de concentração: Política internacional.

Aprovada em 06 de maio de 2021.

Banca examinadora:

---

Prof.<sup>a</sup> Dra. Layla Dawood (Orientadora)  
Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas - UERJ

---

Prof. Dr. Mauricio Santoro  
Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas - UERJ

---

Prof.<sup>a</sup> Dra. Jana Tabak  
Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas - UERJ

---

Prof.<sup>a</sup> Dra. Mônica Herz  
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro

---

Prof. Dr. Danilo Marcondes  
Escola Superior de Guerra

Rio de Janeiro  
2021



## **DEDICATION**

To my mother, the strongest warrior...

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

To my family especially, my mother and my sisters and brother, Georgine, Charlie, Sheila, Nadège, Gustave, Noel, Hervé, who even away from me, gave me all the support necessary for the development of my research. To my uncle Yves, to my nephews and nieces. To my classmates for the tips and help throughout my doctorate. To Martine with whom I finished writing my thesis. To my happy goofy people, Yassin, Giresse, Cisco, Fabrice who have been a real pain in the neck and major support during my doctorate journey. To Thaissi, Betina, Lilian, André and his wife for being lovely persons.

To my dear supervisor Prof. Dr. Layla Dawood for her dedication, corrections, readings and support from the beginning of my PhD until the completion of my thesis. To the professors of the Graduate Program in International Relations (PPGRI) of UERJ, the University of Fribourg and Professor Mariano Delgado who provided me with the infrastructure and access to literature for writing my thesis. To Professor M. Herz for the tips and the book “mediação internacional”

Finally, I must thank the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) for the scholarship in the country and abroad, without which it would not have been possible to better develop my research.

La paix n'est pas un vain mot, mais un comportement  
*Felix Houphouët-Boigny*

## ABSTRACT

AHOUEGAN, A. L. **Conflict Resolution and peacekeeping operation in Côte d'Ivoire: the ONUCI experience from 2004 to 2017.** 2021. 314 f. Tese (Doutorado em Relações Internacionais) – Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2021.

This thesis aims at analysing the impact of United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) in the Ivorian conflict resolution. For that purpose, we explored the role of the UNOCI regarding the phases of negotiation, resolution and transformation of the Ivorian conflict. This thesis analysed peace missions in Africa, especially UNOCI and its impact on Ivorian conflict resolution. I assume that the complexity of resolving these conflicts does not lie in the absence of attempts to resolve the conflicts, but in the lack of appropriate proposals to each situation. The present work highlighted the efforts that have been made in the different phases. In the present thesis the literature of peace operations and conflict resolution dialogued with each other, allowing for a deeper analysis of UNOCI in its conflict resolution and peace operation dimension. I examined the hypotheses that France and ONUCI mediation increased the warring parties' disruptive conflictual behaviour in many ways. I argue that peacekeepers deployment increased the resistance in applying political agreements if one of the warring parties think that the peacekeepers or one of the members of the multidimensional mission are not impartial. I also argue that the presence of France as former coloniser increased the nationalism among many Ivorians and therefore increased their disruptive behaviour in applying many of the peace agreements.

Keywords: Conflict resolution. UNOCI. Peace Operation. Negotiation.

## RESUMO

AHOUEANGAN, A. L. **Resolução de conflito e operação de manutenção da paz na Costa do Marfim**: A experiência da ONUCI de 2004 a 2017. 2021. 314 f. Tese (Doutorado em Relações Internacionais) – Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2021.

A presente tese visa analisar o impacto da Operação das Nações Unidas na Costa do Marfim (UNOCI) na resolução do conflito na Costa do Marfim. Para isso, exploramos o papel da UNOCI no que diz respeito às fases de negociação, resolução e transformação do conflito da Costa do Marfim. O presente trabalho analisou as missões de paz na África, especialmente a UNOCI e o seu impacto na resolução do conflito da Costa do Marfim. Presumo que a complexidade da resolução destes conflitos não reside na ausência de tentativas de resolução dos conflitos, mas na falta de propostas adequadas a cada situação. No presente estudo, destacou-se os esforços que têm sido feitos nas diferentes fases. Na presente tese a literatura das operações de paz e da resolução de conflito dialogaram entre si, o que permitiu uma análise mais profunda da ONUCI na sua dimensão de resolução de conflito e de operação de paz. Examinei a hipótese de que a França e a mediação da ONUCI aumentaram de muitas maneiras o comportamento conflituoso e disruptivo das partes beligerantes. Defendo que o desdobramento de forças de manutenção da paz aumenta a resistência na aplicação de acordos políticos se uma das partes em conflito pensar que as forças de manutenção da paz ou um dos membros da missão multidimensional não são imparciais. Também defendo que a presença da França como antigo colonizador aumentou o nacionalismo entre muitos marfinenses e, portanto, aumentou os seus comportamentos disruptivos na aplicação de muitos dos acordos de paz.

Palavras-chaves: Resolução de conflito. ONUCI. Operação de paz. Negociação.

## RÉSUMÉ

AHOUANGAN, A. L. **Résolution de conflit et opération de maintien de la paix :** l'expérience de l'ONUCI de 2004 à 2017. 2021. 314 f. Tese (Doutorado em Relações Internacionais) – Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2021.

Cette thèse vise à analyser l'impact de l'ONUCI dans la résolution du conflit ivoirien. Pour ce faire, j'ai exploré le rôle de l'ONUCI dans les phases de négociation, de résolution et de transformation du conflit ivoirien. J'ai analysé les missions de paix en Afrique, notamment l'Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire - ONUCI - et son impact sur la résolution du conflit ivoirien. Je pars du principe que la complexité de la résolution de ces conflits ne réside pas dans l'absence de tentatives de résolution des conflits, mais dans le manque de propositions appropriées à chaque situation. J'ai souligné les efforts qui ont été faits dans les différentes phases. Dans cette thèse, la littérature sur les opérations de paix et la résolution de conflits ont dialogué entre elles, ce qui a permis une analyse plus approfondie de l'ONUCI dans ses dimensions de résolution de conflits et d'opérations de paix. J'ai examiné les hypothèses selon lesquelles la médiation de la France et de l'ONUCI a augmenté le comportement conflictuel perturbateur des parties belligérantes de plusieurs manières. Et que le déploiement des casques bleus augmente la résistance à l'application des accords politiques si l'une des parties en conflit pense que les casques bleus ou l'un des membres de la mission multidimensionnelle ne sont pas impartiaux. Je soutiens également que la présence de la France en tant qu'ancien colonisateur a accru le sentiment de nationalisme de nombreux Ivoiriens et, par conséquent, leur comportement perturbateur dans l'application de nombreux accords de paix.

Mots-clés : Résolution de Conflit. ONUCI. Opération de paix. Négociation.

## LIST OF GRAPHS

Graph 1 - Ivorian population by ethnic groups in 2014.....	54
Graph 2 - Côte d'Ivoire religious affiliation (2014) .....	56
Graph 3 - Population by ethnicity (%) 1998 -2014.....	59
Graph 4 - Population by religion (%) 1998 -2014 .....	60
Graph 5 - Côte d'Ivoire urban-rural population (%) 1975 – 2014 .....	77
Graph 6 - The population of the city of Abidjan by commune – 2014 .....	86
Graph 7 - 2010 2nd round Presidential election results (%) in Côte d'Ivoire .....	206
Graph 8 - Côte d'Ivoire: Number of Deaths from 1995 to 2018 .....	231
Graph 9 - Côte d'Ivoire: Number of Deaths from 2002 to 2018 .....	232
Graph 10 - Côte d'Ivoire one-Sided Violence from 2002 to 2018 .....	233
Figure 1 - Ripeness Theory .....	34
Figure 2 - UN Peacebuilding Triangle .....	265

## LIST OF BOARDS

Board 1 -	Indicators of effectiveness and phases of conflict .....	49
Board 2 -	Ivorian citizens according to ethnic groups (%) – 1998 .....	56
Board 3 -	Percentage distribution of the resident population by religion according to nationality .....	59
Board 4 -	Structure (%) of the resident population by religion according to the place of residence 1998 .....	59
Board 5 -	Summary table of forces and main political actors in Côte d'Ivoire since 1999 .....	97
Board 6 -	Factors and Elements of the Ivorian conflict ripeness .....	114
Board 7 -	Subjective and Objective criteria for LMA mediation .....	122
Board 8 -	Conditions for a successful conclusion of the negotiations .....	134
Board 9 -	Different Agreements in the Ivorian conflict resolution .....	166
Board 10 -	Core Goals .....	241
Board 11 -	Non-Traditional Goals .....	247
Board 12 -	Peacebuilding Goals .....	250
Board 13 -	Meaning in peacebuilding terminology .....	279



## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Illustration 1 - Cote d'Ivoire's December 20.....	50
Illustration 2 - Côte d'Ivoire Ethnical groups .....	53
Illustration 3 - Ethnical Origin .....	55
Illustration 4 - July 2000 referendum result .....	83
Illustration 5 - 22 October 2000 presidential election results .....	85
Illustration 6 - December 2000/January 2001 Legislative Election results .....	89
Illustration 7 - March 2001 Municipal election results .....	91
Illustration 8 - UNOCI's deployment in 2004 .....	177
Illustration 9 - UNOCI deployment in 2010 .....	207
Illustration 10 - Côte d'Ivoire Population Movements and violences .....	213
Illustration 11- The Abidjan's battle in 2011.....	219
Illustration 12 - UNOCI's deployment in 2015 .....	234
Illustration 13 - UNOCI's deployment 2017 .....	235

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

ADO -	Alassane Dramane Ouattara
APWE -	Alliance du Peuple Wê
AU -	African Union
BCEAO -	Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest
CC –	Constitutional Council
CDVR -	Commission Dialogue Vérité et Réconciliation
CEI -	Comission Electorale Independente
CNE -	National Electoral Commission
CNO -	Centre Nord Ouest
CNS -	Conseil National de Sécurité
CURDIPHE -	Cellule universitaire de recherche et de diffusion des idées et des actions politiques du président Henri Konan Bédié.
DDR -	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DPKO -	Department of Peacekeeping Operation
ECOFORCE -	ECOWAS Peace Force in Côte d’Ivoire
ECOMICI -	ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
ECOWAS -	Economic Community Of West African States
EU -	European Union
FANCI -	Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire
FESCI -	Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire
FLGO -	Front de Libération du Grand Ouest
FN -	Forces Nouvelles
FNCI -	Forces Nouvelles de Côte d’Ivoire
FNCI -	Forces Nouvelles de Côte d’Ivoire
FPI -	Front Populaire Ivoirien
FRCI -	Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire
GDP -	Gross Domestic Product
HKB -	Henri Konan Bédié
IB -	Ibrahim Coulibaly
ICC -	International Criminal Court
IEC -	Independent Electoral Commission
IMF -	International Monetary Fund

IWG -	International Working Group
LMA -	Linan-Marcoussis Agreement
LMP -	La Majorité Présidentielle
MEO -	Mutually Enticing Opportunities
MHS -	Mutual Hurting Stalemate
MINUCI -	Mission des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire
MJP -	Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix
MPCI -	Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire
MPIGO -	Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest
NATO -	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSC -	National Security Council
NU -	Nations Unies
OCHA -	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OIF -	Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie
ONU -	Organisation des Nations Unies
OPA -	Ouagadougou Peace Agreement
OUA -	Organisation de l'Unité Africaine
PDCI -	Partie Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire
PIT -	Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs
PKO -	Peacekeeping Operations
R2P -	Responsibility to Protect
RDA -	Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
RDR -	Rassemblement Des Républicains
RHDP -	Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix
RTI -	Radiodiffusion Télévision Ivoirienne
SGSR -	Secretary General Special Representative
UEMOA -	Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine
UN -	United Nations
UNAMSIL -	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP -	United Nations Development Program
UNMEE -	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIL -	United Mission in Liberia
UNMISMA -	United Nations Mission in Mali
UNOCI -	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

UNSC -	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR -	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UPRGO -	Union Patriotique pour la Résistance du Grand Ouest
USA -	United States of America
WB -	World Bank

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>1.</b>	<b>CONFLICTS SETTLEMENT, RESOLUTION AND TRANSFORMATION ..</b>	<b>24</b>
1.1	<b>Nature and psychological aspect of the conflict .....</b>	<b>25</b>
1.2	<b>Negotiation in conflict resolution .....</b>	<b>29</b>
1.2.1	<u>Different stages of a negotiation .....</u>	<u>31</u>
1.2.2	<u>Ripeness theory .....</u>	<u>33</u>
1.3	<b>Peace agreement, implementation and conflict transformation .....</b>	<b>38</b>
1.3.1	<u>Peace agreement and its implementation .....</u>	<u>39</u>
1.3.2	<u>Conflict transformation .....</u>	<u>41</u>
1.4	<b>Evaluating peace missions .....</b>	<b>45</b>
1.5	<b>Conclusion .....</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>2.</b>	<b>THE ORIGINS OF THE IVORIAN CRISIS .....</b>	<b>50</b>
2.1	<b>Côte d’Ivoire after 1960 .....</b>	<b>51</b>
2.1.1	<u>Ethnical groups and Regions .....</u>	<u>52</u>
2.1.2	<u>Côte d’Ivoire’s religious geography .....</u>	<u>57</u>
2.1.3	<u>The Ivorian miracle .....</u>	<u>61</u>
2.1.4	<u>Social and land crisis .....</u>	<u>64</u>
2.2	<b><i>Tu sais qui je suis? The ivoirité concept</i> .....</b>	<b>67</b>
2.2.1	<u>The birth of the concept of <i>ivoirité</i> .....</u>	<u>68</u>
2.2.2	<u>The explosion of the <i>ivoirité</i> bomb .....</u>	<u>71</u>
2.2.3	<u>The political impact of <i>ivoirité</i> .....</u>	<u>75</u>
2.3	<b>The 1999 coup d’état and the second Republic in Côte d’Ivoire .....</b>	<b>78</b>
2.3.1	<u>1999 coup d’état .....</u>	<u>79</u>
2.3.2	<u>Côte d’Ivoire post 1999 .....</u>	<u>81</u>
2.4	<b>The difficult way out of the crisis .....</b>	<b>86</b>
2.4.1	<u>The unfortunate timing of the 2000 legislative elections .....</u>	<u>87</u>
2.4.2	<u>A country in turmoil .....</u>	<u>90</u>
2.4.3	<u>The press role in the Ivorian crisis .....</u>	<u>94</u>
2.4.4	<u>They had been warned... ..</u>	<u>97</u>
2.5	<b>Conclusion .....</b>	<b>99</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>AGREEMENTS IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE PEACE PROCESS .....</b>	<b>102</b>

3.1	<b>ACCRA I and LOME Peace Agreement as emergency plans for the Ivorian crisis</b>	103
3.1.1	<u>ACCRA I to De-Escalate the Ivorian crisis</u>	103
3.1.2	<u>From Accra to Lomé: good neighbourly negotiations</u>	106
3.2	<b>No more fun, let's get down to business</b>	111
3.2.1	<u>Linas-Marcoussis</u>	112
3.2.2	<u>Deadlock after LMA</u>	116
3.3	<b>ACCRA II Agreement</b>	123
3.3.1	<u>From Competition to Cooperation</u>	124
3.3.2	<u>Legal and political aspects of the agreements</u>	128
3.4	<b>A peace process in difficulty</b>	130
3.4.1	<u>The Spoilers in the Ivorian peace process</u>	131
3.4.2	<u>A Peacekeeping operation to save the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement</u>	135
3.5	<b>ACCRA III or the summit of the last chance</b>	138
3.5.1	<u>A ripeness for salvation in Côte d'Ivoire</u>	139
3.5.2	<u>After rain the good weather?</u>	141
3.6	<b>Pretoria I and II</b>	145
3.6.1	<u>From Abidjan to Pretoria</u>	146
3.6.2	<u>The difficult way out of the crisis</u>	150
3.7	<b>Côte d'Ivoire: once upon a time eight years conflict</b>	152
3.7.1	<u>The Storm before the Tsunami</u>	153
3.7.2	<u>Ouagadougou Agreement</u>	156
3.7.3	<u>Religion and Ethnicity in Negotiations</u>	160
3.7.4	<u>Summary</u>	165
3.8	<b>Conclusion</b>	167
4	<b>UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE</b>	169
4.1	<b>United Nations Peacekeeping Operation</b>	170
4.1.1	<u>The different UN peace operations</u>	170
4.1.2	<u>The creation of the UNOCI</u>	173
4.2	<b>UNOCI mission: between contestation and legitimisation</b>	178
4.2.1	<u>UNOCI or a vision of neocolonialism</u>	178
4.2.2	<u>UNOCI as a legitimate mission</u>	181
4.3	<b>UNOCI to retrieve peace in Côte d'Ivoire</b>	185
4.3.1	<u>UNOCI from 2004 to 2010</u>	185

4.3.2	<u>The 2010 presidential elections</u> .....	200
4.4	<b>Conclusion</b> .....	208
5	<b>UNOCI AFTER THE 2010'S ELECTION</b> .....	210
5.1	<b>The Ivorian Civil War and the end of UNOCI's mission</b> .....	210
5.1.1	<u>The post-electoral crisis of 2011: a hymn to decadence</u> .....	210
5.1.2	<u>UNOCI: between satisfaction and scepticism</u> .....	221
5.2	<b>The Diehl-Druckman framework to evaluate peacekeeping missions</b> .....	236
5.2.1	<u>Core Goals of peacekeeping</u> .....	236
5.2.2	<u>Non-Traditional Goals</u> .....	241
5.2.3	<u>Peacebuilding Goals</u> .....	247
5.3	<b>Analysing ONUCI impact in the resolution of Ivorian crisis</b> .....	251
5.3.1	<u>ONUCI and the negotiation phase</u> .....	251
5.3.2	<u>ONUCI in the conflict resolution</u> .....	259
5.3.3	<u>UNOCI and the Ivorian conflict transformation</u> .....	263
5.4	<b>Rethinking peace operations in the 21st century</b> .....	266
5.4.1	<u>Peace missions or states "fixing": the blurred line</u> .....	267
5.4.2	<u>ONUCI: an atypical case</u> .....	276
5.5	<b>Conclusion</b> .....	280
	<b>FINAL CONSIDERATIONS</b> .....	282
	<b>REFERENCES</b> .....	288

## INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims at analysing the impact of UNOCI in the Ivorian conflict resolution based upon three phases: 1) the **negotiation** phase, characterised by the presence of a **ripe moment** for negotiation and the perception of this moment by the warring parties (or even the persuasion of the parties by an external actor that a ripe moment is in place), 2) the **resolution** phase, defined by the identification of the **causal factors** behind the conflict and the pursuit of **ways** to deal with them, and 3) the **transformation** phase, marked by modification of the destructive **consequences** of conflict and **improving** relationships and social structures.

First and foremost, it is important to acknowledge that my interest in this topic derives from the fact that I was born and raised in Côte d'Ivoire and I lived during years in a city called Dabou near Abidjan. I am Christian and almost all my friends were Muslim. In September 2002, I was in Bouaké to prospect faculties at the University of Bouaké. On 19 September 2002, Bouaké was attacked by dissidents claiming a coup d'état. The strike in the city left several civilians and soldiers dead. This failed coup d'état became a rebellion which divided the country from centre to north and south. Several people, including myself, were forced to leave the city, which became the capital of the rebellion. The failed coup created a massive internally displaced people problem in Côte d'Ivoire and therefore a humanitarian crisis.

The choice of Côte d'Ivoire as an object of study is justified by these events and, above all, by the fact that peace operation became crucial for the stability in West Africa and Africa in general. Most of the UN peace missions are taking place in Africa. By discussing an example of a UN peace operation in Africa, the thesis proposes to contribute to enrich the academic debates on the importance of peace missions in the contemporary world and on new forms of conflict. Scholars like Sandra Nutley et al. (2003) offered a useful distinction between the conceptual use of research which “brings about changes in levels of understanding, knowledge and attitude,” and the instrumental use of research which “results in changes in practice and policy making” (NUTLEY et al., 2003). As a researcher in the peace mission area, we are important actors in peace processes, and we have to produce evidence-based research that will support empirically our importance, by providing reader, policymakers and practitioners with better knowledge about peace missions.

Security has always been a topic of great interest to great leaders, nations and academics studying International Relations<sup>1</sup> and the transformations of the international system. The issue

---

<sup>1</sup>International Relations (IR – upper case) is usually taken to mean the subject or academic discipline dedicated to the study and teaching of international relations.



of international security during the Cold War years was central to International Relations, but after the end of the Cold War, attention turned more to economics. The post September 11 saw the birth of new perceptions in relations to the use of force in International Relations. The considerable decrease of armed conflicts between States, the growing evolution of internal armed conflicts and the major refugee crisis resulting from these internal conflicts have made the security debate central in the academic environment (KALDOR, 2012). Kaldor (2012) pointed out that some studies show a decline in what she calls the “old wars” – that is, wars involving states in which, battle is the decisive encounter. In her central argument, Kaldor (2012) states that during the last decades of the 20th century a new type of organised violence developed, especially in Africa and Eastern Europe, which is an aspect of the current globalised era, and this type of violence was described as a “new war”.

Negotiations to achieve a peaceful solution to conflicts is one of the UN’s main concerns, and that is indeed its *raison d’être*. In this way, active participation of the UN is expected with regard to attempts at resolution of conflicts around the world. To this end, the organisation has several mechanisms, which have been improved over the years, in order to adjust the response of the UN to the different challenges. The number of peaceful conflict resolution operations is unquestionable, and the number of peacekeeping carried out by the organisation is also high. However, this does not mean effectiveness of action.

Many scholars wrote about these new wars and their consequences on the international stability. The high number of intra-state conflicts in Africa and the difficulties faced, both domestically and internationally, to their resolution led me to examine the matter further. I intend to analyse peace missions in Africa, especially United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire – UNOCI – and its impact on Ivorian conflict resolution. I assume that the complexity of resolving these conflicts does not lie in the absence of attempts to resolve the conflicts, but perhaps, in the lack of appropriate proposals to each situation.

For that purpose, *I propose to explore the role of the UNOCI regarding the phases of negotiation, resolution and transformation of the Ivorian conflict*. Emphasis will be placed on the negotiation and resolution phases, as these two phases offer effective indicators for analysis, while for the transformation phase I will highlight the efforts that have been made in this direction. *Particularly, I intend to examine the hypotheses that France and ONUCI mediation increased the warring parties’ disruptive conflictual behaviour in many ways. And that peacekeepers deployment can increase the resistance in applying political agreements if one of the warring parties think that the peacekeepers or one of the members of the multidimensional*

*mission are not impartial. To test our hypothesis, we carried out documentary research plus bibliographical research using peace operations and conflict resolution literature.*

Subsequently, this thesis comprehends one theoretical chapter. The first and theoretical chapter of this thesis discusses negotiations in conflict resolution and framework to evaluate peace missions. In this chapter some works were reviewed such as Zartman (1985, 1986, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2016), Bercovitch (1985, 1986, 1989, 1996), Touval (1982, 1995, 1999,), Druckman (1997), Touval and Zartman (1995), Kriesberg (2007a), Aggestam and Jönsson (1997), Diehl and Druckman (2010, 2012). The main objective is to highlight the different steps of a negotiation and to address the mechanisms used to achieve better results in negotiation. For that, I used Zartman ripeness theory because it explains how and when warring parties can start to negotiate with successful prospects. Also, I bring back Diehl-Druckman framework to evaluate ONUCI since this framework offers consensus between practitioners and scholars about peace mission “success” and “failure”. Finally, the chapter discusses “effectiveness indicators” of conflict resolution efforts. In other words, the literature on conflict resolution and peace operations tends to highlight the presence of certain common characteristics in successful cases of conflict resolution and transformation. These characteristics are herein discussed and referred to as “effectiveness indicators” which will be contrasted to the negotiation, resolution and conflict transformation process in Cote d’Ivoire.

In addition to Zartman ripeness theory, I explore the psychological aspect during negotiation and the different phases of negotiation. Zartman theory helped us to understand why the Ivorian parties in conflict started negotiation in 2002. Negotiation is an important step on the way of resolving politically a conflict. Therefore, political conflict resolution and negotiation are linked. Using the best of both tools may have effective impact on international interventions in their attempt to resolve conflict.

The second chapter of the thesis is a historical chapter. In this section I have retraced the different political, social and economic events in Côte d’Ivoire since 1960 to 2002 year of the conflict outbreak. This chapter aims at explaining how Côte d’Ivoire found itself in a spiral of violent conflict. Aspects such as the Ivorian miracle, the land crisis, and the concept of “ivoirité” were discussed. This chapter help the reader to better understand the Ivorian crisis. The second chapter is crucial to analyse the resolution phase of the Ivorian conflict based on its effectiveness indicators. Also, this chapter points out the importance of the historical aspect in the implementation of peace mission and during the course of the negotiations. The chapter aims to show that desirable outcomes depend on context and that there is a difference between ideal and achievable goals.

Accordingly, the third chapter is about the different political agreements that were negotiated in the attempt to solve the Ivorian conflict. In this part, I apply Zartman ripeness theory to analyse the ACCRA I, II, III, Lomé, Pretoria I, II, LMA, and OPA negotiations. I discuss how the ripe moment play a crucial role in negotiating peace agreement. Druckman (1997) highlighted negotiation as the resolution of a puzzle. Game and decision theorists think of negotiation as a puzzle to be solved and recommend solutions based on the preferences of the parties. The main question for game theorists is, how do people make optimal choices when those choices depend on what other people do (DRUCKMAN, 1997). Negotiation is then a bargaining game where the opponents exchange concessions, and where the exchange is influenced by the initial situation. Zartman theory explains why and when this bargaining game start in the attempt to resolve the Ivorian crisis. The chapter underlines the role of UNOCI and international intervention in the different phases of Ivorian crisis negotiation.

Chapters four and five discuss more closely UNOCI and its peacekeeping mandate as well as its role in the resolution of the Ivorian conflict. This chapter traces the impact of the UN mission on the Ivorian crisis. The different resolutions that define UNOCI's mandate have been analysed in in the attempt to identify the presence of the effectiveness indicators suggested by the literature on conflict resolution. The content of the meetings, the draft resolutions and also the debates at the Security Council were the subject of a detailed analysis. These chapters underline the role of UNOCI as peacekeeper and as a conflict resolution actor. The objective here is to find out a possible difference between keeping peace and resolving conflict, or a blurred line between these two aspects. In the chapter five I analyse the impact of UNOCI on Ivorian crisis linking negotiation, resolution and conflict transformation effectiveness indicators with core, non-traditional and peacebuilding goals.

It is important to point out that, in the thesis, the word France is used to talk about France's external policies, diplomacy and politics in general. France here do not represent the whole population of the country neither the acts of the French politicians. France was used as an extension to say Quai d'Orsay and presidents Jacques Chirac or Nicolas Sarkozy. And sometimes to refer to France behaviour as formal coloniser and presence in Africa.

## 1. CONFLICTS SETTLEMENT, RESOLUTION AND TRANSFORMATION

In the current use, conflict management and conflict resolution are interchangeable in the media and scholarly analyses (KRIESBERG, 1997). The two processes goals are to stop ongoing violence and preventing its onset or renewal by achieving what is often termed “negative peace,” usually defined as the absence of violence – or war specifically. Contrarily conflict resolution goes slightly further, with a greater focus on “positive peace” as well (GREIG; OWSIAK; DIEHL, 2019). According to Goertz et al. (2016) the positive peace requires the end of violence, but also the achievement of social justice and the removal of the root causes of violence. Conflict resolution goes beyond conflict management since in its ideal form, it works to remove the issues under contention or the underlying bases of dispute from the relationship (BURTON, 1987).

Conflict management is also seen as the first step in the peace process; therefore, it is the precursor of conflict resolution. Conflict management create the conditions for conflict resolution fully achievement. Conflict management assumes that disputants share some common interest(s) in limiting the conflict and its effects (GREIG; OWSIAK; DIEHL, 2019) which leads to ceasefire agreement that creates a support for peacekeeping mission even if the underlying causes remain unresolved. In other word, conflict management creates an enabling environment for the easier implementation of conflict resolution.

Jeffrey Z. Rubin (1993) argued that for years, researchers and conflict theorists paid particular attention to the settlement process, which was perceived as the focal point of studies on the subject. The centrality of conflict resolution efforts on settlement was due to the perception it is able to change the behaviour of the parties involved, and that this phase is essential to the end of conflicts. In contrast, many scholars argue that the purpose of hostilities (RUBIN, 1993), i.e., the temporary solution of violent disputes, may not mean their definitive resolution. Herbert Kelman (1958), in his distinction between conflict settlement and resolution, highlighted three consequences of social influence: identification, internalisation and conformity. Thus, if the solution of the conflict implies observance – which would be the change of conduct, then the resolution of the conflict suggests internalisation – which would be a profound change in the underlying attitude as well as behaviour. The third consequence which is identification, serves as a bridge between a change of conduct and evolution of practice. It denotes a change of attitude which is based on the target of influence, valuing its relationship with the cause of the conflict (KELMAN, 1958).

In addition to settlement and resolution, there is also a third front of studies related to the idea of conflict transformation. In general, conflicting interests are not the only things at issue in conflicts, so conflicts last longer and are more deeply rooted than disputes. According to Brad Spangler (2003) to resolve a conflict, the solution must go beyond merely satisfying the interests of the parties, a relatively stable solution that identifies and deals with the underlying sources of conflict must be found. According to the same author, there are many reasons why the underlying causes of conflict may not be addressed. John Paul Lederach (1995) advocated the quest for conflict transformation, as opposed to “conflict resolution”. Conflict transformation is different from conflict resolution because it reflects a better understanding of the nature of conflict itself (LEDERACH, 1997). Conflict transformation, as described by Lederach, does not suggest that we simply eliminate or control conflict, but that we recognise and work with its dialectical nature (LEDERACH, 1997).

This chapter will be dedicated to discussing conceptual elements related to the nature of conflicts and the means employed to resolve and transform them. These elements will support the analysis of the effectiveness of efforts to negotiate a political way out to the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.

### **1.1 Nature and psychological aspect of the conflict**

Conflict, whether in social life, at the national or international level, is frequent and persistent. It can come to an end in various ways: with mutual agreements, and sometimes with short or long-term impositions. In some cases, groups of individuals want definitive peace; others seek individual and collective freedom, while others expect justice or equality. In some instances, one party seeks recognition or acceptance of its superiority over other group members. Louis Krisberg (1992) sees two groups of conflicts: one that results in agreements, and other that leads to a partial solution between adversaries-and this partial solution can result in a resumption of hostilities and also in increased animosity between the parties. The first would be the case of the US-USSR conflict for years, and the second would be the Arab-Israeli conflict (KRIESBERG,1992).

This research assumes that conflict is part of social life; it intervenes between organisations, communities, social classes and generally between countries. The conflict situation is usually seen in opposition to the period of peace, and as a perfect opposite, each is defined in terms of the absence of the other. On the other hand, in contrast to the idea that peace

and war would be two separate conditions, Karin Aggestam and Christer Jönsson (1997) understand “war and peace” as a continuous process of negotiation. They examined how the parties to the conflict negotiate to (re)build relations in the post-agreement phase, understanding that the end of the conflict does not stem from merely signing a peace agreement. The possibility of a resumption of hostilities remains, especially at the beginning of the implementation of peace agreements (AGGESTAM; JÖNSSON, 1997).

Conflict in its internal or international dimension must be conceived as a process in which collective, human needs and fears are expressed powerfully and violently. This type of conflict is the consequence of non-compliance or the threat of non-compliance with the basic needs of the individual, a group of individuals or the whole community. The requirements at this point do not refer only to the material aspect, but to a set of elements essential to human well-being and development, particularly psychological needs such as identity, security, recognition, autonomy and justice (KELMAN, 1999).

On the African continent, relations between state and society have become increasingly conflicting, and the causes lie in the fact that African plurinational communities have survived the destruction of their original state models to be subjected to a caricature of the Western State (ATCHE, 2008). A situation that gives rise to several identity crises rooted in the collective needs and fears of the groups that make up society. It is from this perspective that political-military organisations initiate protests that usually end in violent confrontations between different social groups in the name of their identity, religion or culture. Historical data show that most conflicts in Africa are the result of movements between ethnic groups or groups from different regions<sup>2</sup>. Ethnic groups, national groups and states are among the collectivities that serve as means for the protection and fulfilment of fundamental needs (KELMAN, 1999).

A critical element related to basic needs in situations of intergroup conflict is the fear of denial of these needs – fear focused, for example, on security threat or identity. Such fear, in a prolonged conflict between different identity groups, is an existential issue and can turn conflict into a struggle for survival. The conflict between Israel and Palestine is an example of a struggle for survival where each group sees its existence at stake in the conflict (KELMAN, 1987). Identity, security and other elements are as important as others. Fear and concerns about their survival are important causal factors in intergroup, internal and international conflicts.

The causes of conflicts usually combine objective and subjective (KELMAN, 1999) factors, and these factors determine the nature of the conflict. The emergence of a conflict may

---

<sup>2</sup>In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, dissidents occupying part of the territory claimed that they took up arms to repair the injustices suffered by the collectivities in the north of the country.

be for territorial reasons, it may be linked to natural resources, or it may be a disagreement between the interests of groups. Over time, the social-psychological aspect of conflict has begun to be theorised concerning international conflict. The exploration of the socio-psychological dimension of international politics started in the early 1930s (KELMAN; BLOOM, 1973). Thus, a new form of conflict resolution practice based on socio-psychological principles has grown in recent years. The approach is derived from the work of pioneer John Burton (1969, 1979 and 1984). Kelman (1999) stated that socio-psychological analysis provides a lens to see international relations in general and international conflict in particular. However, the author says that he does not intend to defend the socio-psychological theory of international relations or international conflict as an alternative theory in the area of International Relations (KELMAN, 1999). According to Kelman (1999), psychological factors are part of international conflict and international relations in general, so any theory that does not take into account psychological processes on the individual or collective level is then incomplete.

Rubin J. (1993) addressed the psychology of the situation, as well as the interaction between person and situation since such interaction takes place in the field of international negotiation. The transition between the psychological studies of conflicts to focus on the importance of negotiation happened gradually in the past decades (RUBIN, 1993).

The socio-psychological approach suggests some proposals on the nature of the international conflict that can be adapted for the study of internal conflicts. The first argues that international conflict is a process driven by collective needs and fears, rather than being entirely a product of rational calculation and objective national interests on the part of decision-makers (RUBIN, 1993). This statement can be applied to internal conflict as it usually stems from the collective actions of certain groups claiming their collective rights and needs to assert themselves or sometimes their fear of being dominated by the other. The second argues that international conflict is an inter-social process, not just an interstate or intergovernmental phenomenon (RUBIN, 1993). To bring this statement into the framework of internal conflict, we can state that conflict is an expression of social relations that are, in general, conflicting. In Africa, for example, internal conflicts are the result of profound antagonisms between relevant social categories. The social aspect plays a significant role in the emergence of conflict on the continent. At the origin of these socio-historical factors, we can note the failure of the post-colonial state translated by the contestation of “wanting to live together”. It is essential to say that there is a profound disagreement between nations – in the case of Africa, it is the ethnic groups – and citizens about the fundamental values of the collectivity (ATCHE, 2008).

This diversity of values becomes vital in the analysis of the behaviour of the actors in the conduct of negotiations in case of conflict. The psychological aspect of the individual is important to understand the very nature of the conflict. In this way, the socio-psychological perspective enriches the analysis of international relations as well as intra-state relations at various levels: by conceiving a conflict – internal or international – as a dynamic process, shaped by changing interests and relationships between the conflicting parties.

Essential elements such as interests, alternatives to an agreement, creation and claiming of value, and movements to transform the game itself, are present in negotiations with different structures and procedures. Simply, the negotiation should involve parties in a bilateral meeting to have a unique outcome (RUBIN, 1993). The general interest in negotiation for proponents of the psychological approach concerns the question of how people negotiate, so the psychological approach is clearly and unequivocally concerned with process issues (RUBIN, 1993).

A negotiation is then an act that takes place between two or more participants, it is an interaction, and the analysis of this interaction may prove to be a complicated task. For example, when analysing a proposal exchange during a negotiation between two players, we will not only take into account the proposal of player X and the reaction that such a proposal generated in player Y. Instead, we will also consider to what extent the offer of X was caused by previous offers (by both X and Y). If the analysis of the interaction between parties becomes complex, it opens the door to examine the relationships not only between two protagonists but between different members of larger groups of the dyad (RUBIN, 1993).

In the area of economics, people use to study the effects of conflict resolution and negotiation on a current divergence of interest. Academics of the psychological approach, on the other hand, focus on the divergence of interests as it is subjectively experienced. Thus, it is not the current difference that leads the parties to act in a certain way, but the perceived differences. According to the proponents of the psychological approach, perceptions, beliefs and assumptions that the protagonists bring to the struggle matters rather than any difference (RUBIN, 1993).

Kelman (1979), in his approach to the importance of psychology in negotiation, stated that the most important thing is not changing behaviour, but changing perception and attitudes towards conflict. Kelman (1979, p 298) wrote: “the only claim of the approach is precisely that it is able to promote changes at the system level by producing changes in individuals, that is, changes in politics through changes in individual perceptions and attitudes”. The learning approach to conflict resolution states that negotiation and conflict resolution are learning



processes in which antagonists acquire new beliefs and behaviour to adapt to changing realities and perceptions of an opponent (RUBIN, 1993).

The psychological aspect becomes essential for our analysis of the periods before, during and after conflict because it will be useful to know how the psychological disposals of the parties were to negotiate, and whether the international negotiation process takes into considerations those arrangements in the pre, during and post negotiation phases. It will be also important to know at what extent negotiations in the Ivorian peace process have taken into account the demands of the latter.

## **1.2 Negotiation in conflict resolution**

According to Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, negotiating "is maintaining relations to reach an agreement, talking with a view to an agreement" (DRUCKMAN, 1997). There is a wide variety of circumstances that happen in a negotiation. The negotiation may have a bilateral form as was the case between the US and the USSR over the 1948-49 Berlin blockade, between Khrushchev and Kennedy over Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, between Carter and Khomeini over American hostages in Iran in 1979-80. Sometimes this negotiation can take place between more than two nations, or between two blocs as was the case between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact in the 1970s on the mutual and balanced reduction of forces. Negotiations can be multilateral when representatives of different nations meet to discuss regional, continental or global issues. Examples of such negotiations include the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Montreal Protocol on the destruction of the ozone layer, and the Rio de Janeiro Declaration on the Protection of the Environment (DRUCKMAN, 1997).

It is noticeable that the negotiation has numerous forms that can be an exchange of communication at a distance or in-person and occur between representatives of two or several nations in the bilateral, trilateral or multilateral scenario. Negotiation can also take place between representatives of two or several parties in conflict, as is the case in internal conflict or civil war. Whether it is a negotiation in the international context or the national context, four significant approaches stand out in the negotiation literature, and these approaches are different in terms of their emphases and complexities. Still, they are also different concerning the particular processes on which they focus – movements and preferences, communication

processes, intra- and inter-organisational processes, and the international diplomatic policy system (DRUCKMAN, 1997).

The first approach that Druckman (1997) highlighted is negotiation as the resolution of a puzzle. Game and decision theorists think of negotiation as a puzzle to be solved and recommend solutions based on the preferences of the parties. The main question for game theorists is, how do people make optimal choices when those choices depend on what other people do (DRUCKMAN, 1997). Another type of problems related to negotiation is decision making in a situation of uncertainty in a position of non-competitiveness and non-interaction. For this, an approach is known as “decision analysis” has been developed that takes into account the element of uncertainty in the negotiation. Like game theory, decision analysis focuses on players’ preferences for alternative outcomes (DRUCKMAN, 1997).

The second approach that Druckman (1997) highlighted is negotiation as a bargaining chip. Another way of thinking about negotiation is at the end of a process influenced by the forces that promote or undermine agreements. Negotiation is then a bargaining game where the opponents exchange concessions, and where the exchange is affected by the initial situation. It is a descriptive approach whereby negotiation is a process by which the parties gradually move from their initial positions to the positions of others (DRUCKMAN, 1997). In their research on the bilateral bargaining monopoly, Siegel and Fouraker (1960) found that the best result is obtained when (1) there is a prominent ideal result; (2) there is complete information on the identification of the noticeable result; (3) each party has a veto power ensuring that the result is mutually acceptable; and (4) there are only two parties involved.

The third approach that Druckman (1997) highlighted is negotiation as organisational management. Organisational theorists see negotiation as a process of consensus-building among several constituent groups with shares in the result. It is a dynamic process consisting of “two or several” types of communication between negotiators, constituents, and leaders before and during inter-party negotiations. This concept turns negotiation into two – or multi – hierarchical processes, characterised as Putman’s (1988) two-level game: an intra-party – or domestic – negotiation takes place simultaneously with an inter-party – or international negotiation.

The final approach that Druckman (1997) highlighted is negotiation as diplomatic policies. This approach sees negotiation as another scenario for developing the international politics game. Thus, negotiations are microcosms of international relations, where parallel interactions or cross-links between various types of diplomatic activities influence each other. Generally, international negotiators are influenced by specific external events, and these

influences are only the logic that negotiations are embedded within a global system (DRUCKMAN, 1997). While the other approaches focus on the negotiation process, the latter focuses primarily on international policies around negotiation. For the international relations scholar, negotiation is a type of interaction between national representatives that impacts on relations between their nations. On the other hand, for the decision-maker, negotiation is just one element of several tools for the implementation and development of external policies (DRUCKMAN, 1997). It is important to stress that, despite the different aspects mentioned above, negotiation is a much longer process than it may seem.

### 1.2.1 Different stages of a negotiation

Crucial though it is, the negotiation itself<sup>3</sup> is only a later part of a broader process, necessary to resolve conflicts by peaceful means. In many cases, persuading the parties to a conflict to commit to a negotiated solution is even more complicated, time-consuming and difficult than reaching an agreement after negotiations have begun. Those who try to resolve a conflict peacefully need to think about ending a process that deals with obstacles to negotiations as well as difficulties in negotiation (SAUNDERS, 1991). Saunders<sup>4</sup> (1991) examines the pre-negotiation phase and looks for ways to encourage the parties to decide to commit to the negotiations. This observation applies to conflicts ranging from international to personal, from Arab-Israeli communication to marriage counselling. In particular, Saunders argues that understanding the pre-negotiation phase is crucial to a better understanding of the peace process. Moreover, given the number of intractable conflicts<sup>5</sup> in the world, it is indispensable to understand better how to initiate peace processes today. Saunders has drawn many of his examples from the Middle East peace process.

The main task of the pre-negotiation phase is to get the parties to commit to negotiating their differences. This task is accomplished mainly by identifying and removing obstacles to negotiation. There are several obstacles to negotiations. One obstacle is that parties to a conflict may be unable to organise themselves for negotiation. For example, there may be internal

---

<sup>3</sup>Here we are referring to negotiation when it takes place in a certain place, the space involving a person at a table fence.

<sup>4</sup>Saunders Harold was Director of International Affairs for the Kettering Foundation in Washington D.C., he served as assistant to the U.S. Secretary of State in West and South Asia from 1978 to 1981.

<sup>5</sup>It is a matter of intractable conflict, when despite all the efforts of parties involved and the international community, the conflict remains without solution or unresolved.

differences of opinion that make the group unable to organise and present a consistent set of interests. A related obstacle is the absence of a credible representative or spokesperson for the group (SAUNDERS, 1991). There can have several substantial barriers to the opening of negotiations, so the importance of defining the problem in question in the pre-negotiation phase. Parties may not be willing to negotiate because they have very different views on the nature of the problem. An essential step for the negotiations is to get the parties to agree on a standard definition of the problem. Without a common definition, the parties will only talk about each other. Even if the negotiations were to take place, they would probably be unproductive and would simply divert attention away from the task required to define the problem (SAUNDERS, 1991).

Another step is to get the parties to agree to negotiate. Before committing themselves to negotiations, leaders must reach certain conclusions. They must decide that continuing in the current situation is not in their interest. They must determine that some fair agreement is possible, i.e., each side must have some general idea of how an acceptable deal might look. Saunders (1991, p 66) notes that “a central element in judging that a just solution is possible is the perception that the ideal solution from each side is not achievable”. Leaders must believe that the other side will be willing to negotiate and that any distrust between the sides can be overcome (SAUNDERS, 1991). These psychological factors can represent a more significant obstacle to negotiation than substantive elements. The parties must decide that it is possible to resolve their dispute fairly, given the balance of power between the parties. When the balance of power is unequal, it may not be possible for the parties to negotiate a fair result (SAUNDERS, 1991).

According to Saunders (1991), the identification of substantive obstacles is a five-part process. First, we have to define the problem in question. The recognition of a common problem that the two parties share an interest in solving is almost a prerequisite for negotiation. Indeed, negotiation is sometimes defined as a shared effort to solve the problem. Second, it is crucial to commit to a negotiated agreement. Before the leaders negotiate, they must judge whether the negotiated solution would be better than continuing in the current situation, whether a fair agreement could be formed, whether the other party would accept it and whether the balance of forces would allow an agreement based on such a decision. Third, once the parties commit to negotiating, the final stage of pre-negotiation is to organise the negotiations to be held. The decision on these arrangements may in itself mean a mini negotiation. The parties must “define the objective of the negotiation to provide an agreement on the principles that will guide the drafting of an agreement” (SAUNDERS, 1991, p 68). They should agree on an overall strategy

for the negotiations. The parties should also make physical arrangements for the negotiations, such as setting a time and place, identifying participants or even deciding who will sit where. These physical arrangements can be politically sensitive (SAUNDERS, 1991).

After these three pre-negotiation phases, two more aspects should be highlighted – the negotiation phase itself, which is the most visible level of the peace process. Saunders (1991, p 69) argued that “negotiation appears as the last “part of a long political process, and pre-negotiation steps can take more time and effort than negotiation itself, and pre-negotiation must be conducted given the situation that will be created”. Finally, the implementation of the peace agreement, which is an integral part of the negotiation process. It is evident because the negotiation will not be considered successful until the parties reach an agreement, and that agreement is implemented (SAUNDERS, 1991). Therefore, before the parties begin negotiations, some elements need to be brought together.

### 1.2.2 Ripeness theory

According to Zartman (2016), there are two major approaches when it comes to the study and the practice of negotiation. One argues that the key to the successful resolution of conflict lies in the content of the proposals, the second that the success of the resolution lies in recognising the appropriate time to use the efforts in that direction (ZARTMAN, 2016).

Attempts to resolve conflicts on the African continent may sometimes seem useless. The difficulty lies in the very solutions proposed by the so-called “community” of conflict resolution, which in general, has a variety of purposes, interests and policies that are often full of ambiguities and contradictions. It is perhaps the reason why many African conflicts can be silenced but remain mostly unresolved (ACHANKENG, 2013). Although conflict resolution in Africa involves the participation of experienced peacemaking groups, using the best personal and recently developed knowledge of ways to manage and resolve conflicts, international and regional conflict management efforts have not been particularly effective or efficient in overcoming the reasons that have brought them to the continent (ZARTMAN, 2001).

Above all, the attempt to resolve conflicts must be based on the environment which includes the geographical delimitation of the conflict, the social and political history of the country, the roots of the conflict and the mentality of the belligerents. As Saunders (1991) pointed out, before starting a negotiation, it is essential to discuss the three phases of pre-negotiation to facilitate an eventual negotiation. The psychological element plays a

considerable role in the negotiation, so it should not be ignored when starting a negotiation process. It is therefore hard to believe that individuals, groups of people or thinkers in the comfort of their offices anywhere in the world, and in particular, in countries in the Centre, can solve problems of countries in the periphery about which they have no basic knowledge.

The absence of democracy on the African continent is considered to be the leading cause of the emergence of internal conflicts. However, it is essential to point out that the continent's colonial past and its Balkanisation cannot be concealed when referring to internal instability. According to Okoyo (1997), political instability is rooted in the very structure of society and, for most new African countries, in the colonial past. The author adds that Africa's post-colonial present was shaped for Africa by Africa's colonial history<sup>6</sup>. Ambassador Herman J. Cohen (1995) said that the modern African States was created by colonial powers from ethnic and regional diversities, making it conflictive by considerable inequalities in power relations, and in the unequal distribution of national wealth and development opportunities.

When a conflict is not anticipated and unfortunately arises, it is vital to bring a political solution to it. Furthermore, as a general rule, such a political solution goes through the negotiation phase. So, the question that arises is to know what lead the parties to the conflict to start negotiating? Zartman (2000) has developed a theory about the T moment, the right time to start negotiations during an armed conflict. This theory was called the "ripeness theory". The ripeness theory is designed to explain and identify the circumstances in which the parties to a conflict are likely, by their efforts or those of others, to resolve a conflict through negotiation. This notion of ripeness was crucial for policymakers seeking to mediate international disputes in the post-Cold War period (ZARTMAN, 2000). According to then US Secretary of State George Shultz (1988), the success of negotiations cannot be attributed to a particular chosen procedure, but to the willingness of the parties to explore opportunities, make fair and mutual concessions, and confront painful choices (ZARTMAN, 2016). Thus, ripeness would be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the start of negotiations, whether bilateral or mediated (ZARTMAN, 2016). Two perceptive elements are required to start negotiation: The Mutual Hurting Stalemates (MHS) and the perception by the parties that some way out to the conflict can be negotiated. A third structural element was added, and this structural element is the presence of a valid representative to conduct the negotiations. This idea was discarded in the


---

<sup>6</sup>OKOYO, M. Africa and political stability. *Africa*, Vol. 9, N° 74, 1977, p. 93-96. The colonial past, the decolonisation process, state-building and nation-building in post-colonial Africa impact on the causes and consequences of internal conflicts in Africa. The persecution of its interests has caused the coloniser to delimit borders without taking into account ethnic and religious barriers. The result is that Africa has become a real powder keg.

current reformulation because it deals with a structural component and, therefore, a distinct category from the other two elements. The verification of the ripeness indicators proposed by this theory will guide the analysis of the negotiation process.

The “ripe moment” concept is based on the parties’ perception of an MHS combined optimally with an imminent, past or recently avoided disaster (ZARTMAN, 2000). As Saunders (1991) noted, before any compromise with the negotiations, leaders must reach certain conclusions. They must decide that continuing in the current situation is not in their interest. From there, they can start a negotiation and must determine that some fair agreement is possible, i.e., each party must have some general idea of how an acceptable deal might look. Leaders must believe that the other party will be willing to negotiate and that any distrust between the parties can be overcome. This distrust can be overcome by the way the conflict is conducted and in the damaging situation in which the parties find themselves. The concept of the ripe moment is based on the notion that when the parties are locked in a conflict, in which they cannot achieve victory through the means employed at the moment, and combined with the existence of an impasse, – this impasse being painful for both, though not necessarily on equal terms or for the same reasons – they seek an alternative policy or a solution (ZARTMAN, 2000). If the parties to a conflict “(a) perceive themselves in an impasse and (b) notice the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for resolution – i.e., for negotiations to begin towards an agreement” Zartman (2016, p 79) stated. Such configuration will lead the parties to start a negotiation.

**Figure 1- The Ripeness Theory**



*Source: Self elaboration based upon Zartman ripeness theory*

According to Zartman (2016), the primary rationale behind MHS is a cost-benefit analysis based on the premise that when the parties to a conflict find themselves on a path that produces suffering, they prepare themselves to seek a more advantageous alternative. It is a calculation consistent with the notions of the rationality of Public Choice Theory and Prospectus Theory. Being a subjective issue, MHS can be perceived at any stage of the conflict, and nothing indicates that it occurs at the peak of the conflict or a high level of violence (ZARTMAN, 2016). Internal – and non-mediated – negotiations in South Africa between 1990 and 1994 constitute a remarkable case of negotiations initiated – and taken forward – from an MHS perceived by both parties based on the imminence of a catastrophe rather than the casualties recorded at that time (ZARTMAN, 1995).

Also, as Zartman (2000) pointed out, the ripe moment can be highlighted by a mediator or a third party when it does not seem immediately apparent to the parties themselves. The ripe moment is only a necessary condition, but not sufficient for the start of negotiations. It is not self-realizable or self-implemented and must be seized by the parties. With these two perceptive elements that are the perception by both parties of a negotiated outcome – and the perception that the other party is prepared and interested in rewarding the concessions – Zartman and Aurik call it “requitement” (ZARTMAN, AURIK, 1991). Attempts to resolve a conflict can be initiated, even though there is no specific solution, however the feeling that a negotiable solution is possible and that the parties share this feeling is crucial to entering into negotiations. In short, the conflict is ripe when there are (a) *subjective expressions of suffering, impasse and inability to meet the costs of escalation*; (b) *objective evidence of impasse* – such as data on the number and nature of casualties as well as on the material costs and/or other indicators of an MHS; and (c) *the perception that there is a negotiated way out* (ZARTMAN, 2016, p 83).

Different factors influence the ripeness of the conflict. These factors are in the elements of ripeness and the decision to negotiate. Thus, ripeness operates both as a dependent variable and as an independent variable. The objective elements (A) and persuasion (B) operate as independent variables, and MHS operates as a dependent variable. MHS (X) and perception of way out (Y) are the elements of ripeness that together lead to the negotiation decision (Z). In short  $A+B \rightarrow X$  and  $X+Y \rightarrow Z$ .

Zartman (2016) pointed out that it is crucial to conduct research and deepen intelligence on the ripeness of conflicts to ascertain whether their defining components exist at any time and whether they are or can be used by the parties or the mediator(s) to start negotiations. The purpose of such research would be, for example, to indicate which nation had a chance to mediate the conflict involving Eritrea and Ethiopia in the early 1980s and 1990s,



or the conflict in Southern Sudan in the early 1990s – even with the total absence of ripeness (DENG, 1995). Zartman (2016) elaborated a relationship between the mediators' tactics and the ripeness of the conflict in the following way: *(a) When ripeness occurs, mediators can use specific tactics to seize the moment and turn it into a negotiation. (b) If only the objective elements of ripeness are present, these tactics can be used to awaken in the parties to the conflict the feeling/understanding of the suffering linked to the stalemate, stimulating them to start negotiations.*

If on several opportunities, ripeness has not been used to start negotiations, there are cases in which it has been triggered. The notion of ripeness has been used and tested in negotiations in cases such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Eritrea, South Africa, Philippines, Cyprus, Iran-Iraq, Israel and Mozambique<sup>7</sup>. Mention explicit of the idea of ripeness from the MHS appears in some diplomatic memoirs such as the memory of Chester Crocker, assistant US Secretary of State for Africa between 1981 and 1989, in the mediation between Angola and South Africa to withdraw Cuban troops from Angola and South African troops from Namibia (CROCKER, 1992). Crocker (1992), in his conclusion, identified specific signs of conflict's ripeness, detailing the persistence of the status quo in Cuito Carnevale despite massive reinforcements from Cuba, which led to the transformation of the “non-collaborative climate” in December into a meeting at the end of January in which the “negotiation was about to change the situation definitively” (CROCKER, 1992, author's Griff). The same signs of ripeness were highlighted by Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Álvaro Soto at the UN in his mission to mediate the peace process in El Salvador. Moreover, in Yugoslavia, Secretary of State James Baker sought to identify a moment of ripeness in the conflict without success (ZARTMAN, 2016). In such a way, the moment of ripeness is a matter of instinct, perception and sensitivity.

However, there are some problems around ripeness theory. That refers to the complication with the notion of MHS when increased pain increases resistance rather than reduces it and leads to an escalation of violence. It should be remembered that while the ripe moment is a necessary precondition for negotiation, not every ripe moment leads to negotiation. As Saunders (1991) pointed out, negotiation can be initiated if the negotiated solution is to be better than continuing in the current situation. If a fair agreement could be formed, if the different parties would accept it, and if the balance of forces would allow an agreement based on such a decision. At this very moment of increased resistance, a party that is not part of the

---

<sup>7</sup>Cf. TOUVAL, 1982; HAASS, 1990; STEDMAN, 1991; AGGESTAM E JONSON, 1997; ZARTMAN, 1995; PRUITT, 1997.

conflict can take the initiative for intervention to mediate when the escalation of violence threatens international peace and security. Although ripeness is a simple idea, the theory needs to be refined. A careful study by Stedman in 1991 of Rhodesia's negotiations for independence points to how Zimbabwe has employed the concept in the complexities of the internal dynamics of conflict (ZARTMAN, 2016).

Another essential aspect, the expression escalation is generally used about the means of conducting conflict. It also refers to other elements of conflict behaviour, including ends and agents (RUBIN; PRUITT; KIM, 1994). When the means used are disproportionate to the conduct of conflict, or when the perpetrators have an attitude that appears to be genocide, extermination, execution, the UNSC may decide that the conflict has reached the ripe moment and requires either negotiation or military intervention. The notion of MHS is linked to the conduct of the conflict. In itself, the concept explains the difficulty of achieving preventive conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy, even if nothing in the definition of the concept requires it to occur at the peak of the conflict or a high level of violence. Members of the same community can discuss preventive resolution and preventive diplomacy. Expecting the conflict to reach a very high harmful impasse may seem irreversible for the community. The qualified time of ripe moment can be short or long term, and the damage can be irreparable.

### **1.3 Peace agreement, implementation and conflict transformation**

Negotiations to find a peaceful solution to conflicts is one of the UN's concerns as well as its main *raison d'être*. It is therefore not surprising to see active UN participation in the peaceful resolution of conflicts around the world. The UN has the role of monitoring international peace and security through different means at its disposal and enjoying the legitimacy it has achieved through its missions. Today, the UN's participation in attempting peaceful conflict resolution is indisputable because of the large number of peacekeeping operations. However, this does not mean practical actions since peace missions' implementation is variable from one place to another.

The existence of UN structures as a tool for making international agreements can be considered as a public good of an intermediate nature (FREUDENSCHUSS-REICHL, 2002). In this way, the different efforts that contribute to the effectiveness of the UN negotiation process can be seen as a direct contribution to the excellent provision of the global public good (FREUDENSCHUSS-REICHL, 2002). The UN then becomes a place of conflict resolution

through the production of agreements and also an intermediary public good. Negotiation comes in many forms and aspects, and we can explore various relationships between different negotiation formats in social and economic environments, and the effectiveness of the resulting agreements and their capacity to produce public goods.

Since the negotiation process is seen as a way to produce directly and exclusively public goods, it should have a strong involvement in sharing implementation costs. Furthermore, it is these implementation costs that make the negotiation process difficult since each party must commit itself in a certain way to this production of public goods. A concrete example to illustrate is the Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD) energy negotiations that were concluded in April 2002.

After reaching an agreement through negotiation, comes the slightly more delicate part of implementing the agreement. A negotiation will be considered successful when the agreements resulting from this negotiation have been applied. In various circumstances, the parties reach an agreement that they can never finally implement, and such difficulty reminds us of the importance of the willingness of the conflicting parties to want an agreement and the feasibility of such an agreement. As a general rule, one of the parties may feel harmed when implementing an agreement following a negotiation process. The international environment itself can have an impact on the implementation of a peace agreement. In addition to the difficulty of implementing peace agreements, the transformation of the conflict becomes a significant challenge for the parties signing the agreement. For an agreement to lead to lasting peace, it has to take into account the social components that led to the conflict, to provide transformation and not just conflict resolution.

### 1.3.1 Peace agreement and its implementation

The appropriate time to start negotiations to end an international conflict depends, at least in part, on the general state of international relations. The general state or context refers to the general conditions of the international system, including the relationships between the parties to the conflict and third parties; and the specific relations between the parties to the dispute (HOPMANN, 1991). The international environment should not only be “ripe” for starting formal negotiations but also and most importantly, should be “ripe” for these negotiations to proceed productively in the conflict resolution process (HOPMANN, 1991). It

is an analysis that focuses on the conditions of the international environment that favour the opportunities to resolve a long-standing conflict through negotiation or that bring negotiations with successful conclusions (HOPMANN, 1991). In non-international conflict too, these environmental conditions are significant for starting negotiations. The changes observed in the behaviour of the parties, the deadlock in the conflict, the social changes are elements to be taken into consideration in the negotiation initiative.

Although the international environment may favour the initiative of negotiation, we can address another factor that may be an essential element in starting a negotiation, the relationship between the parties to the conflict at the time of starting negotiations. In some conflicts, we have been able to observe a de-escalation of confrontations after months of crisis. This de-escalation may be the consequence of the diminution of divergences or the near disappearance in social, political or economic terms of the object of discord. In this case, the environment and the relationship between the parties will favour an initiative for negotiation. Therefore, a change in the relationship between the parties to the conflict is a necessary element to proceed to the negotiation. Another aspect is the change in the internal environment which may favour the resolution of the conflict. In this way, the agreement resulting from such negotiations can be easily implemented.

Subsequent agreements in the negotiations must be fair to both adversaries, at no time should either party to the conflict feel aggrieved. The agreement should reflect the wishes of the opponents to facilitate its implementation. For example, political differences between the parties should be resolved before negotiating disarmament. It is a crucial element in implementing an arms control agreement. Weapons are seen as symptoms of this political conflict, so they cannot be withdrawn while fundamental disagreements remain unresolved.

On condition of relative relaxation of tensions, negotiators are more relaxed and more open with each other. It is a situation that seems to favour more a resolution of the problem than a negotiation that appears to be confrontational. The more relaxed relations with the parties negotiator are, the more support negotiators will have within their respective groups and even from the public in general (HOPMANN, 1991). The de-escalation is easier when domestic factors such as basic political processes, cycles, public opinion, elites and interest groups are favourable to negotiation. The fruits of these negotiations can be implemented without significant difficulties.

As we said above, war and peace are generally seen as two separate conditions: the presence of one justifying the absence of the other. Carl von Clausewitz said that war is the continuation of politics by other means (CLAUSEWITZ, 1984). The authors Karin Aggestam

and Christer Jönsson (1997) adopted a perspective that emphasises continuity rather than on the discontinuity between war and peace. The two authors in their article have attempted to explore how parties to the conflict bargain to (re)build relations in the post-agreement phase. The risk of a resumption of hostilities remains high in the early stages of implementing a peace agreement. Thus, Aggestam and Jönsson (1997) argue that it is essential to study post-war bargaining issues for a better understanding of the end of war and conflict.

Aggestam and Jönsson (1997) identified four variables involved in post-war negotiation: (a) the timing of the end of the war, a variable explored in this chapter when discussing Zartman's ripeness theory<sup>8</sup> on the best time for stating peace negotiation; (b) leadership and domestic politics: political leaders are conditioned simultaneously on what the other party will accept, and what the local electorate will agree. This kind of "double-edged diplomacy" is very well illustrated by the two-tier game approach where political leaders are negotiating at the same time with domestic interest groups and the opposing party. This interaction determines the opportunities and constraints that political leaders may have (PUTMAN, 1993); (c) the (re)conception of the enemy's image and the (re)construction of relations. The persistence of the representation of the old enemy is one of the reasons for the failure of a peace agreement in its implementation phase. A new perception of the enemy will help facilitate the implementation of peace agreements in the post-conflict period; (d) the effectiveness of third-party intervention. Several mediation theories focus on the different strategies used by third parties to reach an agreement, but few of them pay attention to the post-agreement process. Third parties should, therefore, intervene to nourish the peace process since ripeness is a constructed and not inherited condition (AGGESTAM; JÖNSSON, 1997). Thus, the peace process will undergo a (re)construction of broken relations between the parties, hence the importance of continuing efforts to transform the conflict.

### 1.3.2 Conflict transformation

The transformation of conflict as reality has existed throughout human history, but as a field of study and practice only emerged in the early 1990s. The area incorporates some of the central ideas of the contemporary approach to conflict resolution but focuses attention on large-scale, protracted and destructive conflicts. The term refers both to processes of transition

---

<sup>8</sup>The ripeness theory of Zartman explained how the parties can start negotiating from the ripe moment principle.

to relatively non-destructive conduct – i.e., non-confrontational – to a relationship between adversaries that is mainly considered non-litigious (KRIESBERG, 2011). Kriesberg (2011) highlights two phases of conflict transformation. The first is the transition from destructive to constructive containment, often with a focus on ending widespread violence. The second phase refers to the formation of a lasting peaceful relationship, including the recovery from destructive conflict and the reduction of its underlying causes.

The final resolution of a conflict is not only about negotiating but also about transforming the conflict. It is crucial that after the negotiation and signing phase of a peace agreement, efforts are made to maintain this peace through a transformation of the conflict at different levels and new peacebuilding. The approaches of some International Relations theories are different from others about peacebuilding. In realism, peacebuilding refers to maintaining stability through hegemonic power and the preservation of interests. For idealism, peacebuilding is about achieving peace among nations based on the establishment of norms and standards and through a super-entity such as the UN, which can help in regulation and monitoring (PAFFENHOLZ, 2003a).

The School of Conflict Transformation focuses on a possible transformation of rooted armed conflicts into peaceful conflicts, based on a different understanding of peacebuilding. It has been suggested to replace the term “conflict resolution” with the term “conflict transformation” (RUPESINGHE, 1995, author’s emphasis). The conflict transformation approach emphasises the way of thinking and acting in an inclusive way to initiate and sustain transformations. It also emphasises the importance of the long term in achieving and maintaining conflict transformation efforts. Kriesberg (2011) emphasises two concepts in the field of conflict transformation. The first concept promotes reflection and integration of ideas and practices of conflict transformation, placing them in a broader context. The second concept promotes the dissemination and implementation of the latter in everyday practice. Limiting conflict transformation to only one of these concepts would unduly constrain and restrict its growth potential and importance. Nevertheless, merely merging them can have undesirable consequences.

John Paul Lederach developed the first comprehensive and widely discussed approach to conflict transformation in 1997. Lederach (1997) saw the need to resolve the dilemma between short-term conflict management and long-term building relationships, as well as addressing the underlying causes of conflict. He proposes to build “long-term infrastructure” for peacebuilding, supporting the potential for social reconciliation (author’s emphasis). From this perspective, Lederach (1997) sees the need to rebuild broken relationships by focusing on

reconciliation within society and strengthening the potential for peacebuilding in the community. For him, intervention by others should be concentrate on supporting internal actors and coordinating external peace efforts. According to Lederach (1997), we must take into account the sensitivity of local culture, and a long-term period is also necessary.

Lederach (1997) divides society into three levels, which can be addressed through different peacebuilding strategies. Higher-level leadership can be achieved through mediation at the State level – level 1 – and through the results-oriented approach. Intermediate-level leadership – level 2 – can be achieved through more resolution-oriented approaches, such as problem-solving workshops or peace commissions, and with the help of people from within the organisation, such as prominent individuals in society. The grassroots level – level 3 – represents the majority of the population and can be achieved through a wide range of peacebuilding approaches, such as local peace commissions, community dialogue projects or trauma healing (LEDERACH, 1997).

Building on a decade of work in the Horn of Africa, the Life and Peace Institute's conflict transformation adopts a bottom-up approach, based upon the community, extending Lederach's intermediate level approach to the grassroots level. This approach also combines peacebuilding in the country with the promotion of peacebuilding at the international level (PAFFENHOLZ; SPURK, 2006). The evolving field of the conflict transformation approach encompasses a continuum of constructive perspectives. On the one hand, there is a pragmatic perspective based on long-term self-interest, and on the other, there is a moral perspective based on inclusive and widely shared interest principles (KRIESBERG, 2011).

Gatelier (2014) states that conflict transformation completes and also criticises previous approaches to conflict management and conflict resolution. According to Gatelier (2014), conflict transformation differs from conflict management and conflict resolution in that this conflict transformation highlights the need for long-term structural, relational and cultural changes. For the author, before defining conflict transformation, it is essential to clarify the concept of conflict on which she relies. The conflict according to Gatelier (2014) is the manifestation of the multitude that compose society, and which naturally expresses itself through the same diversification of points of view, interests and objectives that can be contradictory and incompatible. The conflict is born from this incompatibility, and this fact is typical in the life of societies. This normality of the social phenomenon of conflict makes the action in this sense mandatory (GATELIER, 2014).

The conflict is then seen as a social phenomenon of rupture with a pre-established order, consequently, introduces a challenge, a request for social change. The transformation of

a conflict can then be defined as the set of social transformations indispensable to the resolution of the conflict. Conflict in this way would be considered as solved when the social changes that will transform perceptions – the cultural, relationships – the relational, and structures – structural, have been applied (GATELIER, 2014). Only these social changes can respond adequately to the demand for change expressed by the conflict. The process is not linear but can experience oscillations, regressions, possibly violent phases, because, as in all situations of contestation of the established order, the forces of resistance to change are numerous and in a position of domination. It explains why conflict is a generally painful process in which uncertainty about future prevails, and beliefs are weakened (GATELIER, 2014).

Depending on the nature of the conflict, violent or otherwise, these social transformations may concern the suppression of a system of injustice or discrimination, distribution of wealth, the conditions for political participation, access to resources. If we consider that the emergence of a conflict corresponds to the expression of the needs of the individuals who carry it, social transformations will have to be able to respond to it in order to consider the conflict resolved (GATELIER, 2014). Finally, these transformations are structural, since they affect the structure of the conflict – actors, context, institutions, resources, and it is by modifying this structure that it will be possible to resolve the conflict. Conflict transformation offers a new perception of the conflicted situation that foster conflict resolution because: (a) it constitutes the exploration of a third way, between two opposing antagonisms in the conflict; (b) it allows expressing oneself to all those interested in the conflict situation. Giving a speech is a form of power allocation; (c) it takes into account power relations, and the need for a redistribution of power relations to understand the structural causes of conflict; (d) it wants to transform a situation of antagonism/opposition between two or more actors by creating a sense of community that includes all those involved<sup>9</sup>.

In the context of this broad approach to conflict transformation, there are numerous analytical concepts and empirical results about social conflicts, and there are many tools and practices consistent with these thoughts. Many of these ideas and applications are examined in several recent books on conflict resolution and peacebuilding (BERCOVITCH; KREMENYUK; ZARTMAN, 2009; KRIESBERG, 2007a; RAMSBOTHAM; WOODHOUSE; MIAL, 2007).

---

<sup>9</sup>Cf GATELIER et al. 2014



## 1.4 Evaluating peace missions

The importance of using the literature of peace operations in conjunction with that of conflict resolution refers to the fact that, in the Ivorian case, it is impossible to dissociate conflict resolution from peace operations. The two go hand in hand because in the first instance the attempt to resolve the Ivorian conflict led to the creation of a peace operation. This peace operation then took over the resolution of the Ivorian conflict. It is therefore essential to make use, in the case of the Ivorian conflict, of the literature on peace operations and conflict resolution.

Since the end of the cold war, international peacekeeping missions have a special place in UN agenda due to the increasing number of intrastate conflicts. An increase which gave rise to different interpretation of peacekeeping mission. So, there is little systematic understanding of its appropriate application. Particularly important are understanding what these missions can accomplish and determining the extent to which they have, in fact, achieved these goals (DRUCKMAN et al., 1997). The evaluation of such peacekeeping mission is central on the debate between peace scholars and practitioners. It is therefore important to underline the concepts we can use to evaluate peacekeeping mission. Are there concepts of peacekeeping “success” or “failure” we can adopt for evaluation?

During an interview, five commentators did not agree on common working definitions of peacekeeping “success” or “failure”. Diehl, Durch, and Ratner emphasised criteria related to the mission’s mandate and its contribution to containing the conflict in the host State or region. And Fetherston and Johansen stressed the need for qualitative criteria and the contribution of peacekeeping to larger values such as world peace, justice, and the reduction of human suffering (DRUCKMAN et al., 1997). Diehl stated that the common definitions of success in the peacekeeping research are based on post hoc face validity. For him, an evident standard for evaluating success at the macrolevel would be to know if the purpose of the mission, as specified in its mandate, was fulfilled. He also added that it is important to consider specific accomplishments of the operation including the number of people fed, cease-fires achieved, etc., and criteria for success do not focus on what has been accomplished but on the manner in which it has been achieved (DRUCKMAN et al., 1997 apud DIEHL, 1997).

Fetherston noted the important point of conceptualising criteria to evaluate peacekeeping is to think about peacekeeping as a huge context of peacebuilding and conflict transformation (DRUCKMAN et al., 1997 apud FETHERSTON, 1997). According to Johansen, “success” and “failure” suffer for a lack of well definition or agreement by either

scholars or practitioners in this field resulting in an elastic and imprecise meaning that leads to analyses and conclusions that are not well reasoned. For him

scholars should define success in terms of making relative gains in realizing transcendent values such as world peace, justice, and a reduction in human suffering aggregated across all relevant groups in a conflict. Instrumental values, such as the economic efficiency of operations, should be evaluated in relation to the end values to be achieved and compared to the estimated costs, admittedly crude, of the alternative conflict dynamics that would be likely in the absence of peacekeeping. (DRUCKMAN et al., apud Johansen, 1997, p 154).

Durch pointed out the possibility and useful evaluation of peace operations however, there are sufficient variations in context and objective that no single set of criteria may be applicable to all. Therefore, criteria that scholars find important may not be that useful to practitioners and vice versa. Operations which contribute to the containment of conflict and the elimination of its underlying causes clearly would contribute to peace and stability within countries or regions (DURCH, 1997 apud DRUCKMAN et al., 1997). Ratner stressed that an abstract or noncontingent definition of peacekeeping success or failure is impossible by drawing four different and relative ways for evaluation: (1) comparison with the mission's mandate, (2) comparison with the results of other peacekeeping operations, (3) impact on the states concerned, and (4) impact on the United Nations or other implementing organization (DRUCKMAN et al., 1997).

The difficulty to find out a definition of peacekeeping success or failure between scholars and practitioners is a key element in evaluating peace operations. Evaluating peace operation can take into account different aspects depending on who is evaluating such mission. That creates a dynamic in peace missions' evaluation and allows a large scope of framework for analyse. Taking for example Ratner's four ways for evaluation, he noted that the first way may ignore exogenous factors that may have made a particular mission more or less able to accomplish its goals, the second does not consider the different mandates assigned to different operations, the third and the fourth ways are the most useful because they take into account each mission and its particularity.

To standardise the evaluation of peace missions Diehl and Druckman in their book *Evaluating Peace Operations* (2010) designed a framework. This book is rather an innovative framework for how to evaluate peace operations than a real support to UN peacekeeping's theory. The aim of this book is to remedy the lack of consensus between scholars and practitioners offering a base for UN peace operation analysis. Diehl and Druckman framework on its own way provides clear standards for assessing peace operation success.

For our analysis on the impact of UNOCI on the Ivorian conflict resolution the Diehl-Druckman framework is useful. Our overall scheme will be structured around three groups of objectives (goals), 1) traditional objectives or core goals; 2) new generation objectives or non-peacebuilding goals; and 3) peacebuilding objectives or peacebuilding goals. The aim here is to link core goals with negotiation phase, non-traditional goals to conflict resolution phase and peacebuilding goals with an outline of conflict transformation.

The pursuit of peace operation core goals is closely connected to the negotiation phase: for instance, the negotiation is often directed to ending violence; in turn, maintaining cease fires is a traditional goal of peace operations. On the other hand, the non-traditional goals are another way to deal with the root causes in conflict. For example, United Nations efforts to prevent conflicts, to achieve and maintain peace, and to assist in post-conflict reconstruction endeavours are characterised by the protection and promotion of human rights as essential elements. Many of the worst human rights violations and abuses are at the root of conflict situations and impunity and armed confrontation fuel new cycles of violations (UN, 2011). Human rights violation is in many cases source of conflict as illustrated by the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Also, compliance with human rights is important for peace.

Diehl-Druckman peacekeeping framework core goals are violence abatement which aims at reducing violence; conflict containment whose purpose is to prevent the spread of conflict and conflict settlement which relates to the resolution of disputes between the parties. As far as conflict settlement is concerned, the authors stressed that “not all operations have this goal”, therefore peacekeepers have limited influence in such area (DIEHL; DRUCKMAN, 2010, p 42). The non-traditional goals are election supervision, humanitarian assistance, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), democratisation, and human rights protection<sup>10</sup>. The peacebuilding goals are local governance, rule of law, local security and reconciliation.

## 1.5 Conclusion

Some different works and theories make it possible to understand the importance of negotiation in the political and/or peaceful resolution of interstate or intra-state conflict. The multiple approaches mentioned above make it possible to understand and analyse the

---

<sup>10</sup>Cf Bellamy and Williams 2012.

negotiation process in conflict resolution. The psychological approach aims to capture the behaviour, perception and feeling of several individuals during the negotiation phase to concentrate the efforts necessary to reach an agreement optimally. The negotiation should follow a particular procedure for greater efficiency to satisfy the negotiating parties, thus facilitating the implementation of the peace agreement. Negotiation is an essential part of the conflict resolution process, so it needs to be conducted carefully to avoid any form of resumption of hostilities. The different actors involved in the discussions should take into consideration all the data that may impede the implementation of agreements resulting from the negotiation.

Negotiation becomes the first stage of conflict resolution. So, for the analysis of the negotiation process in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, we will use Zartman's ripeness theory as a theoretical framework to be able to analyse and understand the different stages that led to the negotiations in the Ivorian conflict and the motivations of the parties behind these negotiations. However, this does not exclude the possibility of using the psychological aspect of the negotiation when necessary.

After the negotiation, another part becomes indispensable: the implementation of the peace agreement. This implementation depends mostly on how the negotiations were managed, and it also underpins the basis for conflict transformation. The implementation of the peace agreement must facilitate the transformation of the conflict at different levels and new peacebuilding. The conflict transformation approach could be used to analyse the impact of peace agreements and UNSC resolutions on the resolution of the Ivorian conflict. However, the end of UNOCI is still too recent to make such an analysis effectively. Nonetheless, this will not exclude an attempt to seek some post-conflict transformation points in Côte d'Ivoire.

The use of Zartman's ripeness theory will serve as a basis for the empirical analysis of the different peace agreements in a tentative resolution of the Ivorian crisis. Such analysis will allow underlining the key agreements in the Ivorian peace process and how these agreements impacted the resolution of the Ivorian crisis. The different steps for the agreement will, therefore, be analysed, and this dissertation will highlight the role of the regional and international organisation in the Ivorian peace process. Similarly, the analysis of UN resolutions, meeting minute, press releases, and official statements will show if ONUCI played an important role in the Ivorian conflict negotiation phase. Consequently, such analysis will allow us to know if ONUCI mandate and international intervention had a real impact in the resolution of the Ivorian crisis. Diehl-Druckman framework is a strong basis to evaluate UNOCI mandate and mission on the ground. The question to be asked is whether UNOCI impacted

Ivorian conflict resolution in the long, medium or short term or whether it was only a mission to contain the violence.

Thus, using this theoretical literature, this dissertation has developed effectiveness indicators in order to evaluate negotiations in Côte d'Ivoire. Beyond the negotiation phase, we will look for conflict resolution indicators such as identifying the causal factors behind the conflict and finding ways to deal with them. We also want to evaluate UNOCI through Diehl-Druckman framework. We resume these step in the following table.

### **Board 1 – Effectiveness Indicators and phases of conflict**

<b>Phases</b>	<b>Effectiveness Indicators</b>
Negotiation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ripe moment (Perception of impasse, Possible solution to the crisis, Existence of a valid spokesman)</li> <li>• Seizure of the parties or persuasion by an external actor</li> <li>• Pursuit of peace operations traditional goals</li> </ul>
Resolution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identification of the causal factors behind the conflict</li> <li>• Find ways of dealing with them</li> <li>• Achievement of peace operations non-traditional goals</li> </ul>
Transformation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Modification of the destructive consequences of conflict</li> <li>• Improving relationships and social structures</li> <li>• Peacebuilding goals</li> </ul>

After having exposed the different theoretical references of our research, we will proceed with a historical account that will allow us to better understand the Ivorian conflict as a whole. This chapter will facilitate an analytical reading on UNOCI and its mandate in relation to conflict resolution.

## 2 THE ORIGINS OF THE IVORIAN CRISIS

After its independence, and like most of its African compatriots, Côte d'Ivoire had the daunting task of meeting all the challenges faced by a state born of colonisation. After independence, several African countries plunged into civil wars and long-lasting crises. Côte d'Ivoire, for its part, had initially escaped the wave of violence that had struck post-colonial Africa. Often cited as a model of political stability from 1960 until the death of its “founding father”, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny<sup>11</sup>, Côte d'Ivoire was shaken by a coup d'état in the late 1990s and an attempted coup in the early 2000s.

Côte d'Ivoire's stability seems to have ended with “*le vieux*” or the “old man” in English – as the Ivorians affectionately called him – when he died on 7 December 1993. Underlying problems such as those related to “*ivoirité*”, land, religion and ethnicity resurfaced to put a strain on a country that was already in the throes of an economic and social crisis. As in Cameroon with state tribalism, in Rwanda with the genocide, in ex-Zaire with the war, Côte d'Ivoire seems to be the manifestation of a current of composition and recomposition of national identity.

For thirty-three years Côte d'Ivoire has lived under what some calls the autocratic and patrimonial political system led by President Félix Houphouët-Boigny and his unique political party: *Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire – Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (PDCI-RDA). In 1990, Côte d'Ivoire organised its first multiparty elections, the opposition was led by Laurent Gbagbo, who had created the *Front populaire ivoirien* (FPI), in 1982. For the first time in 1990, Houphouët-Boigny appointed a prime minister who was Alassane Dramane Ouattara (ADO), a respected economist with regional and international experience.

When “*le vieux*” died, the country sank. First, with the crisis of his succession in 1993, then with the devaluation of the CFA franc, next with the rhetoric of *ivoirité*, after with the coup d'état of December 1999, and finally with the attempted coup of 2002 which turned into a rebellion. This chapter will retrace the trajectory of Côte d'Ivoire from its independence in 1960 to its first inter-state conflict in 2002. The chapter will be divided into four parts: (1) Côte

---

<sup>11</sup>Félix Houphouët-Boigny, born on 18 October 1905 in N'Gokro (Yamoussoukro) and died on 7 December 1993, nicknamed “le sage” or even “Nanan Boigny” or “Nanan Houphouët” or “Le Vieux”, is the “father” of the independence of Côte d'Ivoire. Successively traditional chief, doctor, planter, trade union leader, deputy in France, minister of French governments, president of the Ivorian National Assembly, mayor of Abidjan, Ivorian Prime Minister and first president of Côte d'Ivoire from 1960 to 1993, Félix Houphouët-Boigny played a leading role in the process of decolonisation of Africa, and dominated the political scene of his native country until the end of his life.

d'Ivoire after 1960; (2) the “*ivoirité*” concept; (3) the 1999 coup d'état and the second Republic in Côte d'Ivoire; and (4) the difficult way out of the crisis.

**Illustration 1 - Cote d'Ivoire's December 2011**



Source: ©United Nations, 2011

## 2.1. Côte d'Ivoire after 1960

Côte d'Ivoire, a country of 322.463 km<sup>2</sup>, covers an area that includes the coastal and forest region of the Gulf of Guinea formerly known as *Côte des Dents* or *Côte de l'Ivoire*, and the entire hinterland, which is gradually being transformed into Savannah. The country became French colony in 1893 and integrated into French West Africa (AOF) created in 1893 and independent on 7 August 1960. Côte d'Ivoire is bordered to the North by Burkina Faso and Mali, to the West by Liberia and Guinea, to the East by Ghana, and to South by the Atlantic Ocean. Since colonial times, the country has been the preferred destination for nationals of the sub-region.

The largest foreign community is that of Burkina Faso, followed by Mali. But migration has not only taken place externally; internally, but migration from north to south has also been noted. The most mobile ethnic groups are the *Malinkés* and *Sénoufos* from the northern savannahs, followed by the *Baoulés* from the Centre and the *Bétés* from the south-west (JOLIVET, 2003). This migration was mainly because during colonisation, France established plantation agriculture, especially coffee and cocoa, but also an embryonic urban economy (JOLIVET, 2003). After the independence of Côte d'Ivoire, President Houphouët-Boigny continued to export the workforce from the former High Volta – current Burkina Faso.

This section will be divided as follow: (1) ethnical groups and Regions; (2) Côte d'Ivoire's religious geography; (3) the Ivorian miracle; and (4) social and land crisis.

### 2.1.1 Ethnical groups and Regions

Côte d'Ivoire is a land of immigration. The country has become cosmopolitan in the long run, which has created a problem of the origins of its citizens. Côte d'Ivoire has four main ethnic groups, which are the Akan or Kwa, Mandé – *Langues Voltaïques*, Gour or Gur, and Krou. Two in the Savannah zone, which are related to the Sudanese Muslim populations: the Mandé in the Northwest, and the Gur group in the Northeast. Two in the forest zone along the Coast, which are mainly Christian or animist populations: the Krou, in the Southwest, which is a population also found in Liberia, and the Akan in the Southeast, whose language is close to that of the Ashanti of Ghana.

These four major groups are associated with related ethnic groups. Akan and related: Akyé, Abidji, Abouré, Gwa, Abbey, Adioukrou, Ehotilé, Avikam, Alladian, Baoulé, Ega, Ebrié, Elomouin, Essouma, N'zima, Bron, Agni, Yowré. The Akan area is composed of several ethnic groups all coming from Ghana. In Côte d'Ivoire, the Akan are found in the regions of Sud-



Comoé, Indénié, Bandama Valley, Lakes, Lagoons and part of Zanzan. They share a common linguistic root, Twi. Many Akan siblings are found in Ghana – Ashanti, N’Fanti, N’Zima – and North Togo. The Sanwi kingdoms of Krindjabo, Indénié of Abengourou, Djuablin of Agninibilékrou, Baoulé of Sakassou, Bron of Bondoukou, N’Zima of Grand-Bassam, Abouré of Bonoua and Moossou are some landmarks in Côte d’Ivoire (CÔTE D’IVOIRE, [200-]).

Akan society is patriarchal and matrilineal. Thus, power is reserved for men. However, this power is only exercised in the maternal line, i.e., its transmission by women and does not marginalise them. Instead, it puts them in the spotlight. In the Akan country, women have the power to procreate and to appoint heirs. No inheritance can take place without the designation and consent of the woman in the womb line. It is she, the queen-mother, who appoints the king. The woman thus has a cardinal function that puts her at the top of a political hierarchy accepted by all. Geographically, the Akan area can be divided into three sub-groups: the lagoon Akan, the continental Akan and the eastern Akan, neighbours of the people of Ghana (CÔTE D’IVOIRE, [200-]).

The Mandé are divided into two groups – Mandé North and Mandé South – and Related are composed of Mahou, Malinké, Sénoufo, Mangoro, Nomou, Gouro, Koyaka, Wan, Gagou, Toura, Dan. As for the Gour and Related, they are composed as follows: Gbin, Niarafolo, Ténéwéré, Koulango, Nafana, Tiembara, Degha, Lohon, Tagouana, Lobi, Djamala, Djimini, Birifor, Samassogo, Djafolo, Camara, Lohron. And finally the Krou and related Krou composed by Wobé, Bakwé, Bété, Dida, Godié, Guéré, Kroumen, Kousié, Niaboua, Néyo, Wini (CÔTE D’IVOIRE, [200-]).

Four migratory axes appear: (a) the north-west axis with the Wangara, ancestor of the Manding who push the Gban, the Wan, the Mona towards the south. They founded the kingdoms of Kabadougou, Worodougou and Kpong – kong – in the fifteenth century; (b) the western axis concerns the ancestors of the Magwe occupying the southern forests and subject to the slave trade; (c) the northern and north-eastern axis relates to the Sénoufo waves from present-day Mali and Burkina Faso. From the thirteenth to the fourteenth century, they occupied the Korhogo and Kong regions; and (d) the east-west axis concerns the various Akan groups, firstly the first wave of the lagoons - Adjoukrou, Abbey, Ahizi, Alladian, Avikam, then the Essouma, Abouré, Abidji and others (CÔTE D’IVOIRE, [200-]). The following maps (map 2 and 3) show us clearly the repartition of the different ethnical groups, and the graphic (graph 1) the percentage of these ethnical groups.

**Illustration 2 - Côte d'Ivoire Ethnic groups**




Source : Sites.google.com

In Côte d'Ivoire, there are ethnic alliances or “the Non-Aggression Pact” which allows one group to joke with another group and even “offend” it without the risk of being assaulted. In each of these alliances, there is supposed to be one ethnic group that dominates over the others – slaves. Thus, the slave is required to show unfailing hospitality to his leader, to give

him help, aid and assistance when necessary, to obey his orders and to satisfy all his needs, even if frivolous they may be – which sometimes leads to bullying. However, one ethnic group leader becomes, in turn, the slave of another and so on. But it must be said that each ethnic group cunningly proclaims itself chief and considers the others as slaves. Thus, only the guarantors of the tradition know which ethnic group is chief and in turn slave of another. Ethnic alliances give rise to jokes that are only meant to be self-mockery since the attacker's critical view of one's own culture must be accepted without rancour. The ultimate advantage of inter-ethnic alliances is that they represent a factor of peace between the different ethnic groups because of the pact of non-aggression and mutual assistance that binds them together. For example, there is an alliance between Bété and Dida, Agni and Baoulé, Sénoufo and Lobi, etc (CÔTE D'IVOIRE TOURISME, 2009). In the following 1, table 1 and map 3, we can see the distribution of the ethnic groups in Côte d'Ivoire and their origins.

**Chart 1 - Ivorian population by ethnic groups in 2014**



*Source : Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitation (RGPH) 2014.*

**Table 2 - Ivorian citizens according to ethnic groups (%) – 1998**

Ethnicity	Abidjan	The entire Country (including Abidjan)
Akan	44,8	44,2
Gur	9,3	20,8
Krou	17,4	11,7
Mandé	27,4	22,4
Other	1,1	0,9
Total	100	100

Source : Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitation 1998

### Illustration 3 - Ethnical Origin




Source. Journals openedition

### 2.1.2 Côte d'Ivoire's religious geography

For years there was peaceful cohabitation between the different religious groups in Côte d'Ivoire. Among the religions, we can mention Christianity, Islam and animism. Islam is followed approximatively by about two-fifths of the population, living usually in the Northwest and in Abidjan. About two-fifths of the population is Christian, mostly Roman Catholic or Evangelical (MUNDT, 2019). The distribution of religion is made between Muslims, Catholics, Evangelicals, Animists, other faiths and no religion (see graph 2). In Côte d'Ivoire, ethnicity is often linked to religion. A significant part of the Mandé and the Gour are Muslims, and Krou and Akan are Christians. Most of the ethnical groups live together and have a healthy relationship because of religious affinity.

**Chart 2 - Côte d'Ivoire religious affiliation (2014)**



Source: Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitation (RGPH) 2014

According to the 1998 national census in Côte d'Ivoire – Ivorians and non-Ivorians – before the crisis, out of 15.4 million inhabitants, 38.6 per cent were Muslims, 30.3 per cent Christians, 16.7 per cent practising no religion, and 11.9 per cent animists (COTE D'IVOIRE, 1998). However, Christians predominate over Muslims among Ivorians - 33.9 per cent of the population is Christian, versus 27.4 per cent Muslims. On the other hand, among non-Ivorians, we note the overpowering weight of Muslims (COTE D'IVOIRE, 1998) (see table 2). The religious structure of the resident population in Côte d'Ivoire varied very little from one milieu to another. In Abidjan, the religious structure was as follows: 42.3 per cent Christians; 41.0 per cent Muslims; 11.1 per cent non-believers; 2.9 per cent animists; and 2.1 per cent for other religions. In Abidjan, Christians and Muslims were almost equally represented (COTE D'IVOIRE, 1998) (see table 3).

According to the census, 77 per cent of Muslims lived in the South and only 23 per cent in the North. Abidjan, the economic capital and largest city in the country, alone accounted for 20 per cent of all Muslims in the country. That means there were three times as many Muslims in the south of Côte d'Ivoire as in the north (BASSET, 2003). Which brings us back to say that the statement that the south is Christian, and the north Muslim is wrong in terms of population distribution, not the origin. However, in the aftermath of the crisis in 2002 – detailed in the following sections – the press had headlines which reduced the crisis to a religious disparity in Côte d'Ivoire: “Muslim North” under rebel control and “Christian South” under government control. These headlines are sometimes nothing more than the stereotypical reproduction from Western countries about Africa to legitimise international intervention: state failure, barbarism, religious conflict, etc.

Far be it from us to dismiss the impact that religion had on the Ivorian conflict, the objective here being to castigate the simplistic vision of Muslims north against Christians south in the Ivorian conflict. The international press often also forgets the complex nature of a crisis with social, political and economic dimensions that has its roots in the colonial period. Another important point to stress is that we are not trying to say that northerners are not Muslims and southerners are not Christian. We are just trying to contextualise facts that have been taken out of their original context. Côte d'Ivoire has experienced steady internal migration due to the existence of so-called internal borders. The inner boundary is characterised by the ethno-geographical division within the country itself. In this way, when a Sénoufo moves towards Abidjan, s/he crosses a geographical border – because of ethnicity – that is invisible (see Map 2).

**Board 3 - Percentage distribution of the resident population by religion according to nationality**

Religion	NATIONALITY		All
	Ivorian	Non-Ivorian	
Christians	33,9	20,2	30,3
Muslims	27,4	70,5	38,6
Animists	15,3	2,1	11,9
Other religions	2,0	1,0	1,7
None	20,7	5,4	16,8
n/d	0,7	0,8	0,7
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0

Source : Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitation 1998

**Board 4 - Structure (%) of the resident population by religion according to the place of residence 1998**

Religion	PLACE OF RESIDENCE			
	Abidjan	Other Cities	Rural area	All
Christians	42,3	29,5	26,8	30,3
Muslims	41,0	49,4	33,5	38,6
Animists	2,9	4,9	17,6	11,9
Other religions	2,1	1,8	1,6	1,7
None	11,1	13,3	19,9	16,7
n/d	0,6	0,8	0,7	0,7
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Source : Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitation 1998


The average density in Côte d'Ivoire is 47 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>, but the distribution is far from homogeneous (LAROUSSE, 2020). Forested areas suitable for agriculture and trade are found in the Centre-West-East-South parts. At the same time, the north is mostly made up of Savannah with scarce resources, so people are migrating to the south and the forested areas, especially with the policy of the peasant state advocated by Félix Houphouët-Boigny. The population is concentrated in the Centre and, above all, in the South-East, dominated by Abidjan, the country's largest city and main maritime outlet.



The North is, in comparison, much less populated, the city of Bouaké is the most populated in the north, and the South-West is almost empty. This southward migration promoted the Ivorian miracle and the economic development of the country while bringing with it its share of problems. In Côte d'Ivoire, people's names often convey a lot of information on ethnic and religious affiliation, and the Ivorians are usually able to place one another in an ethnic group according to surname, at least within a more massive ethnic cluster (SKOGSETH, 2006).


For example, Coulibaly, Kanté, Diabaté, Keita, Touré and Traoré are frequent Mandé surnames, while Koffi, Konan and N'Guessan, Kouassi, Kouadio are frequent Akan surnames, and Doué, Gbagbo and Kessy are Krou surnames. Sometimes, in Côte d'Ivoire, we use the word *Dioula* to characterise the ethnical group of the north of the country. The word *dioula* means trader in Bambara. They generally use the expression *Dioula* for anyone with a Mandé or Gour origin in the north of Côte d'Ivoire. In the following two graphs (graph 3 and 4) we have a summary of the populations by ethnicity and religion according to the censuses of 1998 and 2014.

**Chart 3 - Population by ethnicity (%) 1998 -2014**



Source: Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitation (RGPH) 1998 et 2014



**Chart 4 - Population by religion (%) 1998 -2014**

Source : Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitation (RGPH) 1998 et 2014

### 2.1.3 The Ivorian miracle

Like several African countries, Côte d'Ivoire gained its independence on 7 August 1960. From then on, the country had the heavy burden of establishing its institutions and development programs. But as we know, the task was much more complicated than these countries could have imagined. Many African countries sank into political crisis and civil wars, some like Benin experienced successive coup d'état and one-day presidents. However, Côte d'Ivoire seemed not to be affected by this wave of instability because President Felix Houphouët-Boigny had adopted a strategy to enable his country to maintain political and economic stability.

The country relied on its natural potential, which consisted of vast forested areas and a humid and hot climate conducive to plantation agriculture. The wooded areas in the south were very sparsely populated, so people had to be encouraged to migrate to these areas. President Houphouët-Boigny, who intended to set up a peasant and widespread agriculture supported by the agro-industrial blocs, had recourse to foreign labour, thus reinforcing the economic logic of the settlers (JOLIVET, 2003). To develop its economy, Côte d'Ivoire was therefore liberalising, calling on foreign investors and foreign worker particularly from Burkina

Faso and Mali, which had a significant impact on the country's future. The country benefits from a climate conducive to the cultivation of cash crops as well as food crops (ROQUAIN, 2016).

The government was very active, through various organisations, in promoting certain crops, mainly for export. Deposit funds provided farmers with a stable income (ROQUAIN, 2016). President Houphouët-Boigny's close ties with the former coloniser played a crucial role in such strategy. Houphouët-Boigny was France's man in Africa, and for the supporters of *Françafrique*, he was a model to be followed. He represented France's vision of Africa. The strategy of importing foreign labour peaked in the 1970s. Indeed, President Houphouët-Boigny had decreed that the land belonged to the farmer. It was, therefore, a policy of economic development based on a particular national cohesion, where Ivorian nationals were to feel at home while foreigners were to be incorporated into the nation.

As a result, the country experienced strong economic growth in the first two decades after independence. This period will be described as the "Ivorian miracle". During this period, real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an average rate of close to 8 per cent per year. Thus, even though population growth is one of the highest in the world – 4.1 per cent per year between 1960 and 1980. Côte d'Ivoire became a middle-income country during the 1970s and enjoyed the highest standard of living in West Africa (COGNEAU; MESPLÉ-SOMPS, 1999). Coffee, cocoa and wood accounted for 82 per cent of exports in 1965 and 74 per cent in 1972 (BERTHÉLEMY; BOURGUIGNON, 1996). These agricultural surpluses were appropriated mainly by the State. First, a fund was created, la *Caisse de stabilisation et de soutien des prix des produits agricoles* which fixed a national producer price, the difference between domestic and international prices fed the fund. Then, a tax on coffee, cocoa and wood exports was introduced (COGNEAU; MESPLÉ-SOMPS, 1999).

The "Ivorian miracle" was based on balanced growth in which the State and the public sector played an important role even if growth was open to the outside world. Indeed, in terms of trade, the basis of growth was exports of agricultural products; and in terms of factors of production, regional immigration contributed to the farm labour force (COGNEAU; MESPLÉ-SOMPS, 1999). It was clear that the Ivorian State had never had a policy to limit foreign participation in productive Ivorian capital (COGNEAU; MESPLÉ-SOMPS, 1999). This economic policy in Côte d'Ivoire led to a recomposition of Ivorian society. There was a strong community of European expatriates in the country who held positions as teachers, business leaders, etc., and the French held senior positions in Ivorian ministries. At the time, almost

every Ivorian ministry had a French adviser on its team. In the sub-region, Burkinabés and Malians were equally well represented.

In 1975, international coffee and cocoa prices increased considerably and in two years the price of coffee grown by a factor of 3.6 and that of cocoa by a factor of 3, which led to an 80 per cent increase in Côte d'Ivoire's terms of trade. This price increase led to a gain in export earnings of more than 50 per cent (DAVIS, 1983). However, the increase price of coffee and cocoa did not benefit agricultural producers, as the state has set a fixed price for the sale of these products. Even though there was an increase in these prices adjusted to producers in 1978, the State nevertheless remained the biggest beneficiary of this international price increase.

The boom in commodity prices and the accompanying government spending program put intense demand pressure on imports of consumer goods and locally produced goods. It increased the external deficit, and the prices of locally produced goods have risen. As a result, there was an expansion in the sheltered goods sector and a contraction in exposed goods, increasing the external deficit (COGNEAU; MESPLÉ-SOMPS, 1999). But from 1979 onwards, the terms of trade deteriorated utterly. The private sector reacted quickly to this change in economic conditions, contracting 11 per cent of its capital expenditure (BERTHÉLEMY; BOURGUIGNON, 1996). At the same time, the government increased its current spending due to massive recruitment in the civil service as well as wage increases. Also, the State was losing control of its public investment policy.

As boom revenues were not sufficient to finance an efficient investment program, the country was forced to contract external debt. As a result, international public debt increased fourfold between 1975 and 1979 (WORLD BANK, 1997). For the first time, Côte d'Ivoire's operations account with the French Treasury was in deficit. Reforms were undertaken to overcome this crisis, but these reforms were not sufficient to improve public accounts, as the period was marked by the appreciation of the dollar, rising international and domestic interest rates and a deterioration in terms of trade. While the global context was unfavourable, at the national level things were not improving. At the local level, there was a drought that reduced agricultural harvests by more than 30 per cent and compromised the absorption level of the rural population (COGNEAU; MESPLÉ-SOMPS, 1999).

In 1987, Côte d'Ivoire, which was under pressure and could no longer honour its international commitments, stopped paying its debt, leading to the suspension of its credits by the international financial organisations. Faced with this suspension, President Houphouët-Boigny declared, on 9 July 1987, "the cocoa war" (GOMBEAUD; MOUTOUT; SMITH, 1990, Authors' Griffon). However, this embargo on cocoa exports, which lasted a year and a half, and

which was intended to raise world prices, proved to be a failure, forcing the heavily indebted country to accept the adjustment conditions of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This economic crisis has been compounded by social and political turmoil. The Ivorian miracle had, in a short time, turned into a mirage.

#### 2.1.4 Social and land crisis

During the months leading up to the 1999 coup d'état, there had been much turbulence in rural areas. There had been protests by producers against the fall in the price of coffee, cocoa and cotton, and numerous land conflicts between indigenous and non-Ivorian migrants, whether they were planters as in the western forest, livestock farmers in the north and Centre, or fishers in the Centre and along the coast (CHAUVEAU, 2000). Land conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire are the result of the policy of importing massive foreign labour and Houphouët-Boigny's policy of "the land belongs to the one who cultivates it". Since most rural land in Côte d'Ivoire was unregistered, market transactions on property, especially between indigenous people and migrants in the forest zone, were causing tensions.

There were more and more transfers of property in rural areas without a legal basis, with most owners moving away from the big cities to work. The economic dimension of these transfers does not generally make their social aspect disappear because the recipient thereby contracts a "duty of recognition" vis-à-vis the transferor and his community. This causes uncertainty about the rights transferred, which can be challenged by indigenous people for failure by migrants to meet their social obligations (LEROY, M. et al., 2012). Ivorian land conflicts are part of the long history of the Ivorian countryside characterised by the vast agrarian colonisation movements that marked Ivorian rural history since the colonial period, and particularly since the country's independence (CHAUVEAU, 2000).

As observed by Chauveau (2000), conflicts between communities of different origins are only manifestations of land issues as old as the agricultural colonisation movements in Côte d'Ivoire. The call for foreign labour and its gradual establishment as agricultural settlers, especially Baoulé and non-Ivorians, has led to recurrent conflicts, which have manifested themselves both on land rights and modes of cohabitation between the different communities (CHAUVEAU, 2000). Conflicts between Western natives and Baoulé migrants were frequent. Notably at the end of the 1960s between Baoulé and Bété people in the Gagnoa region, in 1985 between Niaboua and Baoulé in the Zoukougbeu region, during the 1990 and 1995 elections

between Baoulé migrants and indigenous Bété, Gouro and Dida. During the drafting of the new law on the rural domain in 1998, conflicts broke out between Niaboua and Baoulé in Zoukougbeu in May 1998 and between Dida and Baoulé in Irobo in November 1998 (CHAUVEAU, 2000). It is important to note that opposition to PDCI – Akan ethnical party – has been strong in Bété circles since the late 1960s. An attempt in 1970 to found an opposition party led to strong reactions from the government, with 4000 Bétés massacred in Gébié (MIGNOT, 2005).

The recurrence of land conflicts showed that there were internal boundaries. As Chauveau (2000) has pointed out, the “internal boundary” process imposed a context of ongoing conflictual negotiation that involved diverse groups and coalitions of stakeholders in the process. Indigenous people ceded land more or less voluntarily. “Foreigners” gaining access to it under the more or less open protection of the administration, local State agents in a more or less systematic patronage relationship with migrants, but also urban “nationals” in rural areas, especially “executives” and politicians, who also took up the land issue (CHAUVEAU, 2000, author’s Griffon).

In the last quarter of 1999, deadly conflicts between indigenous Bété and Burkinabé broke out in the sub-prefecture of Saïoua. There were also clashes between indigenous Krou and Burkinabé in the sub-prefecture of Tabou, which resulted in the evacuation of more than tens of thousands of Burkinabé from the southwest of the country. These conflicts were primarily associated with the concept of “*ivoirité*” – which will be developed in the next section. The laxity with which the government treated these conflicts had been singled out by several press organs, particularly those of the opposition. Indeed, President Bédié was accused of not reacting when it came to non-nationals or the indigenous populations of northern Côte d’Ivoire. However, he would come to the rescue when it came to the Baoulé, the ethnic group from which he comes from and which is located in the centre of the country.

These clashes are nothing more than the disintegration of the social and political pact that has been established between the State, the urban ruling class, merchants, private entrepreneurs and the various components of the Ivorian peasantry. The State at the time had the mission of guaranteeing rural people products prices, outlets, inputs and the improvement of their standard of living. In return, they owed total political submission as well as recognition of the State’s monopoly – the PDCI-RDA was the only political party at the time (CHAUVEAU, 2000). State management by African elites can be an explanation of the current situation on the African continent. Leaders in Africa most of the time to legitimise their powers relied on the myths of development and nation-building and to keep the order stable, a

Hierarchy – Command relationship is established (AHOUANGAN, 2018), as we can see in Côte d’Ivoire.

Government action aimed at the accelerated development of the western forest was based on the use of political instructions, on the fringes of the law or even in contradiction with the legal and juridical mechanism, without seeking to promote the already existing statutory provisions for the regularisation of customary rights (CHAUVEAU; BOBO, 2005). According to Chauveau and Bobo (2005), the traditional institution of “tutoring” between natives and migrants in search of land has thus been instrumentalised and manipulated by the authorities to convince local customary or political powers to welcome Ivorian’s migrant farmers from the centre and north of Côte d’Ivoire and also from neighbouring countries (authors’ Griffon).

The public authorities thus justified the protection afforded to Ivorian and non-Ivorian migrants by their participation in the development of the West. The electoral support of non-Ivorian residents also explained this protection since they were allowed to participate in elections until 1990. For their part, Ivorian’s migrants, mainly Baoulé, voted unswervingly for the government in place (CHAUVEAU; BOBO, 2005). According to Chauveau and Bobo (2005), central pressure had an amplifying effect on the process of land alienation to foreigners. Transfers of land rights by indigenous people in the Centre-West and South-West have been amplified by the practice of ceding a portion of forest or land to migrant labour in exchange for their work.

To retain a minimum of control over the land and to derive some benefit from it, indigenous notables and elders were obliged to cede the property with some semblance of preservation of traditional tutorship. Or else they would lose all recognition of the anteriority of their rights and the benefits derived from their status as tutors (CHAUVEAU; BOBO, 2005). The depletion of forest reserves led to the questioning of land agreements between indigenous peoples and migrants previously raised by the authorities, thus leading to the ethnicisation of the land problem (CHAUVEAU; BOBO, 2005). While this strategy enabled Côte d’Ivoire to implement its “pioneering” model of agricultural development and to achieve the Ivorian miracle, the crisis of the early 1980s revealed the perverse side of this strategy. In an emergency situation, and unable to honour its commitments, Côte d’Ivoire was obliged to follow the adjustments proposed by financial institutions, which consisted of reducing public spending and privatising companies. The Country also had to face land tenure problems due to the forced withdrawal of a large part of the urban population to its original rural environment.

The massive return to the village of nationals who lived in urban areas and land pressure have fuelled tensions between natives and foreigners. Foreign migrants were

increasingly stigmatised because of their relative economic success in a period of crisis in the cocoa sector. Burkinabés were the most stigmatised because they had easier access to the family or migrant labour force, which enabled them to be self-sufficient and to perform well, unlike the indigenous population. Client and influence networks have been effective in accelerating the “development” of the forest region, with favourable conditions. But they have also helped to crystallise a governance system that has been unable to adapt to the changing context (CHAUVEAU; BOBO, 2005). The crisis of the “pioneer” production system, the urban economic crisis, the financial crisis of the State, and the fall in agricultural prices and producers’ living standards have destroyed the implicit pact that linked the State to the main groups of actors involved in the internal border process. Chauveau and Bobo (2005, p 252-253) stated that

The reduction of resources to be redistributed and the weakening of the regime’s political legitimacy encouraged ‘political brokers’ to play the ethnic card [...] The inability of the political elite to redefine the basis of the legitimacy of the State’s local anchorage led to a regionalist disintegration of citizenship (our translation)<sup>12</sup>.

After 1993, the land question was politicised, and the process of ethnicisation of land rights was brought into the political arena. In the forest zone, the political stigmatisation of Alassane Ouattara due to the 1993 succession crisis spread from Burkinabé to non-Ivorian migrants and Muslim Ivorian migrants from the North. In the West Forest, tensions between indigenous people and the Baoulé declined relatively because the introduction of *ivoirité* had pointed to another enemy. We can, therefore, observe that the conflicts between ethnic and religious parts of the population are not due to ancestral hatred among them. But instead to inter-communal factors, such as land disputes in the cocoa-producing western areas (BAH, 2012) and economic inequality between indigenous people and migrants (INTERPEACE INDIGO, 2018).

## 2.2. *Tu sais qui je suis? The ivoirité concept*

*Dans le cœur où la haine s'est installée, l'amour ne trouve pas de place.*

(In the heart where hatred has taken hold, love finds no place.)

---

<sup>12</sup>CHAUVEAU, J-P.; BOBO, S. K. (2005) p 252-253 « La réduction des ressources à redistribuer et l'affaiblissement de la légitimité politique du régime ont encouragé les « courtiers politiques » à jouer la carte ethnique [...] L'incapacité de l'élite politique à redéfinir les bases de la légitimité de l'ancrage local de l'État a provoqué un délitement régionaliste de la citoyenneté. »

In 1990, the first multiparty election was held in Côte d'Ivoire. President Houphouët-Boigny's real opponent was Laurent Gbagbo of the *Front Populaire Ivoirien*. But this election brought to light the deep crisis in which Côte d'Ivoire was plunged. Houphouët-Boigny had granted the right to vote to non-Ivorian migrants to make sure he would win the elections because he had allowed them great favours and in return, they would vote for him. However, the economic crisis in which the country was immersed had aroused great dissatisfaction among the population, and well before the election, many demonstrations had been held due to high unemployment and precarious conditions for students. The results of the 1990 presidential election gave Houphouët-Boigny a clear victory with more than 80 per cent of the votes cast. However, the highlight of this election was the length of time it took to promulgate the results, which suggested massive fraud.

Although Ivorians were certain that Laurent Gbagbo had not won, they hoped for a slightly more honourable score for the latter, who was able to rally to his cause the unemployed and students, who were numerous at the time. Besides, President Houphouët-Boigny did not deliver his famous victory and "thank you" speech to the Ivorian people, as usual, perhaps to show his anger at the ingratitude of a people he has always cherished and mothered. The Ivorian political and social climate was already being reconfigured, and several changes would take place after 1990. In this section, we will discuss the (1) birth of the concept of *ivoirité*, (2) the explosion of the *ivoirité* bomb, and finally (3) the political impact of *ivoirité*.

### 2.2.1 The birth of the concept of *ivoirité*

A wave of democratisation in Africa followed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the communist bloc. Politically untouchable because of the support of the French authorities, even after three decades of full reign, Houphouët-Boigny, in 1990, was to come under high pressure to which he gave in and allowed a multi-party system in Côte d'Ivoire. The economic consequences of the crisis destabilised the country, which internally had to deal with the discontent and pressure of the population, who took to the streets several times chanting "Houphouët-Boigny thief". Externally, pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions was forcing the country to adopt structural adjustments that have been advocated by them. Côte d'Ivoire had to, therefore, reduce its public spending and settle its debt at the international level,



which in turn led to a wave of layoffs in the civil service and increase an already high unemployment rate.

Pressure from the streets and the international community forced the Ivorian president to share his power with the appointment, for the first time in the country's history, of a prime minister. Thus, Alassane Dramane Ouattara (ADO), from the north and former employee of the IMF appears to be the providential man, so he was appointed to the post of prime minister. This appointment was seen by several observers as a strategy by the president to gain the sympathy of the people of the north and thus continue his clientelistic policy. Moreover, if the situation were to go wrong, ADO could take on the role of scapegoat. Although article 7 of the 1960 constitution of Côte d'Ivoire already provided for a multiparty system, it was not until 1990 that a multiparty system was instituted and has been accompanied by an opposition press and trade unions. Since the right to vote was granted to non-Ivorian migrants who were nationals of ECOWAS, Prime Minister ADO instituted a residence permit as a prerequisite. This right to vote was not much appreciated by the opponent Laurent Gbagbo, who holds a nationalist discourse and fears a massive vote of non-Ivorians for his opponent.

It is important to note that the 1990 presidential election was not the first to be held in Côte d'Ivoire. Even with the single party of the PDCI-RDA, there were elections where this single party could present several candidates. Thus, President Houphouët-Boigny was elected in 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985. One thousand nine hundred ninety marked not only the year of the advent of multiparty politics in Côte d'Ivoire but also the creation of *Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire* (FESCI) which will play a leading role in the political configuration of Côte d'Ivoire. Indeed, as Laurence Proteau (2005) pointed out in an interview with Laurent Bazin, in a one-party regime as was the case in Côte d'Ivoire, the school question is above all a political issue. She stressed that:

Since the political question cannot emerge according to the legitimate forms of ordinary democracy, it has emerged from the school field for two reasons. 1- because the school is invested with a stake in social mobility. [...] 2- The characteristic of the Ivorian elites is that they were not very differentiated, i.e., there were no political elites on one side, economic elites on the other, intellectual elites on the other side, etc. [...] (PROTEAU, 2012, p 249, our translation)<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup>PROTEAU, L , p. 249. « La question politique ne pouvant émerger selon les formes légitimes de la démocratie ordinaire, elle a émergé à partir du champ scolaire pour deux raisons. 1- Parce que l'école est investie d'un enjeu de mobilité sociale.[...] La caractéristique des élites ivoiriennes c'est qu'elles étaient très peu différenciées, c'est-à-dire qu'il n'y avait pas d'un côté des élites politiques, de l'autre des élites économiques, d'un autre côté encore des élites intellectuelles, etc. [...] »

Even though the country has opened up to a multiparty system, tensions have not calmed down in Côte d'Ivoire, far from it. In 1991, a demonstration by FESCI supported by FPI was violently repressed by the Chief of Staff, General Robert Gueï under orders from the government. The following year, another demonstration was organised by FPI to demand investigations into the abuses committed during the previous year's demonstrations. The protest was again repressed, and Laurent Gbagbo was arrested and sentenced to two years in prison.

Weakened by age and illness, President Houphouët-Boigny had no longer the capacity to lead the country, so he relied on his Prime Minister. On December 7, 1993, President Houphouët-Boigny passed away, leaving the door open for his succession. But problems linked to his succession exposed the deep split that existed in Côte d'Ivoire, and a dispute erupted between ADO and Henri Konan Bédié (HKB). Indeed, between 1990 and 1993 the country was primarily led by ADO which started to have charisma within the PDCI-RDA and suddenly became the number two leader of the party behind "*le vieux*". Early in 1991 ADO has already shown his ambitions to run for the presidential elections in 1995. Meanwhile, HKB president of the national assembly, also a member of the PDCI was little known and paled in comparison of ADO who had already proved itself nationally and internationally.

However, HKB had the majority in the PDCI and was the constitutionally designated successor in the event of a power vacuum. Article 11 of the Ivorian Constitution stipulated that in case of power's vacancy, the interim of its functions is attributed to the president of National Assembly. ADO tried to amend this article, but his party opposed itself to such amendment, forcing ADO to renounce to do it. When "*le vieux*" died on December 7, 1993, ADO tried to stay in power by taking his case to the Supreme Court and would decide to leave only when the vacancy of the presidency would officially be announced. HKB, which saw this as an attempted coup by ADO, proclaimed itself President of the Republic on 8 December 1993. ADO resigned the following day under some military duress, according to some.

War was declared between ADO and HKB, and the latter several times attacked ADO's nationality. Indeed, Alassane Ouattara, who had a certificate of citizenship issued by the court of Abidjan, claimed to have Ivorian nationality. This nationality was challenged by most of his political opponents, in particular HKB, who said that ADO was actually from Burkina Faso. ADO was born in Côte d'Ivoire, and his father is originally from Kong and his mother from Odienné, a city in the north of Côte d'Ivoire. However, ADO went to school in Burkina Faso and has obtained his baccalaureate as a Burkinabé. He has also worked at IMF and *Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (BCEAO) under Burkinabé quota.

Tension rose a notch in 1994 when ADO decided to leave the PDCI and join with former PDCI cadres, the RDR, a liberal party created by Djeni Kobina in 1994. This betrayal has never been forgiven to him, and the PDCI members officially declare war on him. In Côte d'Ivoire, the economic crisis was rapidly turning into a social crisis which degenerated into a political crisis. If for a long time Houphouët-Boigny tried to integrate foreigners in his policy, his successor HKB went completely against the principles of his predecessor, so will emerge the concept of the *ivoirité* which will be a creature of HKB.

The term "*ivoirité*" actually appears for the first time in an article entitled "*ivoirité et authenticité*" – ivority and authenticity – published in the newspaper *fraternité matin* in 1974. It is, therefore, a neologism that appeared two years after the modification of the constitution on the passage from *jus solis*, the right of the soil, to *jus sanguinis*, the right of the blood, i.e., that from 1960 to 1972 everyone that was born in Côte d'Ivoire was Ivorian. However, from 1972 onwards, one had to be born of an Ivorian father and/or mother to have Ivorian nationality (JOLIVET, 2003).

When the term first appeared in 1974 its effect was less since at the time Côte d'Ivoire was in the middle of an economic boom, and there was no tension. But 20 years later it is in a catastrophic climate that the theme reappeared, reviving an agitated socio-political environment and the consequences will be disastrous for the country.

### 2.2.2 The explosion of the *ivoirité* bomb

In Côte d'Ivoire and everywhere in Africa, the colonial state played a determining role in the formation of ethnic identities and the translation of this into the space – territorial and mental – of power (BANEGAS, [200-]). Colonial ethnologists, including Maurice Delafosse, who was one of the first to distinguish large linguistic families on this territory such as the Agni, Dioula, Sénoufo, etc., set a process of classifying groups which would give substance to cultural stereotypes of which we still find traces today (BANEGAS, [200-]).

There was a hierarchy which reflected the image that the settler had of the local populations. A distinction was therefore made within the colony between ethno-regional groups, based on a functional hierarchy defined according to the willingness and availability of labour for colonial development. Thus, at the top of the hierarchy were the Agni of the Southeast and specific lagoon populations who were the first interlocutors of the Europeans (BANEGAS, [200-]). The northerners, for their part, occupied a unique position in the colonial

representations of the “good savage”. Either they were “good Muslims”, or “good traders” – for the Dioula, or either “good workers” – for the Senoufo, willing to migrate to work on plantations and in construction sites in the South. They were confined in secondary roles of auxiliary forces in a system where the cleavages were structured preferably in the East / West mode (BANEGAS, [200-], author’s Griffon).

Bété, the native of the Centre-west, always represented negative figure, that of Africa of darkness, in opposition to the people of the East and the North. According to Banegas [200-], this colonial ethnogenesis will be articulated with a problem of autochthony and allochtony constituting the matrix of “*ivoirité*” and nationalism. President Houphouët-Boigny had several times stigmatised the Bété people because according to him, they embodied insubordination. In contrast, the northern ethnic groups represented subordination and obedience. An example of such rivalry between Baoulé and Bété appeared in a song by a well-known Ivorian musical group called Magic System. In this song, two people, a Baoulé and a Bété had made a bet on a football match. The match was between ASEC, which is the team generally supported by the Baoulé and AFRICA a team supported by the Bété. And the bet was the following if there was a goal from either side, the one whose team had scored slapped the other. ASEC was the first team to open the score, and it was with the greatest joy that the Baoulé slapped the Bété while imagining that it was Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the FPI and bété (ASALFO, 1999). All this to tell us that the rivalry and ethnic division went far beyond what we could imagine.

This ethnic division, which already existed, was accentuated with the succession crisis that took place in 1993. It is in this tense context against a backdrop of political, economic and social crisis that the “*ivoirité*” would grow up. On 23 November 1994, barely a year after coming to power, HKB passed a new electoral law. This new law tightened the right to vote as well as the criteria for eligibility. It should be noted that under the Houphouët-Boigny regime, the notion of eligibility did not appear in the constitution since whoever had the right to vote was at the same time eligible for election. However, this distinction between the right to vote and eligibility was introduced in article 49 of the new electoral code, which stated: “No one may be elected President of the Republic unless he or she is Ivorian by birth, born of a father and mother who are themselves Ivorian by birth” (CÔTE D’IVOIRE, 1994). The law was adopted on 13 December 1994.

This electoral law had not only introduced a new eligibility criterion but had also withdrawn the right to vote from foreigners. Already during the 1990 presidential election, Laurent Gbagbo had criticised President Houphouët-Boigny for using foreigners as electoral cattle by buying their votes. Most of the foreigners were from Burkina Faso. The populations

of northern Côte d'Ivoire, for reasons more related to cultural similarities, lived in community with these foreigners from Burkina Faso. It is why most of the time, these northern populations of Côte d'Ivoire are assimilated to foreigners when they are not. The episode of the succession between ADO and HKB has exacerbated this exclusion of the communities of the north seen as mere foreigners and not as nationals. Burkinabé origins were soon found in ADO, backgrounds that were not relevant when he was in charge of saving the country from its economic slump and a member of the PDCI.

After their entrance into this electoral law, two very common conjunctions of the French language will burst into the vocabulary of Ivorians: the “and” and the “or”. If the law aimed to reserve the supreme magistracy for “true” Ivorians while reaffirming the right of blood for nationality, it would put in bold the severe problems of a Côte d'Ivoire already on the brink of collapse.

In 1970, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny undertook an “Ivorisation” of executive posts in the Ivorian administration, because, at the time, three-quarters of the senior civil service was still French. Two years later, the method of acquiring nationality changed from *jus solis* to *jus sanguinis*. It was, therefore, necessary to satisfy the “Ivorians” and prepare the next generation for nationals. In 1978, as the “Ivorian miracle” began to take off, a Ministry of Labour and Ivorisation was set up to create jobs reserved for nationals, particularly in senior political and administrative positions (THORIN, 2004, author's Griffon). “*Le vieux*” has thus succeeded in combining a policy of national preference with his discourse on the integration of foreigners. Ellen Jolivet told Jeune Afrique that: “To his detractors, he liked to reply that the Ivorian policy of welcoming foreigners gave Ivorians the right to reserve a few privileges for themselves” (THORIN, 2004, our translation)<sup>14</sup>.

“*Le vieux*” had been able to find the right combination of incorporating foreigners while satisfying Ivorians, as he enjoyed great popularity at the time. On the other hand, HKB, which was less popular than its predecessor both nationally and within its party, the PDCI, exacerbated a precarious situation with a principle of *ivoirité* that was both dubious and poorly elaborated. The question of “and” and “or” was part of the Ivorian political vocabulary thanks to HKB. In the political glossary the “and” represented the Ivorian born of Ivorian parents themselves, while the “or” designated the Ivorian born of an Ivorian father or mother. The Ivorian “and” was eligible as president of the republic and had the right to vote, while the Ivorian “or” only had the right to vote.

---

<sup>14</sup>THORIN. « À ses détracteurs, il aimait répondre que la politique volontariste ivoirienne d'accueil des étrangers donnait le droit aux Ivoiriens de se réserver quelques privilèges »

It was clear that this new measure was aimed explicitly at ADO, leader of the RDR, to oust him from the Ivorian political scene. At its entry into force in December 1994, the new electoral law was the dominion of *ivoirité* even if at that precise moment nobody gave it this name. The bill will manage tension in the Ivorian political class. The term *ivoirité* became official at the 10th PDCI congress in August 1995 when President HKB pronounced it several times in his speech. HKB aspired to the refoundation of Côte d'Ivoire under the protection of the "white coat of ivoirité" (JOLIVET, 2003, author's Griffon). According to him, ivoirité is: "a unifying concept, base on which must rest the Ivorian nation, *ivoirité* constitutes first an identification framework emphasising the specific values of Ivorian society but is also a framework for integrating the first ethnic components that gave birth to the Côte d'Ivoire and integrates all the external contributions that came blend into the mold of shared destiny (JOLIVET, 2003).

To ensure the dissemination of this new concept and neologism, HKB created the *Cellule universitaire de recherche et de diffusion des idées et des actions politiques du président Henri Konan Bédié* (CURDIPHE). These identity entrepreneurs developed a real concept of *ivoirité*, which was based primarily on the Akan model (JOLIVET, 2003). The Akan are an ethnic group present in particular in Ivory Coast, Ghana and Togo. In Côte d'Ivoire, they are represented by the Baoulé, Agni and Abbron ethnic groups. In 1995, the presidential election came to highlight the political rupture in Côte d'Ivoire. ADO excluded from the election because of the new electoral law, Laurent Gbagbo boycotting the said election, HKB, therefore, has no real opponent. HKB faced Francis Wodié of the *Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs* (PIT) after a completely truncated election. HKB managed to be elected but with minimal legitimacy.

Few intellectuals from the PDCI who developed a restrictive and ethnonationalist conception of citizenship published a text in 1996 through the CURDIPHE, which claimed that:

The Ivorian people must first affirm its sovereignty, its authority in the face of messages of dispossession and subjugation, whether it be immigration or economic and political power. [...] The ivoirité appears to be a system[...]whose coherence presupposes closure. Closure and control of our borders[...] Self-identification naturally implies differentiation from the other, and demarcation presupposes, whether we like it or not, discrimination. [...] To build a "We", we must distinguish it from a "Them" (BANEGAS, [200-], our translation)<sup>15</sup>.

---

<sup>15</sup>BANEGAS, R. « Le peuple ivoirien doit d'abord affirmer sa souveraineté, son autorité face aux messages de dépossession et d'asservissement, qu'il s'agisse de l'immigration ou du pouvoir économique et politique. [...] L'ivoirité apparaît comme un système [...] dont la cohérence présuppose la fermeture. Fermeture et contrôle de nos frontières [...] L'auto-identification implique naturellement la différenciation de l'autre, et la démarcation présuppose, qu'on le veuille ou non, la discrimination. [...] Pour construire un "Nous", nous devons le distinguer d'un 'Eux' »

Behind the *ivoirité*, there was in reality and in a subtle way an “*Akanité*” that rejected not only foreigners but also all other groups – and in particular the Northerners – not belonging to the ethnocultural space of the Centre and the South-East (BANEGAS, [200-]). An ethnonationalist radicalisation that has gained followers and generated very significant tensions in the country. And without realising it, President Bédié had just created a hybrid nationalist-xenophobic species. Some Ivorians used this hybrid nationalist-xenophobic to incite ethnic and religious hatred. If the country was in the grip of an economic crisis, the political and social aspects had just been added to it.

### 2.2.3 The political impact of *ivoirité*

*Les larmes ne se voient pas sous la pluie.*

(You cannot see tears in the rain).

*Proverbe ivoirien ; Le proverbe bambara de la Côte d’Ivoire (1980)*

The reactivation of the ideology of autochthony and the reinforcement of the reference to ethnic aspects in the political game of the urbanised elites, as well as the rapid propensity of *ivoirité*, suddenly laid bare the crisis of the peasant state. In 1998, a law on the rural land estate excluding non-Ivorians from land ownership further fuelled tensions. Conflicts multiplied in rural areas, and those who claimed to be indigenous used the provisions of the new agrarian law as a pretext to drive outsiders off their land (DOZON, 1997). In five years of governance, HKB had achieved a significant break with the founding principles of the Houphouët-Boigny regime on land ownership and the nation’s ethnocultural harmony. Inter-community violence and non-national and non-indigenous populations forced into exile was the typical configuration of Côte d’Ivoire in 1998.

Allochtony had been the main driving force behind the spectacular expansion of the plantation economy that led Côte d’Ivoire, in the 1970s, to boast the title of the world’s leading cocoa producer while occupying an essential place in the export of coffee. However, this same allochtony in the light of the new law on land<sup>16</sup> had become the catalyst for conflicts between

---

<sup>16</sup>The Rural Domain Act: Law No. 98750 of 23 December 1998, Official Gazette of 14 January 1999. The law reserves rural land ownership to Ivorians. It provides for an initial ten-year phase during which any holder of land rights involving appropriation of land must have his or her rights recognised in order to obtain an individual or collective land certificate. After this period, the land is registered in the name of the State and the operator becomes the tenant. At the end of a second three-year period, land certificates held by Ivorians must be registered individually and lead to the issuance of a final private property title. Non-Ivorian operators can only aspire to a promise of an emphyteutic lease, either from the indigenous holders of land certificates, if the latter have included them among the “bona fide occupants”, or from the State if the land is registered in the latter’s name.

Ivorians (DOZON, 1997). The Baoulé were the people who have benefited from this allochtony. Politically, the central and ambivalent position of the Baoulé world – i.e., both indigenous and non-indigenous – was reflected in the significant representation, in addition to Houphouët-Boigny, of its nationals in the highest authorities of the party and the State (DOZON, 1997).

President Bédié has tried several times to put forward the Akan culture, according to him, the Baoulé have possessed the very sense of statehood since time immemorial (FOTE, 2000). Being a descendant of a double royal filiation as he liked to assert, he, therefore, had a presidential legitimacy based on traditional and aristocratic legitimacy (JOLIVET, 2003). The president had probably forgotten that Côte d'Ivoire was a democracy where the president is elected based on his political merit and not based on his royal blood. As a result, the country has become highly polarised, politically and socially. And this sharp polarisation immediately resulted in political and regional conflicts against the backdrop of a land crisis. In a country where political ideology is more regional and ethnic than strictly political, incitement to ethnic hatred is a formidable weapon capable of destabilising any regime. Like the Asian Dragon, HKB wanted to create the African Elephant. Only that, the foundations were not strong enough to support the weight of such a pachyderm.

The crisis has also shifted to the university and school levels. Indeed, the two future “charismatic” leaders of the Ivorian conflict, as will be seen in the following chapters, are former general secretaries of FESCI. Guillaume Soro, the future spokesman of the dissidents and secretary-general of the Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI) which became Forces Nouvelles, led FESCI from 1995 to 1998. He was a student of English. And Blé Goudé, the future leader of the “*Jeunes Patriotes*” in favour of President Gbagbo, led FESCI from 1998 to 2001. He was also a student of English (KOUYATE, 2003; PROTEAU, 2012). The 1998 congress was crucial because it was there that the divisions in FESCI between the pro-RDR with Guillaume Soro at its head and the pro-FPI with Blé Goudé as its leader became clear. Blé Goudé won, and it was from that moment that FESCI was divided along clear political lines (PROTEAU, 2012).

*Ivoirité* has grown considerably in the context of the urban employment crisis and a crisis in rurality that had given rise to numerous land disputes. But the politicisation of this land aspect had targeted foreigners and some Ivorian citizens of “doubtful nationality”. In a deleterious context and atmosphere, nationals from the North were systematically associated with “foreigners” and stigmatised by their fellow citizens from the South who were convinced that they were “true Ivorians” (BANEGAS, [200-], author's Griffon). Political quarrels often have grave consequences, but the effects are even more disastrous when they are played out




politically and ethnically. In Côte d'Ivoire, the Baoulé fought against the Dioula, the Bété no longer got along with the Guéré, and all because of politics, as Tiken Jah Fakoly so aptly points out in one of his songs (FAKOLY, 1999).

Ethnic groups in the south, particularly the Akan and Krou, which are overwhelmingly “Christian” and live in the rich and prosperous forest zone of Côte d'Ivoire, saw their congeners in the north as foreigners – reinforcing the view that these migrants from the north had never been at home in the south. In a country where the rural population is more than the urban population (see graph 5), land tenure problems are real triggers for conflict. The shift from the concept of *ivoirité* to xenophobia and social and ethnic exclusion took on religious overtones when ADO was assimilated to the North and Muslim while HKB represented the South and Christians. It was therefore not surprising to see the international and even local press highlight the theory that Côte d'Ivoire was divided between its Muslims in the north and its Christians in the south. This bombardment of the press had echoes among Ivoirians who psychologically adopted this tendency painted by the media. Tensions between Muslims and Christians increased.

As Basset (2003, p 17) pointed out, “Ivorian political life produced a narrow definition of citizenship, based on ethno-territorial criteria”. This political vision has given rise to the absolute notion of the foreigner, who, as opposed to the Ivorian, “is not of his or her ethnic group and is not a national” (DEMBELE, 2002, p 161). The ethnic-regionalist turn in political life was partly due to the economic crisis that hit the country in the 1980s and early 1990s (BASSET, 2003). This economic crisis deprived Côte d'Ivoire of the financial resources that had fuelled a well-oiled mechanism of political patrimonialism under the mandates of Houphouët-Boigny and Konan Bédié (MARIE, 2002).

Political, economic, social and land crisis were the ingredients that pushed Côte d'Ivoire and the Ivoirians to their final entrenchment, and with no other way out, the country sank. And as a symbol of this rift, 24 December 1999, the eve of Christmas Day – a holiday that traditionally brings the whole family together - was the day chosen for Côte d'Ivoire's first military coup d'état.

**Chart 5 - Côte d'Ivoire urban-rural population (%) 1975 - 2014**

*Source: Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitation (RGPH) 2014*

### **2.3 The 1999 coup d'état and the second Republic in Côte d'Ivoire**

Surrounded by countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Liberia and Guinea that have experienced coup d'état, Côte d'Ivoire seemed to be the blessed child that had escaped this calamity. Côte d'Ivoire was one of the small circles of nations proud to have never suffered a coup d'état with disastrous consequences on the socio-economic development of the countries concerned (N'GUESSAN, 2003). But make no mistake about it, the country was not marked with the divine seal, it only escaped to this calamity due to its clever clientelism and to strategically satisfy several actors both nationally and internationally. But when resources become scarce, and one can no longer please everyone, one creates discontent and revolt, as an old African saying goes "when money goes out the door, love goes out the window". In Côte d'Ivoire money had gone out the door slowly because of the economic crisis and above all the mismanagement of resources and love thus, had gone out the window giving way to hatred, resentment and bitterness.

In many cases, you can make revolts with doctrines, but in Côte d'Ivoire revolts were made with injustice, economic, political and social crisis. It is in this climate that General Gueï Robert and his soldiers decided to act. This section is to talk about the (1) 1999 coup d'état, and (2) Côte d'Ivoire post-1999.

### 2.3.1 1999 coup d'état

On 24 December 1999, a coup d'état came to fulfil the wishes of certain Ivorians who always had more or less implicitly wanted such a scenario, the only one likely to redistribute the cards politically (N'GUESSAN, 2003). During the night of Wednesday 22 to Thursday 23 December, a small group of soldiers seized, without difficulty, the powder magazine of the Akouédo camp on the road to Bingerville, east of Abidjan. At the head of this commando were Staff Sergeants Souleymane Diomandé and Boka Yapi, who were supported by four other corporals (KPATINDE, 2009). Initially, these men intended to obtain the payment of arrears of pay and bonuses and, beyond that, the improvement of the situation of the men in the ranks. It was only a revolt by a handful of soldiers claiming their arrears of pay.

Corporal Issa Touré complained, "We also wanted to take this opportunity to protest against the bullying and injustices that we, men of the rank, have suffered for several years at the hands of some of our leaders. For example, promotions were no longer based on merit and seniority, but on ethnic criteria" (KPATINDE, 2009). After taking control of the arms depot, the soldiers fired bursts into the air, causing a start of panic in the barracks. Captain Crépy thus received orders from his hierarchy to quell what appeared to be a mutiny. But the six men claimed to have a hundred or so heavily armed partisans – which was not the case – and threatened, in the event of an attack, to blow up the powder keg, at the risk of destroying the entire camp, but also part of the city of Abidjan. The bluff worked wonderfully, and the mutineers' daring seduced their comrades, who rallied the movement (KPATINDE, 2009).

President HKB was informed of this mutiny, but although, he decided to return to his native village of Daoukro to spend the end of the year festivities with his family. The insurgents requisitioned private cars in which they spread panic throughout the town and shortly afterwards took control of *Radio Television Ivoirienne* (RTI). As if nothing had happened, the president, for his part, had a quiet lunch with his family. One of his advisers advised him to return to Abidjan to try to calm the mutineers, but the president did not seem to realise the

seriousness of the situation. After his adviser's insistence, which was more than reckless, he decided to return to Abidjan.

Meanwhile, Daniel Kablan Duncan, then Prime Minister, was receiving a delegation of insurgents led by Staff Sergeant Boka Yapi. The head of government promised to do his best to satisfy them, on condition that the insurgents return to their barracks as soon as possible. The militaries, refusing to be satisfied with vague promises, then asked to negotiate directly with the president (KPATINDE, 2009).

The insurgents had seized the Félix-Houphouët-Boigny airport and had blocked the two bridges linking Abidjan South with Abidjan North. President HKB received a call from the President of Benin, Mathieu Kérékou, who told him: "Believe in my experience as an officer. Judging by the images of foreign televisions that reach me in Cotonou, this is not a simple mutiny. These people know that they are facing a firing squad. If they go that far, it is because they are ready for anything" (KPATINDE, 2009). In the early morning of 24 December 1999, the President received a call from General Robert Gueï – a former chief of staff and former minister – who informed him of his return to Abidjan. President HKB was becoming increasingly nervous, so he decided to bring the meeting scheduled later in the day with the insurgent soldiers forward to 07:00 a.m. HKB received four mutineers led by Sergeant Ibrahim Coulibaly alias "IB", a former sports instructor and former member of the close guard of former Prime Minister ADO (KPATINDE, 2009).

But it was too late, a group of soldiers led by General Robert Gueï arrived at Radio Nostalgie, whose director, Ahmed Bakayoko, was a close relative of ADO. Robert Gueï announced the dismissal of the head of state, the dissolution of the National Assembly, the government, the Constitutional Council and the Supreme Court. The Ivorians were overjoyed, "Bédié has fallen! Gueï president!", was the word used here and there. At the same time, soldiers went to the *Maison d'arrêt et de correction d'Abidjan* to release RDR leaders and activists who have been imprisoned since October. However, dangerous criminals were taking advantage of the situation to get away with it.

Radio Nostalgie, the new mutineers' favourite station, broadcasts reggae and rap. Some Ivorian artists such as Fadal Dey hummed "*Plus jamais ça, on ne veut plus de ça*", while Tiken Jah Fakoly covered one of his key songs "*Promesses annoncées, promesses oubliées. L'éléphant annoncé est arrivé avec un pied cassé. Xénophobie, corruption, voici le lot quotidien*" (KPATINDE, 2009). HKB having understood that all was lost, had the idea to join with his family and friends the French embassy by a tunnel that linked the presidential residence

to the French representation. This tunnel had been built in the time of the “*vieux*” for such eventualities.

Later, Togo agreed to receive HKB and his relatives, so it is in this country that he was exiled. At the same time, the one who organised everything so that former President HKB would have a place to stay, Mr Georges Ouénin, Director of State Protocol, decided to remain in Côte d’Ivoire. This gentleman had led Félix Houphouët-Boigny to his final resting place. He had also just led HKB on the road to exile. His mission accomplished, Ouénin returned home quietly. He resumed service a few days later in his office on the ground floor of the presidential palace, surprisingly preserved from sacking by the mutineers.

The coup d’état, or as some liked to call it “*the coup d’éclat*” – a burst of radiance in English, took place without loss of human life, so it is a rare occurrence when it comes to coups in Africa. HKB after six years in power had just been deposed, the Ivorians saw in the coup d’état of 24 December 1999, a gift from heaven for renewal and reconciliation in Côte d’Ivoire. As General Robert Gueï, or rather President Gueï or “Santa Claus in military uniform” – as the national and international press called him, said, “We have come to sweep the house [...] and believe me, I’m not a power-hungry wannabe.” (GUEÏ, 1999)

In 1990, General Robert Gueï was appointed Chief of Staff by President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who at the time was already suspicious of him. Robert Gueï was far from being the most senior officer in the highest rank. Félix Houphouët-Boigny used to say with great cynicism: “Well, if he likes money, I will line his pockets!” (KPATINDE, 2009). HKB, for his part, feared the independence and rebellious spirit of Gueï, whose popularity among men of the rank annoyed him. In October 1995, he, therefore, relieved him of his post of General and appointed him Minister of Civic Service (KPATINDE, 2009). Robert Gueï who frightened a lot and this well before December 24, 1999, became the third President of Côte d’Ivoire.

### 2.3.2 Côte d’Ivoire post 1999

After HKB’s fall, parties such as the FPI and the RDR, which in the meantime had allied themselves to fight against the excesses of HKB power, disunited and each party started to defend its interests. In February 2000, General Robert Gueï appointed a so-called Transitional Government composed of members of the RDR and members of the FPI. But the attitudes of President Robert Gueï disappointed many Ivorians who had believed in the miracle for a long time. For instead of being federative, the president would further exacerbate pre-

existing political tensions. It did not take long for the man who said he did not have power addiction to change his mind. He formally appeared as a candidate in the 2000 presidential elections, and following a cabinet reshuffle, all members of the RDR left the Transitional Government. The road to the 2000 presidential elections was a long one.

The General-President, at the head of a military junta, did no better than his predecessor HKB. Indeed, he too adopted the principle of *ivoirité* to ward off his rivals, and by this, we mean ADO, leader of the RDR. Robert Gueï introduced a draft bill for a new constitution which was submitted to a referendum. This new Constitution was adopted in July 2000 almost unanimously. The most striking fact is that this constitution was also supported by all the major parties, including the RDR whose leader, Alassane Ouattara, seemed to be targeted by this constitution. Article 35 of the new constitution states that: “[...] The candidate for the presidential election must be at least 40 years old and no more than 75 years old. He must be of Ivorian origin, born of a father and mother who are themselves Ivorian by origin. He must never have renounced Ivorian nationality. He must never have availed himself of another nationality. [...]” (CÔTE D’IVOIRE, 2000).

The referendum vote was won by a vast majority of YES at 86.53% against NO at 13.47%, for the adoption of the Constitution of the 2nd Republic and the Electoral Code (KAUDJHIS – OFFOUMOU, 2001) (see map 4). Thus, a Constitution and an Electoral Code were adopted, the basis on which the 2000 presidential elections have been held. It was a massive and historic YES with fundamental legal value to bring the country out of the transition period and allow presidential and legislative elections to take place to have a healthy institutional life. The transparency in the organisation of the referendum foreshadowed the openness of the general elections (KAUDJHIS – OFFOUMOU, 2001).

Presidential elections were scheduled for 17 September 2000 and the National Electoral Commission (CNE), established by Ordinance No. 2000-551 of 9 August 2000, has registered 19 candidacies for the 2000 presidential elections (KAUDJHIS – OFFOUMOU, 2001). Among these candidates was that of President General Robert Gueï, President of the *Comité National du Salut Public*, which was, in fact, the transitional government. It should be noted, however, that the candidacy of the outgoing Head of State was the subject of many discussions. Also, there were, among others, the candidacies of ADO president of the RDR, Laurent Gbagbo president of the FPI and HKB who was in exile in France and was one of the nine candidates of the PDCI.

Of the 19 candidacies received by the CNE, 14 were rejected by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, which was presided over by Mr Tia Koné – former Special

Legal Adviser to Robert Gueï – who was appointed President of the Supreme Court and President of the Constitutional Chamber (KAUDJHIS – OFFOUMOU, 2001). Indeed, the Supreme Court declared ineligible ADO and the candidates proposed by the PDCI including HKB, Emile Constant Bombet and Lamine Fadiga.

HKB was accused of submitting an incomplete file. The medical examination provided for in Article 35 of the Constitution required that “[...] The candidate for the Presidency of the Republic must present a complete state of physical and mental well-being duly established by a panel of three doctors appointed by the Constitutional Council from a list proposed by the Council of the Medical Association. These three doctors must take an oath before the Constitutional Council [...]” (CÔTE D’IVOIRE, 2000). It seemed that HKB would not have fulfilled this requirement.


ADO’s candidacy was disqualified because there was doubt about the identity of his parents. Also, there was an initial doubt that affected the validity of his sworn declarations of non-waiver of Ivorian nationality and non-prevalence of another nationality. ADO had enrolled at the University of Pennsylvania with Voltaic citizenship – Burkina Faso – and married Barbara Jean Davis in Philadelphia on 10 January 1966, as a Voltaic. He was then appointed Vice-Governor of BCEAO on 1 December 1982 and decorated as a Voltaic in the same year (KAUDJHIS – OFFOUMOU, 2001). That led the Supreme Court to conclude that he was not Ivorian by origin, born of a father and mother who were themselves Ivorian by birth and who at times in his life had claimed another nationality.

The candidature of Emile Constant Bombet was rejected for dubious morality because of the judicial investigation in the case of embezzlement of public funds known as the case of the 18 billion of the European Union in which he is charged. The candidacy of Mohamed Lamine Fadiga was rejected because he had not repaid for a long time a loan of money that banks had granted him for work on his house. And for the fact that a company under the supervision of his Ministry had allegedly given his wife a plane ticket as a gift (KAUDJHIS – OFFOUMOU, 2001).

Thus, as credible candidates in the race, only Laurent Gbagbo and Robert Gueï remained. Faced with the elimination of many candidates, Washington suspended its assistance in the preparation of the ballot, Gnassingbé Eyadema and the Organisation of African Union – OAU – regretted the rejection of these candidates. At the same time, France called on Ivorians to take their responsibilities. The European Union and the United Nations recalled their observers. In a completely tense climate, the electoral calendar was published with the following deadlines: the Presidential elections on 22 October 2000, the legislative elections on

10 December 2000 and the municipal elections on 21 January 2001, which were postponed to 25 March 2001.

#### Illustration 4 - July 2000 referendum result



Source: Carte: Ch. Bouquet; dessin: N. Pau-Martinez, G. Ravignon et M-L Penin

The presidential campaign took place in a relatively calm atmosphere, but things began to tighten as the election approached. The RDR and the PDCI naturally called for a boycott of the said election. On Sunday 22 October 2000, the polling took place in a flat calm, there were 5,475,143 registered voters on the electoral list for a total of 16,317 polling stations (KAUDJHIS – OFFOUMOU, 2001). There have not been many presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire under the banner of the multiparty system. The 2000 election was the third, but each time the Ivorians were entitled to their share of surprises. The CNE had started to count the




ballot papers on Monday 23 October 2000. After counting 20% of the constituencies, the outgoing president was in the lead, but this trend was reversed entirely after 40% of the votes have been counted.

But the counting of the votes and the provisional results ceased to be broadcast live to the general stupefaction. On 24 October, the CNE, which had been created by presidential order of Robert Gueï and charged with managing the electoral process, was dissolved by the latter as it proceeded to count the votes. The head of the junta accused CNE of a lack of professionalism. The CNE's powers were subsequently transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and Decentralisation by another presidential order. Immediately, a curfew and a state of emergency were declared for the same day until Saturday 28 October 2000.

The Ministry of Interior and Decentralisation declared Robert Gueï the winner of the election with 52.72% of the votes against 41.02% for Laurent Gbagbo. Robert Gueï thus, proclaimed himself elected president. Facing what appeared to be another coup, Laurent Gbagbo asked the Ivorian population to take to the streets until Robert Gueï backed down. At the same time, the RDR was organising a demonstration for the resumption of the presidential elections with the participation of all candidates. Violent clashes between pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara followed.

In the meantime, on 25 October 2000, the rehabilitated CNE resumed its work to continue to proclaim the provisional results of the presidential elections at the end of which Laurent Gbagbo was elected President of the Republic with 59,36% of the votes against 32,72% to the outgoing president (see map 5). On 26 October 2000, the provisional results proclaimed by the CNE were confirmed by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court which proceeded the same day to the investiture of Laurent Gbagbo as President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire (KAUDJHIS – OFFOUMOU, 2001). After the investiture, it is noted that Robert Gueï was no longer in Abidjan. He left the Presidential Palace by helicopter. A mass grave with 57 bodies was discovered in the industrial zone of Yopougon on 27 October 2000. That is how Côte d'Ivoire began its new political life under the Second Republic.

**Illustration 5 - 22 October 2000 presidential election results**




Source: carte: Ch. Bouquet ; dessin : N. Pau-Martinez, G. Ravignon et M-L Penin

## 2.4 The difficult way out of the crisis

The participation rate of 37.42% showed how this election took place in a climate of tension and crisis. The many clashes that occurred in the post-election period were only the result of a socially and politically divided country. In Cocody, Yopougon and Abobo, several people had been beaten up either because of their ethnic origins or because of their membership in a political party. Clashes between RDR militants and gendarmes took place in front of ADO's home, and ADO had to take refuge at the residence of the German ambassador, which was close to his own. Abobo and Yopougon have always been the scene of violent clashes between supporters of the RDR and the FPI; they are the two most populous communes in Abidjan (see

Graph 6). This partly explains why the battle of Abidjan in 2011 lasted longer in these two communes (see Chapter 4).

**Chart 6 - The population of the city of Abidjan by commune – 2014**



Source : Recensement Général de la Population des de l'Habitation (RGPH) 2014

The 57 bodies discovered on the Yopougon mass grave were those of the “dioula”, an ethnic group that supports ADO. The RDR demanded that an investigation be opened to establish the responsibilities of the perpetrators of such a massacre. Even the announcement of the formation of a new government including the ministers of the FPI, PDCI and PIT did not help to ease tensions. PDCI had also requested a postponement of the legislative elections scheduled for December 2000 given the tense political climate, but its request was not heard. It was therefore in a tense socio-political climate that the CNE began receiving candidatures for the legislative elections. Legislative that did not augur well. In this section, we will discuss (1) The unfortunate timing of the 2000 parliamentary elections, (2) a country in turmoil, (3) the press role in the Ivorian crisis, and (4) They had been warned.

#### 2.4.1 The unfortunate timing of the 2000 legislative elections

The PDCI's request for the postponement of the 2000 legislative elections appeared at first to be a desperate attempt by the party to try to unite its forces, yet the events that followed these elections would prove the PDCI was right. From 3 November 2000, less than a week after the clashes that followed the proclamation of the presidential results, the CNE began receiving candidatures for the legislative elections. Among the candidates were the unfortunate presidential candidates such as ADO, Emile Constant Bombet and Mohammed Lamine Fadiga. The CNE has registered the candidatures of this three-person. The CNE based its decision on the fact that the conditions of good morality, high integrity and non-prevalence of another nationality provided for the presidential elections are not required for the legislative elections. According to the CNE, only the condition of non-renunciation of Ivorian citizenship is needed for parliamentary elections, as stipulated in article 71 of the Electoral Code (CÔTE D'IVOIRE, 2000). Article 82 of the Electoral Code stipulates that: "The Electoral Commission shall reject any candidate whose application does not comply with the above provisions..." (CÔTE D'IVOIRE, 2000). The CNE found the said candidatures to conform and declared them admissible.

However, article 98 of the same Electoral Code mentions that "The right to contest eligibility belongs to every voter within eight days from the date of publication of the candidacy" (CÔTE D'IVOIRE, 2000). The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court is responsible for challenging eligibility. As a result, 1117 petitions challenging the eligibility of the President of the RDR, Mr ADO, were filed with the Supreme Court (KAUDJHIS-OFFOUMOU, 2001). On 1 December 2000, the Supreme Court, whose members were all appointed by the former putschist general Robert Gueï, rejected the candidacy of Alassane Ouattara for the legislative elections on the grounds of doubt as to his Ivorian nationality (ENCYCLOPÆDIA UNIVERSALIS, 2020).

The RDR announced that it was withdrawing from the Mediation Committee for National Reconciliation set up by President Gbagbo and that it would not participate in the legislative elections, thereby removing its 221 candidates for the legislative elections. ADO called on his supporters to take part in a national protest march, on the 4 December, towards Abidjan, a rally which was banned by the authorities. It was followed by violent clashes between ADO supporters and gendarmes, resulting in dozens of deaths. President Gbagbo declared a state of emergency.


The Mediation Committee for National Reconciliation initiated to investigate post-electoral violence in Abidjan that claimed the lives of 171 citizens between October 24-26, 2000, issued a communiqué in which it proposed the rehabilitation of Candidate ADO in his

civil and political rights and the postponement of the legislative elections to one week. Under these conditions, the RDR agreed to participate in the parliamentary elections and undertook to launch an appeal to its militants for a definitive return to calm and social peace (KAUDJHIS-OFFOUMOU, 2001). The committee's call to report the December 2000 elections remained unheeded because of the refusal of the PDCI and the FPI to postpone the legislative elections of 10 December 2000. Thus, the legislative elections were held on Sunday 10 December in 145 electoral districts out of a total of 174. The polls could not be held in 27 constituencies in the north – because of the violent demonstrations – which could only be filled with deputies during the by-elections on 14 January 2001 (COMMISSION DIALOGUE, VÉRITÉ ET RÉCONCILIATION, 2014).

Following the legislative elections of 10 December 2000, without the by-elections of 14 January 2001, the ruling FPI party won 96 seats, the PDCI won 79 seats, the PIT won 4 seats, the UDCY 1 seat and the MFA 1 seat. Independent candidates defecting from the PDCI won 17 seats. The participation rate was 33 per cent, and 198 seats out of a total of 225 were filled, the remaining 27 were to be filled in the north in the January 2001 by-elections. By-elections were therefore finally held in 25 constituencies out of the 27 remaining to be filled, with a participation rate of 13.27%. In the Kong constituency, elections were not held for two seats (KAUDJHIS - OFFOUMOU, 2001). In the end, the distribution of the 223 seats out of the 225 was as follows: FPI 96 seats, PDCI 94 seats, RDR 5 seats, PIT 4 seats, Independents 22 seats, UDCY 1 seat and MFA 1 seat (KAUDJHIS - OFFOUMOU, 2001). (see map six below). During the ordinary session of the National Assembly on Monday 22 January 2001, Mr Mamadou Koulibaly was elected President of the National Assembly. The FPI had succeeded in rallying other deputies, thus obtaining 115 deputies, which constituted an absolute majority.

Meanwhile, during the night of Sunday 7 to Monday 8 January 2001, intense gunfire was heard not far from the Centre of Abidjan, the Ivorian economic capital. The attackers, who were trying to overthrow President Gbagbo, seized the radio station in the administrative Centre of plateau and the national television station in the Cocody district (CHAMPIN, 2001). The recovery of television and then radio later in the morning came at the cost of violent fighting between loyalist and putschist forces. At least two gendarmes were killed, and there were reportedly several deaths among the assailants (CHAMPIN, 2001).

**Illustration 6 - December 2000/January 2001 Legislative Election results.**



Source : carte: Ch. Bouquet; dessin: N. Pau-Martinez, G. Ravignon et M-L Penin

The great question was who was behind the failed putsch? It was difficult to give a clear answer. However, the Ivorian government, while cautiously avoiding overly direct accusations, pointed out at the north of Côte d'Ivoire, the stronghold of ADO. Many of the 30 or so attackers arrested have northern names, and some have papers from countries along the north border (RUEFF, 2001). The Defence Minister also explained that a convoy of 4 x 4 men-at-arms escorting a black Mercedes from the north had been stopped, before disappearing into the wilderness on the side of Kong, the Ouattara family's paternal village (RUEFF, 2001). This black Mercedes would belong to "IB" chief of mutineers and former ADO bodyguards. In barely two months of his presidency, Laurent Gbagbo had had to face his third crisis.

#### 2.4.2 A country in turmoil


If members of a repressed group, either ethnic or religious cannot be employed in specific sectors, while other groups can, members of these groups are more likely to suffer higher levels of unemployment and poverty (MUCHLINSKI, 2019). If these divisions are relevant in explaining political, social, or economic outcomes across political regimes, these divisions may become fault lines for ethnic or religious conflict (GRIM; FINKE, 2007). Recently, scholars have emphasised the likelihood of group conflict by looking at political exclusion as the primary explanatory variable (CEDERMAN; KRISTIAN; HALVARD, 2013), however ethnical and religious grievances can be added to political discrimination. As Tilly (1978) made clear, the presence of grievances alone does not necessarily lead to conflict. Therefore, groups must not only be motivated to engage in conflict but also must have the opportunity to do so (LUDOVICO; HALEY; JEROEN, 2020). The rise of poverty, unemployment and the “ivoirisation” process opened up for new tensions between the ethnic groups. Foreigners and Northerners became deemed as a threat to the advancement and survival of the other autochthonous groups. As a result, several ethnic conflicts arose during the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century (UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM, 2020).

Recent studies measured economic inequalities and conflict on a national level and found a positive relationship between economic inequality and conflict (CEDERMAN; KRISTIAN; HALVARD, 2013). The financial crisis of the early 1980s snowballed, and land, political and social crisis were added to it. The concept of *ivoirité* advocated by HKB was utterly wrong, those who were Ivorians in 1990 were no longer Ivorians in 1995 and those who were Ivorians in 1995 did not know if they would be Ivorians in 2000. The “and” and the “or” conjunctions burst into the political life of Ivorians were a real problem for the Ivorians.

After the coup in 1999, the truncated presidential and legislative elections in 2000, Côte d’Ivoire was to organise the municipal elections in 2001. The municipal elections were held in good conditions and ADO’s RDR, which had boycotted the previous elections because its leader was banned from running, won in 64 out of 195 municipalities. The PDCI won 58 cities, while President Laurent Gbagbo’s FPI won only 34 with a 41 per cent turnout (ENCYCLOPÆDIA UNIVERSALIS, 2020) (see map 7 below).



### Illustration 7 - March 2001 Municipal election results



Source: carte: Ch. Bouquet ; dessin : N. Pau-Martinez, G. Ravignon et M-L Penin

Following the municipal elections, the political situation in Côte d'Ivoire became relatively relaxed. In the application of its policy of national unity, the Ivorian authorities issued a certificate of nationality to ADO on 29 June 2002, and President Laurent Gbagbo appointed four members of the RDR to the government. But in Côte d'Ivoire, for the last ten years, the calm has always preceded the storm. During the night of 18-19 September 2002, armed men launched an assault on several barracks and gendarmeries in Abidjan and simultaneously in the north of Côte d'Ivoire, in Bouaké and Korhogo.

There was confusion in the ranks of the army, but it was not long before the army launched its counterattack. In Abidjan, street fighting turned in favour of the loyalists. The army tracked down the insurgents while remaining on the alert in case a second wave of attacks broke



out (KAIROUZ, 2016). In Bouaké, where I was, we had heard rifle shots, but since I lived next to the military and police barracks, I told myself that it was probably soldier training. But in the morning, from my bay window, I realised that there wasn't a soul living in the streets. Bouaké, a city so lively had turned into a ghost town. So, I suspected that something was wrong. I went to the balcony, and that's when a shot – no doubt a warning shot or perhaps a missed shot – went through the bay window and into the wall. So, I had just realised that this was no laughing matter, but that things were dangerous.

In Abidjan, the former president, General Robert Gueï, was assassinated in unexplained circumstances, along with the Minister of the Interior, Emile Boga Doudou. In Bouaké and Korhogo the first attempts at loyalist counter-offensives were made and failed, these two cities fell into the hands of the dissidents. A colossal confusion was reigning in Côte d'Ivoire because it was not clear what was going on. ADO and his wife narrowly escaped an assassination attempt by death squads by taking refuge in extremis in the German embassy (KAIROUZ, 2016). President Gbagbo, who was on an official visit to Italy, had to shorten his stay and return to Côte d'Ivoire in a hurry. Terror had taken hold in the country and summary executions – both loyalists and dissidents – had become the order of the day. But who were the dissidents so powerfully armed? Laurent Gbagbo had his idea when he said: "Heavy weapons, mostly new weapons, weapons that our army does not have – so we cannot say that it is the army of Côte d'Ivoire that is rebelling – weapons used in foreign armies or bought from governments" (KAIROUZ, 2016). Immediately Burkina Faso and Blaise Compaoré were pointed out. It was already circulating the information of assailants' training in the base of Pô in Burkina, facts which support the thesis of Burkinabé interference.

The 19 September attack plan targeted three cities: Abidjan, Bouaké and Korhogo. A different military leader was appointed for each of the three cities. Messemba koné in Korhogo, Diarassouba Oumar in Bouaké – who died accidentally at the end of September, and Ouattara Yssouf in Abidjan. These men, therefore, infiltrated these localities. Soon the towns of Bouaké and Korhogo fell into the hands of the dissidents, in Abidjan the government forces repelled the attackers. However, Soro Guillaume, who was stuck in Abidjan, had to disguise himself as a young girl to escape, first to Bassam and then to Ghana before reaching Bouaké (SORO, 2005). At that time, nobody knew the identity of the dissidents.

After the failure of the loyalists to retake the northern cities, the north-south split of the country was slowly beginning to take place. The dissidents announced their first demands through one of their leaders, Guillaume Soro: the departure of Laurent Gbagbo, the acquisition of Ivorian nationality by all the country's inhabitants, but also and above all the cessation of the

xenophobic ideology of *ivoirité* (SORO, 2005). It was thus the beginning of the Ivorian-Ivorian crisis, which extended over a long period and which will be discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis.

#### 2.4.3. The press role in the Ivorian crisis

Propaganda is a very effective means in politics, and its effectiveness depends in part on the tool used to relay the information. Nowadays, with the proliferation of social media, it has become effortless to circulate information. It favours the dissemination of Fake-news – a tactic that is widely used by powerful politicians today. So, the Internet has become a method of getting information and getting informed. However, the internet can be an instrument of disinformation. While the internet is increasingly playing a leading role in social and political life, the print and broadcast media continue to have a privileged place as an information apparatus. The press therefore played a prominent role in the pre-crisis period, during the crisis and in the post-crisis period in Côte d’Ivoire. At the beginning of the Ivorian crisis, the Ivorian print and audio-visual media were accused by national actors and international observers of adding fuel to the fire by inciting violence and hatred between the population.

In an ethno-regionalist configuration of politics in Côte d’Ivoire, the affiliation of the press with political parties is commonplace. Thus, a media may be financed by a charismatic leader of a political party to be more read by the supporters of that party. In December 2005, there were 16 daily newspapers of opinion and information in the Ivorian press landscape, divided into three categories: blue journals, “G7” newspapers and balanced newspapers (THÉROUX-BÉNONI; BAH, 2008). The so-called “blue” newspapers take the colour of the emblem of their political party, i.e., the FPI. These are so-called republican newspapers, advocating constitutional legality and respect for institutions. For them, the Ivorian crisis had to be placed in a context of neo-decolonisation against France led by Chirac who has the support of the great powers, foreign media and some African heads of state. According to them, the national opponents – military and political – of the crisis would only be puppets of the colonising powers (THÉROUX-BÉNONI; BAH, 2008).

The “G7” newspapers group are indifferently pro-RDR, pro-PDCI, pro-IB, pro-Soro or more simply anti-FPI or anti-Gbagbo. For most of these newspapers, the fight is not for postcolonial emancipation but for human dignity and the right to citizenship, which requires a redefinition of the contours of the nation, the modes of access to nationality and the prerogatives of citizens (THÉROUX-BÉNONI; BAH, 2008). Balancers are newspapers that call

themselves “neutral and objective” and “type one day on the left, the other day on the right”. However, they do not always manage to stay on edge (THÉROUX-BÉNONI; BAH, 2008, authors’ Griffon).

But it should be noted that the media war had already begun before the start of the Ivorian crisis in 2002. These pro-Gbagbo, pro-HKB and pro-ADO press organs were engaged in a distant battle that culminated in the 2002 crisis. In a country where readers are mostly “*titrologue*”, i.e., people who only read newspaper titles and then debate without even knowing the content, some titles may simply incite hatred and violence. Once when a newspaper put on its front page “Alassane the American is back” because he held a position at the International Monetary Fund in the United States. Several Ivorians had taken up the idea that Alassane was an American, not even an African<sup>17</sup>.

In addition to the phenomenon of “*titrologue*”, there was another widespread socio-cultural fact in Côte d’Ivoire which consisted of buying a newspaper so that almost the whole neighbourhood could read it. In this way, young and old alike can engage in debates arising from the reading of the journal. It is followed by real discussions in the streets, in spaces called “*agoras*” or “*parlements*” and “*grins*”. The expression “*agoras* or/and *parlements*” is a term used in Côte d’Ivoire to refer to the spaces for street discussions organised by young people in practically all the communes of Abidjan and certain cities in the interior of the country (BAH, 2003).

The “*Sorbonne*” was the most famous place of the “*agoras*” or “*parlements*” in Abidjan. The “*Sorbonne*” like the name of the University of Paris in France, was the forum for Laurent Gbagbo’s young ideologues – often unemployed academics. They met there to discuss politics and the debates were often heated, and to listen to them up close one would sometimes think they were advisors to Laurent Gbagbo or his family. The “*Sorbonne*” was also a vast informal market, a temple of piracy – of CDs and DVDs – and a place of prostitution. The “*Sorbonne*” was destroyed on April 2011 after the president Laurent Gbagbo was defeated by the French and ADO troops. These groups of young people, mostly Akan or Krou, welcome the pieces of information of the blue newspapers as gospel lyrics. In contrast, the newspapers of the “G7” group are kept under surveillance and qualified as pro-colonialist.

As for grins, it is a term commonly used in the *Dioula* language and refers to “the place where people gather” (THÉROUX-BÉNONI; BAH, 2008). It is, therefore, a place where people affiliated with the “G7” meet to discuss the political and social situation of the country.

---

<sup>17</sup>Cf Les garagistes. Titrologues. Performed by les garagistes. Dynamite Ivoire Vol 1, 2010. Apple Music.

They exist in the various communes of Abidjan with names linked to the Ivorian political situation such as “*Le Parlement*”, “*L’ONU*”, “*Linass-Marcoussis*”, “*Fraternité*”, and the “*Sénat*” in Bouaké which would have the same mode of operation as the “*Sorbonne*” in the Plateau (THÉROUX-BÉNONI; BAH, 2008).

The press was therefore aware of the influence it had on these various movements, which enabled it the instrumentalisation of this social and political polarisation in Côte d’Ivoire. The lack of economic opportunity and the lack of appreciation of the youth in Côte d’Ivoire, combined with political propaganda against the backdrop of a quarrel between natives and migrants, has been a real catalyst in the Ivorian crisis, as the economic crisis is a source of migration or violence. The press has played a crucial role in disseminating the information that migrants are at the root of the economic situation of indigenous youth because they have a monopoly on informal employment and therefore survive the crisis. It is important to recall that in Côte d’Ivoire there are two types of migrants: the Ivorian migrant who crosses the internal borders of the regions and the non-Ivorian migrant who is a citizen from a third country. However, this migration is only the result of the policy of the peasant state put in place by the first Ivorian president. Nonetheless, the concept of “*ivoirité*” has created a wholly blurred line between the Ivorian migrant – especially the Mande and the gour – and the non-Ivorian migrant.

The international press, for its part, was very reductive about the Ivorian crisis to a conflict between the Muslim north and the Christian south or to a weak or failed state. In one of the articles in the New York Times, it said: “[...] a failed coup last September split Ivory Coast into a government-held area in the Christian and animist south and a rebel-held area in the Muslim north” (SCIOLINO, 2003). We can find some information which is not valid. For example, the same article of the New York Times mentioned that: “A cease-fire unravelled, and French troops, bound by a 1961 treaty, now find themselves trying to stop the rebels from advancing.” (SCIOLINO, 2003). That was not true because France refused to apply a treaty that bound them with Côte d’Ivoire. This point will be further developed in the next chapter. Also, images shown by a specific international television channel on the situation in Bouaké did not reveal what was going on there. What is certain is that the reasons that have plunged Côte d’Ivoire into a circle of violence go far beyond religious and ethnic fragmentation.

## Board 5 - Summary table of forces and main political actors in Côte d'Ivoire since 1999

Political forces and actors	Leaders and Orientations	Ethnical groups background and Newspapers
<i>Front Populaire Ivoirien</i> - FPI  Army and militias: Forces Loyalistes - FDS, and “ <i>Jeunes Patriotes</i> ” civil activist groups claiming to be Laurent Gbagbo.	Created in clandestinity in 1982 by Laurent Gbagbo, constituted political party in 1988 and officially recognised in 1990, member of International Socialist	Ethnical group : Krou  Newspapers: Notre Voie, Le courrier d'Abidjan, Fraternité Matin
<i>Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire</i> – PDCI	Party of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, “father” of independence, then Henri Konan Bédié his heir. Longtime single party.	Ethnical Group: Akan  Newspapers: Nouveau Réveil
<i>Rassemblement des Républicains</i> – RDR	Created by Djeni Kobina in 1994, a dissident party to PDCI. In 1999, Alassane Dramane Ouattara became President	Ethnical group background: Mandé and Gour  Newspapers: Le patriote
<i>Union pour la Démocratie en Côte d'Ivoire</i> – UDPCI	Party of the general Robert Guéï.	
Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire -MPCI- then Forces nouvelles - FN.  Army and militias: Rebel Forces / <i>Forces armées des forces nouvelles</i> - FAFN.	With Guillaume Soro at its head in 2002	

Source: Self elaboration based on self knowledges

### 2.4.4 They had been warned...

Several signs were already pointing to a crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. But politicians chose to ignore them. In their album called *victoire*, released in 1999, Petit Yodé and l'enfant Siro in the song “tu sais qui je suis?” said this:

If the Ivorian says do you know who I am, he means he is more Ivorian than you. A new millennium is coming, where every country is preparing its balance, the Ivorian is afraid, because he does not know if he will always be Ivorian. The case of 'ivoirité'. [...] I knew a man, he was Ivorian, towards the end, he became Ghanaian. There was another as well, he was Ivorian, and then he became Burkinabé. [...] Let us avoid injustice among ourselves because a lot of injustice can create a little disorder, but it is the bit disorders that create massive conflicts<sup>18</sup>.

Tiken Jah Fakoly in his album *Caméléon* had a song called "*le pays va mal*" where he criticised the current situation in the country saying:

Before we did not talk about northerners or southerners before we did not talk about Christians or Muslims. But today they have ruined everything. The army is divided, students are divided, society is divided; even our mothers at the market are divided. [...] We lack remedies against injustice, tribalism, xenophobia. After ivoirité, they created the "and", the "or". But my country is going badly, from bad to worse. [...]<sup>19</sup>

The crisis in Côte d'Ivoire was latent. All signals were pointing in the same direction. But they simply chose to ignore it. Guillaume Soro (2005, p. 63, our translation) stated that "Gbagbo, instead of working for reconciliation within the army, worked for its division, as in the nation, promising to send lightning on our heads."<sup>20</sup> Soro blamed Gbagbo for betraying him and for not pursuing his quest against injustice and the fight for equality since the 1998 events at FESCI. In a country where witch-hunting, and the systematic marginalisation of an ethnic group because they belong to a given region, the only way out for some is exile. Often feeling threatened and imprisoned several times during his life for his political ideas, Soro had to go into exile. It was from his exile and in the face of the anti-Ouattara discourse and the marginalisation of Ivorians in the north that he decided to act. Exile strengthened his links with other refugees, and it is from this common cause and converging analyses that the *Mouvement Patriotique Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI) was born. The first MPCI leaflet was distributed in Côte d'Ivoire from 25 September to 12 October 2001, one year before the beginning of the insurgency. The flyer reached an Ivorian newspaper on 25 September 2001, but for fear of reprisals, the newspaper did not publish it. Soro said: "Our deepest conviction was that Gbagbo came to power through ethnic exhaustion and continued to pursue his murderous logic"<sup>21</sup> (SORO, 2005, p 79, our translation).

<sup>18</sup>PETIT YODE & L'ENFANT SIRO. Tu sais qui je suis? Abidjan, Burida, 1999. 1 Audio tape (50 min)

<sup>19</sup>TIKEN JAH FAKOLY. Le pays va mal. Abidjan, Burida, 2000. 1 audio tape (55 min)

<sup>20</sup>SORO, G. Pourquoi je suis devenu un rebelle: la Côte d'Ivoire au bord du gouffre. Paris: HACHETTE Littératures, 2005, 174p. « Gbagbo, au lieu de travailler pour la réconciliation au sein de l'armée, a travaillé pour sa division, comme dans la nation, en promettant d'envoyer la foudre sur nos têtes »

<sup>21</sup>SORO, G. Op. Cit. p. 79 « Notre conviction la plus profonde était que Gbagbo est arrivé au pouvoir par exaction ethnique et a continué à poursuivre sa logique meurtrière »

According to Soro Guillaume, this operation did not mobilise many financial resources, nor much military equipment, because his brothers-in-arms had “saved” weapons since 2000, weapons to which were added the weapons stolen on 24 December 1999 during the coup d’état (SORO, 2005, my Griffon). However, the presence of many exiled soldiers in Burkina Faso had been reported several times to the Ivorian authorities, who had not responded to these alerts because they considered that these soldiers did not represent any danger. They suffered the consequences (SORO, 2005).

At the beginning of the rebellion, many doubts remained about the identity of the assailants. Guillaume Soro admitted that he pretended to be Dr Koumba to give an interview to a foreign radio station. When the African heads of state wanted to mediate, they reached the dissidents by telephone. Soro identified himself as Dr Koumba when he spoke to President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal (SORO, 2005). Several media attributed the rebellion to Ibrahim Coulibaly. However, Coulibaly was outside Ivorian territory. Ibrahim Coulibaly himself claimed to be the father of the rebellion, Guillaume Soro disputed that. It contributed to the tensions within the rebellion itself. There was a revolt within the insurrection.

When the crisis erupted in September 2002, Ivorians were by no means surprised. Both sides blamed France. Gbagbo complained that France had not intervened in his favour to counter the rebellion, him being the democratically elected president. Soro accused France of allowing Gbagbo to come to power while the UN Secretary-General, the AU and the US called for the presidential election to be resumed. Soro also accused France of preventing the dissidents from advancing southwards, depriving them of a decisive victory. It is a situation all the more paradoxical that Côte d’Ivoire claims to be independent but does not hesitate at the slightest opportunity to resort to France. Why is France often singled out? Maybe because of its interference in the internal affairs of its former colonies, double standards, a disastrous colonial legacy. Maybe because with France the line between colony and the former colony is often crossed, a little too often. But has this line ever existed?

## 2.5 Conclusion

Independent since 7 August 1960, Côte d’Ivoire has for a long time been the model in Africa both economically and politically, despite the existence of a single party, the PDCI, found by Houphouët-Boigny. The policy that has been put in place by Houphouët-Boigny helped to attract human resources both internally and externally. Due to a peasant state policy,

Côte d'Ivoire achieved significant economic growth and was qualified as a middle-income country. It was the birth of the Ivorian miracle. In the 1970s, the price of coffee and cocoa allowed Houphouët-Boigny to establish his policy by encouraging internal and external migration. He even went so far as to declare that the land belongs to the one who cultivates it. This strategy raised the discontent of some Ivorians. Houphouët-Boigny as a good strategist set up the "ivoirisation" of the Ivorian civil service to satisfy his population.

But the commodity crisis and the deterioration in terms of trade hit Côte d'Ivoire hard. Cocoa prices fell sharply, cash inflows were becoming increasingly scarce, and the country was unable to pay its external debt. Bretton Woods institutions placed the country under structural adjustment, public spending must be reduced, and the privatisation of companies was being advocated. Private companies had begun to repatriate their foreign exchange outwards. Thus, the Houphouët-Boigny had to face the widespread discontent and dissatisfaction of the Ivorians. The well-oiled system that favoured clientelism has come to a halt. Students began to show their anger, and several civil servants lost their jobs in the public service.

All those who had left the rural areas for the urban areas were forced to return to their village. This massive return of people to rural areas led to serious land disputes. Houphouët-Boigny had to accept external pressure for the establishment of a multiparty system. In 1990 the first multiparty election took place, and Laurent Gbagbo's FPI was seen as a credible opposition. However, the crisis was still in full swing and the newly elected President Houphouët-Boigny had to appoint for the first time ADO as prime minister. His mission was to turn the Ivorian economy around. At the death of Houphouët-Boigny, a succession crisis opposed ADO to HKB. An open war raised between HKB and ADO who left the PDCI and joined the RDR, party created by Djeni Kobina. The political discrimination of RDR was extended to religious and ethnic groups. ADO was respectively excluded from the presidential elections of 1995 and 2000 because of doubts about his nationality. HKB's concept of *ivoirité* as more xenophobic than nationalist worsened relations between Ivorians. The crisis would thus take on economic, political and social characteristics. In 1999, this crisis reached its climax with the coup d'état of General Robert Gueï.

The crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, was not a pure religious division. It had its origins in the crisis of the Ivorian miracle, the decline in the income of the population and a specific ethnic group, the political discrimination, the land crisis and the introduction of the concept of *ivoirité*. The crisis also had its roots in incitement to ethnic and religious hatred by the press both locally and internationally. The UNSC devoted a special section on the media at the public information section of Resolution 1528 establishing UNOCI (see chapters 3 and 4). While for decades the



Akan and the Baoulé, in particular, had increased their dominance over other ethnic groups, the trend began to reverse in the late 1990s. In a multi-ethnic country like Côte d'Ivoire, the risk of conflict remains high, especially in times of economic and political crisis. The attempted coup d'état that turned into armed conflict is just an illustration.

The crisis of September 2002 led the various protagonists to start negotiations through mediators at both regional and international level. Were the negotiations successful? How were they conducted? Chapter 3 of this work will try to answer these questions.

### 3 AGREEMENTS IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE PEACE PROCESS

Several discussions and negotiations were held in different parts of the world to reach a peace agreement for the Ivorians crisis. One of them and the most significant was the Linas-Marcoussis agreement in 2003. It is significant because it was the starting point of the implementation of *Mission des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire* (MINUCI) from the UNSC 13 May 2003, resolution 1479. Even if Linas-Marcoussis agreement was significant on the way for Ivorian conflict resolution, the agreement was preceded by two other agreements: 1) ACCRA I in September 2002 at the beginning of the crisis to discuss a general framework to resolve the crisis. The summit was followed by a meeting of the ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission, which recommended that immediate arrangements be put in place to deploy ECOWAS troops to Côte d'Ivoire; 2) Lomé in December 2002 when the two parties reaffirmed their commitment to the ceasefire agreement and the deployment of ECOWAS and French forces and the creation of a *Zone de Confiance*.

The difficulties to the implementation of these two agreements show us how it is important to reunite different elements of the conflict ripeness that lead to negotiation and then to a stable peace agreement, according to Zartman. But before trying to find out the aspects of Zartman's ripeness Theory into the Ivorian crisis negotiations for a peace agreement, it is crucial to notice that after the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (LMA) there have been: ACCRA II in March 2003, To reinforce the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement; ACCRA III in July 2004 to include new measures to address the key obstacles to the peace process, in particular, the criteria for eligibility of the President, legislative reforms concerning citizenship and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Regroupement (DDR) program; PRETORIA I in April 2005; PRETORIA II in June 2005 and finally Ouagadougou Peace Agreements (OPA) in March 2007. The fact of having several Peace Agreements (PA) is testifying the difficulties of implementation of such PA. In the following parts, a review of the PA will be made by applying the Zartman's Ripeness theory at each step of the negotiation. And this section will be divided as follows: (1) ACCRA I and LOME Peace Agreement as emergency plans for the Ivorian crisis, (2) No more fun, let's get down to business, (3) ACCRA II agreement, (4) A peace process in difficulty, (5) ACCRA III or the summit of last chance, (6) Pretoria I and II, (7) Côte d'Ivoire: once upon a time eight years conflict.

### 3.1 ACCRA I and LOME Peace Agreement as emergency plans for the Ivorian crisis

On 29 September 2002, following the 19 September events in Côte d'Ivoire that caused hundreds of deaths and wounded, and due to the prolonged occupation of several cities by hundreds of armed attackers, the former President of the Republic of Senegal and President in the office of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Abdoulaye WADE, following the provisions of the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Prevention, Management, Settlement of Conflicts, Peacekeeping and security, convened an extraordinary session of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS member states, held in Accra (capital of Ghana). The special session examined the security situation in Côte d'Ivoire as well as its implications for the sub-region. It was composed only by the Heads of State and Government or their duly accredited representatives.

#### 3.1.1 ACCRA I to De-Escalate the Ivorian crisis

The urgent convocation of the Defence and Security Commission was decided, and the Commission recommended immediate arrangements to be put in place to deploy ECOWAS troops to Côte d'Ivoire. On 17 October, a ceasefire has been signed between the belligerents, and the Mediation and Security Council met on 26 October 2002, agreed to deploy West African troops to monitor a ceasefire. Ecowas Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI,) deployed approximately 1,400 soldiers from Ghana, Benin, Togo, Niger and Senegal (DOKKEN, 2008).

The fact is that ACCRA I agreement was not strong enough to resolve the Ivorian crisis and thereby failed. The weakness of ACCRA I agreement can be explained theoretically by Zartman ripeness theory. In his first proposition about this theory Zartman (2000; 2016) argues that ripeness is a necessary condition, but not sufficient enough, to start a negotiation, whether bilateral or mediated (ZARTMAN, 2000). This concept bases upon the perception of Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) which was completely missing during the ACCRA I agreement negotiation. The Ivorian crisis started on 19 September 2002, and the ACCRA I extraordinary summit was held ten days after, that truly means the situation was not ripe enough for starting a negotiation. In 1992, the Iranian vice chancellor observed, during the conflict, that “*the*

*situation in Azerbaijan is not ripe for such mediation manoeuvres*”<sup>22</sup>. In the same way, John Campbell (1976:73) wrote: “*the ripeness of time is one of the absolute essences of diplomacy.*”

In such a situation, how many people should die before starting a negotiation in a conflict? How many damages should be made before acting in the direction of a peace agreement? The ripeness theory raised some intriguing problems, for example complication linked to the MHS can appear when the growth of suffering caused by the conflict increases resistance to the negotiation instead of reducing it (ZARTMAN, 2000). This kind of behaviour may be considered irrational, but it is genuinely a common reaction, which can be natural or functional. The resistance of accepting an MHS may be linked to four different levels of situation or contexts: (a) it is a normal response to the opposition in style; (b) escalations of violence refer to other aspects of the conflict, such as its ends and agent; (c) certain types of opponents have an unusual propensity for incisive resistance behaviour; (d) the group that faithfully believes in his cause (ZARTMAN, 2000).

By calling an extraordinary summit, ECOWAS wanted to avoid an escalation of violence and thus an increase in such resistance, because there is a reaction of resistance that can make the MHS mechanism, under certain conditions, the cause of its destruction (ZARTMAN, 2000). Another fact is that the resistance can quickly increase the number of deaths, and pain between population. Waiting necessarily for the MHS could be dangerous, it is impossible to predict how much damage the conflict will have caused and what the extent of its destruction will be. The main ECOWAS preoccupation by calling a summit was to avoid the situation getting out of control. It was expressed at the point six of Accra I Extraordinary Summit Final Communiqué: “*At the end of their work, the Heads of State and Government [...] deplored the numerous losses of human life and unnecessary Goods destruction. They have expressed their concern at the peace and security of the subregion who find themselves threatened by this situation which could also lead to a humanitarian catastrophe*”<sup>23</sup>.

Despite its desire to do well and avoid an escalation of violence, ECOWAS convened a summit at a time when the conflict was not ripe to start negotiations. It is important to remember that the Ivorian conflict had the characteristic as mentioned above (d) of resistance to MHS. In this situation, people could try to create an MHS to generate a ripeness. It happened in the Pueblo incident between the United States and North Korea, but this case was cited as an anomaly than a model (ZARTMAN, 2000). In the two golf wars cases, the strategies used by

---

<sup>22</sup> Cf AGENCE FRANCE PRESS -AFP- 17-05-1992

<sup>23</sup> Cf Accra I Extraordinary Summit Final Communiqué.

Carter – who chose to conduct ongoing negotiations – and George H. W. Bush – permanently excluded the negotiation way – were opposed. Still, Carter strategy succeeded and Bush's plan too in its way. The lesson of these two cases is: negotiations with parties that are faithful to their causes take longer to happen because it becomes more difficult to find ripe moments. However, in the end, if there are time and patience to wait for that moment, it is possible to realise that even the parties faithful to their causes need to survive (ZARTMAN, 2000).

In the Ivorian case, as we talked in chapter 2, it was an opened conflict between a dissident group that believe that their fight was for the (re)establishment of democracy and social equality. In contrast, government forces fought to avoid undermining democracy and constitutional legality. Both parties were faithful to their causes which created a resistance to the MHS even with a high number of deaths between the parties. Another important fact of the MHS is when the parties are stuck in a conflict without the possibility of winning it, and the impasse in a different way for the parties is costly, they seek a possible way out from this conflict. The ripeness is concentrated to the perception of the MHS by the parties, MHS highly associated with an imminent, passed or recently avoided catastrophe (TOUVAL; ZARTMAN, 1985).

At ACCRA I summit, only one representative of both parties was present, the government side. The dissident group was therefore not represented. And the point nine (9) of Accra I Extraordinary Summit Final Communiqué was: "They (participants to the summit) urged the assailants who continue to occupy several cities, to refrain from carrying out violence and assault on the populations of these cities, to engage in dialogue with the ECOWAS Mediation Committee immediately, with a view of laying down their arms and settle their disputes with the Government by peaceful means"<sup>24</sup>. The contents of this point, combined with the exclusion of the dissidents' group to the negotiation, looked like a call to the resistance and comforted them to their real cause. Exclusion being one of the reasons that pushed the dissidents to take up arms, it can, therefore, be a factor of resistance in this case where they were not invited to the negotiations. They might see their absence from the peace talks as another form of discrimination and therefore, less conducive to a peaceful solution to the conflict. An important point when you are negotiating a peace agreement is to take into consideration all the aspects of the conflict principally in the Ivorian case. Still, that misperception and the lack of case per case analyse led to a stereotype agreement for a matter which was different from other ECOWAS conflict mediation cases. To go further, the point twelve (12) stipulated: "The Heads

---

<sup>24</sup>Cf Accra I Extraordinary Summit Final Communiqué point 9

of State and Government invited the ECOWAS member states to provide immediate support – political, material, logistical – to the legal authorities of Cote d’Ivoire to maintain constitutional order, peace and security, national unity and cohesion”<sup>25</sup>.

Nonetheless, ECOWAS was acting under the Declaration of the Political Principles of ECOWAS of 6 July 1991 adopted at Abuja, with the Protocol on the Mechanism for Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts, and Maintenance of Peace and Security of 10 December 1999, and with Decision AHG DEC 142 (xxv) on the framework for a reaction by the OUA to anti-constitutional changes of government, adopted by OUA in Algiers in July 1999. The Heads of State and Government accordingly reaffirmed the position of ECOWAS under the terms of which no government will be recognised if it takes power by overthrowing a democratically elected government or by using unconstitutional methods<sup>26</sup>. Notwithstanding, among the dissidents, such recommendations were not favourable since the agreement seems tendentious and only goes in one direction.

In doing so, did ECOWAS wished to give precedence to the norms of the organisation over the resolution of the conflict? The answer to this question seems a little complicated, ECOWAS acted under its texts in force. Nonetheless, the existence of texts is not synonymous with conflict resolution. Since the conflict is a dynamic and not static action, all possible parameters must be taken into consideration to carry out negotiations that could lead to political agreements.

### 3.1.2 From Accra to Lomé: good neighbourly negotiations

Following Accra I Summit, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed in Bouaké on 17 October 2002. ECOWAS obtained from the dissident forces a declaration of cessation of hostilities and an agreement to enter into dialogue with the government. From the Government of Côte d’Ivoire, a statement attesting the end of hostilities and their agreement to enter into dialogue with the dissident forces. In its declaration, the government announced the cessation of hostilities and its agreement to enter into dialogue<sup>27</sup>. But in most cases, the agreements obtained under the aegis of ECOWAS were difficult to apply.

---

<sup>25</sup>Cf Accra I Extraordinary Summit Final Communiqué, point 12

<sup>26</sup>ECOWAS. Extraordinary summit of heads of State and of Government on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire. Final Communiqué. Accra, September 29, 2002, point 7.

<sup>27</sup>ECOWAS. Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of October 17, 2002. Available from: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/199>. Accessed on 1 June 2020.

We are facing here a problem of the commitment of the negotiations led by the ECOWAS. The negotiation can be a tactical break, an interval used for recuperation and rearmament, a response to external pressure, without any sincere intention for a common political result (ZARTMAN, 2000). The warring parties in general use ECOWAS period of negotiation as a tactic to rearm and resume fighting. Ikle (1964) qualified this kind of attitude as a negotiation of side effects. A negotiation of side effects is one in which negotiators do not necessarily act to resolve the conflict but to gain an opinion, advance their image or other propaganda motivations, obtain intelligence, dissuade the other party from using force (IKLE, 1964). Indeed, the perception of ripeness can be necessary for transforming the so-called negotiation of side effects in negotiations for resolving the conflict itself (ZARTMAN, 2000). At the beginning of October 2002, and after the calling of the ACCRA I summit, the Ivorians felt that the resolutions of the summit were partial and elitist<sup>28</sup>.

In this situation, what ECOWAS was supposed to do? Wait for an escalation of the violence or an opportunity of ripeness and then start a negotiation? In his final report, the UN undersecretary-general, Marrack Goulding, mentioned literature of ripeness when discussing conflicts UN had to deal with: “Not all conflicts are “ripe” for UN action (or any other third party). [...] It is therefore up to the Secretary-General to be selective and recommend actions when he considers that the investment of scarce resources is likely to produce a positive return – in terms of prevention, management and conflict resolution – in a given situation” (GOULDING, 1997, p 20).

Apart from the MHS, another necessary element and less complicated and controversial for the ripeness is the way out. The way out is a perception that it is possible to negotiate some end to the conflict. In this case, the parties do not need to identify a specific way out. They only require a feeling that a negotiated way out is achievable, and the other party share the same perception and willingness to engage to find out a solution. The addition of the way out to the MHS for the ripeness led Zartman to his proposition 2: *if (two) parties to a conflict (a) find themselves at an impasse and (b) notice the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for its resolution (that is, for the initiation of negotiations towards an agreement)* (ZARTMAN, 2000).

---

<sup>28</sup>This opinion was shared by a large part of the population of the cities of the north, in Bouaké, city where I was at the beginning of the hostilities. Many people shared the same opinion and found these resolutions weak and of this fact ineffective. It should be noted that the city of Bouaké fell into the hands of the “rebels” during the first hours of the Ivorian crisis.

Early in October, the dissidents of the *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI), who occupied the northern half of the country since September, agree to conclude the ceasefire proposed by the mediators of ECOWAS. However, President Laurent Gbagbo rejected it, despite French pressure. For Holbrooke (1998), these facts go in the same way of what the former President Bush senior Secretary of State James Baker said in 1991 about Yugoslavia: "My feeling is that we will not produce a serious dialogue on the future of Yugoslavia until all parties have a greater sense of urgency and danger". In the Ivorian case, it looked like the two sides were not aware of the danger this conflict represented for the country but especially for them too.

On the 8 October, President Gbagbo called on the dissidents to surrender, saying that he would be "ready to discuss" after this prerequisite. But that occurred after governmental army failed to reconquer Bouaké in the hands of the mutineers following an unsuccessful offensive the day before. The following days, the dissidents attacked and took the city of Daloa, in the West of the country. Nevertheless, the loyalist forces<sup>29</sup> retook the town three days later. Both side offensive creates an MHS characterised by unsuccessful attacks and the number of dead and displaced people. A situation that could not be sustained either by the government forces or by the dissidents.

The ripeness moment is necessarily an event that sustains itself in the perception, and then not necessarily in the objective reality. It can be created if third parties, manage to show the perception of a context of suffering, as opposed to a preferable alternative (ZARTMAN, 2000). Objective and subjective elements compose the MHS, and this relation between subjective and objective components generate the proposition 3: *an MHS contains objective and subjective factors, of which only the latter is necessary and sufficient for its existence* (ZARTMAN, 2000).

As a subjective question, the MHS can be perceived at any stage of the conflict, because in its definition nothing mention that it should occur at the peak of the conflict or amid a high level of violence. The internal negotiations and without mediation in South Africa between 1990 and 1994 constitute a brilliant case of negotiation started and carried out from an MHS perceived by both parties based upon an imminence catastrophe and not the casualties registered at that time (LIEBERFIELD, 1999a; OHLSON; STEDMAN, 1994, ZARTMAN, 1995).

---

<sup>29</sup>The Loyalist forces are the forces that stay loyal to the regime of the president Laurent Gbagbo. They were fighting to maintain a constitutional state and for the respect of the institutions in Côte d'Ivoire.



The different efforts to resolve the Ivorian crisis led to the creation of the called contact group in charge of settings up diplomatic initiatives. After a period of hesitation, Laurent Gbagbo agreed with its creation and accepted to negotiate with the dissidents. On 17 October 2002, the Senegalese Minister of Foreign Affairs and the MPCCI reached a ceasefire agreement in the city of Bouaké with the ECOWAS contact group. Then France has been asked by President Laurent Gbagbo to control the implementation of the ceasefire (AKINDES, 2011). Contrarily to the ACCRA I, the dissidents were present during the ceasefire negotiations. Later to the ceasefire, direct negotiations between representatives of Ivorian State and dissidents' group MPCCI opened in Lomé – Togo. The negotiations lead to an agreement in principle on the amnesty of the soldiers who mutinied in September and who continue to occupy the northern half of the country. The civilian and military prisoners captured during the hostilities which began on 19 September 2002, should be released by each of the parties holding them (THE NEW HUMANITARIAN, 2002).

In late November, a new dissidents movement seized two cities in the West of the country, Danané and Man. The movement claimed to be partisans of General Robert Gueï, head of the junta in power from December 1999 to October 2000 and assassinated in Abidjan on the first day of the rebellion, in September. A few days later, clashes opposed the dissidents from the West to the French soldiers who proceeded to evacuate foreign nationals from the city of Man. The Ivorian crisis has reached another level, and the dilemma was how to incorporate this new movement to the negotiations. The emergence of this *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest* (MPIGO) has turned more difficult the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire and to identify the components of ripeness moment. The discussions remained blocked, and the parties blamed each other. Laurent Dona Fologo, head of the Ivorian government fifteen members delegation said that his team was unable to reach an agreement. He indeed accused the MPCCI of going back on the agreements, of not sincerely negotiating and of doing everything to make the negotiations fail. "They came to Lomé for everything except for a peace agreement," accused Fologo (THE NEW HUMANITARIAN, 2002). On their side, Tuo Fozilé, a leading figure of the MPCCI, told from Bouaké that his movement was also prepared to resume negotiations. "Why not? We will go if they resume," said Fozilé (THE NEW HUMANITARIAN, 2002).

The French government decided to send reinforcements in men and equipment to Côte d'Ivoire, where 1,500 French soldiers watched over the ceasefire. Also, it condemned all kind of violence and abuses as well as any outside interference following the discovery of a mass grave of 120 bodies in Monoko-Zohi, in the Centre-west of the country, and the appearance of

death squads in the government area. Consecutive to the France decision of reinforcements, the MPCJ demanded total neutrality on the part of France. ECOWAS States leaders reunited gathered in Dakar and seeing that the situation was going out of control, asked the United Nations to take action on the Ivorian crisis. They have also announced the deployment of a regional force in the country before the end of the year, in return for the proposal, made by President Laurent Gbagbo, of a global plan to end the crisis providing for deep reforms and popular consultations (ENCYCLOPÆDIA UNIVERSALIS, [201-?]). UNSC, therefore, invited the belligerents to seek a negotiated political solution to resolve the crisis. In a statement, the Council condemned “firmly the use of force to weigh on the political situation in Côte d’Ivoire and overthrow its elected government”. The UNSC stressed its full support for the legitimate government of this country. It expressed support for the efforts made by the ECOWAS and thanked the Government of France for having deployed troops (THE NEW HUMANITARIAN, 2002).

Three months afterwards, the attempt to resolve the Ivorian conflict was stalled. Parties to conflict struggling to agree on terms of the agreement. But meanwhile, food supplies were running out in the North and West of Côte d’Ivoire at the hands of dissident forces<sup>30</sup>, government forces ran out of ammunition and had no more possibility to continue clashes. The population had already had enough of the situation, and a part of them had to move from the besieged zones for security reasons.

MHS is an opportunity to be readily taken advantage of, the failure to identify that moment usually accelerates its passage, and the parties may stop believing in the possibility of a negotiated way out. The MHS can be identified by a mediator or a third party who shows to both parties that a negotiated way out is possible and could be beneficial for them. The perception that another party is prepared and interested in returning the concessions is called by Zartman and Aurik (1991) a requitement. Such evidence and indications can be summarised in proposition 4: *the conflict is matured when there are (a) subjective expressions of suffering, impasse and inability to bear the costs of an escalation; (b) objective evidence of the stalemate – such as data on the number of casualties and the nature of the victims, as well as on the material costs and/or other indicators of an MHS; and (c) perception that there is a negotiated way out* (ZARTMAN, 2000).

---

<sup>30</sup>During the conflict, several Ivorian musicians were singing for the peace in the country, the lack of food in Bouaké appears in several songs of Zougloous groups, in particular the collective “Libérez mon pays”, Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TDGyALEZqC4>

However, sometimes the fact that the mediator does not correctly assess the conflict, or the causes of the conflict may lead to the failure of negotiation even if the conditions of the MHS are met. Even if the mediator can mobilise the parties to the conflict to start a negotiation, he or she must also become immersed in the real problem that led to the conflict. It is customary in Africa to trust elders because of their experiences and background. President Eyadema was considered a wise man in Africa because of his age and the number of years he spent in power. Therefore, his mediation in the Ivorian conflict because of his elder right would only be beneficial. Notwithstanding, he was less familiar with the Ivorian case than one might have thought. Indeed, Soro Guillaume (2005, p 134-135) admitted that they went prematurely to Lomé. He thus affirmed:

This negotiation failed because the mediation wanted to limit the problem to strictly military matters. Eyadema considered that what was happening was only a mutiny, which had to be answered by distributing bonuses to the angry military. He had no wish to deal with the political dimension of the conflict. Therefore, the mediation could only fail. You can't treat the effects without understanding the causes.<sup>31</sup>(our translation)

In early 2003 after several violations of the ceasefire by the different parties, the MPIGO and the *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (MJP) which controls the West, sign a ceasefire with the Ivorian government, in Lomé – Togo, under the aegis of the ECOWAS. Subsequently perceiving the existence of an MHS and showing the parties to the conflict that there was a negotiated way out from the crisis, French diplomacy managed to convene a meeting to start negotiations for a final peace agreement in Côte d'Ivoire. On 15 January 2003, a summit behind closed doors has begun in Linas-Marcoussis bringing together representatives of Ivorian political parties, dissidents' movements, the MJP and the MPIGO, which controls the West of the country, and MPCI, the most important, which controlled the North.

### 3.2 No more fun, let's get down to business

At the beginning of the crisis, France refused to implement its bilateral military agreements with Côte d'Ivoire after it had been asked by the Ivorian government to help defeat the dissidents, arguing that the crisis was purely "Ivorian" one that did not involve an external

---

<sup>31</sup>SORO, G. Op. Cit. p. 134-135. « Cette négociation a échoué parce que la médiation voulait limiter le problème à des questions strictement militaires. Eyadema a considéré que ce qui se passait n'était qu'une mutinerie, à laquelle il fallait répondre en distribuant des primes aux militaires en colère. Il ne souhaitait pas traiter la dimension politique du conflit. Par conséquent, la médiation ne peut qu'échouer. On ne peut pas traiter les effets sans comprendre les causes »

threat (AKINDES, 2011). The difficulties in implementing the political dimension of the ECOWAS-brokered agreements Accra I and Lomé and the delays of deployment of the ECOMICI led France –which had direct interests in stabilising the situation in Côte d’Ivoire due to the number of its citizens residing in the country – to become increasingly involved militarily and politically (NOVOSSELOFF, 2015).

Even if France had deployed a military force, Operation Licorne<sup>32</sup>, to monitor the ceasefire line, at the request of the Ivorian President, the tension between both countries was palpable. After three months of tensions between Côte d’Ivoire and France, the French government, therefore, decided to play another role than its military role in the Ivorian crisis. France decided the organisation of the peace talks on its territory. The summit took place at Linas-Marcoussis from 15 to 24 January 2003. It was chaired by the former French Minister Pierre Mazeaud – who knew very little about Africa (SORO, 2005) – a member of the Constitutional Council, with the assistance of Judge Keba Mbaye. They were also assisted by the former and future Ivorian Prime Minister, Seydou Diarra, as well as facilitators and observers appointed by the Organisation of the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Organisation International de la Francophonie (OIF). Ten political parties and movements from the rebellion proceeded on 23 January 2003 to the signing of a consensual agreement, known as the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement or, to simplify “Marcoussis” (DU BOIS DE GAUDUSSON, 2003).

### 3.2.1. Linas-Marcoussis

The Accra summit of 29 September 2002 decided to create a contact group responsible for a mediation mission for an agreement to end hostilities and a negotiated political outcome of the military crisis (SADA, 2003). The ceasefire agreement, which was signed on 17 October, did not prevent the spread of the conflict to the East and south-west of Côte d’Ivoire. The settlement of the military component obtained by the Togolese President Eyadéma was rendered ineffective by the blockages on the political side of the negotiation (SADA, 2003). The ECOWAS has shown itself incapable of managing the crisis, the AU was utterly absent

---

<sup>32</sup>Following an attempted coup and control of several cities in the North and center of Côte d’Ivoire by rebel forces, France launched Operation Licorne on September 22, 2002. Operation Licorne with about 4,600 troops was initially deployed to ensure the protection, and possible evacuation, of the French citizens, but it eventually also had to perform interposition tasks pending the deployment of ECOMICI. Since then, the presence of French soldiers in Côte d’Ivoire has evolved, constantly adapting to the security situation in the country.

from the debate, and France has limited its fields of action. Faced with this failure of ECOWAS mediation, French diplomacy “obliged” Senegal, which held the presidency of ECOWAS, to bring the Ivorian case to UNSC.

The failure of ECOWAS mediation combined with the inability of the parties to complete a military offensive and the perception that there was the possibility of a negotiated way out from the crisis, led to negotiations which drive to a peace agreement. Even if the ripeness had not always been used to start negotiations, in the Ivorian case, France used the subjective expressions of suffering, impasse and inability to bear the costs of an escalation in which the parties were. These situations were objective evidence of the stalemate, and their perception that there is a possibility of a negotiated way out, to start successful negotiations. We can quickly summarise that situation as follows in table 6. The desire to adopt measures conducive to the establishment of genuine trust that, through dialogue, would create a favourable environment for the round table of Ivorian political forces from 15 to 24 January 2003 at Paris. The Government of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, the MPIGO and the MJP signed a ceasefire peace agreement on 13 January 2003<sup>33</sup>.

However, there were serious doubts about France’s real willingness to convene this summit. Indeed, at the beginning of the crisis, France had long advocated the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of another sovereign state. Nonetheless, it did not prevent itself from deploying the Force Licorne, which is the manifestation of France’s omnipresence on Ivorian territory. The incomprehensible fact was that Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo had not been invited to the Linas-Marcoussis negotiations. It is a great enigma that was already distorting the agreement that was to emerge from these negotiations. It raises the principle of good faith in negotiations on the part of the mediator. Each mediator brings his or her skills, experience and personality to the table. While this background is often independent of the organisational context, it nevertheless has a significant impact on the process (BAUMANN; CLAYTON, 2017). The attitude of the mediators will, therefore, influence the implementation of an agreement resulting from these negotiations. As will be seen below, the French presence in the negotiations had a direct impact on the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (LMA).

Linas-Marcoussis peace talks, however, has been publicly viewed by Africans as a severe political failure of their ability to play a decisive role in a conflict that is essential to

---

<sup>33</sup>Cf UN Security Council. Ceasefire agreement between the Government of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, the Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest and the Mouvement pour la justice et la paix. UN Doc. S/2003/51.

them (SADA, 2003). But the fact is that at the time of the signing of the Accra I peace agreement and the ceasefire, the Ivorian crisis did not yet show the characteristics of a ripe conflict to begin peace talks. Far from being cynical concerning the number of dead and displaced, the elements of MHS were not yet assembled. There did not exist for the parties a perspective of a way out from the crisis that could be envisaged through negotiation. The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (LMA) was a political agreement which provides for the immediate establishment of a national reconciliation government including the dissidents' movements, and on the military level, provided for the regrouping and disarmament of all the forces present, and the securing of the country by French and West African troops.

### Board 6 - Factors and Elements of the Ivorian conflict ripeness

Factors that influence the ripeness (Independent Variables)
Western dissidents have tried to take positions held by French forces near Duékoué. Thirty rebels were killed (IV 1)
The dissidents seize Daloa, in the West of the country. Loyalist forces retake the city a few days later (IV 2)
The army launched, without result, an offensive towards Bouaké, the second city of the country, in the hands of the mutineers. Some 150,000 people have fled the city since its conquest, for fear of ethnic retaliation. (IV 3)
Food supplies were running out in the North and West of Côte d'Ivoire at the hands of dissident forces, government forces ran out of ammunition and continuing the clashes became almost impossible. (IV. 4)
Persuasion by France that the two parties find themselves in a dead-end (IV 5)
$(IV\ 1 + IV\ 2 + IV\ 3 + IV\ 4 + IV\ 5 = MHS\ (DV\ 1)) + (Perception\ of\ the\ way\ out\ (DV\ 2)) = Decision\ to\ Negotiate\ (DV\ 1 + DV\ 2)$

*Source: Self elaboration*

The LMA dealt with significant issues such as (i) nationality, identity, condition of foreigners; (ii) electoral regime; (iii) eligibility for running for the presidency; (iv) agrarian regime; (v) the media; (vi) human rights and liberties; (vii) regrouping, disarmament,

demobilisation; (viii) economic recovery and the need for social cohesion; (ix) and implementation. Some problems that led to the crisis were approached without taboo, which drives to an agreement. Nevertheless, the great difficulty was the implementation of the agreement. As Vettovaglia (2014, p 17) said: “Wars eventually end, but in most cases, peace does not last very long. Many agreements fail in their implementation. In 45 per cent of cases, conflicts flare up again within three to five years because their root causes have not been addressed”. To anticipate such difficulty, the French President Jacques Chirac organised the Kleber Conference in Paris on 25-26 January 2003. With the UN General Secretary, European and African Heads of State, and multilateral donors in attendance, the conference set up the institutional framework for implementing the LMA: the constitution of the national reconciliation government, power-sharing principles within the government, the appointment of new Prime Minister, and the establishment of a relationship between the government and the National Assembly (AKINDES, 2011).

Seydou Diarra, the former President of the National Forum for Reconciliation in 2001, was appointed to lead the government. In Abidjan, the announcement of the attribution of the Ministries of Defence and Security to the dissidents mobilised the young patriots close to the government in place. They attacked all that was a symbol of the French presence. President Laurent Gbagbo, who was present in Paris only for the Kleber Conference, was therefore obliged, upon President Chirac’s summons, to return to Côte d’Ivoire for restoring calm. While anti-French violence continued in Abidjan, President Gbagbo described, in front of the young patriots, the terms of the LMA as proposals. A few days later the young patriots prevented the plane of the designate Prime Minister, Seydou Diarra, to land in Abidjan and disturb the departure of French nationals who were fleeing the country (ENCYCLOPÆDIA UNIVERSALIS, [201-?]).

However, to understand why Gbagbo called the LMA a proposal, we have to look back to what happened at the negotiations at Linas-Marcoussis. President Gbagbo claimed that he had not been invited to the Linas-Marcoussis talks but was summoned to sign the agreement (GBAGBO; MATTEI, 2018). Indeed, the list of participants in the Linas-Marcoussis negotiations dated 23 January 2003 did not include the name of the Ivorian President<sup>34</sup>. The Linas-Marcoussis round table, therefore, took place without the President of the Republic. The latter just went to the conference on Avenue Kleber which took place after the Linas-Marcoussis negotiations, where he was to meet his counterpart, Chirac. On the evening of his arrival, the

---

<sup>34</sup>Cf Document S/2003/99 of the UN Security Council, 27 January 2003.

LMA agreements he was to sign were slipped under the door of his hotel. The next day on his way to the meeting with Chirac, Gbagbo read in the newspaper *le monde* that Mrs Henriette Diabaté, a member of the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) of Ouattara, was the new Prime Minister of Côte d'Ivoire<sup>35</sup>.

At the meeting attended by Gbagbo, Chirac and de Villepin, President Chirac told Gbagbo that he wanted Diabaté to be appointed prime minister. President Gbagbo's response to this request was a definite "no" to signing the LMA, saying that for Ivorians this would appear to be a given to the rebels. A fact that President Chirac admitted. In the evening of the same day, another meeting took place this time between Soro Guillaume, Laurent Gbagbo, Alassane Ouattara, Konan Bédié and Dominique de Villepin. The refrain was the same, and everyone wanted Mrs Diabaté as prime minister except Gbagbo of course. De Villepin, therefore, told Gbagbo that if he did not accept Diabaté as prime minister, he would give his defence and security ministries to the rebels<sup>36</sup>. Gbagbo refused to sign and walked away from Quai d'Orsay. Finally, on 25 January 2003, all the parties agreed upon the LMA with the appointment of Seydou Diarra as Prime Minister and the sharing of the ministries for a national unity government<sup>37</sup>.

### 3.2.2 Deadlock after LMA

After the LMA, the situation in Côte d'Ivoire tended to escalation rather than de-escalation. Escalation is the mark of conflict in its dynamic form. It is the dynamics of determining where the conflict peak is and if it has been reached and conflict begins when a static incompatibility is turned into dynamic incompatibility (ZARTMAN; FAURE, 2005). First, hundreds of thousands of supporters of President Gbagbo protested in Abidjan against the peace plan drawn up at the Linas-Marcoussis summit in January. President Gbagbo who initially "accepted" the LMA went back on his word, and spoke about "renegotiating" the LMA, ratified by the international community. France not sharing this opinion asked him to embark on the path of reconciliation. After the LMA, the opponent of the Gbagbo's regime, the very popular actor and TV presenter Camara H., member of the RDR of Alassane Ouattara, was

---

<sup>35</sup>Cf Document S/2003/99 of the UN Security Council, 27 January 2003.

<sup>36</sup>Cf Document S/2003/99 of the UN Security Council, 27 January 2003.

<sup>37</sup>Cf UN Security Council. Annex II to the letter dated 27 January 2003 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. UN Doc. S/2003/99. Available from: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/473>. Accessed on 1 June 2020.



kidnapped a day earlier. The following day, he was found dead riddled with bullets in Abidjan, which provoked strong reactions of bitterness and anger in the working-class neighbourhoods of Abidjan.

On 4 February 2003, the UNSC has unanimously adopted the resolution 1464, which disavowed the power in place by approving the LMA, by condemning severe human rights violations and by authorising the African and French forces present in Côte d'Ivoire to provide security for civilians. The High Commissioner for Human Rights' report on which the resolution is based denounced the actions in the country of "death squads [which] are made up of elements close to the government" (ENCYCLOPÆDIA UNIVERSALIS, [201-?]). De-escalation may not be the declining of conflict, but merely the overhanging of its cost to prolong its duration. The LMA should be an instrument to exit from the crisis but seemed to generate more tension than appeasement between the parties. The feeling of insecurity was growing among the populations. Usually, instability arises from problems unsolved and conflicts unmanaged but, it is the solution of the issues and the resolution of conflicts that bring security to states in their relations with each other and to the populations they contain (ZARTMAN, 2008). Zartman (2008, author's Griffon) argued that negotiation has a role to play in three acts process: (a) in the "prologue" when the conflict is merely an issue or a problem, to prevent it from getting worse; (b) during the conflict if the first has failed, to provide solutions and resolutions; (c) and in the crisis, if the first two have been unable, to bring the escalation and violence to an end.

In fact, negotiation means giving something to get something in return. In LMA negotiation the President Laurent Gbagbo was asked to concede his ministries of Defence and Security, two key ministries vital for Côte d'Ivoire in matters of governmentability and control of the territory by the executive. And above all, Gbagbo had to accept the immediate establishment of a government of national reconciliation which had the "prerogatives of the executive" to carry out its mission of institutional reforms, at his expense as President. The dissident forces must offer their weapons and the demobilisation of their members as a contribution to the LMA and accept the securing of the country by French and West African troops. Negotiation is the process of combining of divergent/conflicting positions through communication into a joint decision, determining the price and the currency in a barter, where both the purchase and the price are indeterminate and must be brought into concordance with each other (ZARTMAN, 2008). In the Ivorian case, the good – the end of the crisis – was known, and the price – government of national reconciliation and disarmament – too. But why does buying the goods seem so complicated?

The answer to this question is, however, straightforward: the price of the goods for each of the parts is not the same. Indeed, President Gbagbo had to be deposed from the essence of what represents power and offer it to dissidents, dissidents who took up arms and tried to overthrow a “democratically” elected power, an unconstitutional act. Dissidents have to lay down their weapons, which is the characteristic and expression of their claim. Accepting to be disarmed is synonymous with losing the soul of their resistance. In negotiation if you want something, right is not enough: you have to either take it or buy it; if you cannot take it, you must buy it; and if you have to buy it, you have to pay for it, by giving something in exchange (ZARTMAN, 2008). If political agreement is the merchandise, dissidents and President could not take the merchandise and therefore had to buy it. Buying it means that they are providing something in trade, in particular the ministries of Defence and Security, and the weapons.

However, this exchange was conditioned: first President Laurent Gbagbo accepted the creation of a national reconciliation government including all dissidents, and then the latter would lay down their arms. Unfortunately, it is this chronology of events that seemed to be the problem. Indeed, President Laurent Gbagbo when returned in Côte d’Ivoire and as far as the creation of a government of national reconciliation concern, asked beforehand the disarmament of the dissidents. And he was supported by the young patriots led by Charles Blé Goudé. President Laurent Gbagbo so refused to apply the LMA at first and then in an awaited speech to the nation since his return from France, declared to accept the “spirit” of the peace plan negotiated with the opposition at Linas-Marcoussis. Thus, confirming Seydou Diarra as Prime Minister, but did not approach in the direction of the creation of the government of national reconciliation.

The deadlock the Ivorians were facing before starting the negotiation at Linas-Marcoussis seemed so far, the implementation of the LMA brought out tension, unpredictability, confusion and violence because the government, opposition and dissidents could not agree on the modalities (AKINDES, 2011). The legal scope of LMA was more complicated than it seemed. Firstly, it urged the Ivorian public authorities to implement some reforms as soon as possible while specifying the guidelines. These reforms concern politically sensitive legislation criticised by the opposition and dissidents, which are considered to have contributed significantly to the start of the crisis. At least for some of them, because of their content than their ignorance and misunderstanding by the populations as well as the reluctance of the authorities to apply them (DU BOIS DE GAUDUSSON, 2003). Thus, these reforms were about questions relating to the nationality and the conditions of the eligibility of the President of the Republic, issues which are constitutional and highly sensitive.

Next, there were provisions for immediate application to the government and the Ivorian Parliament. They modify the distribution of powers organised by the Constitution of 23 July 2000. It was one of the significant challenges of political negotiation. If it was difficult to change the holder of the presidential office, there was the possibility of reforming a regime marked by a strong presidentialisation aggravated by the revision of 2 July 1998 (DU BOIS DE GAUDUSSON, 2003). Three sets of ultra-restrictive provisions restrict the role of Head of State in LMA: (a) he first lost his freedom to appoint the Prime Minister and to terminate his functions; (b) he was then forced to carry out a substantial delegation of “executive prerogatives” for the benefit of the government led by the Prime Minister; (c) he finally saw his military powers reduced for the benefit of the government responsible for “rebuilding and restructuring the defence and security forces”. This implied, in fact, the delegation of his capacity as supreme chief of the armed forces and of the power to appoint military jobs recognised by articles 46 and 47 of the Constitution (DU BOIS DE GAUDUSSON, 2003). The question arising of this situation is why did President Laurent Gbagbo accept almost to lose part of his powers as President? Maybe we can find an answer in what Zartman (2008, p 5) said: *“If I am Tough, I increase the chances of a favourable agreement but decrease the chances of any agreement at all, whereas if I am Soft, I increase the chances for an agreement but decrease the chances for a favourable one for me.”* In such a situation, Gbagbo was soft increasing, therefore, a chance for an agreement, but weakening his opportunity to a favourable one for him.

The whole process of LMA degenerated into reciprocal accusations of hidden motives, active sabotage and a profound lack of interest in reconciliation. It was often followed by claims of bias on the part of the mediator(s) (SKOGSETH, 2006). In 2004, Crisis Group, which closely monitors the development in Côte d’Ivoire and the region at large, pointed out that on both sides there were considerable financial interests in maintaining impasse and a low-key conflict:

To get to the heart of Côte d’Ivoire’s problems, it is necessary to understand their economic dimension, and in particular, in terms of the old dictum, to “follow the money”. The political impasse is exceptionally lucrative for almost everyone except ordinary citizens. Major government figures have been accused of using state monies, especially from the Enron-like maze of interlinked institutions within the cocoa marketing system, for personal enrichment, purchasing weapons, and hiring mercenaries. Members of the Forces Nouvelles have been accused of monopolising lucrative economic activity, including the trade-in cotton and weapons. (CRISIS GROUP, 2004, pi)

To explain the failure of LMA, we can rely on the socio-psychological aspect of the conflict. The socio-psychological approach suggests that conflict is a process driven by

collective needs and fears, rather than being entirely a product of rational calculation (RUBIN, 1993). In the Ivorian case, the conflict arose from the collective actions of certain groups claiming their collective rights and needs to assert themselves or their fear of being dominated by the other. The socio-historical facts recounted in chapter 2 of our thesis, played an essential role in the implementation of the LMA.

The diversity of values becomes vital in the analysis of the behaviour of the actors in the conduct of negotiations in Linas-Marcoussis. On the one hand, Soro Guillaume wanted the demands of the people of the North to be taken into account and therefore proposed Mrs Diabaté, who was close to Mr Ouattara, as Prime Minister of the Government of National Union. This lady of conviction and outstanding reputation in Côte d'Ivoire was, therefore, the unanimous choice of the parties present at the Linas-Marcoussis negotiations except for President Gbagbo. On the other hand, President Gbagbo was concerned about the reaction of the Ivorians and especially of his supporters if he accepted such an agreement. The parties would, therefore, have to agree on different points for the agreement to be approved by all.

Essential elements such as interests, alternatives to an agreement, creation and claiming of value, and movements to transform the game itself, are present in negotiations with different structures and procedures. It means that the negotiation should involve parties in a bilateral meeting to have a single result (RUBIN, 1993). In this particular case, the role of the negotiator would be to provide only a framework for the negotiation to take place. The process of negotiation is fundamental in the psychological approach. In the case of the Linas-Marcoussis negotiations, the negotiator played a slightly too dominant role to the detriment of the parties to the conflict. Already after the 24 January 2003, meeting, Gbagbo cried out: "The headquarters of the rebellion is the Quai d'Orsay!" (GBAGBO; MATTEI, 2018, p 85).

Gbagbo was angry because when he arrived at the meeting Soro Guillaume was not yet present and Villepin had to phone him. When the latter arrived, he entered through the front door with honours – honours usually reserved for distinguished guests such as heads of state and diplomatic representatives. Villepin had thus signified Gbagbo the little respect he had for him and his function. Villepin, therefore, ignored the psychological side of the negotiation. Furthermore, Villepin did not take into consideration that designating Diabaté as prime minister was already creating pre-negotiation friction. Bearing in mind that it is difficult to say no to the representatives of the French authorities when they are militarily the bosses on the ground. And the fact that neither Gbagbo nor Villepin had feelings of love for each other, it would, therefore, have been difficult for an agreement signed under such conditions to bear fruit.

Druckman (1997) as Game and decision theorists think of negotiation as a puzzle to be solved and recommend solutions based on the preferences of the parties. In the Ivorian case, the solution seemed to be based on the preference of the mediator and both parties did not share these preferences. Negotiation is then a bargaining game where the opponents exchange concessions, and where the exchange is affected by the initial situation. Without that, we are probably facing an arbitration.

Mediation usually is a part of a more complicated process that involves numerous variables. It indeed becomes a variable itself in determining the outcome of the more extensive process of conflict resolution (SARGSYAN, 2003). To evaluate mediation in terms of success and failure is such a hard task. Withal, Bercovitch (1992) proposes evaluative subjective and objective criteria for international mediation. Subjective criteria are linked to the perception by the parties or the mediators that the goals of mediation have been achieved by impacting the parties' behaviour. The criteria are subjective because they cannot be assessed empirically in terms of precise meaning, measure, etc. Drawing upon this perspective, we can evaluate mediation as being successful if: 1) the parties expressed satisfaction with the mediation because the process allows them a final say over the outcome, or because of the nature of the mediation (satisfaction); 2) when the parties express their concern with the process of mediation or its results, and when it is open to continuous modification by the disputant (fairness); 3) when international mediation emphasises timeliness, minimises costs and produces outcomes that maximise the benefits each party experiences (efficiency); 4) the mediated outcome is valid, that is stable and realistic and offers opportunities to avoid similar disputes in the future (effectiveness) (SARGSYAN, 2003).

Objective criteria offer a different perspective for evaluating mediations outcome because they rely on substantive indicators which may be assessed empirically by an observer or any of the participants in the mediation. Objective criteria are used to examine the behaviour of parties upon termination of mediation and determine the extent of the change that has taken place. If parties continue to interact in the same dysfunctional manner, then mediation can be assessed as a failure. According to such evaluation, mediation is considered as successful, if: 1) mediation efforts contribute to the cessation of violent behaviour and opening of a dialogue between parties; 2) parties embrace a formal outcome that settles many of the issues in dispute and produces new and more productive interaction (SARGSYAN, 2003). In the following table 7, we will apply such criteria to the LMA.

### Board 7 - Subjective and Objective criteria for LMA mediation

Criteria	Elements	Gbagbo	Dissidents	Outcome
Subjective	1- Satisfaction	No	Yes	Unsuccessful*
	2- Fairness	No	No	
	3- Efficiency	Yes	Yes	
	4- Effectiveness	No	No	
Objective	1- Cessation of hostilities and dialogue between parties			Mixed**
	2- Issues settlement and productive interaction			Unsuccessful***

*Source: Self elaboration*

\* Although we cannot empirically measure the subjective components, we can try to turn them palpable. As a result, after the LMA, Laurent Gbagbo refused to apply the agreements in the first place because he was not satisfied with the content. None of the parties has shown its concern with the process of mediation or its outcomes because the content was less realistic given the situation. However, the mediation has emphasised timeliness, minimised costs and produced results that maximise the benefits each party experienced. The parties did not have to make war efforts; they were busy blaming each other for the non-application of the LMA. For effectiveness, the LMA addressed the issue of the constitution, which concerns eligibility for the presidency and also the law on land without providing a real solution for the future. Subjectively the LMA was a failure.

\* \* The LMA led to a partial cessation of hostilities, even if sporadic clashes were noted, particularly in western Côte d'Ivoire. The LMA also opened the dialogue between the parties, which led to successive amendments to the original agreement.

\* \* \* Notwithstanding, the productive interaction between the parties and the resolution of the conflict were not observed. The parties were focused only on the political aspect of the LMA, and consequently, they made no effort to address the social and economic issues that led to conflict. Objectively it was also a failure.

For explaining the failure of the LMA, reference must be made to the form of mediation. The UN Charter recognises three applicable techniques for the peaceful management of conflict. We have direct negotiation between the parties, mediation and arbitration. In arbitration, for example, it is the third party that is responsible for making the decisions that must be implemented by the parties. For the LMA and according to Laurent Gbagbo, France, which was the mediator, imposed on him the decisions of the Linas-Marcoussis talks in which he did not participate. The LMA is more like the result of arbitration than mediation. As Bercovitch (2016) pointed out, mediation is a non-coercive, non-violent and

non-binding form of intervention. However, after the Kleber Avenue summit, Laurent Gbagbo said: “Villepin told me that if I did not accept Henriette Diabaté, he would give the ministries of Interior and Defence to the rebels. I refused everything and left the Quai d’Orsay very angry” (GBAGBO, MATTEI, 2018, p 85).

The intervention of the former French Prime Minister was made in the form of a threat to the former President of Côte d’Ivoire. France, of which Côte d’Ivoire is a former colony, had been “too” involved in settlement of the Ivorian conflict and by its excessive “zeal” trampled on the very principle of mediation and compromised the LMA. Several authors have defined what mediation would and should be. For Mitchell (1981), mediation is “any intermediary activity undertaken by a third party, with the primary intention of achieving agreement of the issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive conflictual behaviour”. Moore (2003, p 15) emphasises that mediation consists of including a third party – a mediator in the negotiations who is accepted by the adversaries as an impartial and a neutral subject. Bingham (1985, p 5) defines mediation as “assistance of a neutral third party in a negotiation”.

Neutrality and impartiality are distinctive characteristics of mediation. Given that certain essential aspects of mediation were not respected during the Linas-Marcoussis negotiations, it is therefore not surprising that the French mediation failed. As proof, there will be other agreements, including the ACCRA II agreement that we will see in the next section. However, the failure of the LMA could not only be attributed to the dubious mediation of France. Other elements, such as the behaviour of the parties, should also be taken into consideration. What is certain is that the mediation of France has not been at all favourable to a peaceful resolution of the Ivorian conflict.

### **3.3 ACCRA II Agreement**

There was a renewed tension between France and Côte d’Ivoire, precisely between the presidents Jacques Chirac and Laurent Gbagbo. At the end of February 2003, President Gbagbo did not participate in the France-Africa summit. During this summit, President Chirac confirmed the existence of death squads operating in Côte d’Ivoire. Faced with the difficulties for the implementation of the LMA, John Agyekum KUFUOR, President of the Republic of Ghana, President in the office of ECOWAS, convened a Round Table of the Ivorian political forces signatories to the LMA, held in Accra on March 6 and 7, 2003. The deadlock the parties were facing before starting the Linas-Marcoussis negotiation was the same after the LMA.

Zartman ripeness theory illuminates the linkage between conflict escalation and negotiation through its emphasis on a specific situation, a ripe moment, that is favourable for timing de-escalation strategies (AGGESTAM, 2005).

It is important to remember that MHS motivates conflicting parties to begin a negotiation or a de-escalation, but it does not mean that bargaining will be a success, or the agreement resulting from the negotiations will be easy to implement. Sometimes, ripeness theory can serve as a predictive tool, helping practitioners to know when to begin a negotiation, and can explain failure or success of a negotiation. The Ivorian case shows that all elements for a de-escalation were reunited, MHS and perception of the way out, and these elements led to the LMA. As we will see in the following sections, the Linas-Marcoussis negotiation was one step in a long way for the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire.

### 3.3.1 From Competition to Cooperation

If a new summit was convened in Accra, it meant that there was necessarily a problem with the LMA. The laborious appointment of a government of national reconciliation was the reason for the convening of this summit. Still, in two days the parties present in Accra had already agreed on the modalities of creation of this government. The parties were convinced that there was a negotiated way out from this crisis and that each of them was disposed to negotiate the way out from the crisis. President KUFUOR has persuaded the parties that this impasse will be painful for them, so he took advantage of this situation to bring them to the negotiation table, there is, therefore, a relation between the mediators' tactics and the ripeness of the conflict. This relation has been articulated in Zartman Proposition 5: *(a) when ripeness occurs, mediators can use specific tactics to take advantage of the moment and turn it into a negotiation. (b) If only the objective elements of ripeness are present, these tactics can be used to awake, in the parts of the conflict, the sensation/understanding with the suffering linked to the impasse, stimulating them to start negotiations* (ZARTMAN, 2016).

Traditional approaches to mediation assume that the parties to the conflict and the mediator share a strong motive to initiate mediation: the desire to reduce, cool down, or resolve the conflict (BERCOVITCH, 2016). As a motivation of the President, one could underline the fact that Ghana is a neighbour of Côte d'Ivoire and any instability on the Ivorian soil could have consequences also in Ghana. Besides, Côte d'Ivoire is the heart of the West African economy, its weakening has repercussions on the economy and even on the politics of neighbouring



countries. Côte d'Ivoire accounts for 40 per cent of *Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine* (UEMOA) GDP and is the second most dynamic economy in Africa (DIOP, 2017). Soro Guillaume (2005, p 141, our Griffon, our translation) opted for a collective wish between the parties and the mediator by affirming: "On African soil and in the absence of France, it is a question of "tropicalising" the LMA, which remains the basic frame of reference but needs to be clarified"<sup>38</sup>.

Two days after the beginning of negotiations in Accra, representatives of political parties and dissidents have reached an agreement on the composition of the government, which has been the subject of litigation since the signing of the LMA in January. The timing to start the negotiation was perfect. Mediation has catalysed negotiation, helping the parties doing what they cannot do alone by overcoming identifiable types of obstacles. Zartman (2008) argues that mediator has his motivating interests and need not be impartial but is expected to deliver to the side toward which it is biased. In such situation, the interests of the mediator can make peace talks difficult since impartiality is important in mediation. We remember the tensions that were palpable between President Wade of Senegal and Eyadema of Togo. These tensions prevented several Heads of State from going to the extraordinary Dakar summit on 18 December 2002.

Since negotiation is the process of combining divergent viewpoints to produce a joint agreement (ZARTMAN, 2008), the parties finally accepted the formation of the government of national reconciliation. President Laurent Gbagbo's FPI had ten out of forty-one ministries. And the PDCI the former single party, and the RDR of Alassane Ouattara, the main opposition party, have seven each. The dissidents obtain nine ministries. ACCRA II was a kind of negotiation to negotiate the implementation of the LMA. A major part of the ACCRA II negotiation concerned the attribution of the ministries of Defence and Security. Indeed, the LMA provided that these two ministries would revert to the dissident forces. Still, given that these ministries constituted the survival of the government of Laurent Gbagbo, it was therefore tough for him to concede it to his enemies. The way out to this deadlock was that these charges should be entrusted to a National Security Council (NSC), a Council, composed of the Head of State, the Prime Minister and representatives of political parties, dissidents' movements and the armed forces. Following this Council, the Ministers of Defence and Security must be chosen on a consensual basis.

The idea in itself seemed fair as a price to pay for a way out of the crisis. Both sides perceived conflict's ripeness. On the one hand, the mediators of the conflict, and on the other

---

<sup>38</sup>SORO, G. Op. Cit., p. 141. « En terre africaine et en l'absence de la France, il s'agit de tropicaliser les accords de Marcoussis, qui demeurent le référentiel de base mais gagnent à être précisés. »

hand, the parties into the conflict. If the parties were so keen to negotiate it was because they knew that they could not get out of the war by a military victory, also, they realised that the negotiations would be less damaging and less costly than an escalation by military means. As we know, the ripeness concept is straightforward, however, it has been subject to frequent misunderstandings. Zartman (2000) pointed out that a careful study by Stedman in 1991 on Rhodesia's negotiations for independence points out how Zimbabwe used the concept in the complexities of the internal dynamics of the conflict. Each conflict has a different internal momentum, the Ivorian case did not deviate from the rule. The various unsuccessful attempts to end the crisis by military means on both sides, surely showed them that they were in a deadlock and the increasing number of deaths has favoured the choice of a negotiated way out from the crisis. The military element of each party has constituted a principal aspect in the perception of the deadlock so that they can see a victory in the alternative result provided by the negotiation. Why fight if we can achieve the same results by sitting at a bargaining table?

Starting bargaining is to combine divergent viewpoints to produce a collective agreement, and for that, we need to use "*who*", "*when*" and "*what*". "Who" refers to the parties negotiating "what" refers to the outcome, and "when" refers to the end of the process (ZARTMAN, 2008). After the debates of ACCRA II, specific recommendations were made including: (a) the urgent creation of a National Security Council of fifteen (15) members including, the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, a representative of each of the political forces' signatories of the LMA, a representative of the FANCI, a representative of the National Gendarmerie and a representative of the National Police to contribute to the excellent management of the Ministries of Defence and Security. On the proposal of this Council, the Prime Minister would submit, as soon as possible, to the President of the Republic, a list of potential Minister of Defence and Minister of Security, who will be chosen on a consensual basis. (b) The attribution to the MPCII of two Ministers of State: Ministry of Territorial Administration and Ministry of Communication. (c) Respect for the choices made by the political forces of their representatives in government<sup>39</sup>.

In fact, the most sensitive point in LMA was the attribution of the two ministries of Defence and Security. The great discord was around this point. President Laurent Gbagbo did not want to lose his quality as Head of State, Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces, the guarantor of the Constitution and the republican institutions. But why did he agree with the LMA? One would see this as a strategy to save time and try to extend the deadline until 2005, the year of

---

<sup>39</sup>Cf ACCRA II agreement.

the presidential election. But we were only in February 2003, two years before the said election, so this would be a too tricky and hazardous manoeuvre. Soro claimed that Gbagbo was providing another excuse for inaction to have more time to acquire additional weapons (SORO, 2005). The complexity of the situation reached its peak when the “young patriots” already rejected the government of national reconciliation which had not even been formed.

LMA should be a starting point of the de-escalation of the Ivorian crisis, however, looking for the situation after the signing of LMA, the Ivorians were facing another escalation of the crisis, not at the military aspect but on the social level. Based upon the situation, a question could arise: was the moment ripe to start negotiations? Still, the basic understanding of the ripeness theory is that some kind of appropriate moment exists when the parties converge in their perceptions that unilateral strategies are no longer useful (AGGESTAM, 2005). As we know, a ripe moment is, a perceptual event based on the values and preferences of the political leaders making the assessments (ZARTMAN, 2001), and add to this perceptual event a persuasion by a third party or a mediator. Nonetheless, the mediator’s tactics and strategies are variables that increase and diminish the possibility of successful mediation.

The complexity of intrastate conflicts and the process of promoting peace pose two particularly important challenges to international mediators. First, before taking on their role, mediators must acquire a thorough understanding of history, politics, cultures and local personalities. Second, they must refrain from speeding up the process and making hasty interventions (NATHAN, 2016). By underestimating the stubbornness of the belligerents and the intricacies of the conflict, mediators can turn complex the situation than generate positive impact (NATHAN, 2016). Kissinger’s attempt to broker an agreement in Rhodesia, ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia, UNOSOM II in Somalia, and mediation in the Sudanese civil war in the 1990s, are examples of haste in trying to resolve a conflict (OFUATEY-KODJOE, 1994; DENG, 1995). To this list, must be added the rapid intervention of ECOWAS in its attempt to resolve the Ivorian conflict. An interference which ultimately generated even more tensions, not only between belligerents but also between Heads of State members of ECOWAS.

Kelman (1979), in his approach to the importance of psychology in negotiation, stated that the most important thing is not changing behaviour, but changing perception and attitudes towards conflict. It means that during the negotiation process, the psychological aspect of changing the understanding of the conflict is crucial. The mediator and the parties to the conflict must take psychological dimension into account. All along with negotiation, antagonists must acquire new beliefs and behaviour to adapt to changing realities and perceptions of their

adversary. On this point, the Ivorians crisis' parties did not try, at least at the stage of the Linas-Marcoussis negotiations, to change their perception or attitude towards their adversary. As a result, they left France as they came, with an agreement of course, but no change in the perception of their adversary.

Negotiation is a long-term process and should be the result of proper preparation – that why it is important to follow carefully the different phases and to identify the actors involved psychologically. In many cases, persuading the parties to a conflict to commit themselves to a negotiated solution is even more complicated, time-consuming and difficult than reaching an agreement after negotiations have begun. The mediator and the parties to the conflict must analyse and interpret themselves psychologically from the outset. The way the negotiations in Linas-Marcoussis were conducted has shown that this step was omitted.

The LMA also seems to be the result of a fast mediation. First, from a legal point of view, the agreement itself was very controversial. As soon as signed, the LMA provoked many reactions in the political class. Critics focused on the agreement's nature, the constitutionality of its provisions, the modalities of its application, and ultimately on its binding force to the parties (DU BOIS DE GAUDUSSON, 2003). These shortcomings, therefore, led to the holding of a new summit in Accra intending to reach agreement on the LMA. ACCRA II and the LMA were consequently linked.

### 3.3.2 Legal and political aspects of the agreements

The debate on the legal scope of the LMA was raised by the Ivorian President and his ministers who were therefore supported by several Ivorians and foreign lawyers. The reasons for this debate were obvious, lawyers and the government spoke of set-up and an attempt to destabilise a democratically elected and constitutionally legitimate government. Two series of criticisms were addressed to the agreement. On the one hand, it could not bind the Ivorian State and its government because the latter was not present during the peace talks of Linas-Marcoussis – only the political parties and dissident representatives were. On the other hand, it suffered from a crippling weakness, that of being incompatible with the Constitution and, if it was applied, it would cause insurmountable difficulties in the rule of law (DU BOIS DE GAUDUSSON, 2003).

At first glance, it appeared that several provisions of the LMA did not comply with the Constitution, yet it is known to all that the institutions of a country must be respected for the

proper functioning of the rule of law. By thus limiting the presidential prerogatives, the LMA was going against article 41 of the Ivorian Constitution which stipulates that the President of the Republic is “the exclusive holder of the executive power”. Therefore, offering an imperative mandate to Parliament is an unconstitutional act. It partly explains the difficulty in applying the LMA, which led to the holding of new negotiations at ACCRA II. However, all the elements of the Ripeness Theory seem to be reunited in the Ivorian case.

Failure to appreciate the complexity of the conflict inevitably led to limited analysis and error-prone strategies (NATHAN, 2016). The resolution of the conflict must be seen from the perspective of the parties to the conflict and also from the socio-cultural and political context. When the warring parties refused to accept the terms of a negotiated way out from the crisis, we may ask ourselves the question about the existence of MHS and perception of a negotiated way out from the crisis in the Ivorian case. One of the disadvantages of the MHS is its dependence on the conflict, that means it could not have a pre-emptive resolution and preventive diplomacy in an early stage of the conflict. On the other hand, this means that, in some cases, to ripe a conflict, it is necessary to increase its intensity until a deadlock is reached and then to advance it until it begins to generate suffering – and yet to act so that there is a perception of imminent catastrophe. In such a situation, a ripeness, therefore, becomes a product of “brinkmanship” (ZARTMAN, 2000, author’s Griffon).

The Ivorian conflict did not need to reach such extreme, at least until the ACCRA II agreement. However, the impasse after the signing of the LMA highlighted another limitation of the ripeness theory in that it barely deals with the opening of negotiations. If the Ripeness theory of the conflict can explain the beginning of a negotiation, it is to be expected that there is a theory that explains its successful conclusion (ZARTMAN, 2000). Nonetheless, the ripeness theory remains no less attractive for a negotiated way out from the crisis. According to some views, the attractiveness of the negotiated solution lies in the possibility of winning at lower costs than those caused by the conflict or in the possibility of dividing power (MITCHELL, 1995). This attractiveness takes the form of a new ingredient, offered by a mediator, which is more than a pure perception of a crisis solution. The opportunity for an agreement becomes more attractive because the conflict loses its relevance and ceases to justify hostile relations between parties. These loopholes can be called Mutually Enticing Opportunities (MEO) (ZARTMAN, 2000).

Even if in practice the MEO seems less attractive or less put into practice than the MHS, it is nevertheless visible in the holding of negotiations in the Ivorian crisis. If the content of the LMA had characteristics of unconstitutionality, it remains nonetheless an agreement

resulting from the attractiveness of the negotiated solution. Regarding its unconstitutionality, the LMA recommended modifications that are not incompatible with the constitution. Constitutionalists recognised the existence of several readings of the Constitution or the possibility of having “conventions of the Constitution” established. Some lawyers know how to use the principle of interpretation<sup>40</sup> of the useful effect to give meaning to the texts, make them compatible and ensure consistency in their application (DU BOIS DE GAUDUSSON, 2003).

The ACCRA II talks are indeed a counterbalance to the shortcomings of the LMA. Although the LMA had legal loopholes, the ACCRA II agreement was intended to fill them by providing a legitimate force that could bind the parties and thereby oblige them to commit to its execution. For the resolution of the Ivorian conflict, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms were used, which resulted in a political agreement. If the LMA did not have the force of law, it is subject to evolution during the negotiations. The proof is that the LMA has been renegotiated in ACCRA II and has brought another dynamic to the resolution of the Ivorian conflict.

During the first CNS meeting, President Gbagbo announced the transfer, for six months renewable, of some of his prerogatives to Prime Minister Seydou Diarra, in the application of LMA<sup>41</sup>. The first Council of Ministers took place in the absence of the ministers of the RDR and the dissident formations. Later the two personalities designated by the CNS to occupy the ministries of Security and Defence – one member of the FPI and one of the RDR, were rejected by the dissident movements. The imbroglio continued around the LMA, even if five ministers from dissident groups will finally be invested on 14 April 2003. Following ACCRA II resolutions, two ministries of state have been allocated to the MPC: Ministry of Territorial Administration and Ministry of Communication.

### 3. 4 A peace process in difficulty

The peace process in Côte d’Ivoire was struggling to be implemented. Peace processes are often rife with strategic and tactical deception, and even those who sign peace agreements may cultivate violence to undermine their new “partners” in peace (STEDMAN, 2003, author’s

---

<sup>40</sup>When the intention of legislature is not clearly expressed, a court needs to interpret the laws using the rules of interpretation. There are two types of Rules of Interpretation with sub-categories: primary rules and other rules.

<sup>41</sup>But this announcement was contested in that it seemed to transform one of the essential parts of the Accra Accords of March 2003 into an advisory body meeting every three months at the initiative of the Head of State. See *Le Patriote*, April 8, 2003.

Griffon). Person and factions who view a particular peace as opposed to their interests and who are willing to use violence to undermine it are called spoilers. They pose a grave threat to those who are making peace (STEDMAN, 1997). The peace process in Côte d'Ivoire encountered great difficulties when it was implemented in the aftermath of the LMA. In many cases, such a situation led to an escalation of violence after the peace agreement. Sometimes violence acts as a catalyst creating an MHS for starting a negotiation for de-escalation, but also, violence can destroy a promising peace process.

The presence of spoilers in the earlier stage of implementation underlines the short-term implementation of peace agreements. Stedman (2003) has approached the question of violence and peace processes from a belief that peace is most vulnerable in the short term and though that we know more about protecting peace in the short time than we know about healing societies in the long term. Events in Côte d'Ivoire after the LMA just corroborated the difficulty of implementing peace agreements in a short-term due to the bad faith of the spoilers.

#### 3.4.1 The Spoilers in the Ivorian peace process

Peace agreements often involve multiple pledges, which then translate into sub-goals implementation: demobilisation, disarmament, elections, human rights, refugee repatriation, economic reconstruction, reforming the police and establishing accountability (STEDMAN, 2003). The LMA provided among other capacities for demobilisation, disarmament, the preparation of electoral deadlines to have credible and transparent elections, the relaxation of the law on the presidential candidacy. The post-LMA situation was tense because of the attitude of President Gbagbo, the young patriots and also the dissident forces. The ambivalence of President Gbagbo who treated the LMA as a “proposal” and the refusal in the first place of the dissident troops to participate in the government of national reconciliation have undermined a socio-political situation.

But the LMA was the basis of a long and tumultuous peace process in Côte d'Ivoire. Indeed, even with the unwillingness of the parties into the conflict, the LMA first allowed proposals to end the crisis, then it served as a basis for starting other negotiations on some of its recommendations. In reality, specific major points were at the origin of the discord, and not having binding force. The LMA was, therefore, subject to interpretation by the parties into the conflicts. Besides, the LMA also posed the problem of good faith during the negotiation process.

It was difficult to believe that the government would respect the point (d) of the recommendations of the round table which stipulated: *The government of national reconciliation will be led by a Prime Minister of consensus which will remain in place until the next presidential election at which he cannot stand*<sup>42</sup>. Also, the point (g) would dispossess dissidents of their leverage to get what they took up arms for stipulating: *To help restore the security of people and property throughout the national territory, the government of national reconciliation will organise the regrouping of the forces present and their disarmament. It will make sure that no mercenaries stay on the national territory any more*<sup>43</sup>.

From this point of view, the LMA seemed doomed to failure as the proposals looked utopian in specific aspects. This failure of French mediation raises the debate on rationalist-materialist perspective. This perspective suggests that the best way to successful mediation is the material manipulation of the bargaining environment by third parties with a high degree of economic and military resources. It is a capacity-based mediation based on coercion and provision of some good, and it is usually the case of non-Africans third parties' mediation (DUURSMA, 2020). In contrast, African third parties have a high degree of legitimacy as a result of a joint African commitment to the norm of African solutions to African challenges (ZARTMAN, 1967). Since African leaders generally perceive that they are bound by rules related to the African solutions norm, Africans third parties possess a social status that, in turn, provides them with a high degree of legitimacy when mediating armed conflict in Africa (DUURSMA, 2020).

Yet the LMA was the only way to ease tensions on both sides as ECOWAS and the AU struggled to manage the crisis. And this has reinforced the thesis that African third parties with their limited means are ineffective in relation to non-African third parties which have unlimited economic means and resources. Smock and Gregorian (1993) argue that the former colonial powers and the US seem to have a better record of successful mediation than either African organisations or African leaders. They claim that the “very significant role of the United States and the European states seems related to the assets, resources, and leverage available to these powers” (SMOCK; GREGORIAN, 1993, p 12). By his side, Khadiagala asserts that “by intervening with only limited tangible and material resources, African interveners have

---

<sup>42</sup>Cf LMA propositions available from: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/cote-d-ivoire/colonne-droite/documents-de-reference/article/accord-de-linas-marcoussis>

<sup>43</sup>Cf LMA propositions available from: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/cote-d-ivoire/colonne-droite/documents-de-reference/article/accord-de-linas-marcoussis>



contributed to the widespread perception of being meddlers rather than mediators” (KHADIAGALA, 2007, p 6).

LMA was, therefore, a half-open breach in which the parties to the conflict were engulfed so that the spoilers could act and hinder the peace process in quietness. But how can we prevent this kind of spoils? Stedman (2003) has proposed to give priorities to overcoming spoilers, demobilising soldiers, providing civilian security and building up local capacity for peace. However, how can people achieve such goals when both parties sabotage the peace process. We must, therefore, refer again to the MEO of Zartman (2000) with his proposition 6: *the perception of a mutually attractive opportunity is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the continuation of negotiations towards the successful conclusion of a conflict* (ZARTMAN, 2016).

The main task of the pre-negotiation phase is to get the parties to commit to negotiating their differences. This task is accomplished mainly by identifying and removing obstacles to negotiation. There may be many substantial obstacles to the opening of negotiations, so the importance of defining the problem in question in the pre-negotiation phase. The parties may not be willing to negotiate because they have very different views on the nature of the problem. An essential step for the negotiations is to get the parties to agree on a standard definition of the problem. Without a common definition, the parties will only talk about each other. Even if the negotiations were to take place, they would probably be unproductive and would simply divert attention from the task of defining the problem (SAUNDERS, 1991).

Hence the need for psychological work on the parties to the conflict. At the end of the Linas-Marcoussis and ACRRA II talks, it would have been difficult to say what this common problem identified by the parties was. Neither the proposal to appoint Mrs Diabaté as Prime Minister, nor the appointment of Seydou Diarra to that post, nor the allocation of the Ministries of Defence and Security to the dissidents was the common problem in the Ivorian crisis. Here, one of the shortcomings of the ripeness theory is highlighted. To have a definitive way out of the crisis, a negotiated decision and a perception of the MEO are not enough. The necessity to add the willingness of the parties to agree on a common problem appears crucial. The parties must decide that some fair agreement is possible and have the perception that the ideal solution for each side is not achievable. We can represent it in the table below.

## Board 8 - Conditions for a successful conclusion of the negotiations

Negotiate decision + perception of the MEO + perception of fair agreement = Successful end of a conflict

The question of the ripeness of the conflict always comes up because of the post-LMA events. That is why Crocker (1992, p 471) vigorously maintains that “the absence of ‘ripeness’ does not mean that there is nothing to do. On the contrary, it helps us to identify obstacles and indicates ways of dealing with them and managing the problem until its resolution be possible”. In this way, two policies which are secondary to the theory of ripeness, but very important for the professionals of the negotiations, can be recommended: positioning and ripeness. For the positioning, Crocker (1992) suggested elements to be considerate: (a) offer original ideas to the parties, to put them into action; (b) establish basic principles that should form the constituent elements of an agreement. Stein (1994) also suggested pre-negotiation by identifying the following points: (a) identify the issues that must be resolved and set aside topics that are not possible to address in the referred conflict; (b) clarify the costs and risks involved in seeking an agreement; (c) establish retribution, the sense in which each party will make reciprocal concessions to the other party.

In the African continent, relations between state and society have become increasingly conflicting. The causes lie in the fact that African plurinational communities survived the destruction of their original state models to be subjected to a Western State caricature (ATCHE, 2008). Historical data shows that most conflicts in Africa are the result of movements between ethnic groups or groups from different regions<sup>44</sup>. A critical element related to basic needs in situations of intergroup conflict is the fear of denying these needs – concern focused, for example, on a threat to security or identity (KELMAN, 1987). The diversity of values becomes vital in the analysis of the behaviour of the actors in the conduct of negotiations in case of conflict, hence the psychological aspect of the individual concerning the nature of the conflict. Kelman (1999) stated that socio-psychological analysis provides a lens to be able to see international relations in general and international conflict in particular.

This psychological aspect seems to have been left out in mediation when trying to resolve the Ivorian conflict, so the parties to the conflict seem to have forgotten the recent past

---

<sup>44</sup>In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, dissidents who were occupying part of the territory claimed that they had taken up arms to repair the injustices suffered by the collectivities in the north of the country.

and the differences that brought them to the negotiating table. Kelman (1979), in his approach on the importance of psychology in negotiation, stated that the most important thing is not the change in behaviour, but, rather, the change in perception and attitudes toward the conflict (KELMAN, 1979). If not, we are running the risk of an increase in spoils after the peace agreements.

On 3 May 2003, i.e., four months after the signing of the LMA and two months after the signing of ACCRA II, the FANCI and the FN signed a ceasefire agreement in Abidjan. The signatory parties considered that the scrupulous respect of this agreement was an essential condition for the implementation of the peace process, which should lead to the rapid restoration of the authority of the State throughout the national territory, re-establishing the integrity of the national area and to a return to a healthy life in Côte d'Ivoire<sup>45</sup>.

#### 3.4.2. A Peacekeeping operation to save the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement

The post-LMA was marked by turmoil among the political class and the population. The LMA which should be the catalyst for the end of the crisis has turned into a trigger for protests and confrontation in Côte d'Ivoire. The first three months post-LMA saw the government of national reconciliation be set up reluctantly, after that there was a relative calm which led to the signature of an agreement of integral ceasefire between the Chief of Staff of the Ivorian forces and the dissident's chief of FN. This ceasefire immediately came into effect. But in the meantime, FN had extended its control zone in western Côte d'Ivoire to the detriment of other dissident groups. A security force, composed of French soldiers, Ivorian's soldiers, West African soldiers of ECOWAS and fighters of the FN had to be deployed in this region, an arena of looting and violence since November 2002.

The UNSC on 13 May 2003, adopted resolution 1479 which established the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire – MINUCI which would enforce the respect of the ceasefire. And for this reason, a contingent of 26 military officers arrived in Côte d'Ivoire (AHOUANGAN, 2019). However, the UN contingent was tiny; the number of soldiers was very low for a mission of this scale. In July 2003 the FANCI and the *Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles* (FAFN) signed a joint declaration (UNSC, 2003), and 2003 was a relatively calm year in Côte d'Ivoire.

---

<sup>45</sup>Cf COTE D'IVOIRE. Accord de cessez-le-feu entre les FANCI et les FN. Abidjan, le 3 mai 2003.

Nonetheless, on 25 August 2003, French authorities announced the arrest, in Paris, of a dozen people who were preparing a coup against the Ivorian regime, under the direction of Chief Sergeant Ibrahim Coulibaly alias “IB”. The latter was the “head” of the MPCJ, which had instigated the attempted coup in September 2002. Also, on the same day, two French soldiers were killed by dissidents in the demilitarised zone located in the Centre of the country. These deaths are considered to be unrelated to the arrests in Paris (ENCYCLOPÆDIA UNIVERSALIS, [201-?]).

After some months, and when all were resolutely turned towards the smooth running of the peace process, certain events will come to shake it and consequently put back on the agenda the fragility of the LMA and the ACCRA II agreement. Indeed, the posts of Minister of Defence and Minister of Security which had not been allocated since the LMA for lack of consensus were finally assigned by President Laurent Gbagbo. However, these appointments were contested by the opposition and the dissidents. Guillaume Soro, head of the Forces Nouvelles<sup>46</sup> threatened to leave the government.

The tension was escalating in Côte d’Ivoire, and the Forces Nouvelles were carrying out their threat by announcing the suspension of their participation in the government to protest against the blockage of the peace process. The fragile relaxation between the parties to the conflict has been deteriorated, and in October 2003 Jean Hélène, a French journalist of Radio France Internationale (RFI), was shot in the head by a policeman in front of the general direction of the police in Abidjan. He was awaiting the release of several opponents to interview them, and this was the outcome of an anti-French climate prevailing in Côte d’Ivoire, even if the government promised to open an investigation.

Afterwards months of boycott, the ministers representing the dissident movements return to the government of national reconciliation, a return which coincided with the sentencing of Sergeant Théodore Séry Dago by the military tribunal, to seventeen years in prison following the murder of the French journalist Jean Hélène. Notwithstanding, the latter supported by the young patriots, claimed his innocence. Due to the situation, ECOWAS then called for an increase in MINUCI military officers and the conversion of the mission into a peacekeeping operation. On 27 February 2004, the 1528 UNSC resolution established the

---

<sup>46</sup>The Forces Nouvelles de Côte d’Ivoire (FNCI) was the new name of the coalition of dissident movements, the MPIGO, the MPCJ and the MJP, whose armed elements controlled the area called “CNO” area (Center, North and West), or 60% of the territory of Côte d’Ivoire, during the first part of the crisis, from 2002 to 2007, mainly in the northern part of the country. Guillaume Soro was the secretary general of this movement.

United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreements and to end the conflict (AHOUANGAN, 2019).

UNOCI's mandate provided for the deployment of nearly six thousand and six hundred soldiers and police for twelve months. Its mission was to supervise the disarmament and the return to civilian life of the combatants, as well as to help organise the presidential elections scheduled for October 2005 by the LMA. The Council also has requested the Secretary-General to transfer the authority of MINUCI and ECOWAS forces in Côte d'Ivoire to UNOCI. The resolution also authorised the French forces of Operation Licorne to use all necessary means to support UNOCI. But the fragile peace situation in the country continued to deteriorate. A new political crisis emerged on 5 March 2004, when the PDCI, party of former Ivorian President, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, withdrew from the government. On 25 March 2004, violent clashes between pro-government and opposition militants resulted in several deaths. In response to the events, the other opposition parties also decided to withdraw from the government, accusing Gbagbo of sabotaging the peace process (AHOUANGAN, 2019).

Violence and roundups continued to claim victims in the following days, and opposition to President Laurent Gbagbo demanded clarification upon such violence against them, and the establishment of an international commission of investigation requesting the support of France. The situation in Côte d'Ivoire did not improve, in April 2004 the French-Canadian journalist Guy-André Kieffer was kidnapped in Abidjan while he was investigating a case of embezzlement, Paris prosecutor's office has opened a judicial investigation for kidnapping and sequestration. A commission of inquiry of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights was sent to Côte d'Ivoire following the deadly repression of a manifestation in favour of the LMA on 25 March. Investigators said opposition march was used "as a pretext [for] a carefully planned and executed operation not only by [law enforcement] but also by so-called parallel forces under the direction and responsibility of the highest state authorities" [ENCYCLOPÆDIA UNIVERSALIS, [201-?]]. The commission has estimated the casualties of the repression at least one hundred and twenty deaths.

UN has strongly condemned President Gbagbo's regime, but that did not prevent him from dismissing three ministers from the opposition, opposition which has suspended its participation in the government of national reconciliation after the violence in March. Among the dismissing ministers was Guillaume Soro, leader of the dissidents that controlled the North of the country. The Prime Minister Seydou Diarra, who had the support of the UN Security Council, has protested against this measure and this new political imbroglio led to the holding of a new summit in Accra, ACCRA III.

### 3.5 ACCRA III or the summit of the last chance

President John Kufuor, the host of this umpteenth summit – which aimed to find a solution to the Ivorian crisis, had at the outset set the bar high by putting the protagonists in front of their responsibilities. “There will be no Accra IV,” he told them (RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONALE, 31-07-2004). He wanted to situate the responsibilities and notify that this time things were serious, not that the last times they were not, but that a final agreement was to come out of these ACCRA III talks. Since the LMA which was struggling for its implementation, the UN decided to be more severe and firmer vis-à-vis the protagonists of the Ivorian crisis. To the “rescue” of African negotiators, a delegation from the UN Security Council adopted a firm tone when arrived on 23 June in Abidjan. The UN delegation brandished some sanctions which could be applied individually to anyone who hampered the smooth running of the peace process (SAMSON, 2004). “We came here with a very firm message, we will not make threats but will present very concrete requirements on the measures that we want to see implemented” (SAMSON, 2004) said the ambassadors.

The firmness with which this new deadlock was treated shows the urgency of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire. Prime Minister Seydou Diarra had several times shown his disappointment about the fact that the government he was leading was suffering boycotts by the opposition. Also, the fact that President Laurent Gbagbo has appointed interim ministers all from the presidential party (FPI) distorted the balance. The situation also was not looking good within the Forces Nouvelles. Indeed, an inevitable leadership war between Ibrahim Coulibaly still under judicial control on French territory and Guillaume Soro, the secretary-general of the Forces Nouvelles appeared. This war made dozens of deaths in Korhogo and Bouaké. For the first, it was reproached his connivance with Laurent Gbagbo, while the second, it was criticisms against his methods and his desires of cessation, which initially was not the objective of the dissidents.

This internal war represented a danger for the ceasefire agreement, during the night of 6 to 7 June 2004, French military positions and the FANCI were attacked in Gohitafla, a town more than 150 km west of Bouaké. The French soldiers of Operation Licorne then repelled these uncontrolled elements of the dissidents. Nonetheless, this provocation had triggered the anger of the Young Patriots. A bloody massacre in Bouaké and Korhogo, between supporters of Ibrahim Coulibaly and followers of Guillaume Soro at night from 20 to 21 June had foreshadowed a disintegration of the dissidence and a tilting of the North into anarchy. A sign of the growing nervousness of soldiers of all stripes, on 25 June, a French soldier was shot down

at a FANCI checkpoint near Yamoussoukro (GHORBAL, 2004). There was, therefore, an emergency in Côte d'Ivoire which was on the brink of the abyss.

### 3.5.1 A ripeness for salvation in Côte d'Ivoire

Ripeness can also be a theme of creative diplomacy, as indicated by the theory, ripeness results from objective indicators added to persuasion. If some objective factors were present, persuasion is the visible diplomatic element, which serves to awaken in the parties, the perception of both the impasse and the suffering generated by the conflict (ZARTMAN, 2000). It was the message of Kufuor (2004) and other mediators who emphasised the absence of real alternatives in the situation in Côte d'Ivoire (impasse) and the high cost of the conflict (suffering). The case of extreme tension in the dissidents' camp, the withdrawal of the opposition ministers from the national reconciliation government and the clashes between FANCI and FAFN combatants, are constitutive elements of an MHS (impasse). The numerous losses in human lives on both sides constitute a high cost of the conflict (suffering).

In some cases, if there are no objective indicators to be mentioned, the mediator may have a more active part in ripeness, thus changing from communicator and formulator to manipulator (ZARTMAN; TOUVAL, 1997). In 1995 NATO bombed Serbian positions in Bosnia to create a mutual impasse. The United States provided arms to Israel in the October 1973 war and to Morocco in 1981 and acted as a mediator manipulating an impasse. Fortunately, such manoeuvres delicate and dangerous did not need to be employed to bring the parties to the negotiating table in Accra III. However, it is essential to remember that this summit was held under pressure from twelve regional Heads of State and the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan.

These were two days of intense negotiations that finally ended with an agreement to relaunch the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire. The most striking facts of ACCRA III was that the mediators persuaded the parties to the conflicts to negotiate, and the latter were convinced that a way out to the crisis could be settled. At the end of the talks, President John Kufuor announced: "The President of Côte d'Ivoire and all the leaders of Côte d'Ivoire have agreed to restore the government of national reconciliation to restore the management of their country before free and fair elections next year" (DAOUDI, 2004). Albert Tevoedjere Special Representative of the United Nations in Côte d'Ivoire said: "It is the first time that Gbagbo signs an agreement, signs a press release, signs a commitment, it is huge" (DAOUDI, 2004).

Optimism was in order at the end of the ACCRA III negotiations. The various actors who participated in the summit showed their satisfaction. Mathieu Kérékou, President of Benin, said with satisfaction “The conflict is almost over, it’s about getting to work” (DAOUDI, 2004). If there was so much enthusiasm around the ACCRA summit, it was because on the one hand, the belligerents had the perception of MEO, and on the other hand, there was a motivational ripeness. Motivational ripeness consists of “willingness [of the parties] to give up their advantages at that time, in exchange for substantial concessions from the other party, instead of waiting until later, in the expectation that other may be persuaded to make such concessions unilaterally” (ZARTMAN, 2000). Pruitt (1997) and Pruitt and Olczak (1995) extended the notion of maturity to Readiness Theory. Pruitt, when identifying the motivational ripeness, incorporates the positive factor of mutual dependence to the negative elements already contained in the MHS – unattainable victory and unacceptable costs of the escalation. We can argue that the legitimacy-based mediation of Ghana president played a considerable role in signing this agreement with such enthusiasm. This third-party legitimacy was the normative belief by the conflict parties that they should comply with the Ghanian President, differently to France capacity-based mediation which refers to its economic and military resources as the third party.

Boniface Vignon Journalist at RFI after the ACCRA III agreement stated: “Even if the LMA were the framework for these negotiations, it is now Accra III which is becoming the reference. [...] 48 hours of intense negotiations to put Côte d’Ivoire back on the road to peace, it was worth the money” (VIGNON, 2004). Why did ACCRA III generate so much enthusiasm? Simply because it was the result of perspectives of reconciliation articulated by the parties during the negotiation. This agreement obtained under “pressure” from a dozen African heads of state present during the talks, did not guarantee that the protagonists will discharge their duty. However, these were premises that the parties to the conflict “definitely” want to end the crisis. For this, the Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan did not hesitate to brandish the threat of sanctions by affirming: “I had the impression at the end of the session that everyone was ready to go to work. [...] The Security Council of the United Nations reserves the right to take the necessary measures to ensure peace and security in Côte d’Ivoire” (SAMSON, 2004).

ACCRA III agreement provided for a council of ministers to be held in the coming weeks in the presence of the two representatives of the Forces Nouvelles, and that of the opposition, who had been dismissed on 19 May. It also planned to adopt the political reforms provided by the Marcoussis peace agreements signed in January 2003, some of which, for example, the nationality code, which was in an impasse in the Ivorian assembly. The eligibility



law, which currently prevents opponent Alassane Ouattara from running for President in 2005, should, therefore, be amended very soon. The agreement signed in Accra provided that the Head of State, Laurent Gbagbo, had to use his constitutional powers to adopt an amendment to article 35 of the Constitution which required that any presidential candidate must be “born of Ivorian father and mother of origin”. The Marcoussis peace agreements provided for an amendment so that the necessary condition for any application is that the applicant can be “born of an Ivorian father or mother of origin.” (SAMSON, 2004).

If LMA served as the basis for the start of the resolution of the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, ACCRA III seemed to have taken over as the parties and also the mediator was confident at the end of the talks. Each party to the conflict announced that they would commit to this agreement to end the crisis, and this commitment can also be explained by the choice of the mediator and local mediation. The traditional answer to the question “who should be selected as a third party in mediations?” was: the mediator must be a neutral and exogenous actor (WEHR; LEDERACH, 1996).

According to this view, neutrality is seen as a necessary tool for the work of a successful mediator (CARNEVALE; ARAD, 1996). It is therefore preferable that the third party has no link with the parties to the conflict, nor any specific interest in the result which will result from it. As we all know, France, apart from its colonial past with Côte d’Ivoire, has maintained relations with the latter. The strategic challenge that Côte d’Ivoire represents in Africa, for France, no longer needs to be demonstrated. Its participation in the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire was seen as biased by the two parties, especially the presidential camp. The anti-French attacks in Côte d’Ivoire after the LMA by young patriots is only the illustration of a rejection of France’s partiality. Unlike Ghana, which theoretically has no “link” with Côte d’Ivoire apart from the fact that they are neighbours.

### 3.5.2 After rain the good weather?

If the ACCRA III agreement seemed to arouse so much enthusiasm, it is because the parties were determined to put an end to the conflict definitively and above all also because of the threat of sanctions brandished by the United Nations. Ten days after the ACCRA III agreement, the government of national reconciliation finally met in full after President Laurent Gbagbo reinstated the three opposition ministers, he had dismissed in May, including Guillaume Soro, head of the rebels. The agreements, therefore, provided the reconstitution of

the government concluded in Accra in July under the aegis of the Ghanaian President and Chairman of ECOWAS, which also imposed, under penalty of sanctions, institutional reforms and the disarmament of dissidents and pro-government militias.

After three months of calm following ACCRA III, Côte d'Ivoire fell into an unprecedented bloodbath. At the beginning of November 2004, the Ivorian air force carried out raids against the dissident cities of Bouaké and Korhogo, in the North of the country, thus breaking the ceasefire put in place in early 2003. The preoccupation was growing in the French ranks since four thousand five hundred French soldiers of Operation Licorne were monitoring the “*zone de confiance*”<sup>47</sup>, and what France feared happened two days later. In fact, on 6 November 2004, a supposed Ivorian army plane bombed a *Force Licorne* camp in Bouaké, resulting in the death of nine French soldiers and an American civilian refugee on this camp, and making 38 wounded, some of them seriously. The most massive loss to the French military since the attack on the Drakkar building in Beirut in 1983 (HOFNUNG, 2014). Yet Jacques Chirac had tried to dissuade his Ivorian counterpart from attacking the dissidents camp in Bouaké and Korhogo. The ambassador of France in Abidjan in 2004 told justice: “the interview is appalling, Chirac would have told him that if he moved, he would do something, to stop fooling.” (HOFNUNG, 2014).

The bombing was carried out by an Ivorian army aircraft, a Sukhoi-25 – Russian-made, piloted by Belarusian mercenaries with an Ivorian co-pilots. The French response was quick. General Poncet, who commanded the Licorne force in Abidjan, ordered without the advice of President Jacques Chirac – yet supreme head of the armies – the destruction of the two Sukhoi which came to land on the Yamoussoukro airport. And also, the entire Ivorian military fleet, including helicopters stationed in the presidential compound, while seizing Abidjan airport after heavy fighting with the Ivorian army (HOFNUNG, 2014).

Franco-Ivorian relations were deteriorating completely, and the Ivorian conflict took another turn. Then ambassador of France in Côte d'Ivoire Le Lidec was sceptical by saying: “I was wondering how, on a Saturday, he can react so quickly, and my second reaction is to say: ‘You are completely crazy in Paris, they will all go after the French population.’” (HOFNUNG, 2014, our translation)<sup>48</sup> It was enough for the young patriots to invade the streets of Abidjan,

---

<sup>47</sup>The “*zone de confiance*” is the zone dividing the country in two, one part under control of governmental forces (FANCI), and the other part under the control of the Dissidents movements. The “*zone de confiance*” controlled by the peacekeepers of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI), prevented attacks between the belligerents.

<sup>48</sup>HOFNUNG, T. le journal libération. (05.11.2014), “ je me demandais comment un samedi ils ont pu réagir aussi rapidement, et ma seconde réaction est de dire ‘ils sont fous à Paris, maintenant ils vont s’en prendre aux ressortissants français’”

attacking interests and the French community. In just a few days, nearly 8,000 French people were evacuated from Côte d'Ivoire in an emergency. The most massive exodus since the end of the Algerian War.

Another significant fact in this Franco-Ivoirian crisis was that a column of French armoured vehicles found itself in front of Gbagbo's residence. "A guide error", pleaded the soldiers who had to go to the nearby Ivoire hotel, place of gathering for French nationals. A "mistake" barely sufficient to trigger deadly clashes in Abidjan between French soldiers stationed around the Ivoire hotel, in the residential district of Cocody, and besieged by patriots who accused them of fomenting a coup d'état. On their side, believing themselves to be surrounded and panicked, Gbagbo and his relatives were ready to surrender said Le Lidec (HOFNUNG, 2014). They call the Elysée Palace, which denied that an assault was underway. "In Paris, they deflated," allegedly launched a few days later General Poncet, according to a well-informed source (HOFNUNG, 2014). In reality, for all those who know the topography of the city of Abidjan, it is difficult or almost impossible to go wrong in wanting to go to the Hotel Ivoire. Besides, the area is fully known to French soldiers since the French Embassy is located there.

In an interview with France 24 in November 2004, President Gbagbo said: "I cannot give the order to shoot the French, because I am not an idiot. I believe you can concede that to me. And the minimum intelligence means that neither French soldiers nor ONUCI soldiers should be shot" (FRANCE 24, 2004, our translation)<sup>49</sup>. After the Bouaké attacks, columns of French armoured vehicles left Bouaké for Abidjan, and it was these same armoured vehicles that were posted around Gbagbo's residence. Difficult to believe, therefore in a manoeuvring error especially, in a well-known area by the French army.

The objective seemed to be to scare or wrongfully dislodge Gbagbo since a video made by the own French soldiers shows the Belarusian mercenaries quietly leaving their Sukhoi. Another grey area, in this case, is that after the attacks on some of the dissident camps in Bouaké and Korhogo, UNOCI, through a communiqué, underlined the professionalism of the intervention, which did not cause any collateral damage (GBAGBO; MATTEI, 2018). General Poncet has also refused to an Ivoirian magistrate the access of the *camp Descartes*, the place where the bombing has taken place.

---

<sup>49</sup>FRANCE 24 (11.2004), Interview accordé à la chaîne de télévision française après les attaques de Bouaké qui ont tué 9 soldats français et un américain. "Je ne peux pas donner l'ordre de tirer sur les français, parce que je ne suis pas idiot. Je crois que vous pouvez me concéder cela. Le minimum d'intelligence veut qu'on ne tire pas ni sur les soldats français ni sur les soldats de l'ONUCI."

Why did they not apprehend the Belarusian mercenaries? Also, these mercenaries were arrested in Togo, and the Togolese authorities directly advised their French counterparts who asked them to do nothing, thus leaving the mercenaries to vanish. It would, therefore, seem that France had perhaps intended to oust President Gbagbo and changed their mind at the last minute. At least that was what the Gbagbo camp thought because neither Dominique de Villepin former French Prime Minister nor Michèle Alliot-Marie minister of the interior at that time could explain this imbroglio. The only thing we are sure of is that this episode had catastrophic consequences for the peace process and the situation in Côte d'Ivoire at the time.

In a televised address, Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo expressed his regrets for the incident of Bouaké. He has justified the breaking of the ceasefire by the dead-end of the peace process and by the looting of the country's resources by the dissidents. It is difficult to say whether this act of the Ivorian government is part of the resistance to accepting the impasse. That is, (a) a normal response to the opposition in style "do not give up without a fight" and "if you do not succeed at first, try again"; (b) although escalations are commonly seen as a way of conducting conflict, they also refer to other aspects of the conflict, such as its purposes and agents (RUBIN; PRUITT; KIM, 1994); (c) certain types of adversary have a particular propensity for incisive behaviour of resistance; (d) there is a specific culture, the part that faithfully believes in its cause. (ZARTMAN, 2000)

We are again faced with a spoiler situation. Marie-Joëlle Zahar (2003) calls into question the usefulness of the typology of spoiler by arguing that ex-ante it is impossible to know what kind of spoiler one is confronting. It is impossible to know the intentions of people a priori since we are not mind readers. But what we do know was there were a lot of spoilers on both sides during the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire.

The breaking of the ceasefire in November 2004 in Côte d'Ivoire was proof of spoiler action and has also shown how the post-agreement period remains fragile and subject to more attention. Post-agreement violence can sometimes be more intense than pre-agreement violence. On 9 November 2004, violent clashes between the French soldiers of the Force Licorne and the young patriots pro Gbagbo, report several civilian deaths. During the repression of the demonstrations in Abidjan, French forces fired real bullets by helicopter and on the ground on the demonstrators installed on the two bridges of the Ebrié lagoon and around the Hotel Ivoire. After the facts, France continued to minimise the scale of the tragedy caused by the brutal intervention of its armed force. While concordant sources announce a hundred dead and a thousand wounded, France spoke of twenty dead and "enlarged self-defence" (MAS, 2004).

The UNSC had rightly condemned the attack on French forces in Bouaké as well as the deadly airstrikes in the North of the country by the Côte d'Ivoire National Armed Forces, which violated and spoiled of the Ceasefire Agreement of 3 May 2003. In addition to this condemnation, the UNSC adopted unanimously on 15 November 2004, the resolution 1572, imposing an arms sales embargo on Côte d'Ivoire. This crisis led to another conflict mediation for Côte d'Ivoire.

### 3.6 Pretoria I and II

At the beginning of December, South African President Thabo Mbeki, mediator mandated by the African Union in early November, announced the conclusion of an agreement to end the crisis aiming the application of the LMA, signed in January 2003. The agreement provided for the initiation of political reforms, the disarmament of combatants, the effective establishment of an Ivorian government of national reconciliation and the securitisation of the country. In the application of this agreement, President Laurent Gbagbo prohibited by decree any demonstration on the public highway in Abidjan for three months, thus depriving his most radical supporters, the young patriots, of the field of action. In the process, Parliament voted to revise article 35 of the Constitution on the conditions of eligibility for the presidency. The text could allow a candidacy for the presidential election – planned for October 2005, of the leader of the opposition Alassane Ouattara. Were the Ivorians heading towards an end to the crisis?

Since the beginning of the crisis in September 2002, various actors in the conflict have struggled to find a solution to the crisis. The AU, ECOWAS, and France have, in turn, mixed up with the Ivorian crisis with relative success. The LMA served as a base for all mediations and negotiations of the Ivorian crisis. However, the success of these negotiations was below expectations. Either the warring parties spoiled the accord by mutually blaming each other, or they attacked the content of the agreements that they considered partisan. The Ivorian crisis seemed to drag on longer than imagined. Almost three years after the coup attempt, which turned into an intrastate conflict – marked by lulls and sporadic attacks – the situation often presented the appearance of a resolved conflict before sinking into extreme violence each time.

The day after each agreement, it was said that this time was the right one before the whole process was called into question again. Despite the existence of the MHS, the MEO, and the persuasion and perception that there was a negotiated crisis way out, the negotiations would have been successful at first before they went completely out. Zartman's theory is, therefore

limited in that it does not provide for the implementation phase of the agreements. Zartman himself spoke on the need for refinement of the theory, especially at the post-agreement period. But it is difficult to predict whether an agreement will be successful or not given the versatility and the lunatic character of certain parties to the conflict.

To be successful, negotiation depends on several objective and subjective elements. Zartman has repeatedly mentioned the fleeting character of the MHS, to this must be added to the utterly unpredictable behaviour of the participants during the implementation phase of the agreement. It is therefore not surprising to see that in the Ivorian case, there were several objective and also subjective elements to achieve a fruitful negotiation, but also wholly unpredictable factors such as the supposed attack on French soldiers and dissident forces by the FANCI.

### 3.6.1 From Abidjan to Pretoria

After three days of closed-door negotiations, the protagonists of the Ivorian crisis, – President Laurent Gbagbo, the leader of the rebellion Guillaume Soro, the leader of the opposition Alassane Ouattara, former President Henri Konan Bédié and the Prime Minister of transition Seydou Diarra, gathered in Pretoria (South Africa) with President Thabo Mbeki – reached an agreement. The agreement planned to remove the specter of an imminent resumption of violence in Côte d'Ivoire. The immediate and final cessation of fighting was solemnly proclaimed (THIJS, 2005).

The purpose of signing this declaration of the end of the war was to avoid any possibility of renewed hostilities on either side. This agreement, which provided for the immediate and definitive end of hostilities and the resumption of the disarmament and cantonment process of the Forces Nouvelles and government militias, will allow the belligerents to no longer engage in spoil or ceasefire violations. A so-called security plan should allow all the actors of the crisis living in exile to return to the country.

After consulting the African Union and the UN, mediator, Thabo Mbeki informed the signatories of the agreement of his decision concerning the candidacy of Alassane Ouattara in the presidential election scheduled for October and the problem of the necessary revision the Constitution which it lays down. He asked the Constitutional Council to accept the eligibility of the candidates who would be presented by the political parties' signatories to the Linas-Marcoussis agreement of January 2003. To this end, he asked President Gbagbo to give legal

force to [this] decision, to circumvent the obstacle of a constitutional revision (ENCYCLOPÆDIA UNIVERSALIS, [201-?]).

The Pretoria I agreement includes among others: a joint declaration of the end of the War, Disarmament and Dismantling of the militias, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), security in the area under the responsibility of the Forces Nouvelles, Security of members of the Government from Forces Nouvelles, a delegation of powers to the Prime Minister, an Independent Electoral Commission, an organisation of elections, eligibility for the Presidency of the Republic, and the interpretation of the agreement.

These points were significant for the proper implementation of the agreement. DDR and the disarmament of the militias will make it possible avoiding the resumption of fighting and thereby prevent Côte d'Ivoire from sinking into post-agreement violence which was often common after the various peace talks. Since the parties to the agreement agreed to disarm and dismantle militias throughout the national territory immediately<sup>50</sup>. The joint end-of-war declaration, therefore, obliged the parties to commit to the peace process in the country. To this end, they unequivocally rejected the use of force as a means of resolving differences. They also recognised that the war had caused indescribable suffering and misery for the Ivorian people<sup>51</sup>.

To avoid acts of looting and theft in the area under the responsibility of the Forces Nouvelles more security was recommended. The signatory parties to this agreement recognised the need to guarantee the security of property and people from the start of the Forces Nouvelles quartering operation in the North<sup>52</sup>. The safety of the members of the Government from the Forces Nouvelles was necessary for the establishment of a climate of confidence and also would allow the Forces Nouvelles to reintegrate the Government of National Reconciliation. A sensitive point in the Pretoria I agreement was the delegation of powers to the Prime Minister. Indeed, this delegation had aroused much anger on the part of the young patriots pro Gbagbo.

---

<sup>50</sup>Cf point 4 of Pretoria I Peace Agreement. The Prime Minister of the Government of National Reconciliation, assisted by the President of the Republic and the Neutral Forces, is responsible for conducting this disarmament operation and the dismantling of the militias by drawing up an action plan and its implementation. It was agreed that (point 5) the Chiefs of Staff of the National Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI) and the Armed Forces of the Forces Nouvelles (FAFN) meet immediately to ensure the implementation of the National Plan Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (PNDDR).

<sup>51</sup>Cf the point 3 of Pretoria I Peace Agreement signed by the parties, disponible at annex. The war also led to a deterioration of the economy of Côte d'Ivoire with negative consequences for the West African sub-region. The Ivorian leaders, through this agreement, reaffirm the sacred right of the Ivorian people to peace and development. The mediator reiterates his disapproval and condemnation of the violations of the ceasefire from 4 to 6 November 2004 and from 28 February 2005 as well as the violence from 6 to 9 November 2004; he calls on all the parties and the Ivorian people in general to work together to avoid violent incidents and war.

<sup>52</sup>Cf point 7 of Pretoria I Peace Agreement. Six hundred (600) elements of the FAFN will be recruited and trained according to the national criteria of the Gendarmerie and the Police in force. These elements will receive accelerated training by the ONUCI police section.

They saw in this point outright skinning of their emblematic leader of his presidential prerogatives. The parties, therefore, agreed that the Prime Minister of the Government of National Reconciliation needed the executive authority necessary to fulfil his mission according to the LMA properly. Consequently, the President of the Republic reaffirmed the influence of the Prime Minister.

The establishment of the Independent Electoral Commission was eagerly awaited. This Commission will have the massive task of organising the presidential elections and proclaiming the results. The parties to the agreement therefore agreed to make changes to the composition, organisation and operation of the current Independent Electoral Commission<sup>53</sup>. As for the organisation of the election, it would definitively mark the end of the Ivorian crisis if the parties accept its results.

As a reminder, the organisation of the said election is one of the primary motivations for the attempted coup and the taking up of arms by the dissidents. The signatory parties to the agreement were aware of the difficulties and sensitivities linked to the elections. Intending to ensure the organisation of free, fair and transparent elections, they accepted that the United Nations be invited to take part in the work of the Independent Electoral Commission. To this end, they have given a mandate to the Mediator, His Excellency Thabo Mbeki, to address a request to the United Nations, on behalf of the Ivorian people, for their participation in the organisation of general elections<sup>54</sup>.

Unlike previous agreements, Pretoria I included in its final declaration code of ethical conduct and an interpretation of the agreement. The code of ethical conduct stipulated that the signatory parties agreed, in the interest of peace in Côte d'Ivoire, to bring together the Ivorian political leaders. This action must continue after the Pretoria meeting. The parties agreed, taking into account the gravity and the persistence of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, the need to keep the process of national reconciliation beyond the elections<sup>55</sup>. Concerning the difference of interpretation on all or part of this agreement, the parties signatory to this agreement agreed to defer to the arbitration of the Mediator<sup>56</sup>. Few days after the signing of the Pretoria I agreement, President Gbagbo, in a televised address, declared that he accepted Alassane Ouattara's candidacy for the presidential election. He was thus laying stone for the construction and consolidation of the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire.

---

<sup>53</sup>Cf point 9 of the Pretoria I Peace Agreement: Composition and functioning of the Central Commission and the Bureau of the Central Commission.

<sup>54</sup>Cf point 10 of Pretoria I Peace Agreement

<sup>55</sup>Cf point 15 of Pretoria I Peace Agreement

<sup>56</sup>Cf point 16 of Pretoria Peace Agreement



FANCI's Chiefs of Staff and the Armed Forces of the Forces Nouvelles (FAFN) signed in Yamoussoukro, on 14 May 2005, an agreement on the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process, as well as on the restructuring of the armed forces. Everything led to believe that the mediation of Thabo Mbeki was more successful than that of his predecessors even if the basis of any negotiation in the Ivorian conflict remains the LMA. Saadia Touval (1982) had already identified different attributes of a successful mediator, among which exercising influence over the parties, playing the role of intermediary between them, helping to identify common interests and focusing on these interests (TOUVAL, 1982). It was therefore not surprising to see that after the Pretoria talks, the parties displayed a new enthusiasm. "We will not shirk," said the leader of the Forces Nouvelles, Guillaume Soro. Laurent Gbagbo, meanwhile, declared that "let time do its work", and praised the South African mediator: "He worked with a lot of method, [...] of clairvoyance, but also a lot of modesty, while previous speakers gave us orders, taught us a lesson." (THIJS, 2005)

In Pretoria, legitimacy-based mediation proved to work better than capacity-based mediation. Duursma (2020, p 297) argued that "ideational factors – and legitimacy in particular – greatly influence the prospects of mediation success. Mbeki's mediation, as opposed to that of France, did not impose a relationship of force between the mediator and the parties in conflict. It was a mediation that was based more on Mbeki's legitimacy as an African Head of State and therefore, a bearer of intrinsic cultural value to Africa. It is in direct opposition to France's mediation, which was based on the economic and material capacities at its disposal. It does not mean that South Africa did not have substantial capacities, quite the contrary. However, it did not embody the domination of the North over the South or even less a relationship of ex-coloniser and ex-colonised. A barrier has been removed in Pretoria: that of the imposition of a course of action or an agreement imposed on one or more parties. One key element appeared in Pretoria I agreement; it concerned RTI. The agreement stressed that The RTI is an important institution that should be used to contribute to national unity and reconciliation. Consequently, the program of the RTI must immediately cover the whole national territory. It was also decided to restore the status of the RTI to that it enjoyed before 24 December 2004. Decrees 2004-678 and 2005-01 would be revoked immediately<sup>57</sup>.

If the Pretoria I agreement seemed to generate so much enthusiasm, it was because the mediator Thabo Mbeki had done a remarkable job beforehand. Indeed, as Gbagbo had said, Mbeki was the only mediator who treated the parties appropriately, without ordering or obliging

---

<sup>57</sup>Cf Pretoria I agreement point 11.

them to do anything. It was a real psychological work that was done on the parties. He identified the substantive obstacles by first trying to define the problem(s), then compromise on the negotiated agreement and finally organise how the negotiations would be carried out. In South Africa, the mood was, therefore, one of reconciliation.

### 3.6.2 The difficult way out of the crisis

Rubin (1992) has identified three central and necessary requisites for any kind of mediation: The parties' motivation, the opportunity, and the mediator abilities. The identity and the skills of the mediator are important as underlined by Touval and Rubin. The mediators, therefore, aim to achieve a much better result than the situation in which the parties to the conflict find themselves. "The mediator's identity affects his influence, his trust and his legitimacy" as Bercovitch (2007, p 185) said. There would, therefore, have been an influence from Thabo Mbeki on the various parties present at the negotiations.

However, there is another element which is closely linked to the identity of the mediator: his motivation. Indeed, motivation is fundamental since it determines whether or not there will be mediation (BERCOVITCH; KADAYIFCI-ORELLANA, 2016), and Thabo Mbeki's mediation in an Ivorian crisis seemed to have a strategical motivation. South Africa, the country from which Thabo Mbeki is from, was seeking a seat on the Security Council, which could explain more enthusiasm leading the Pretoria I negotiations. As a result, the parties to the conflict and the mediator, therefore, have in common a strong desire to reduce, eliminate or resolve the dispute (GREIG, 2005). Functions, behaviour, relationships between the mediator and the parties, the history of the relations between the parties, as well as the nature of the conflict are central factors for the success of mediation (BERCOVITCH; KADAYIFCI-ORELLANA, 2016).

However, given the particularity of the Ivorian conflict, several factors must be taken into account to explain its extension over time. Indeed, given the regional fracture and rupture from which Côte d'Ivoire suffered, ethnic, regional and religious settlements also hinder the smooth running of the peace process. For example, in the *Zone de Confiance*, local militias, as well as infiltrated elements of the Forces Nouvelles, continued to rage, committing increasingly violent acts against the civilian population. To this were added inter-ethnic clashes, mainly

between Guérés<sup>58</sup> and Dioulas<sup>59</sup> in the southern part of the *Zone de confiance*. Implying the participation of – *Alliance du Peuple Wê* (APWE), *Union Patriotique pour la Résistance du Grand Ouest* (UPRGO) and *Front de Libération du Grand Ouest* (FLGO), Guéré's militias and "Dozos"<sup>60</sup>. Also infiltrated elements of the Forces Nouvelles in majority from Dioulas populations (ONU CI, 2005).

The violence has left several civilians dead, and those despite the signing of the Pretoria agreements. The involvement of more than one ethnic and armed group has increased the risk of renewed violence in the country. This mass violence is often characteristic of inevitable conflicts in Africa in general. The spread of these inter-ethnic conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire and the active involvement of informal actors such as pro-government militias and "Dozos" armed groups have increased the spectrum of instability and chronic conflict in the country this despite the hopes raised by the Pretoria Political Agreement of 6 April 2005.

These latest events in the country weakened inter-community cohesion and provoked new confrontations and inter-ethnic reprisals, due to the involvement of certain groups of young people, coming from these communities, who have presented themselves as the main perpetrators of this violence. In the night of Tuesday, 31 May to Wednesday, 1 June 2005, unidentified individuals, armed with hunting rifles and knives, attacked the villages of Guitrozon and Petit-Duékoué in western Côte d'Ivoire. This attack left 41 dead, more or less 64 seriously injured and around 30 huts burnt down according to the staff of the FANCI (MAS, 2005). The victims of this nocturnal massacre all belong to the Guéré community.

Paradoxically, these attacks occurred at the moment when the disarmament of three militias (APWE, FLGO, UPRGO) was to start, where many Guéré and related soldiers are recruited, and also a few days before the start of DDR. Given that, all these events were exploited, if not instrumentalised, for political ends, to justify the non-application by political actors of the various agreements signed. There was a new gathering of all the actors of the Ivorian crisis in Pretoria. If the signing of the agreement of 6 April had aroused enthusiasm, this latest meeting in Pretoria did not seem to excite the different actors; in fact, this one started under bad auspices. The disarmament of the combatants, which was to start the day before, did not begin as planned. The situation was in a total dead-end because the rebellion postponed its

---

<sup>58</sup>An Ethnic Group of the west of Côte d'Ivoire

<sup>59</sup>A generic term which designates in Côte d'Ivoire not only the Malinke traders from the north of the country but also other communities with shared Islam.

<sup>60</sup>The multiple identity of the Dozo, forged for centuries, is thus summarised. A knowledgeable erudite of nature, which he learns and understands thanks to long years of initiation, supposedly endowed with magic powers, like that of resisting bullets, the Dozo remains above all a traditional hunter, which we find elsewhere in West Africa, as in Mali, Burkina Faso or even in Guinea.

disarmament to a later date, demanding the prior dismantling of militias favourable to President Gbagbo. These militias argued that the recent ethnic violence in the Ivorian Great-West did not encourage them to lay down their arms.

Nor do the different parties believed in a conflict resolution, PDCI Secretary-General Alphonse Djédjé Mady acknowledged that his party had responded to President Mbeki's invitation, without any illusions (JOURNAL LE MONDE, 2005). The parties to the conflict, therefore, develop a certain resistance to the MHS. As Zartman (2000) pointed out, resistance can be the result of a psychological reaction caused precisely by the pressure placed on one of the parts, which usually causes a deterioration of the opponent's image. Besides, resistance increases as the pressure and suffering grow up, so that suffering strengthens the determination to continue the conflict (ZARTMAN, 2000). Add to these elements a feeling of revenge and the MHS turns into an escalation of violence.

The Pretoria II meeting, therefore, aimed once again to de-escalate the violence in Côte d'Ivoire and put the peace process back on track. Even if certain essential clauses of the Pretoria I agreement were applied, in particular, the possibility given to Alassane Ouattara to run for the presidential planned for 30 October, the disarmament process was stalled. Thus, the threat of a resumption of hostilities and acts of spoilers will always affect the peace process. The ethnic and religious Balkanisation used by politicians, the multiplication of groups and militias supported and encouraged by the regular army, on the one hand. The presence of traditional hunters and other militias in the ranks of the Forces Nouvelles, on the other, have perpetuated the Ivorian crisis.

The parties have once again pledged to disarm pro-government militias and dissidents, and the disarmament would begin immediately and end by 20 August. The Pretoria II statement stated government and rebel military chiefs would meet again on 7 July to finalise a timetable for disarming the 42,000 dissidents' fighters who control the North of Cote d'Ivoire<sup>61</sup>. Pretoria II summit reiterated that the ballot should take place on schedule even if just four months were remaining.

### **3.7 Côte d'Ivoire: once upon a time eight years conflict**

---

<sup>61</sup>Cf Pretoria II Statement

In October 2005, the French government announced that serious breaches of the law, of military regulations and orders, were noted concerning an operation carried out in Côte d'Ivoire, in May, as part of the Operation Licorne. The French Ministry of Defence inflicted a “minister’s blame” which is the most substantial disciplinary sanction on Generals Henri Poncet who then commanded Operation Licorne and Renaud de Malaussène his assistant. Even after the recommendations of Pretoria II, the peace process was still stagnating in Côte d'Ivoire. It was not a surprise as the actors of the Ivorian crisis had accustomed the entire world to last-minute turnarounds. The disarmament process once again failed when the Forces Nouvelles refused to send their combatants to cantonment sites arguing that President Gbagbo has not implemented the promised political reforms.

Kofi Annan, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, announced that the elections could not take place on 30 October 2005 as planned because of the lack of cooperation of the parties in conflict. The UNSC, therefore, kept President Laurent Gbagbo at the head of the Côte d'Ivoire after his mandate expired on 30 October, for a maximum of 12 months. It also increased the powers of the Prime Minister, who had to be appointed. A council of four African presidents appointed Charles Konan Banny as transitional prime minister of Côte d'Ivoire, under the terms of UN resolution 1633. The latter was responsible for setting up a 32-member interim government comprising representatives of the ruling party, dissident forces and the political opposition. Guillaume Soro, the leader of the Forces Nouvelles, had been also nominated minister (THE NEW HUMANITARIAN, 2006).

The actors of the Ivorian crisis show once again that the peace agreements served as camouflage and are systematically violated despite the sanctions brandished by the UNSC. The enthusiasm and hope always preceded the dismay of the people after the signing of the agreements. In this cynical deadly “cat and mouse game”, it was the Ivorians who pay the hefty price. For example, in dissident-controlled areas, hundreds of thousands of students at the end of the cycle could not advance to the next level because the annual school exams had not taken place for years. Also, thousands of displaced people and a bruised population. But where did you go, dear Côte d'Ivoire? In search of its glorious past, and under the weight of the disillusionment of its present, Côte d'Ivoire and its beloved sons headed to Ouagadougou to try once again to ward off bad luck.

### 3.7.1 The Storm before the Tsunami

Barely started, 2006 did not bode well for anything useful, armed men attack the Akouédo camp, the country's main military base, on the suburb of Abidjan. The army has regained control of the field after fighting that left ten dead according to an official report. In a country already on the brink, a small spark can turn into a massive blaze. An announcement from the International Working Group (IWG), responsible for overseeing the peace process resulting from the April 2005 agreement, about the dissolution of Parliament, whose mandate expired in December, was sufficient for President Gbagbo's supporters to react with violent protests in Abidjan.

The following days, in Abidjan, the young patriots paralysed the city, again causing violent unrest directed against the French military base, the French embassy and the headquarters of the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire. It was the moment chosen by the FPI, which dominated the Parliament, to threaten to leave the transitional government of Charles Konan Banny and to withdraw from the peace process (ENCYCLOPÆDIA UNIVERSALIS, [201-?]). The UN has proceeded to the temporary evacuation of part of its civilian personnel stationed in Abidjan while firmly condemning the "orchestrated" violence against the organisation.

On a proposal from France, supported by the United Kingdom, Denmark and Slovakia, the UNSC adopted sanctions – the first since the start of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, against Charles Blé Goudé, leader of the young patriots loyal to President Laurent Gbagbo, the "marshal" Eugène Djué, one of their leaders, as well as a commander of the dissidents' forces, Martin Kouakou Fofie<sup>62</sup>. According to UNSCR 1633, the presidential election was to be held in October 2006. Yet, the issue of disarming combatants and counting populations, the prerequisites for holding general elections, was at a stalemate. Ivorians were inexorably heading towards a new postponement of the presidential elections, "preconditions" for the return of peace in Côte d'Ivoire.

The different failures of the peace agreements in Côte d'Ivoire raised the question of priorities in the negotiations. Conflict mediators generally have the dual objective of ending the war and resolving disputed issues. However, mediators realise that resolving conflict in a way considered fair by opponents can be a time-consuming task (TOUVAL, 2016). If, for example, a war is causing many losses and suffering, mediators may face the dilemma of dividing the task of mediation into two parts, thus prioritising the ceasefire and postponing the resolution of

---

<sup>62</sup>Cf UNSC/8631 du 7 février 2006

the conflict (TOUVAL, 2016). This dilemma was found in the first attempt to resolve the Ivorian conflict by ECOWAS.

Indeed, ten days after the start of hostilities in September 2002, ECOWAS had attempted to obtain a ceasefire to avoid a bloodbath and try to find a final solution to the conflict after the fact. This dilemma which is characterised by choice between getting an immediate ceasefire and a definitive peace, brings out the problem of order and justice. Justice needs order, and an order, to maintain itself, needs to be fair (TOUVAL, 2016). A ceasefire at the expense of a final peace agreement can relieve pain and reduce risk. Such a situation generates a kind of tolerable stalemate, which the parties may find preferable to the alternative of making the necessary concessions for a mutual commitment agreement (TOUVAL, 2016).

Something like that happened in 1949, during the conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis when Ralph Bunche was a mediator in the armistice agreements between Israel and its neighbours. And it was not until 1979 that the first peace agreement was signed between Egypt and Israel, but during these thirty years, there have been four wars between these two countries (TOUVAL, 2016). But in the Ivorian case, such a strategy could have been used, except that the Ivorian conflict did not have the same characteristics as the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In the Ivorian case, specific precipitation could have been noted at the time of the attempt to resolve the Ivorian crisis. ECOWAS attempt came at a time when the conflict was not ripe. There were no MHS sufficient elements to start a negotiation. Therefore, the parties involved had no reason to start a negotiation when both of them were thinking that they could escalate conflict through clashes. Then, the solutions proposed four months later at Linas-Marcoussis failed to re-establish the dialogue between political factions and had no chance for being respected because of its content, and the pretences.

The presidential elections that should be held in October 2006 were one more time postponed since conditions were not reunited for such elections. The UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 1721 presented by France, which provides for the modalities of the political transition in Côte d'Ivoire. President Laurent Gbagbo's mandate was extended for a year. Still, some of his powers were entrusted to the transitional prime minister, who was responsible for organising a presidential election before the end of October 2007. But President Gbagbo has declared that these provisions were unconstitutional and would therefore not be applied, thus asking the army to defend the Ivorian Constitution.

President Laurent Gbagbo had presented a plan to end the crisis by proposing: (a) to open a direct dialogue with the rebellion with a view to disarmament and the reunification of the country; (b) abolish the *zone de confiance* separating belligerents, controlled by UN forces

and the Operation Licorne; (c) to create an eighteen-month national civic service intended to teach young people to respect the republic and institutions; (d) to pass an amnesty law; (e) finally, to set up a program to assist the return of war-displaced persons.

The UN, the AU and ECOWAS had to keep Gbagbo in office as President of the Republic. From one impasse to another, from one crisis to another, the Ivorian crisis began to drag on. Ivorians were far away from the time when they were one and only one country, a model of economic growth and political stability. Like an evil fairy tale, the destiny of the country bore the name of cities scattered around the world: Accra, Linas-Marcoussis, Lomé, Pretoria, sometimes with numbers, Accra I, II and III, Pretoria I and II. But if Côte d'Ivoire found itself in such situation, it is because the Ivorians had since a longtime fled their responsibilities and those long before 19 September 2002.

### 3.7.2 Ouagadougou Agreement

At the beginning of the Ivorian crisis, Burkina Faso had been singled out by the Ivorian authorities. Activism in Ouagadougou of Ivorian soldiers – such as Ibrahim Coulibaly, Tuo Fozie or Cherif Ousmane, members of the Cosa Nostra militia under the junta of Gueï, who had taken refuge in Ouagadougou after the purges of summer 2000 (BANEGAS; OTAYEK, 2003), and at this time at the head of the rebellion – accused the regime of Blaise Compaoré. Relations between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire had deteriorated, and the fact that Alassane Ouattara, alleged to be Burkinabé, was associated with this dissidence did not improve matters.

In January 2003 for the French daily newspaper *Le Parisien*, Blaise Compaoré compared Laurent Gbagbo to Milosevic and threatened, as such, the wrath of the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity ((BANEGAS; OTAYEK, 2003). After almost five years of crisis marked by the repeated failures of mediations, the government in place in Côte d'Ivoire concluded that the crisis could only be resolved by going back to its origins. President Gbagbo said: “The rebels have come from Ouaga, and (that) it is from Ouaga that they will lay down their arms<sup>63</sup>”. He was soliciting in this way the auspices of the President of Burkina Faso to conduct direct negotiations with the dissident (OUEDRAOGO, 2012).

So, started in Ouagadougou under the auspices of Blaise Compaoré negotiations which, unlike other talks, are direct between the two important men of the Ivorian crisis:

---

<sup>63</sup>LAURENT GBAGBO (our translation) “les rebelles sont venus de Ouaga, et (ce) sera à Ouaga qu’ils vont déposer les armes”



Laurent Gbagbo and Soro Guillaume. These two men have control of the troops and the support of their political activists. President Laurent Gbagbo and Guillaume Soro, secretary-general of the Forces Nouvelles, signed a peace agreement in Ouagadougou on 4 March 2007.

The Ouagadougou meeting was held at a time when there was no escalation of violence or elements of ripeness. Indeed, there was no MHS, no confrontation between the parties but a real status quo in which the parties seemed to take pleasure. It is also one of the shortcomings of ripeness theory, as it does not explain whether the ripeness moment can occur long before the parties decide to negotiate. In the run-up to the signing of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) there was no confrontation, and it was status quo. So, there was no MHS or MEO, just a status quo. It leads us to say that the status quo in a conflict can lift the parties to the negotiating table, which is to say that the lack of evolution concerning a conflict can create a sense of weariness between the parties and lead them to negotiate. Between 2005, when the Pretoria Agreements were signed, and 2007, when the OPA was initialled, the parties went around in circles and finally got tired of it.

The main actors agreed on the need to put an end to this crisis, which was taking too long to reach a political and peaceful outcome. Already after Pretoria, when Gbagbo had just made concessions for the candidatures of Ouattara and Bédié, Soro had asked him: “And what about us?” Gbagbo said he understood that the “us” used by Soro meant him and Compaoré (GBAGBO; MATTEI, p 195). The psychological aspect of the actors played a decisive role in the signing of this agreement. As will be seen later, the Ouagadougou agreement was more focused on addressing the underlying problems of Côte d’Ivoire at that time. Indeed, it will be the last of a long series and led to the long-awaited presidential elections. The most striking fact of this agreement is that there was no ripe moment for negotiation, but it was the one that bore fruit.

The OPA had two main components: on the one hand, endeavour to allow, finally, the establishment of documents identifying citizens in the run-up to the presidential elections and on the other hand, resume question of the reunification of the country and therefore of the return to civilian life of the forces which hold arms (COTTEREAU, 2011). About the general identification of populations, the signatory parties to the OPA recognised that the identification of Ivorian and foreign people living in Côte d’Ivoire is a primary concern. It is important to remember that the nationality problem always remained at the centre of the debates during the negotiations, so many Ivorian citizens did not have official documents proving their nationalities of this fact so they could not vote.

This census of the population was done based on testimony at the public hearing to obtain remedial orders for birth certificates. To achieve, as soon as possible, lasting peace and political and institutional normalisation in Côte d'Ivoire, the Parties to the Direct Dialogue reaffirmed their commitment to preparing, at the end of the identification operation, open, democratic and transparent presidential elections, under the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra and Pretoria agreements<sup>64</sup>.

The Parties to this Agreement, aware that the National Army must be a reflection of national unity and cohesion and the guarantor of the stability of republican institutions, have undertaken to carry out the restructuring and the rebuilding of the two armies for the establishment of new defence and security forces attached to the values of republican integrity and morality<sup>65</sup>.

To facilitate the reunification of the country, the two Parties to the Direct Dialogue, agreed to request Forces Licorne and UNOCI the abolition of the *zone de confiance*. The zone will be temporarily replaced by an imaginary line, called the “green line”, going from East to West following the centre line of the *zone de confiance*. They also provided for the creation of observation posts installed on the infiltration axes. The observation posts would be occupied by the impartial forces and will be reduced by half every two months until their complete abolition<sup>66</sup>.

On the military level, the signatory parties to the OPA were committed to the disappearance of the so-called *zone de confiance*. The dissident soldiers must be incorporated into the regular forces which will be placed under the integrated command of the two opposing staffs, and the pro-regime militias must be dismantled. On the political level, a transitional government must be formed, and reliable voters' lists drawn up for the organisation of general elections before the end of the year. A few days later, Guillaume Soro, Forces Nouvelles' secretary-general and signatory of the OPA was designated as Prime Minister according to the agreement.

Meaningful progress was made in terms of implementing provisions related to the ceasefire. The chief of staff of FAFN, force commanders of UNOCI and Force Licorne signed an accord on 11 April 2007, which provided the legal basis for the dismantling of the *zone de confiance* (UNSC, 2007), and the *zone de confiance* ceased to exist in September 2007 (AFP,

---

<sup>64</sup> Cf point II of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement about electoral process

<sup>65</sup> Cf point III of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement about Defense's and Security Forces In Côte d'Ivoire

<sup>66</sup> Cf point VI of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement about measures to consolidate national reconciliation, peace, security and the free movement of persons and goods.

2007). On 29 June 2007, while travelling to Bouaké, in the northern half of the country controlled by the Forces Nouvelles since 2002, to install the magistrates who will issue identity papers to approximately 3 million people as part of the census of the population in view of the organisation of the 2007 elections, Guillaume Soro was the victim of an armed attack (JOURNAL LACROIX, 2007). The plane transporting the Ivorian Prime Minister suffered a rocket and light weapon attack when it landed in Bouaké.

On 27 December, another attack on Forces Nouvelles personnel took place in Bouaké, and sergeant Ibrahim Coulibaly, a former member of Forces Nouvelles, was allegedly involved in the attack. Eighteen arrests were made in Bouaké area in connection with the attack, which resulted in several deaths (UNSC, 2008a) and an international arrest warrant has been issued against Sergeant Coulibaly. Attacks insufficient to hinder the smooth running of the peace process even if a change in the dissidents' command structure led to battles in the North, particularly in Séguéla and Bouaké. While some violence occurred on issues related to voter registration and land disputes, as well as incidents involving demonstrations by disgruntled personnel from FAFN and Forces De Sécurité (FDS) due to payment issues, the security situation remained relatively stable (UNSC, 2008b).

But as usual, and this is not a discovery, the absence of real political will to implement these agreements, particularly from the angle of the Constitution of a solid electoral body, leads the African Union Peace Council and the UNSC to accept further successive postponements. While the problem of the free movement of people, goods and services has not been hindered, the security situation has remained very fragile due to unresolved issues related to the disarmament of the Forces Nouvelles and pro-government militias (JOSHI; QUINN; REGAN, 2015). Also, the full deployment of joint units was not carried out due to the lack of capacity of the Integrated Command Center (UNSC, S/2009/495, 2009). United Nations experts warned of a possible escalation of violence as the parties rearmed in the North, despite the arms embargo (JOSHI; QUINN; REGAN, 2015).

After many dithering, several OPA amendments, we finally managed to set a date for the organisation of presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire. It is only the resolution of 15 October 2010 that will announce the precise date:

Welcoming the conclusions of the last meeting of the Permanent Consultative Framework held in Ouagadougou on 21 September 2010 under the aegis of the Facilitator, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, welcoming the establishment and the certification of the voters' list, taking note of the commitments of the Ivorian stakeholders to hold the first round of the presidential elections on 31 October 2010 and urging them to ensure that elections take place as scheduled and complete this electoral process in open, free, fair and transparent conditions, within the timeframe fixed by the Independent Electoral Commission. (UNSC, 2010)

After several years of postponement, several agreements, persistent tension, endless negotiations and after visiting several cities, the elections finally took place. Was it a premonition when President Gbagbo announced that it was in Ouagadougou that all started, and it is in Ouagadougou that it will end? Would this election mark the end of the Ivorian crisis? In Africa, when we talk about the presidential polls, nothing is less certain, although the Côte d'Ivoire in its entire history has never had a handover after a presidential election. The change of President was made either because of death or by a coup and sometimes by sleight of hand.

The success of the OPA can be explained at various levels. First, it was an initiative of the two main actors in the crisis, and the negotiations were between Africans. Second, unlike other agreements, the OPA addressed a diverse range of conflict and post-conflict issues. These included the issue of population identification and the granting of identity documents, the reintegration of ex-combatants and the modalities of disarmament. Third, the election was not the focus of the OPA. The agreement was seen as a real cover-up for France and the UN, which focused and concentrated all their energies on wanting to organise the elections. In the end, the OPA had four other amendments to deal with the grey areas that persisted. The social structure in which the third party and the conflict parties operate dramatically determines the nature of this relationship (DUURSMA, 2020).

It took three years from the signing of the OPA to the organisation of the elections in 2010. In the meantime, some of the dissidents were disarmed, and weapons were symbolically burnt at the municipal stadium in Bouaké, the dissidence's capital. Paradoxically, Bouaké before the 2002 crisis was the capital of what is called in Côte d'Ivoire the Baoulé country, i.e., the capital of the Baoulé region – which is part of the Akan group. So many symbols in the Ivorian crisis, the mediations that bore fruit were made between Africans even if the UN was regularly invited there. Legitimacy-based mediation has prevailed over capacity-based mediation. Nonetheless, an important element has played a crucial role in the Ivorian resolution crisis mediation, religion and ethnicity.

### 3.7.3 Religion and Ethnicity in Negotiations

According to Ahmadou Kourouma (2004, p 107), “*ivoirité*” is “the narrow, racist and xenophobic nationalism that is born in all countries of high immigration subject to unemployment”. This concept has only rekindled wounds in a country where the economic

crisis has exacerbated tensions between Ivorians and non-Ivorians over the farming and land issue. As Lacina Yeo (2015, p 70, our translation) pointed out, “rather than being the foundation of Ivorian unity, ‘ivoirité’ is proving to be a real bone of contention”<sup>67</sup>. This division has mainly reached two levels of the Ivorian social stratum: religious and ethnic. The conflict that broke out in September 2002 revealed the instrumentalisation of the spiritual or sacred fact. In the North as in the South, the traditional sacred was mobilised and often characterised by the wearing of amulets, which has been observed among dissidents; the sacrifice of animals by traditional chiefs in Agboville; the sending of bees against the assailants in Béoumi; a dance of curses performed by women among the Akan in the government-controlled zone (DAKOURI, 2011).

Several churches, mosques and other religious temples have been looted in search of weapons; supporters of the warring parties have attacked imams, pastors, and priests. Most of these actions, which took place outside the battlefield, show that the protagonists of the Ivorian conflict wanted to shift the conflict from symbolic violence to psychological warfare, where combat weapons become mental strategies to weaken the enemy and then defeat him. In the tactical weapons of combat of the Ivorian protagonists, the sacred Islamic and Christian were also summoned. Indeed, at the outbreak of the Ivorian crisis in 2002, religious leaders, particularly in the South, gave their support through prayers and declarations to the democratic and legitimately elected authorities of Côte d’Ivoire (DAKOURI, 2011).

The beginning of the twenty-first century was characterised in Côte d’Ivoire by an increasingly visible religiosity as a result of social breakdown. This vitality was taking place in a regional and international environment marked by the emergence of forms of radicalism and violent extremism (INSTITUT D’ETUDES DE SECURITE, 2015). The first decade of this century recorded in Côte d’Ivoire the intrusion of religion in politics and especially Pentecostalism into the republic, thus showing to what extent the relations between political and religious facts can appear complex. This interference of some Pentecostal movements in the political sphere has taken place through pastors and “prophets” who have reinforced their presence in the entourage of the presidential couple (INSTITUT D’ETUDES DE SECURITE, 2015).

On its side, Islam in Côte d’Ivoire is characterised by its diversity and is dominated by two currents: the Sunni and the Wahhabi or Salafite. The populations of Sunni inspiration constitute the vast majority with the Koran and the tradition of the Prophet – Sunna – as

---

<sup>67</sup>YEO, L. « Plutôt que d’être le socle de l’unité ivoirienne, l’ivoirité” se révèle être une véritable pomme de discorde. »

references. The Wahhabi current, also known as Salafite, has introduced several changes in Ivorian Islam (INSTITUT D'ETUDES DE SECURITE, 2015). Côte d'Ivoire's religious landscape was diverse, and there was sometimes fear of radicalisation, but religious radicalism did not develop to the extent seen in other countries in the region. Indeed, geopolitically, Côte d'Ivoire is in a regional environment that could foster radicalism given the continuing threat of violent extremism and jihadist terrorism.

The theory of international relations has long ignored religion and two reasons may explain this. The first is historic because it is the fruit of the installation of the international system, at the time of the entry into modernity. The second is theoretical since this historical movement was accompanied by scientific reflection, which considered the decline of the encompassing, or “public”, dimension of the religious as the necessary future of the history of societies (PORTIER; RAMEL, 2015, authors' Griffon). Notwithstanding, things have changed in recent years, and religion has become more and more part of the theory of international relations. This change is due to a recomposition of practices, since the 1960s, the proportion of conflicts based on religion has risen from 25 per cent to 60 per cent (PORTIER; RAMEL, 2015).

Relations between politics and religion are in constant evolution. As Portier and Ramel (2015, authors' Griffon) noted, the Westphalian moment, in the first – “enchanted” – phase of “modernity”, referred to a model of relations between peoples determined primarily by the interests of the State, without the intervention of religious groups. The contemporary world, anchored in a more hesitant phase of modernity, confronts us with a much more hybrid situation in which politics is moving away from its status as an overarching body, to be constructed in interaction with autonomous and religious forces (PORTIER; RAMEL, 2015).

However, violence is, in some cases, part of the repertoire of action when politics and religion are intertwined. Both religious and extra-religious factors could explain this violence. On the extra-religious level, violence is the consequence of economic interests, social inequalities, and also represents the language of the invisible and the humiliated, to whom secular ideologies could no longer give hope (PORTIER; RAMEL, 2015). On the purely religious aspect of religious violence, Silvio Ferrari used the example of the mobilisations recorded on the issue of the publication in Denmark of the cartoons of Mohammed to affirm:

Conflicts are not protagonists of States or ethnocultural communities, nor are they characterised by a plurality of causes (economic interests, social inequalities, aspirations to national independence, etc.) among which religious differences play an important but not essential role: they are, on the contrary, conflicts which have essentially religious origins, and which manifest themselves on such a large scale that

they go beyond factors linked to local realities (FERRARI, 2013, p 152, our translation)<sup>68</sup>.

But in Côte d'Ivoire, religious extremism has remained only at the stage of speculation and fortunately so. If the conflict that broke out in September 2002 revealed a rupture in the religious unity of Côte d'Ivoire, it did not have this religious dimension exclusively as some media have been willing to make-believe. Religion was, therefore, on the path taken by the conflict and was swept along with it. It is consequently visible that in the Ivorian case, religion became an integral part of the conflict because the various parties played on the sensitive chord that religion could represent in an economic and social context that was conducive to manipulation. It is clear that religion has been used in many ways as a weapon in the Ivorian conflict; however, it has also been used as a means of promoting peace, that is, as a crisis management tool.

The crisis period in Côte d'Ivoire lasted from 2002 to 2011. This crisis has its roots in the distant past of the country. This period of 8 years represents only the visible part of the iceberg. Traditional conflict literature refers to the vocabulary of “intractable conflicts” and “prolonged social conflicts” when it comes to disputes characterised by recurrent clashes and specific resistance to resolution initiatives (COLEMAN, 2000; CROCKER; HAMPSON, 2009). The Ivorian conflict falls into the category of prolonged social conflict because it is the direct consequence of the poverty of the population, inequalities, the concept of *ivoirité*, and misinformation. In such a configuration, ethnic and religious identities can foster hostility dynamics between distinct social groups such as in Sudan and northern India (HERZ; SIMAN; DRUMOND, 2016).

The religious – Muslims and Christians – have chosen to side with legality to the extent that they saw in this crisis, a war of original sin and the lack of faith of Ivorians. Their aim was, therefore, to free Côte d'Ivoire from the demonic forces. The politicians, for their part, transformed their political discourse into theological discourse or preaching. At the same time, expressions such as “May God bless Côte d'Ivoire” appeared in the popular vocabulary (DAKOURI, 2011). A Forum of Religious Confessions was set up after the beginning of the crisis. Religious leaders with direct experiences of their religious communities on the ground

---

<sup>68</sup>FERRARI, S. « Religions et conflits ». In: VETTOVAGLIA, J.-P. (dir.), *Déterminants des conflits et nouvelles formes de prévention*, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2013, p. 152. « Les conflits ne sont pas des protagonistes d'États ou de communautés ethnoculturelles, ni ne se caractérisent par une pluralité de causes (intérêts économiques, inégalités sociales, aspirations à l'indépendance nationale, etc.) parmi lesquelles les différences religieuses jouent un rôle important mais non essentiel. Il s'agit au contraire de conflits qui ont des origines essentiellement religieuses, et qui se manifestent à une échelle telle qu'ils dépassent les facteurs liés aux réalités locales »

gathered to initiate interfaith prayers for peace and reconciliation in Côte d'Ivoire. As a result, all Ivorians, regardless of their religious denomination, were called to unite their prayers to try to bring the country out of the crisis. Religions often played a leading role in the resolution of crises, with freedom being left to each believer to join the political party of his or her choice. Even if some of the preaching are sometimes tendentious, religion has contributed to political pluralism and has promoted tolerance.

Following the crisis that began in September 2002, the Forum of Religious Confessions made a public declaration:

After so many painful events, the National Forum of Religious Confessions still calls on every inhabitant of Côte d'Ivoire to make love triumph over hatred, so that forgiveness prevails over revenge. [...] To you, our brothers and sisters, who decided to take up arms to defend your cause, we say that whatever your motivations, the use of weapons or force is not the best means. For after the shortest or the longest war, there is only one gesture that always remains in history: meeting around a table for dialogue. So, dear brothers and sisters, why not begin there? (TRICHET, 2011, p 369, our translation)<sup>69</sup>

Several conflicts have already been subject of religious mediation. Religious mediation refers to the intervention efforts of the third party in which religious beliefs, objects and institutions play an essential role (BERCOVITCH; KADAYIFCI-ORELLANA, 2016). The entry of religious actors into mediation is not a new fact. In the conflict between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel, the Pope succeeded in mediation (GARRETT, 1985). In Sierra Leone, the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone – IRCSL – played an active role in promoting reconciliation and mediation efforts and contributed to the negotiation and signing of the Lomé Peace Treaty (TURAY, 2000). In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, religious actors through the Forum of Religious Confessions have been very active in the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

With the events of October 2000, when mosques and churches were burned down, the media has tried to explain the violence as a struggle between Muslims and Christians. However, this was an interpretation that was not in line with reality and tended to set Ivorians against each other while distancing them from the real problems that were undermining the country. I confess that me – a Christian – and many of my friends – Muslims – have long believed that the problem was between Muslims and Christians. It weakened our relations and pushed Côte

---

<sup>69</sup>TRICHET, P. « Après tant d'événements douloureux, le Forum national des confessions religieuses appelle encore chaque habitant de la Côte d'Ivoire à faire triompher l'amour sur la haine, afin que le pardon l'emporte sur la vengeance. [...] A vous, nos frères et sœurs, qui avez décidé de prendre les armes pour défendre votre cause, nous disons que, quelles que soient vos motivations, l'usage des armes ou de la force n'est pas le meilleur moyen. Car après la guerre la plus courte ou la plus longue, il n'y a qu'un seul geste qui reste toujours dans l'histoire : se réunir autour d'une table pour dialoguer. Alors, chers frères et sœurs, pourquoi ne pas commencer par-là ? »



d'Ivoire further into crisis. The Forum of Religious Confessions has repeatedly rejected these allegations. Imam Idriss Koudouss has repeatedly stated that the war in Côte d'Ivoire is not a religious war but mostly a socio-political war. The various peace agreements in the Ivorian crisis have proved him right because there has never been any mention of religious war or religious radicalism in Côte d'Ivoire.

National and international media and political leaders have used religion and ethnicity to exacerbate tensions in Côte d'Ivoire. The polarisation was well defined: ADO, Muslim and from the North and Laurent Gbagbo, Christian, from the South. The speeches of some religious leaders, especially Evangelicals and Pentecostals, but also some of the Catholic and Muslim, including some members of their hierarchy, not only led to this regionalist and religious division but also enshrine it. Fortunately, most of the religious personalities in Côte d'Ivoire have played their roles as promoters of peace in the Ivorian conflict, even if some of them have tried to strike a religious chord, Côte d'Ivoire has not sunk into radicalism or religious fanaticism.

### 3.7.4 Summary

The Ivorian crisis spread beyond anything the Ivorians could have imagined. The crisis persisted over time because the causes were much more in-depth and the international community and the Ivorians believed that it was a temporary crisis. It was therefore not surprising that the first measures adopted in its attempt to resolve the conflict were doomed to failure. Once again wanting to show its resource capacity and superiority over Africans, the international community and France, in particular, contributed to a polarisation in Côte d'Ivoire. A total of eight agreements have been signed on the road to resolve the Ivorian conflict, and thousands of people have died, most of them civilians. In the following table, all the agreements on the Ivorian crisis resolution are compiled.

#### **Board 9 - Different Agreements in the Ivorian conflict resolution**

Date	Agreements	Content
29/09/2002	ACCRA I	The summit aimed to discuss a general framework to resolve the crisis. It was followed by a meeting of the ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission, which recommended that immediate

		arrangements be put in place to deploy ECOWAS troops to Côte d'Ivoire
01/11/2002	LOME	Agreement on the liberation of civilian and military prisoners, the parties reaffirmed their commitment to the ceasefire agreement and the deployment of ECOWAS and French forces and the creation of Zone de Confiance.
23/01/2003	LINAS-MARCOUSSIS	The main objective was the creation of a government of national reconciliation with a consensual Prime Minister, which will implement provisions in the constitutional, legislative and regulatory spheres. The LMA remained for years a basis of the Ivorian crisis resolution.
07/03/2003	ACCRA II	The agreement sought to reinforce the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and recommended the immediate formation of a National Security Council with fifteen (15) members including the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, a representative of each of the political groups' signatory to the Marcoussis Agreement, a FANCI representative, and a representative of the National Gendarmerie and the National Police to assist effective management by the Ministers of Defence and Interior Security.
30/07/2004	ACCRA III	The objective was to remove all obstacles to the peace process by including new measures to address the critical challenges to the peace process, in particular the criteria for eligibility of the President, legislative reforms concerning citizenship and DDR program. Add some modification to the LMA
06/05/2005	PRETORIA I	This meeting resulted in a joint declaration of the end of the War, Disarmament and Dismantling of the Militia, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Ensuring security in the area under Forces Nouvelles' control, Independent Electoral Commission, Eligibility to the Presidency of the Republic, Elections organization
29/06/2005	PRETORIA II	The meeting was held against the background of the massacre in Duékoué and to review the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement and to agree on the principle of the legitimacy of UN targeted sanctions upon anyone viewed to be slowing down the peace process.
04/03/2007	OUAGADOUGOU	This time there was direct dialogue between the parties to the conflict who have agreed on the urgent need for them to work together to restore peace. They decided on the following points: General identification of the population, Electoral process, Defence and Security Forces of Côte d'Ivoire, Restoration of the authority of the

---

State and redeployment of the administration throughout the national territory.

The OPA was the basis of the new peace process in Côte d'Ivoire and had four complementary agreements.

---

### 3.8 Conclusion

The Ivorian conflict that started in September 2002 extended well beyond the time that we thought it would take to be able to resolve it. First, ECOWAS in late September 2002 made its first unsuccessful attempt to resolve the Ivorian crisis. Then followed several other attempts which had the same fate as the previous ones. It was not for unwillingness or lack of attempts to resolve the crisis. But several endogenous and then exogenous elements have come to disrupt the smooth running of the peace process.

First, ECOWAS, having neither elements nor coercive force, has never been able to impose its authority and has never been able to enforce the agreements, despite the spectrum of a sanction. ECOWAS in the Ivorian crisis has once again shown its limits in terms of peacekeeping in West Africa. The organisation has seen its goals mostly frustrated by political crises in the region and rivalries between Heads of State struggling for regional leadership. Since its involvement in the difficult resolution of the long and devastating civil wars in Liberia (1990-97 and 2003-2007) and Sierra Leone (1991-2002), which had also occasionally spilt over into Guinea and threatened to engulf entire West Africa, ECOWAS has been trying so hard to play the role of diplomat and mediator. In its defence, at the time of its creation in 1975, ECOWAS had as its primary objective the economic integration of the member states, before gradually giving a central place to questions of peace, defence and security.

Second, the AU, one of whose objectives is the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent, completely gone astray in the Ivorian case, thus showing its limits. After being absent at the start of the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire, the AU has not been able to play its role in the Ivorian crisis. Third, the attitude of the parties to the conflict towards the peace agreements has underlined the limits of the MHS and the ripe moment. If the Theory explains thoroughly what we need to go to the negotiating table, it does not explain to us how to deal with it when the parties to the conflict refuse to apply the agreement even while being in an MHS and in being convinced that there is a possibility of a negotiated way out from the crisis.

Fourth, these limits of the theory become particularly interesting when they allow us to meditate other possibilities and alternatives for better analysis and practice. For example, about the Ivorian case, we can add to the MHS and to the perception of a negotiated exit from the crisis, another element which is the psychological availability of the actors to negotiate and apply the agreements. We must also add to this, to negotiate an agreement which is mutually “satisfactory” and attractive or both parties while insisting on the words satisfactory, mutually and attractive, since each conflict has its dynamic. Also, the status quo in a conflict can bring warring parties at negotiations table. The lack of evolution concerning a conflict can create a sense of weariness between the parties and lead them to negotiate. It is therefore an alternative to a ripe moment.

Fifth, it is crucial to take into account socio-cultural elements, especially when it comes to conflict in Africa. There are conflicts that neither mediation nor negotiation can manage to settle. It does not mean that we should stay without doing anything, but on the contrary, show the parties that only they have the means and the necessary elements to solve their problem. Negotiation could result in a ceasefire, which would avoid bloodshed and allow the parties to reflect more calmly rather than trying to find a final solution to a conflict that everyone knows we have to go back to the origins to find solutions.

Sixth, the position of third parties must be completely impartial. Impartiality is an essential element in mediation and negotiation to avoid resistance reactions. If the LMA agreement had had difficulty in being implemented, it is also because of the ambiguous and ambivalent position of France. That raised the problem between capacity-based mediation and legitimacy-based mediation. The legitimacy-based mediation proved to better work to manage the Ivorian crisis. Even if the mediators have limited resources, theirs reached better results than France mediation, which was a capacity-based mediation. We need African solutions for African problems. That do not mean that we should reject the non-African third-party mediation, but we should not accept a conflict-of-interest mediation such as France mediation. A conflict of interest can be defined as a situation where a person or persons, an institution or several institutions are at the centre of a decision-making process where their objectivity, their neutrality can be called into question.

The next chapter which has been separated from chapter three to avoid it being too long is about the participation of the UN in Côte d’Ivoire conflict resolution. So, How UNOCI mandate impacted in negotiation and resolution phases in Côte d’Ivoire?

#### 4 UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

*I am sure that none of you  
would want to rest content with the  
superficial kind of social analysis that  
deals mainly with effects and does not  
grapple with underlying causes*

(Martin Luther King Jr  
1963).

The creation of UNOCI followed the signing of the LMA. Even if it did not follow immediately from the agreement, it succeeded MINUCI, which was the immediate fruit of the LMA. The increasing number of internal conflicts globally made the International Community pay more attention to these types of conflicts and in some instances, act with different tools of intervention and conflict management. The UN in specific, whose mission is to keep peace and security globally employed several Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) in various regions. PKOs include the deployment of, usually, United Nations personnel, known as Peacekeepers, with the consent of the parties involved and with a peace agreement in place, to maintain a ceasefire and prevent the resumption of hostilities (AHOUANGAN, 2019). Peacekeepers remain neutral to the conflict, do not intervene and only engage in cases of self-defence (ONU, 2008).

Security has always been a topic of great interest to great leaders, nations and academics who study International Relations and the transformations of the international system. The theme of international security during the Cold War years was central to International Relations, but after the end of the Cold War, the focus was more on the economy. Post 9/11 saw the birth of new perceptions about the use of force in International Relations. The considerable decrease in armed conflicts between States, the growing evolution of internal armed conflicts and the great refugee crisis resulting from these internal conflicts made the debate on security in the academic environment central (KALDOR, 2012).

Mary Kaldor (2012) pointed out that some studies show a decline in what she calls the “old war” – i.e., a war involving states in which, the battle is the decisive encounter. Kaldor (2012) states that during the last decades of the twentieth century, a new type of organised violence has been developed mainly in Africa and Eastern Europe, which is an aspect of the current globalised era, and this type of violence was described as a “new war” (KALDOR, 2012, author’s Griffon). This upsurge in intra-state conflicts coincided with an apparent increase in UN peacekeeping missions. This chapter focuses on UNOCI, a peacekeeping mission created by the UNSC in February 2004 to monitor the ceasefire and movements of

armed groups in Côte d'Ivoire, to protect civilians, and to provide humanitarian assistance following the civil war in the country.

#### **4.1 United Nations Peacekeeping Operation**

Before considering UNOCI, it is essential first of all to define and situate what is a peacekeeping operation. Indeed, several peace operations have been labelled as generation of peace operations. The expression “generation of peace operations” is used to distinguish the different types of peace missions. They mainly refer to United Nations peace operations but are also used to designate the tasks of other international organisations, such as NATO or the European Union. Peace missions have evolved considerably over the past sixty years, both in terms of their mandate, constitution and the conflicts in which they are deployed. There are usually three generations of peace missions (ROP, 2010). There are therefore qualified as first-generation operations, second-generation operations and third-generation operations.

##### **4.1.1 The different UN peace operations**

The Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) can be defined as the deployment of personnel, mainly military, from the United Nations, with the consent of the parties involved, to maintain a ceasefire and prevent the resumption of hostilities. These forces are deployed only when a peace agreement exists, and that agreement is respected. Also, these forces remain impartial and neutral; they can only act and fight in self-defence. They are immediately removed if armed hostilities are resumed (DAVID, 2006). Three basic principles continue to set UN peacekeeping operations apart as a tool for maintaining international peace and security. These three principles are inter-related and mutually reinforcing: (a) Consent of the parties; (b) Impartiality; (c) Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate (UNPK, 2020).

UN peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict. It requires a commitment by the parties to a political process. Their acceptance of a peacekeeping operation provides the UN with the necessary freedom of action, both political and physical, to carry out its mandated tasks (UNPK, 2020). In the absence of such consent, a peacekeeping operation risks to be drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its fundamental role of keeping the peace (UNPK, 2020). Sometimes it possible that the approval

to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation does not necessarily imply or guarantee that there will also be consent at the local level. That generally happens when the main parties are internally divided or have weak command and control systems and with an existence of other spoilers.

The other key aspect of the PKO is the impartiality. Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity. United Nations peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate. Just as a good referee is impartial, but will penalise infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds (UNPK, 2020).

The third principle of PKO concerns the non-use of violence since UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool. However, due to the versatile and volatile situations of some operations, UN peacekeeping operations may use force at the tactical level, with the authorisation of the Security Council, if acting in self-defence and defence of the mandate. The UNSC concedes, therefore, a “robust” mandate authorising them to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order (UNPK, 2020). Nonetheless, we cannot confuse a robust peacekeeping with peace enforcement, as envisaged under [Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter](#).

After the different fundamental principles of a PKO, we have the three types of generation of peace operations. First, we have the so-called first-class peace operations. This category of peace operations refers to traditional or classic peacekeeping missions. These operations are generally authorised by the UNSC to enforce a ceasefire agreement previously signed between the belligerent parties. The UN mainly used this type of operation during the Cold War.

In this way, to meet the criteria of the first-generation operation, the operation must obey the following criteria: (a) the mission is established under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter and it is the responsibility of Security Council; (b) the peacekeepers intervene in the context of conflicts between two States recognised by the international community, thus excluding civil wars and revolutions; (c) the interested parties have signed a ceasefire agreement before the mission is created and agree to its deployment; (d) the international soldiers have the mandate to create a buffer zone between the states in conflict in order to avoid the resumption of the confrontations; (e) the UN troops are considered to be neutral and

impartial in the face of the conflict; (f) States involved in one way or another in the crisis are not contributing to the operation so as not to compromise criterion (e); (g) the five permanent members of the Security Council do not generally contribute to these missions. The primary purpose of this provision was to avoid any conflict between the great powers; (h) the peacekeepers are mainly soldiers, lightly armed. They use force only in self-defence. Since they are neutral and impartial, they cannot open fire on either party (ROP, 2010).

Until 2010, the United Nations authorised thirteen first-generation peace missions, which today are infrequent peace operations. United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), created in 2000, was the only UN peacekeeping mission that meets all the criteria to have been created since the end of the Cold War. Then we have second-generation peace operations. These types of operations are emerging following the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Since the Security Council authorised no peace mission between 1978 and 1988, this period is generally used to differentiate the two generations. They, therefore, take place in the context of intra-state conflicts, often of a religious and / or ethnic nature under the impetus of the Boutros Boutros-Ghali Agenda for Peace, made public in 1992 (ROP, 2010).

This proposal was innovative in several aspects and stood out from first-generation operations because: (a) Missions are created under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It means that peacekeepers intervene in often hostile environments where they may be called upon to open fire to impose their mandate; (b) the UN workforce is no longer considered neutral and impartial. It is for this reason that they can now use force; (c) peacekeepers can intervene in conflicts within states; (d) The parties concerned no longer need to be recognised States. That allows deployment in the context of civil wars and revolutions; (e) the consent of the parties is no longer a prerequisite for the creation of an operation. This policy has two opposite effects. It makes it possible to intervene more quickly, and thus help stabilise a region before the conflict come at its peak. But, when the peacekeepers intervene without the agreement of all conflicting parties, they sometimes are considered as enemies, and they are targeted; (f) the military is working to create the conditions for peace rather than maintaining the fragile peace guaranteed by a ceasefire agreement; (g) the missions are much more staffed than before; and (h) the great powers can participate in missions (ROP, 2010).

But these operations are mostly known for their failures the UN has not always done well and the ambitious mandates granted by the Security Council have failed to be fulfilled in their entirety. Among them, we can cite: United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), the United Nations Operation in Somalia I & II (UNOSOM) and the United



Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) (ROP, 2010). Second generation operations have given way to third-generation operations.

The term “third-generation operations” is relatively new, but not universally accepted. It is generally used to designate peace missions that are not first or second generation. Instead, they are operations with diverse and complex tasks, ranging from the supervision of elections to the disarmament of combatants, but which exclude the imposition of peace (ROP). After having suffered a bitter setback from its significant second-generation operations, the UN decided to review the composition of its missions as well as the mandate granted to them. The organisation then tends to delegate coercive operations to other better-suited international organisations (ROP, 2010).

Peacekeeping is one among a range of activities undertaken by the United Nations to maintain international peace and security throughout the world. The other activities are usually: conflict prevention and mediation, peace-making, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding (UN, 2020). As far as conflict prevention concern, it involves diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. In the other side, peace-making generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. As to peace enforcement, it consists of the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. It requires the explicit authorisation of the Security Council. And finally, peacebuilding aims at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development (UN, 2020). Conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping and peace enforcement rarely occur linearly or sequentially, and the usual experience has shown that they should be seen as mutually reinforcing. That why, the boundaries between conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred. Peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity (UN, 2020).

Usually deployed to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement, the peacekeeping operations are often required to play an active role in peace-making efforts. They are also involved in peacebuilding activities and become multidimensional peace operations like the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire.

#### 4.1.2 The creation of the UNOCI

Mediation efforts by representatives of States and ECOWAS led to the signing of a ceasefire agreement in Côte d'Ivoire on 17 October 2002. Following this, ECOWAS leaders decided that the ECOWAS Peace Force in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOFORCE) which would quickly transform into an ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI), would be deployed on 31 December 2002. Given the difficulty of applying the ceasefire, another summit was convened in Linas-Marcoussis in early 2003. But the problem of applying the LMA forced the UN to create a mission to be able to maintain a fragile peace obtained in France at the beginning of the year.

The Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, Mr Jean-Marc de La Sablière, sent a letter dated 27 January 2003 - S/2003/99, to which he annexed the contents of the Linas-Marcoussis and Avenue Kléber Agreements. He then requested the UNSC to circulate the text of the letter and its annexes as a document of the Security Council (NU, 2003a). It was followed by a Draft resolution - S/2003/140, in which paragraph 5 has requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Council at the earliest possible date recommendations on how the United Nations could support the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement fully<sup>70</sup>. This draft resolution will be voted on the same day with 15 votes in favour, under resolution 1464 (2003)<sup>71</sup>.

Having determined that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region, the Security Council set up, on 13 May 2003, through the resolution 1479, a political mission – MINUCI – to facilitate the implementation of the LMA and to complement the operations of the peacekeeping force of the ECOWAS and French troops. Following a meeting held on that day afternoon on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, the Security Council unanimously adopted this resolution based on the text of draft resolution S/2003/539<sup>72</sup>. The Council approved the establishment of a small staff to support the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on political, legal, civil affairs, civilian police, elections, media and public relations, humanitarian and human rights issues, and the establishment of a military liaison group whose tasks included: (a) providing advice to the Special Representative on military matters; (b) monitoring the military situation, including the security of Liberian refugees and reporting to the Special Representative thereon; (c) establishing liaison with the French and ECOWAS forces for the purpose of advising the

<sup>70</sup>Cf UN Security Council S/2003/140, Draft Resolution, 4 February 2003, para.5.

<sup>71</sup>Cf NU Conseil de Sécurité S/PV.4700, 4700e Séance, 04 février 2003.

<sup>72</sup>Cf NU Conseil de Sécurité. CS/2494. Le Conseil de Sécurité crée la Mission des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) pour une période initiale de six mois. Communiqué de presse de la 4754e séance. UNSC. Available from: <https://www.un.org/press/fr/2003/CS2494.doc.htm>. Accessed on 7 May 2020.

Special Representative on military and related developments; (d) establishing also liaison with the *Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d'Ivoire* (FANCI) and the Forces Nouvelles, in order to build confidence and trust between the armed groups, in cooperation with the French and ECOWAS forces, in particular concerning helicopters and combat aircraft; (e) providing input to forward planning on disengagement, disarmament and demobilisation and identifying future tasks, in order to advise the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and support the French and ECOWAS forces; (f) reporting to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the above issues (UN, 2004).

This one-year duration mission had 26 military liaison officers in the initial period and up to 50 additional officers as needed, and a small civilian staff. However, with a small troop combined to the difficulty of applying the LMA, ECOWAS was obliged to call for an increase in MINUCI military officers and the conversion of the mission into a PKO. In the UNSC S/2004/3 report on 6 January 2004, the UN Secretary-General stated that in a letter dated 12 November 2003<sup>73</sup> addressed to the UNSC, President Laurent Gbagbo proposed the strengthening of the Mission's mandate and the deployment of the UN Peacekeeping force (UNSC, 2004a).

The same report noted that the progress in the Ivorian peace process over the past 12 months had been mixed and points, such as a formation of the national reconciliation government and the DDR encounter difficulties (UNSC, 2004a). And due to the fragile situation of the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire, the UNSC at in its 4918th meeting, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has decided to establish the UNOCI (see map 8) – for an initial period of 12 months as from 4 April 2004. It also requests the Secretary-General to transfer authority from MINUCI and the ECOWAS forces to UNOCI on that date and decided, therefore, to renew the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) until 4 April 2004<sup>74</sup>.

We should recall that the discussions that gave rise to the resolution establishing UNOCI took place on 27 February 2004 at 10 a.m. in New York. China held the chairmanship of the SC and 14 other members were present, including some countries of the Global South. To be included in the debate, the representative of Côte d'Ivoire had to request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. He was therefore invited to join in the discussion without the right to vote, following the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure (UNSC, 2004b).

---

<sup>73</sup>Cf UN Security. Council S/2003/1081 document addressed to the president of the UNSC

<sup>74</sup>Cf S/RES/1528 (2004) Establishing the UNOCI

The UNOCI comprised, in addition to the appropriate civilian, judiciary and corrections component, military strength of a maximum of 6,240 United Nations personnel, including 200 military observers and 120 staff officers, and up to 350 civilian police officers, as required to perform the mandated tasks<sup>75</sup>. The UNSC has decided that the mandate of UNOCI, in coordination with the French forces, should be the following:

- *Monitoring of the ceasefire and movements of armed groups*: to observe and monitor the implementation of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement of 3 May 2003, investigate violations of the ceasefire, and to assist the Government of National Reconciliation in monitoring the borders;
- *Disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement*: to help the Government of National Reconciliation implement the national program for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the combatants (DDR), undertake the regrouping of all the Ivorian forces involved and to ensure the security of their cantonment sites, and to secure, neutralise or destroy weapons, ammunition and other military material handed over by the former combatants;
- *Protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians*: to protect UN personnel, installations and equipment, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, and to support, in coordination with the Ivorian authorities, the provision of security for the ministers of the Government of National Reconciliation;
- *Support for humanitarian assistance*: to facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian aid, among other things, by helping to establish the necessary security conditions;
- *Support for the implementation of the peace process*: to facilitate in cooperation with ECOWAS and other international partners, the re-establishment of the authority of the State throughout Côte d'Ivoire, and to provide oversight, guidance and technical assistance, to prepare for and assist in the conduct of free, fair and transparent electoral processes;
- *Assistance in the field of human rights*: to contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights in Côte d'Ivoire with particular attention to violence committed against women and girls, and to help investigate human rights violations to help to end impunity;

---

<sup>75</sup>Cf paragraph 2 of S/RES/1528 (2004) Establishing the UNOCI

- *Public information:* to promote understanding of the peace process and the role of UNOCI among local communities and the parties, through an adequate public information capacity, including the establishment as necessary of a United Nations radio broadcasting capability;
- *Law and order:* to assist the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international organisations in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law, and in restoring a civilian policing presence throughout Côte d'Ivoire<sup>76</sup>.

### Illustration 8 - UNOCI's deployment in 2004



Source: United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operation, November 2004.

Unlike MINUCI, UNOCI had a much more robust mandate and had more financial, logistical and material resources to carry out its mission. The UNOCI mandate accorded to the

<sup>76</sup>Cf UN Security Council. Resolution Establishing UNOCI. UN Doc. S/RES/1528 (2004), para 6.

French forces the use of all necessary means to support UNOCI under the agreement to be reached between UNOCI and the French authorities<sup>77</sup>. But the mandate of UNOCI would not be one of the easiest, far from it, the operation faced numerous violations of the peace agreements.

#### 4.2 UNOCI mission: between contestation and legitimisation

*“On ne sort pas d’une guerre comme d’un dîner-gala”*

Laurent Gbagbo

Being a peacekeeper is not the simplest thing, especially when it comes to working in a hostile environment. From its creation in 2004 until its effective end in 2017, a total of fifty-one UNSC resolutions have been passed on UNOCI. On the ground, the mission had 11,058 uniformed personnel at its maximum strength, with an annual budget of \$584 million in June 2013 (NOVOSSOFF, 2018). Several tools have been used by the UNSC to resolve the Ivorian crisis, including political missions, mediation, arms embargoes, sanctions on individuals, the use of force, referral to the International Criminal Court, and a peacekeeping operation (NOVOSSOFF, 2018).

Yet the mission of ONUCI has not been the easiest to implement over the years. The mission can be divided into two parts: the first part extends from 2004 to 2010 and includes all the different peace agreements as part of the resolution of the Ivorian conflict, and the second part from 2011 to 2017, from the post-electoral crisis to the end of the mission.

##### 4.2.1 UNOCI or a vision of neocolonialism

No country worthy of the name would like to see its sovereignty called into question. Under the terms of Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, “[the] Organisation is founded on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members” (UN, 1945). Sovereignty and equality remain fundamental principles of public international law to which States remain particularly attached. That theoretically means that sovereign states are

---

<sup>77</sup>Cf UN Security Council. Resolution Establishing UNOCI. UN Doc. S/RES/1528 (2004), para 16.

therefore all equal, whatever their area, population, geographic location and economic and military power.

However, the reality is less happy and more complex. First, because the facts and actions of western States towards their compatriots show us that it is utopic to speak of the sovereignty of so-called third world States. Then, perhaps because we live in globalisation where the limits of borders are reduced and sometimes non-existent. Or simply we have passed the age of believing in the fantastical stories of Santa Claus at least for the so-called third world states.

Further on, paragraph 4 of the same Charter states: “The Members of the Organisation shall refrain, in their international relations, from resorting to the threat or use of force, either against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State or in any other way incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations” (UN, 1945). If the Charter of the United Nations contributed to the accession to independence of several countries under colonial domination, it could not prevent a new form of colonialism which is called today neo-colonialism.

Between France and Côte d’Ivoire, it is an ancient story, intimate, ambiguous, sometimes difficult to define. By becoming the first president of Côte d’Ivoire, Félix Houphouët-Boigny gave full meaning to the term “*françafrique*<sup>78</sup>” of which he was the inventor. He was a truly “African” basically, however, Houphouët was not a nationalist. He was convinced that the young nations of the south of the Sahara were not ready to take up the challenge of development without maintaining close ties with the former metropolis (KUNDE, 2012a).

It was the time when almost no Ivorian minister could not do without French aid workers in his cabinet. Côte d’Ivoire – a preserve turf of the old metropolis, then seemed to live in a sort of symbiosis with France. But like any relationship, this one did not resist the wear of time and has been weakened. Pointed out during the Rwandan genocide, France will review its interventionism on the African continent by pronouncing the doctrine of “No interference, no indifference (KUNDE, 2012b)”.

After a long colonial past marked by ups and downs, Côte d’Ivoire and France have maintained close relations both economically, militarily and politically. This Franco-Ivorian

---

<sup>78</sup>The *Françafrique* is a positive term used by the president Félix Houphouët-Boigny, reflecting the close interweaving between France and Africa for the better, symbol of all the drifts for detractors of the relationship between Paris and its former colonies. Later this term will be challenged by Ivorians in view of a growing nationalism.

relationship experienced a significant turning point with the crisis of the early 2000s. In the first hours of the 2002 crisis, President Laurent Gbagbo asked France to activate the defence agreements that bound it to Côte d'Ivoire to repel dissidents. But France replied in the negative, arguing that the Ivorian conflict was internal and that there was, therefore, no external aggression.

The hypothesis of a United Nations intervention force having been dismissed because of United States opposition, and no other power not wishing or unable to intervene militarily to end a conflict that could escalate into a civil war or even open war between countries of the zone. A more critical French military engagement quickly appeared inevitable (SADA, 2003). The Force Licorne would, therefore, be the first non-regional force to intervene militarily in the Ivorian crisis even if it did not participate directly in the confrontations. This intervention reflected all the ambiguity of France's role in the Ivorian conflict. First, it did not want to intervene. Then it had to deploy its troops to protect its nationals, thus creating a buffer zone preventing both sides from moving either north or south. This strategy, which the Ivorians found difficult to understand, was blamed on France by the government and by the dissidents.

After the LMA the anti-French feeling was growing, the young patriots loyal to President Gbagbo saw in these agreements a manifest interference on the part of the Western countries and especially of France in the internal affairs of Côte d'Ivoire. Thus, violating the principle of sovereignty of article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. The situation escalated after the destruction of the Ivorian air fleet by the Force Licorne troops, the storming of Abidjan airport and the residence of Laurent Gbagbo. These bombings took place after an alleged attack on the French base in Bouaké by the FANCI in November 2004.

In few days, France had to repatriate thousands of its nationals, lost face and even worse, opened fire on Ivorian citizens in Abidjan. In such situation, it was the UNOCI that had been targeted by the young patriots being and directly assimilated to the French Force Licorne. The UN mission was highly contested by part of the Ivorian population, thus making it difficult to carry out this operation. Indirectly, ONUCI paid the catastrophic management by France of the events of November 2004. Its mission has been contested and lost all legitimacy since the Force Licorne indisputably violated the sovereignty of Côte d'Ivoire, granting itself the right to unilaterally attack the existing institutions of an "independent" State.

Besides, France had a most ambiguous position in its communicative strategy, sometimes declaring that Gbagbo was at the head of a "fascist" type regime, sometimes that he was a "legal" and "legitimate" president (SMITH, 2004). One day, the soldiers would not have killed civilians; the next day, the French army would have killed twenty Ivorians. The



dissemination by the French media of images of French actions in Abidjan during this near war provoked strong reactions in France from civil society and leftist parties, as well as in all African capitals (MARSHALL, 2005).

The French military retaliation was criticised by many public personalities and presented by Gbagbo as evidence that the conflict was primarily a battle for independence from Côte d'Ivoire former colonial power. Security Council members, however, expressed their unambiguous solidarity with France's Operation Licorne and condemned the violation of the ceasefire by government forces (NOVOSSOFF, 2018). The French reaction was perhaps understandable, but it would have been wiser to entrust the bombing of the Ivorian air fleet to UNOCI troops. It would have had the merit of avoiding a Franco-Ivorian "war" and of preventing the UNOCI mission from being regarded as an incapable bending to the goodwill of France.

At the different phases of the Ivorian crisis, UNOCI faced extreme challenges from the beginning of its deployment in 2004. These challenges started with the UN Secretariat's mixed feelings about the mere existence of the mission due to France's strong push for its creation and divisions among regional powers and organisations that produced different mediation processes (NOVOSSOFF, 2018). Côte d'Ivoire cooperated in varied ways with UNOCI; therefore, that had an impact on its mandate. UNOCI as many if not all other peacekeeping operations, also failed to meet the expectations of a population in search of peace (NOVOSSOFF, 2018). However, this mission has the merit of having contributed to stability and the return to certain normalcy in Côte d'Ivoire.

#### 4.2.2 UNOCI as a legitimate mission

In a letter dated 12 November 2003, the president of Côte d'Ivoire, Mr Laurent Gbagbo, expressly asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations the strengthening of the mission's mandate as well as the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force. Add to that, ECOWAS asked the council to strengthen the ECOMICI troops and transform it into a United Nations peacekeeping force (UNSC, 2004a). As a result, the UNSC Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations has decided to establish UNOCI for an initial period of twelve months as from 4 April 2004 (UN, 2004).

There was no doubt that the UNSC, under article 39 of chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, assumed its responsibilities in establishing a peacekeeping operation in

Côte d'Ivoire. Article 39 states: *"The Security Council notes the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression and makes recommendations or decides what measures will be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace and security"* (UN, 1945). The UNSC thus legitimised its presence in Côte d'Ivoire.

The legitimacy of the Operation can also be tested based on the three underlying principles of a UN peacekeeping operation: (a) Consent of the parties; (b) impartiality; (c) non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

a) - Consent of the parties

As we mentioned above, the Ivorian expressly asked for the creation of a peacekeeping operation in his country. Before implementing such operation, the sine qua non-condition was fulfilled, and this condition was the LMA. Subsequently, the commitment by the parties to a political process provided to the UN necessary freedom of action, in political and physical ways, to carry out its mandated tasks through the UNOCI. This prior consent was justified by the fact of not going against the own fundamental principles of the UN, which is the equality of all States and the respect of their sovereignty by their peers.

In this way, the legitimacy of the mission started from the fact that the mission was not imposed but agreed by the main parties to the conflict. The acceptance of the parties to the conflict is crucial concerning the smooth running of the mission, given that peacekeeping troops are often in unknown territory, which makes their mission difficult from the beginning. In a hostile environment, the operation would become almost impossible mission.

In absence of such consent, ONUCI would have running towards a hard mission to be implemented. However, in some situations, the main parties may give their consent to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. Nevertheless, that does not necessarily imply or guarantee that there will also be consent at the local level, particularly if the main parties are internally divided or have weak command and control systems. The universality of consent becomes even less probable in volatile settings, characterised by the presence of armed groups not under the control of any of the parties, or by the presence of other spoilers (UNPK, 2020).

After the LMA, the situation in Côte d'Ivoire experienced peaks of tension and a multiplicity of dissident groups, added to this a limitless number of spoils perpetrated by the parties to the conflict. Facts which could have called into question the universality of consent.

## b) - Impartiality

Impartiality should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity, since the UNSC has authorised the UNOCI to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment (UN, 2004). The UNOCI should be impartial when dealing with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of its mandate. That means acting as a referee, the ONUCI would penalise infractions and should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds.

The issue of impartiality is one of the most challenging core principles of United Nations peacekeeping operations. It is a norm in that it prescribes how peacekeepers should behave: namely, that they are unbiased and informed when making decisions or in taking action (PADDON RHOADS, 2016). The impartiality is integral to the identity of peacekeepers, to what peacekeeping is and what it is not, and to the values and principles that the UN seeks to project (PADDON RHOADS, 2016).

Since impartiality is not a given the UN peacekeepers work hard to outline this value in a mission's mandate in conformity with norms of international peace and security. The impartiality is paramount to establish and maintain good relations with the parties. A peacekeeping operation should, therefore, avoid activities that might compromise its image of impartiality. A mission should not shy away from a rigorous application of the principle of impartiality for fear of misinterpretation or retaliation. Failure to do so may undermine the peacekeeping operation's credibility and legitimacy and may lead to a withdrawal of consent for its presence by one or more of the parties (UNPK, 2020).

Emily Paddon Rhoads (2016) argued that she started to interest herself to impartiality because of a change in the meaning of impartiality in peacekeeping doctrine, at the end of the 1990s, and stating that the new conception was more assertive and called for robust uses of force to protect civilians (PADDON RHOADS, 2016). The consequence is that many questions are raised. One is about the sustainability of peacekeeping, in this case, other is about the acceptance of peacekeepers locally for implementing their mission, and the last one calls into question the UN's future role and ability to act as the legitimate guarantor of international peace and security. She also argued that such transformation deeply politicised peacekeeping at all levels and, in cases such as Congo, converting UN forces into one warring party among many (PADDON RHOADS, 2016). These questions are understandable given the rising number of

peacekeeping missions around the world in particular in Africa where such missions are seen as a hybrid mission between neo-colonialism and real peacekeeping.

c) - Non-use of force

As we know, UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool, for that reason, the use of force as an instrument for its mission is restricted. Notwithstanding, the limited use of force does not mean the non-use of force. The UN peacekeeping operations may use force at the tactical level, with the express authorisation of the Security Council, if this use is for self-defence and defence of the mandate. In paragraph 8 relating to the creation of the UNOCI and its implementation, the UNSC authorised UNOCI to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, which, in other words, enable the use of force if necessary, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment.

The UNOCI was deployed in an unstable environment, while Gbagbo and dissident were trying to manage the LMA. And throughout the crisis, UNOCI troops attempted to reduce tensions by maintaining close contacts with both parties and working to preserve the integrity of the *zone de confiance* (NOVOSSELOFF, 2015). UNOCI had, therefore, neither the mandate nor the capacity to enter in a confrontation in the Ivorian crisis (NOVOSSELOFF, 2015).

Following the 4 to 6 November 2004 attacks and bombing, and as reported by Gilles Yabi (2009), there were “diverging views within the UN mission senior staff about the reaction to adopt in the face of the 4 to 6 November resumption of hostilities.” Such diverging views was due to the fact of the non-use of force principle. Also, according to Yabi (2009), the posture of the then force commander was “seen by some senior civilian staff as too passive”. And without “clear directive from New York to guide the reaction of the peacekeeping mission to major security developments that could have plunged the country back into direct military hostilities.”

Usually, in this volatile situation, the UNSC has given UN peacekeeping operations “robust” mandates authorising them to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order (UNPK, 2020). But we have to be careful about not confusing robust peacekeeping with peace enforcement. The first one involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorisation of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict, whereas the last one does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or

international level, even if it is prohibited for the Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter unless authorised by the Security Council (UNPK, 2020).

The UNOCI was fulfilling the requisites of the three principles of the United Nations Peacekeeping operations, so it was a legitimate operation implemented in Côte d'Ivoire. In the following parts, we will see the ONUCI mandate and the development of the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire in two phases.

### 4.3 UNOCI to retrieve peace in Côte d'Ivoire

The genesis and the nature of the armed conflict in Côte d'Ivoire were unique, although the problems that confronted UNOCI in 2011 were similar to those of the wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan (ADEBAJO, 2004). Like many other missions, ONUCI mainly highlighted the challenges confronted by new forms of robust multidimensional peacekeeping (TARDY, 2011). With a well-defined mission, peacekeepers had been deployed primarily into the *zone de confiance* which split the country into a rebel-controlled north and government-controlled south (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2012).

The UNOCI mandate started from 2004 and finished in 2017. During this period, the execution of UNOCI's mandate was constrained by several disagreements between parties, and also was modified for adapting to the evaluating situation of the Ivorian crisis. Then, we will divide the execution of the UNOCI's mandate into two distinct periods. The first one starts from 2004 to 2010 and the second part from 2011 to 2017.

#### 4.3.1 UNOCI from 2004 to 2010

The UNOCI initially was created to achieve a specific goal in Côte d'Ivoire. Between 2004 and 2010 there were several peace processes from ACCRA I to OPA, some significant adjustments to UNOCI's mandate, several additional agreements between the parties, a significant and hotly contested change of government and at least two major outbreaks of violence (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2012). The mission encountered several instances of hostile actions and difficulties operating. One month before its installation, Côte d'Ivoire had to face violent repressions of demonstrations on 25 and 26 March 2004 in Abidjan. The UNSC, therefore, mandated a commission to clarify the clashes in Abidjan.

The main conclusion of this commission's report, based on accounts from eyewitnesses and survivors as well as other corroborating evidence, was that the demonstration of 25 March was used for, targeting opposition parties and community groups not only in Côte d'Ivoire but also in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (UNSC, 2004c, para 12). Even if the deployment of UNOCI and its initial activities had a positive impact, the security situation in the country remained dangerously fragile. Serious tensions continued throughout the country, resulting in shooting incidents, particularly in the western towns of Duékoué and Gagnoa. UNOCI was targeted during demonstrations in Abidjan. Although mostly peaceful, the demonstrations were characterised by increasingly worrying vitriolic threats by "young patriots" to resort to violence against UNOCI if the Forces Nouvelles were not disarmed by the end of May. On 17 May, a group of violent demonstrators in Toumodi threw stones at a UNOCI convoy proceeding from Abidjan to Yamoussoukro (UNSC, 2004c, para 33).

Facing these hostilities, the UN emphasised that UNOCI was established at the request of all Ivorian parties. Given the stalemate in the peace process and the non-implementation of the LMA, the Security Council mission to West Africa made the following recommendation: First, the Government of National Reconciliation would be reconstituted to resume its work. Second, the government should take the necessary steps to expedite the adoption in the National Assembly of the fundamental political reforms provided for in the Agreement. Third, the Ivorian parties should move beyond their ambitions to act together to build a better future for the country (CSNU, 2004d, para. 15).

Another difficulty that peacekeeping missions face is not being able to explain their mission to the people in concrete terms. In its report, the mission noted the urgent need for United Nations Radio to begin broadcasting to explain to all Ivorians the mandate of the UNOCI (CSNU, 2004d, para. 16). To carry out its operations, UNOCI established several channels of communication. Apart from UNOCI radio, cartoons such as "Palabre n'est pas bon" and "La Bouche et M. ONUCI" have been created. A peacekeeping operation finds itself in a difficult situation when the authorities of the host state fundamentally disagree with its mandate, see its presence as a limit to their sovereignty (NOVOSSELOFF, 2015), and is continuously tackled by the population. By sensitising the population through accessible channels, UNOCI therefore tried in its mission to be as close as possible to the people.

After a few months of operation in Côte d'Ivoire, UNOCI was satisfied with some progress in the peace process in the country. The resumption, after a five-month hiatus, of the Quadripartite Commission meetings was also a positive development about disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, the UNSC said (UNSC, 2004e, para. 36). However, DDR has

been severely hampered since the World Bank, which was to finance part of the reintegration process, suspended its payments to Côte d'Ivoire because the country failed to meet its debt obligations (UNSC, 2004e).

The UNSC also noted that progress in the preparations for the elections was limited. So that the identification process, which was to serve as the basis for drawing up the voters' list, was hampered by various problems, in particular the financial constraints faced by the National Commission for the Supervision of Identification and the National Identification Office (UNSC, 2004e). In this way, the presidential elections that were scheduled for October 2005 were postponed.

For the Operation's mandate, UNOCI FM, the mission's radio station commenced broadcasting regular news bulletins. In addition, it would broadcast cultural, political and economic programs, as well as entertainment and sports programs, in French and up to seven local languages, 24 hours a day, every day of the week.

But the events of 4 and 6 November 2004 forced the UNSC to take more radical measures concerning armament in Côte d'Ivoire. Indeed, the UNSC in its 1572 resolution decided that:

All States shall, for a period of 13 months from the date of adoption of this Resolution, take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Côte d'Ivoire from their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft registered in their territories, of arms and any related materiel, including military aircraft and other materiel, whether or not originating in their territories, as well as the provision of any assistance, advice or training related to military activities. (UNSC, 2004f)

In early 2005, the UNSC began to take a harder line and through its resolution 1584 requesting the Force Licorne to assist UNOCI in closely monitor the arms embargo and to use all necessary means to enforce it. FANCI and FAFN were required to submit, within 45 days of the adoption of the resolution, an inventory of their arms. The same resolution requests the Secretary-General to establish, for six months, a group of experts consisting of not more than three members (CSNU, 2005a).

Given the progress made by UNOCI, its mandate was initially extended for one month (CSNU, 2005b) and then for another month until June 2005 (CSNU, 2005c). However, a report on the human rights situation in Côte d'Ivoire reported serious human rights violations in a tense and deleterious political-security context, marked above all by the controversy surrounding the maintenance in power of President of the Republic in the absence of a

presidential election in October 2005, beyond his term of office, and by a violation of Article 35(ONU, 2005).

In a catastrophic climate marked by the signing of an agreement in Pretoria, the UNSC requested the Secretary-General, based on the Pretoria Agreement, to appoint, on an exceptional basis, and after consultation with the African Union and President Thabo Mbeki, a High Representative for the elections in Côte d'Ivoire – the High Representative, independent of UNOCI. The High Representative would assist, among other things, the work of the Independent Electoral Commission and the Constitutional Council without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (CSNU, 2005d).

The mission of the High Representative was: (a) to verify, on behalf of the international community, that all stages of the electoral process, as well as the establishment of voters' lists and the issuance of voters' cards, provide all the necessary guarantees for the holding of inclusive, free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections; (b) provide, in close cooperation with the mediation and UNOCI, all necessary advice and guidance to the Constitutional Council and the Independent Electoral Commission; (c) to report immediately to the Security Council on any difficulties that could jeopardise the holding of inclusive, free, fair and transparent elections (CSNU, 2005d).

Based on events including inter-ethnic attacks, attacks on UNOCI and Force Licorne, the bombing of FANCI and the delay in the DDR process and the organisation of an election, the UNSC decided to extend the mandate of UNOCI for seven months with some adjustments concerning its mission as defined in Resolution 1528 (2004). In resolution 1609 (2005) it was added: disarmament and dismantling of militias; monitoring of the arms embargo; support for the redeployment of State administration; and support for the organisation of open, free, fair and transparent elections (UNSC, 2005e). The same resolution authorised an increase in the military component of UNOCI of up to 850 soldiers and as well as an increase in the civilian police component of up to a ceiling of 725 civilian police personnel, including three formed police units, and the necessary additional civilian personnel (UNSC, 2005e). The mandate of the Group of Experts was extended by resolution 1632 (2005).

However, due to the disagreement about DDR, political reforms and the meaning of Ivorian citizenship, the political process remained stagnated in Côte d'Ivoire. Therefore, the UNSC decided, upon the basis of the decision of the ECOWAS Peace and Security Council, that President Gbagbo shall remain Head of State from 31 October 2005 for a period not exceeding 12 months and supported the establishment of the International Working Group at a ministerial level and the Mediation Group (UNSC, 2005f).



Resolution 1633 (2005) comprehends AU decisions adopted by the United Nations. Its purpose is to prepare for the October 2006 presidential elections in peace. It would, therefore, allow for the dismantling of militias, the disarmament of ex-combatants, the identification and organisation of the election. This resolution was illustrated in the Comic “La ‘Bouche’ et M. l’ONUCI”<sup>79</sup> with the aim of broad dissemination, explanation and understanding of the maintenance of Laurent Gbagbo in power and the establishment of a one-year deadline for the organisation of elections.

The UNSC expressing its grave concern for the persistence of the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and obstacles on all sides to the peace and national reconciliation process and considering that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continues to endanger international peace and security in the region, decided to extend until 15 December 2006 the respective mandates of the UNOCI and the French forces which supported it (CSNU, 2006a). The UNSC also decided to authorise the Secretary-General to redeploy immediately, until 31 March 2006, an infantry company from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to UNOCI to enhance the security of United Nations personnel and property (CSNU, 2006b).

The stalemate in the peace process at several levels was symptom of deeper unresolved political problems in Côte d’Ivoire. For example, the International Work Group asked the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Head of State, to ensure that the mobile court hearings, continue in the best possible conditions of security and transparency<sup>80</sup>.

The actors in the Ivorian crisis were doing their utmost to ensure that the peace process was doomed to failure, or at least that is what their acts show. After an agreement was reached in Yamoussoukro on the modalities for disarmament and the conduct of the identification process, the implementation of those agreements was hampered by obstructionist manoeuvres, which led to a new stalemate. This impasse was primarily the result of deep disagreements between the Ivorian parties on fundamental issues relating to the procedures for the issuance of nationality certificates and the establishment of voters’ lists, which depend on these certificates (UNSC, 2006c). For its part, the dismantling of militias has been suspended due to the low number and poor quality of weapons and ammunition recovered (UNSC, 2006c).

By expressing its serious concern at the persistence of the crisis and the deterioration of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, the UNSC finally endorsed the decision of the Peace and

---

<sup>79</sup>Cf BANDES DESSINEES N° 002 - Janvier 2006, Available from:

[https://onuci.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old\\_spip/bd/bouche2.pdf](https://onuci.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_spip/bd/bouche2.pdf). Accessed on 21 March 2020.

<sup>80</sup> Lettre adressée au Président du Conseil de Sécurité par le Secrétaire Général - Communiqué de la 9ème réunion ministérielle du Groupe de Travail International – UN Doc. S/2006/584

Security Council that President Laurent Gbagbo should remain Head of State as from 1 November 2006 for a new and final transition period not exceeding 12 months. However, the president was consolidated in his functions on the paper, because the point 8 of resolution 1633 (2005) stipulated that the Prime Minister must have all the necessary powers according to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Also, all the governmental financial, material and human resources, particularly about security, defence and electoral matters, to ensure the effective functioning of the government (UNSC, 2005f). The Security Council relied on the work of the AU to legitimise such a decision, one of the rare times that the AU has seen one of its recommendations fully implemented by the Security Council. President Gbagbo was maintained without, however, having the full extent of his powers. So, it was not surprising to see in the press release that followed the vote on resolution 1633 on 21 October 2005: “Security Council: Laurent Gbagbo has been held at the head of Côte d’Ivoire at the side of a prime minister with all the powers up to 31 October 2006.” (UNPR, 2005)

However, it was difficult to come up with a consensus since the Prime Minister held all the powers. Indeed, during the 30 November 2005 meeting the UNSC Chairman Mr Denisov affirmed his preoccupation about the situation in Côte d’Ivoire stressing: “Therefore, the Security Council expresses its deep concern at the persistent disagreements among Ivorian parties on the appointment of the Prime Minister and considers that the Prime Minister must be designated without any further delay” (UNSC, 2005g). Finally, Mr Charles Konan Banny was appointed as Prime Minister of Côte d’Ivoire. To avoid any impediment to the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire, France submitted a draft resolution, which was unanimously adopted as resolution 1643 (2005). That resolution called for “the Secretary-General and the French Government to report to the Security Council immediately, through the Security Council Committee established by paragraph 14 of resolution 1572 (2004) (the Committee), of any serious obstacle to the freedom of movement of UNOCI and of the French forces which support it.” (UNSC, 2005h)

But once again the “Young Patriots” attacked UNOCI and international NGO facilities in Côte d’Ivoire to protest against France and its implication in the management of the Ivorian crisis. The Security Council strongly condemned violent attacks. It expressed its deep concern also at the brutal and orchestrated street protests led by the “Young Patriots”, in particular in Abidjan and several cities in the west. The RTI was also used as an instrument of government propaganda, thus losing all its neutrality as the Ivorian national body. The Security Council, therefore, underscored the imperative to guarantee the independence and impartiality of RTI.

Given the tense situation in Côte d'Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo, HKB, ADO and Guillaume Soro met for the first time on Ivorian soil since the beginning of the crisis in 2002. These four Ivorian crisis leaders discussed the sensitive points of the peace process such as the dismantling of the militias and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, identification and elections, Independent Electoral Commission, etc. Mobile court hearings in connection with the registration of Ivorians on the electoral list and the regrouping of the armed forces for disarmament began in 2006. However, acts of blockades and sabotage, mainly due to the actions of the young patriots, hampered the smooth running of the process. Also, the IEC's structures have not been deployed throughout the country as well as the local offices of the National Commission of Supervision of the Identification.

As the conditions were not met for the organisation of elections in October 2006, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of President Gbagbo for a final period of 12 months. The Security Council also decided to renew the mandate of the Prime Minister, Mr Charles Konan Banny, as from 1 November 2006 for a new and final transition period not exceeding 12 months (UNSC, 2006d). The Security Council renewed for 12 months the mandate of the High Representative for the Elections laid down in paragraph 7 of resolution 1603 (2005). The High Representative should be the unique authority authorised to arbitrate, to prevent or resolve any problems or disputes related to the electoral process, in liaison with the Mediator. He should certify all stages of the electoral process, including the process of identification of the population, the establishment of a register of voters and the issuance of voters' cards (UNSC, 2006d).

The lack of consensus and progress combined to the stalemate facing Côte d'Ivoire peace process prompted yet again the UNSC to postpone the presidential election. Initially scheduled in October 2005, this presidential election was postponed in October 2007. The UNSC through the resolution 1739 (2007) amended the ONUCI mission in Côte d'Ivoire. To the original resolution 1528 (2004) and the modified resolution 1609 (2005), it was added new tasks for ONUCI. The Council asked ONUCI to provide security of the operations of identification of the population and registration of voters, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment. In addition of this task, ONUCI had to assist in formulating a plan on the restructuring of the Defence and Security Forces and in preparing possible seminars on security sector reform to be organised by the African Union and ECOWAS. A final third task was the monitoring of the Ivorian mass media, in particular with regard to any incidents of incitement by the media to hatred, intolerance and violence (UNSC, 2007a).

At the insistence of France, the UNSC strengthened the position of the Prime Minister Mr Charles Konan Banny as a counterbalance to the president, as we know, the president Laurent Gbagbo was furious about such insistence and accused France of neo-imperialism. President Laurent Gbagbo called a direct dialogue with Soro Guillaume Secretary of Forces Nouvelles, which resulted into an OPA and the appointment of Guillaume Soro as a Prime Minister.

Following the signing of the OPA, the UNSC decided to further extend the mandate of UNOCI until January 2008 and at the same time terminate the mandate of the High Representative for the elections (CSNU, 2007b). The OPA gave new impetus to the peace process. Firstly, because it aimed at resolving the conflict through the unification of the Forces Nouvelles and the national defence and security forces through an integrated command centre. Secondly, the redeployment of the administration throughout the national territory, followed by the replacement of the *Zone de Confiance* by a “Green Line” marked by United Nations observation posts. The Agreement also provided for the dismantling of militias; the disarmament of combatants and their enrolment in civic service programmes; and the establishment of new institutions to carry out these tasks, including a new transitional government (CSNU, 2007c).

Unlike the other peace agreements, the OPA placed a little more emphasis on the reunification of the country, which has been divided in two since September 2002, and on the pacification of the country. It should also be pointed out that the OPA has been amended four times to adapt to the changing situation in Côte d’Ivoire. In a fourth supplementary agreement, the signatories of the OPA emphasised the importance of national reunification over the holding of presidential elections. It somewhat took UNOCI by surprise, which until then had focused on the organisation of the elections (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2012).

It should be noted that the OPA contributed significantly to the easing of relations between the parties to the conflict. Thus, President Gbagbo paid a three-day visit to the north of the country from 28 to 30 November 2007, including to Ferkessédougou, the Prime Minister’s hometown (UNSC, 2008a). But it must be acknowledged that there have been delays in the implementation of the agreement concerning the adoption of some essential legal instruments. Also, it was a delay at the beginning of important operations such as mobile court hearings, the electoral registration process, dismantling of armed militia and the deployment of the administration throughout the national territory (UNSC, 2007d). This delay in the implementation of the OPA could easily also be explained by the complexity of the operations involved and the high cost triggered by the bad faith of both parties. Additionally, the

implementation of this agreement faced several challenges inherent in the very nature of the crisis and which were mainly tied to the financing of the operations.

Even with some difficulties to be implemented, the OPA made it possible to establish a new framework for peace and reconciliation between the two warring parties. Nonetheless, a report of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire appointed by the Security Council according to resolution 1727 (2006) pointed out that the activities of the Group of Experts were hindered by the reticence of some Ivorian stakeholders who questioned the need for a mission to verify the implementation of the Security Council embargo. The OPA prompted the UN Secretary-General to establish a new series of benchmarks for UNOCI's withdrawal: (a) DDR and dismantling of militias; (b) holding presidential elections in November 2009; (c) restoring state authority throughout the country; (d) starting a nation-wide security sector reform process (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2012).

The OPA replaced the LMA, which had serious difficulties to be implemented. The OPA became the basis on which the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire had to be built. It is important to recall that this agreement was the result of direct negotiations between the parties to the conflict. It effectively ruled out the participation of the former colonial power. Furthermore, this agreement recognised the legitimacy of Blaise Compaoré as the Chairman of ECOWAS. This negotiation based on legitimacy surpassed that based on capacity.

The Security Council gave its approval for the implementation of these agreements and thus modified UNOCI's mandate to better adapt to the new agreements. The Ivorian leaders' continued commitment to take the lead in restoring peace to their country was a key factor for effective implementation of the OPA. Particular attention should be paid to addressing the outstanding political and military issues that are linked closely to the performance of other key aspects of the Agreement to turn the peace process irreversible. In addition, it was also essential to develop pragmatic arrangements between the national stakeholders and their international partners in the context of a new partnership for peace.

The OPA, unlike the LMA, led to a fundamental change in the political situation in Côte d'Ivoire. It contributed to a general calming of the political and social environment, and it made it possible to reunify the country by removing the *zone de confiance* and redeploying the administration throughout the national territory (UNSC, 2007e). Despite the progress made towards normalisation in Côte d'Ivoire, and despite the enormous difficulties encountered, the representative of France to the United Nations expressed dissatisfaction with the progress made. He underscored this by saying: "But this progress is not enough. [...] This is worrying. Admittedly, no date is set in stone, but there has to be a clear and irreversible prospect of open,

free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections, in accordance with international standards.” (UNSC, 2007e)

France seemed more concerned about the organisation of the elections than about resolving the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. Its representative at the United Nations said: “In the very short term, however, as the Minister observed, priority must be given to the process of population identification.” (UNSC, 2007e). Long-term priority should be given to the identification process in Côte d’Ivoire. As a reminder, the problem of documents, specifically the certificate of nationality and the identity card, was an aggravating factor in the Ivorian crisis. Was the priority, therefore, the organisation of elections following international standards or the resolution of the underlying problems in Côte d’Ivoire?

The Representative of South Africa at UN, Mr Kumalo stressed that the OPA led the Ivorian parties, with the assistance of their neighbours, particularly President Compaoré of Burkina Faso, to reach an agreement and create ownership for resolving an issue that had baffled the international community for many years (UNSC, 2007e). Also, the Secretary-General described the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement as a “unique turning point” and an “Ownership of the peace process”, in the Ivorian peace process (UNSC, 2007e). It meant that the responsibility led upon the Ivorian parties to implement the OPA in full and in good faith. As the UN Secretary-General stressed, “The positive political atmosphere that prevailed in Côte d’Ivoire since the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement allowed the Ivorian parties to make concrete progress towards its implementation.” (UNSC, 2007f, para. 59). Chinese Representative called The United Nations to strengthen its coordination with regional and subregional organisations, including the African Union and the ECOWAS and to continue to provide necessary assistance to Côte d’Ivoire.

The representative of Côte d’Ivoire, Mr Djédjé also regretted the fact that, eight months after the signing of the OPA, none of its recommendations on lifting individual sanctions and easing the arms embargo had been implemented. “On the contrary, an anachronistic draft resolution calling for the extension of sanctions for another year is being circulated, [...] The war is over in Côte d’Ivoire” he said (UNSC, 2007e). Mr Djédjé remembered that noting that the context that led to the adoption of sanctions had wholly changed. And the draft resolutions on his country had been initiated by the French delegation and recalling that peace had come from the sons and daughters of Côte d’Ivoire with the facilitation of a Head of State of the subregion and the support of all Africa. Mr Djédjé suggested that the initiative for the draft resolutions on Côte d’Ivoire should now be left to the three African members of the Security Council. “Why is France attacking Côte d’Ivoire and

some of its political actors?” he asked himself. “Is the aim to punish them?” He questioned himself. The ECOWAS and the African Union, which had initiated sanctions in 2004, were now calling for them to be lifted (UNSC, 2007e).

In his report, Ban Ki-moon considered that the overall security situation in Côte d’Ivoire “continued to improve, thanks mainly to the favourable political climate created by the Ouagadougou Agreement” (UNSC, 2008f). In a text submitted by France, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1795 (2008), which extended the mandates of UNOCI and the French forces supporting it until 30 July 2008. The purpose of the extension was to assist in the organisation of free, open, fair and transparent elections in Côte d’Ivoire within the time frame provided for in the Ouagadougou Political Agreement and the Supplementary Agreements of 28 November 2007 (UNSC, 2008g). In its resolution 1826(2008) UNSC decided to extend the mandates of the UNOCI and French forces supporting it until 31 January 2009 to assist in the organisation of free, open, fair and transparent elections in Côte d’Ivoire. The Ivorian authorities announced the holding of the first round of the presidential elections for 30 November 2008. Once again, the focus was upon the organisation of elections and downgraded DDR and the implementation of the OPA.

The Secretary-General Special Representative in Côte d’Ivoire Mr Young-Jin Choi in his report related for the first time that the delays in the process were solely due to bureaucratic and logistical aspects and not political ones (CSNU, 2008c). It proved that the OPA had the effect of relaxing relations between the parties to the conflict. For the record, on 15 November 2004, in response to the resumption of hostilities in Côte d’Ivoire, the Security Council adopted resolution 1572 imposing an embargo on arms, military equipment and any form of assistance, advice or training related to military activities for that country. The embargo, which was initially imposed for 13 months, has been periodically renewed since 2004. With the same resolution, the Security Council had decided to impose sanctions against persons who constituted a threat to the peace and national reconciliation process in Côte d’Ivoire, who committed serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Côte d’Ivoire, who publicly incited hatred and violence, and who violated the arms embargo. The Security Council, in its resolution 1842(2008) decided to extend these sanctions until October 2009 (UNSC, 2008d).

Because of the technical and logistical difficulties in the identification and voter card issuance process, the election initially scheduled for the end of November 2008 was postponed to a later date. The Security Council expressed its deep concern about this third consecutive delay since the signature of the OPA, which could put at risk the entire Ivorian peace process.

It, therefore, urged the president of the Independent Electoral Commission to share this new timeline, including, in particular, the full rollout of the identification process and some other stages such as the publication of the provisional and final versions of the electoral list, the fabrication and distribution of the identity and voter's cards and the date of the presidential election publicly (UNSC, 2008e). The pressure was always put on the parties to the conflicts to organise the elections even if conditions such as DDR and the dismantling of militias were not met. Has the multidimensional mission been transformed into a mission for an organisation of elections in Côte d'Ivoire? So, would the objective be to have short-term results as opposed to long-term effects? The organisation of the elections and the post-election period demonstrate that the strategy adopted by the Security Council under constant pressure from France and its allies had drawbacks in Ivorian crisis.

Mr Choi recognised three pressing issues for Côte d'Ivoire: identification of the population, disarmament and the elections and those three issues had direct and decisive impact on Côte d'Ivoire's future and even on a possible exit strategy for UNOCI. Indeed, he stressed that the signing of the fourth supplementary agreement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement was crucial to the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire. With this complementary agreement, the major decision was to postpone the presidential election initially planned for 30 November 2008 and to announce that the new date could be set according to the progress made in identifying the population. Mr Choi argued such decision was both understandable and intriguing. It was natural in the light of the historical importance of identification for the Ivorian people and intriguing because, for the first time since the signing of the OPA in March 2007, the Ivorian people and the international community have neither a date nor a period for the elections (UNSC, 2009a).

In its Resolution 1865 (2009), the UNSC decided to reduce the authorised military strength from 8,115 to 7,450 while continuing to contribute to the provision of security for the peace process, including support for the DDR program and the disarmament and dismantling of militias, as well as for the electoral process, and to provide technical and logistical support to the Independent Electoral Commission for the preparation and conduct of the elections (UNSC, 2009b).

In his report S/2010/245, the Secretary-General of the United Nations indicated that the identification and voter registration operations, which were officially completed in November 2009, allowed the establishment of a provisional electoral list of some 5.3 million persons confirmed by technical operators – the so-called “whitelist” – and some 1,030,000 persons who have not yet been approved – the “grey list” (UNSC, 2010a). However, in early



January, it was reported that a separate parallel list of some 429,000 people had been produced by the Chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission, Mr Robert Beugré Mambé, outside the framework of established procedures (UNSC, 2010a). This list has been controversial within the Ivorian political class, and Mr Mambé has been asked to resign. Faced with the latter's refusal to leave, President Laurent Gbagbo, therefore, dissolved the government and the Independent Electoral Commission.

At the same time, the ruling party had requested the courts in many areas in central Côte d'Ivoire to purge from the provisional voters' list those who did not meet the requirements, and such a decision led to political tensions. These requests triggered violent protests in several parts of the country, including Abidjan, where one protester was killed on 22 February, Gagnoa, where at least five people were killed on 19 February, and Daloa, where three people were killed on 22 February. On 20 February, mobs raided the prefecture in the Forces Nouvelles controlled town of Bouaké, destroying civil registers and burning six vehicles and 30 computers recently provided by the World Bank (UNSC, 2010a). President Gbagbo and the ruling party considered that the security situation in the north of the country would not allow for a free election campaign and free and fair elections. Opposition parties accused the ruling party and the President, alias the "*boulangier*"<sup>81</sup>, of using the fourth Ouagadougou Agreement as a pretext to delay the elections indefinitely (UNSC, 2010a).

Months after the signing of the OPA fourth supplementary agreement, the protagonists of the OPA have been focusing on the reunification issue. As a result, the electoral process has been struggling with a slower pace, which has resulted in further delays. Mr Choi so recognised that the progress in the electoral process was contingent upon the evolution of the reunification issue. He also stressed that a complicated and mixed picture of the Ivorian political and electoral map required some hard thinking on their part. "It is now necessary for us to focus our attention both on progress in the elections process and on the negotiations on reunification," (UNSC, 2009c) he said. He also claimed, "Now that the electoral process is predicated on the reunification issue, we may have to engage in some deep reflection on the Ivorian reunification problem, to make some meaningful contribution to the reunification of the country and, by extension, accelerating the electoral process." (UNSC, 2009c) The reunification of the country shall be a critical point for the organisation of free, fair and transparent elections. The establishment of a reliable electoral list is a condition sine qua non for these elections. The

---

<sup>81</sup>This name was given to President Gbagbo by his opponents because of his ability to roll his adversaries in flour and taking advantage of the situation, thus succeeding in extending his mandate beyond what was constitutionally foreseen.

efforts, then should be concentrated to encourage the warring parties to step toward the crisis without pressure.

In a communiqué dated on 18 May 2009 of the Permanent Consultative Framework of the OPA, a comprehensive electoral time frame scheduled the first round of the presidential election in Côte d'Ivoire on 29 November 2009. And the most important thing was that all the main Ivorian political actors had endorsed the time frame. However, four critical reunification related issues are to be accomplished at least before the election. First, the transfer of authority from zone commanders to préfets. Second, the centralisation of the treasury. Third, the profiling of Forces Nouvelles for integration into the army, police, gendarmerie and as ex-combatants. Finally, their reintegration as well as payment. Besides, non-political challenges, such as the technical, managerial and planning aspects of the electoral process, were rapidly emerging as the major impediments to respecting the 29 November deadline (UNSC, 2009d).

Further, Mr Djédjé, Representative of Côte d'Ivoire at the UN said "[...] It is during this stage, when the process is nearing completion, that there have been some attacks on the peace process and the institutions in Côte d'Ivoire. My delegation is referring to the recent statements by French personalities who made unfair and unjustified remarks against the Ivorian authorities and the ongoing process" (UNSC, 2009d). Such a statement shows that there was an open war between French and Ivorian Authorities. A war, which during years undermined the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire. Mr Djédjé finally added:

My delegation would not have dwelt on these remarks had it not been for the fact that they come from a Power which holds a special status in the settlement of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. No one can claim to be unaware that France has troops supporting United Nations peacekeepers in Côte d'Ivoire, that France is a permanent member of the Security Council, that France initiates draft resolutions on Côte d'Ivoire, and that France is therefore not just anybody in the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire. This heavy responsibility, as well as the influence and impact that French attitudes and comments can have in Côte d'Ivoire, should be a reason for a greater sense of restraint and responsibility on France's part (UNSC, 2009d).

The France statement was then awaited. The Representative of France, Mr Lacroix, for his part, stated:

[...] We did not intend to speak at this meeting, but the comments made by Mr Djédjé, as Council members can well understand, came as some surprise to the French delegation. [...] The French authorities are committed to ensuring a successful end to the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, which is, in point of fact, a country that is close to us and with which we have very close ties. I do not understand what is behind the comments that have been made, but in any event, if they can be interpreted to mean that France is distancing itself from the objectives of the Security Council, I wish to state most emphatically that we do not agree with such an interpretation. (UNSC, 2009d)

In the aftermath, an umpteenth resolution presented by France was unanimously adopted by the Security Council under the number 1880 (2009) and 1893 (2009). These resolutions maintained sanctions against some people close to the president. They announced sanctions against any person who hinders the peace process and those who commit crimes against women and children. Following this resolution and according to Mr Djédjé, the fact that identical resolutions followed one another since 2004, while the situation was improving in Côte d'Ivoire, show the anachronistic nature of the decision to maintain the sanctions regime for yet another year.

By way of conclusion, I would like to point out that given the obstacles that my government notes at the level of the Security Council, Côte d'Ivoire will now undertake steps at the level of the Economic Community of West African States to implement the provisions of the Ouagadougou Agreement, namely the immediate lifting of sanctions against individuals and the lifting of the arms embargo three months after the presidential elections. Similar steps will also be undertaken at the level of the African Union, (UNSC, 2009e) he said

Despite some efforts, the DDR programme stalled, State authority was not re-established throughout the country, the definitive electoral list was not published, crime and banditry remained, and military equipment continued to flow into the country in violation of the United Nations arms embargo. The presidential election was once again postponed and scheduled to late February 2010. The Security Council noted with concern the postponement of the first round of the presidential election, scheduled for 29 November 2009. This new postponement was mostly due to the fact that a reliable and definitive list had not been established. The Ivorians were undoubtedly eager to go to the elections but not to any poll, in particular not an election that would bring them back to square one, that is to say, another conflict.

Another draft resolution proposed by France was adopted unanimously under the number 1911(2010). This resolution urged the relevant Ivorian stakeholders to ensure the publication of the final voters' list and to announce the official date of the first round of the presidential election and to meet their commitments in full. The resolution also renewed UNOCI mandate until 31 May 2010, in particular, to support the organisation in Côte d'Ivoire of free, fair open and transparent elections (UNSC, 2010b). It should be noted that the production of the parallel electoral list by the former Independent Electoral Commission Chairman, Mr Mambé, resulted in a serious weakening of the electoral momentum. Mr Mambé, a member of one of the opposition parties, had fraudulently registered more than 429,000 people

on the electoral list. This figure represents nearly 8 per cent of the electorate. “Besides the issue of the electoral list, there remains a further significant challenge to credible elections – the challenge of disarmament and reunification.” (UNSC, 2010c) Mr Djédjé said.

The OPA fourth amendment provided for the reunification of the country, DDR and the establishment of a reliable voters’ list to hold fair, free and transparent elections. Unfortunately, the Security Council, under the leadership of France, focused a little too much on the electoral issue than on other matters equally essential to the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire. The pairing in March 2010 of reunification and elections emerged as the governing dynamic of Ivorian politics, producing, unfortunately, a political impasse, which proved to be as complicated as it is delicate. This impasse emerged because the three major protagonists of the Ivorian crisis were at that moment dealing with their core interests. As Mr Choi noted, “The presidential camp wants reunification before elections; the opposition wants elections before reunification, and the Forces Nouvelles wants identification before reunification.” (UNSC, 2010d)

After years of prevarication, the signing of several peace agreements, violations of these agreements, clashes and several postponements of the presidential elections, the date of 31 October 2010 was set as the effective date of the first round of the presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire. Following discussions in the Council of Ministers and a proposal by the Independent Electoral Commission, Prime Minister Soro announced that the first round of presidential elections would be held on 31 October 2010. The Commission also indicated that it would announce the provisional results of the first round by 3 November and that the Constitutional Council would confirm the final results of the first round of the presidential elections on 10 November. The timetable published by the Independent Electoral Commission also foresees a possible second round of presidential elections on 28 November 2010 (UNSC, 2010e).

#### 4.3.2 The 2010 presidential elections

*“La paix n’est pas un mot, c’est un comportement”*

Felix Houphouët-Boigny

*“La paix a été un trésor pour la Côte d’Ivoire,  
il faut nécessairement consolider cette paix.”*

Alassane Dramane Ouattara

*“Le message à lancer ici, c'est d'abord la paix (...)  
Nous continuerons de construire la paix.”*  
Laurent Gbagbo

The official campaign for the first round of the presidential election in Côte d'Ivoire was launched on 15 October 2010. This first round of presidential elections had three big favourites, Laurent Gbagbo of *La Majorité Présidentielle* (LMP) the outgoing president, Alassane Dramane Ouattara “ADO” of the *Rassemblement des Républicains* (RDR) and Henri Konan Bédié “HKB” of the *Partie Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI) former single party. At the invitation of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and the Independent Electoral Commission (EIC), the European Union established an Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) for the two rounds of the presidential elections on 31 October and 28 November 2010. It was led by Chief Observer (CO) Cristian PREDA, Member of the European Parliament (EU, 2010).

With the assistance of UNOCI and the United Nations country team, the Independent Electoral Commission managed to resolve logistical problems in the weeks leading up to the vote. UNOCI and the United Nations country team also assisted the Commission in the delivery of other electoral materials to the 415 local electoral commissions (UNSC, 2010f). Observers were sent by, among others, the African Union, ECOWAS, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), the European Union, the *Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie* (OIF), the Carter Center and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, as well as the diplomatic missions of Japan and the United States of America (UNSC, 2010f).

A total of 14 candidates for the 31 October elections had their candidacy validated by the Constitutional Council after examination of supporting documents and payment of a deposit. Among these candidates, there was only one woman, an independent candidate. The first-round campaign was generally calm. Only a few tampering with election posters, isolated and minor clashes between militants were observed (EU, 2010). According to the decision of the Constitutional Council N° CI 2010/EP032 of 6 November 2010, the final rate of participation in the first round of the presidential election was 83.67% (CÔTE D'IVOIRE, 2010).

After the general census of the ballot of 31 October 2010, the Independent Electoral Commission proceeded to the provisional proclamation of the following results: registered voters, 5,784,490; voters, 4,843,445; participation rate, 83.73%; invalid votes: 225,624; votes cast, 4,617,82. The following candidates came first, second and third: Gbagbo Laurent: 1,756,504 with 38.04%; Ouattara Alassane: 1,481,091 with 32.07%; and Bédié Konan Aimé Henri: 1,165,532 with 25.24% (CÔTE D'IVOIRE, 2010).

Given that the second round opposes the first two candidates from the first round, Laurent Gbagbo's challenger was Alassane Ouattara. In this configuration, the PDCI, which came in third place, was therefore in the position of "kingmaker". If the first round's presidential campaign went smoothly, we could not say the same for the second round. Indeed, it was marked by a radicalisation of positions and a very noticeable hardening of exchanges, causing violence and intimidation on the part of militants.

While the second round of the election went smoothly, according to reports from peacekeepers and observers, despite some intimidation and occasional violence, the announcement of the results set Côte d'Ivoire on fire. The IEC was unable to agree on the results to be announced. The presidential camp, which did not have the majority in the IEC, disputed the work of compiling the results. This dispute within the IEC culminated on 30 November when Laurent Gbagbo's representative snatched from the hands of the IEC spokesman the results, he wanted to announce to the press (BIGOT, 2016).

Faced with this imbroglio, the president of the IEC took it upon himself to proclaim the provisional results, outside the three-day deadline set by the electoral law. However, the announcement was not made at the headquarters of the IEC, but at the Hotel du Golf, the headquarters of Alassane Ouattara, because in the meantime UNOCI had refused to allow its installations for that. Alassane Ouattara was declared the winner with a lead of 376,000 votes (BIGOT, 2016). According to the IEC, Mr Ouattara received 54.1% of the votes. His opponent, outgoing President Laurent Gbagbo, received 45.9% of the votes in the second round (JOURNAL LE MONDE AFRIQUE, 2010)

For its part, the Constitutional Council<sup>82</sup>, having taken up the matter since the IEC was out of time, hastily annulled the votes of seven departments of the Centre-North-West zone and proclaimed Laurent Gbagbo the winner of the election with 51,45%<sup>83</sup>. The president of the Constitutional Council, Paul Yao N'Dra, said that the results communicated on Thursday by the Electoral Commission were not valid<sup>84</sup>. The Constitutional Council had annulled some 600,000 votes because of some apparent irregularities. Indeed, the outgoing president, Laurent

---

<sup>82</sup>Under the Ivoirian constitution, the Constitutional Council is charged with judging the legality of national presidential and legislative nominations and elections and with determining the final results of the presidential elections, including by deciding the outcome in cases of disputes pertaining to the outcome of such elections, among other duties.

<sup>83</sup>The Council's decision allocated 2.05 million votes to Gbagbo (52,518 more votes than he had garnered during the first round), while it awarded Ouattara 1.94 million votes (544,492 fewer votes than he had won during the first round). The Council's cancelled 597,010 votes and all of the annulled districts were located in major population zones of in northern Côte d'Ivoire. To justify these cancellations, the Constitutional Council stated that it had more voters than registered persons in the said areas.

<sup>84</sup>Cf The Council's decision

Gbagbo, had filed a complaint about fraud in the departments under rebel influence. In the aftermath, Choi Young-Jin, the representative of the UN Secretary-General in Abidjan, certified his own results and declared Alassane Ouattara, the winner with different numbers from those of the IEC and the Constitutional Council.

However, UNOCI certified the election even though its representatives were present in only 721 polling stations out of a total of 20,073, or 3.6% of the polling stations. Choi Young-jin states in his book, *Au coeur de la crise ivoirienne* (2015), that his teams certified all the minutes. But they can only guarantee the authenticity of a small number of them (BIGOT, 2016). “*The result of my method of certification was clear: there was a single winner, by an irrefutable margin,*” (CSNU, 2010g) said the Special Representative. He also added that “*ignoring the will of the Ivorian people would be tantamount to abandoning it and would be a waste of the significant resources invested over the past eight years*” in the country by the international community (CSNU, 2010g).

Laurent Bigot<sup>85</sup> (2016) stated that “*there were good reasons to take the time to recount as no one was within a few weeks of waiting five years. Yet France was stubbornly opposed to any recount*” (BIGOT, 2016). Laurent Gbagbo for his part said during his trial at the International Criminal Court “[...] And so when I asked for a recount, it wasn’t an empty phrase. You’ve seen for yourself the documents that the prosecution has and on which the votes of the voters are recorded. We have seen that in the city of Bouaké alone, they added 100,000 votes to my opponent [...]” (GBAGBO, MATTEI, 2018, p 112-113, our translation)<sup>86</sup>. Despite Mr Alassane Ouattara’s called to respect the results of the IEC and his promise to form a government of unity including all political forces, Côte d’Ivoire slid into a series of post-election violence. The first outbreak of violence erupted with the attack on an office of candidate Alassane Ouattara in Abidjan, which caused the death of several people. The death toll of this attack on an RDR office in the famous district of Yopougon was between four and eight people. The next day, the local headquarters of the FPI, the party of outgoing President Laurent Gbagbo, located 300 meters from the RDR headquarters in Yopougon, was also attacked, leaving two injured, according to one of its leaders, Lazare Zaba Zadi (JOURNAL LE MONDE AFRIQUE, 2010).

---

<sup>85</sup>Laurent Bigot is a former French diplomat turned freelance consultant. In 2010, he was deputy director for West Africa at the Quai d’Orsay.

<sup>86</sup>GBAGBO, L.; MATTEI, F. p 112-113 « Et donc, quand j’ai demandé un recomptage, ce n’était pas une phrase vide de sens. Vous avez vu par vous-même les documents dont dispose l’accusation et sur lesquels sont enregistrés les votes des électeurs. Nous avons vu que dans la seule ville de Bouaké, ils ont ajouté 100 000 voix à mon adversaire »

ECOWAS and the African Union decided to impose sanctions on Côte d'Ivoire. Including the suspension of Côte d'Ivoire from all Community decision-making bodies until further notice, and from all participation in all activities of the Union as long as the democratically elected president does not exercise the powers of the State. The UNSC in its resolution 1962 (2010) urged all Ivorian parties and actors to respect the will of the people and recognised Mr Alassane Dramane Ouattara as elected President of Côte d'Ivoire as proclaimed by the Independent Electoral Commission. Why was there so much certainty on the part of the UNSC about the results of an election that the Ivorians themselves who voted did not have? Was it not UNOCI's mission to certify the elections? Because of the reported frauds, why did it not conduct an investigation? From the beginning, all energies were focused on the organisation of the elections. Why did not they concentrate on the same energy in return to even recount the votes?

It should be noted that in Haiti, at the same time that Côte d'Ivoire was in the imbroglio, the Organisation of American States decided to recount the votes under pressure from the streets in the presidential election. There had been fraud and challenges to the results of the first round announced by the Provisional Electoral Commission. Faced with the inertia of the European Union and the United Nations, the demonstrators succeeded in obtaining this recount. After a new evaluation under the aegis of an international panel, the candidate Michel Martelly, who came in third place and was therefore eliminated in the first round, would finally join the second round. This singer finally won the second round with almost 68 per cent of the votes (GBAGBO; MATTEI, 2018). On 3 October 2013, during the 12th congress of his party the PDCI, Henri Konan Bédié said:

Following the first round of the 2010 presidential election, it is worth remembering that the rank I held was not mine! Despite the poor organisation of the leadership of my campaign, I was able to note, with proof, that I had been robbed of at least 600,000 votes and I informed various chancelleries, including UNOCI, the Constitutional Council and the Independent Electoral Commission which were seized by me. (GBAGBO; MATTEI, 2018, p 131, our translation)<sup>87</sup>.

If we go back to our little primary school calculations, we will realise that with the voices that Henri Konan Bédié claimed to have been stolen, Alassane Ouattara would not be in the second round. We recall that in the first round HKB had obtained 1,165,532 votes (25.24%),

---

<sup>87</sup>GBAGBO, L.; MATTEI, F. p 131 « Après le premier tour de l'élection présidentielle de 2010, il est bon de rappeler que le rang que j'occupais n'était pas le mien ! Malgré la mauvaise organisation de la direction de ma campagne, j'ai pu constater, preuves à l'appui, qu'on m'avait volé au moins 600 000 voix et j'ai informé diverses chancelleries, dont l'ONUCI, le Conseil constitutionnel et la Commission électorale indépendante qui ont été saisies par moi »



ADO 1,481,092 votes (32.07%), and Laurent Gbagbo 1,756,504 votes (38.04%). However, HKB has not lodged a formal protest with the Constitutional Council, and we cannot tell why. Laurent Gbagbo accused Sagem of manipulating the data. Sagem was the French technical operator in charge of the identification, of the population. Nonetheless, this agreement between the Ivorian government and Sagem had been signed by the Gbagbo government.

Another highlight of the second round of the presidential election was that some African Union observers were threatened and blocked by the dissidents in north Côte d'Ivoire and were therefore unable to carry out their mission. Indeed, on 30 November 2010, Mr Joseph Koffigoh at the head of African Union observation mission thanked UNOCI for releasing two of his observers. He said:

The mission noted with regret serious acts of violence including loss of life, physical harm, kidnapping, intimidation and attempted kidnapping. In addition, the mission deplores the late opening of some polling stations, the lack of stickers in some polling stations and the relatively harsh climate around the polling stations. Finally, the mission deplores the kidnapping of two of its observers and thanks to the UNOCI staff for the successful and timely conclusion of the operation. (GBAGBO, L.; MATTEI, 2018, p 134, our translation)<sup>88</sup>

During the second round, there were several minutes with more voters than registrants. The IEC had meanwhile announced a 71 per cent turnout at the closing of polling stations. A few days later, however, when the same Commission announced the results, the participation had risen to 82 per cent. Mr Amadou Soumahouro, Vice-President of the IEC, said on the RTI: "We are close to 70 per cent. We are surprised that the participation rate is so high, contrary to what we thought yesterday Sunday. We were afraid that we would not even reach 60 per cent participation." (GBAGBO, L.; MATTEI, 2018, p 133)<sup>89</sup> The difference between these two rates of participation is about 400,000 votes. Why did UNOCI in charge of the certification of these elections not address these irregularities? Mr Choi, the Secretary-General Special Representative, announced 83 per cent turnout. For this second round, it was three different percentages. "I conducted my certification without taking into account the methods initiated and the results proclaimed by the IEC and the Constitutional Council," (JEUNE AFRIQUE,

---

<sup>88</sup>GBAGBO, L.; MATTEI, F. p. 134 « La mission a noté avec regret de graves actes de violence, notamment des pertes en vies humaines, des dommages physiques, des enlèvements, des intimidations et des tentatives d'enlèvement. En outre, la mission déplore l'ouverture tardive de certains bureaux de vote, le manque d'autocollants dans certains bureaux de vote et le climat relativement rude autour des bureaux de vote. Enfin, la mission déplore l'enlèvement de deux de ses observateurs et remercie le personnel de l'ONUCI pour la réussite et la rapidité de l'opération ».


<sup>89</sup>GBAGBO, L. ; MATTEI, F. p. 133 « Nous sommes proches de 70 %. Nous sommes surpris que le taux de participation soit aussi élevé, contrairement à ce que nous pensions hier dimanche. Nous avons peur de ne pas atteindre 60 % de participation »

2010, our translation)<sup>90</sup> he said. Côte d'Ivoire is the first country in Africa where the United Nations certified election results. On the same occasion, the UNSC decided to renew until 30 June 2011 the mandate of UNOCI (see UNOCI deployment in 2010, map 9), which would maintain its total authorised strength at 8,650 personnel, including a maximum of 7,200 troops and officers and 192 military observers, and a maximum of 1,250 police officers and eight seconded customs officers, as authorised by resolution 1933 (2010) (CSNU, 2010h).

The Council of the European Union also decided to impose sanctions on Mr Gbagbo and his entourage prohibiting them from residing in the territory of the Member States of the Union (LE CONSEIL DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE, 2010). The two candidates declared themselves winners and formed their respective governments. Laurent Gbagbo on his part was occupying the presidential palace as president, and Alassane Ouattara had his headquarters at Hotel du Golf as President of the Republic. President Laurent Gbagbo called for the withdrawal of UNOCI as well as France's Force Licorne. The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, however, refused to accede to Laurent Gbagbo's request. The situation within the country worsened, and the uncontrollable armed conflict between the two parts led to several deaths on both sides (AHOUANGAN, 2019).

In December 2010, security forces fired on demonstrators leaving at least eleven civilians dead, and many reports emerged of a broader pattern of killings and murders across the country (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2012). In Abidjan, President Alassane Ouattara was under UNOCI peacekeepers protection at the Hotel du Golf. Côte d'Ivoire has once again tipped over to the wrong side, and one wonders whether the organisation of the presidential election was the solution to the Ivorian crisis.

**Chart 7 - 2010 2nd round Presidential election results (%) in Côte d'Ivoire**



Source: Self elaboration

<sup>90</sup> « J'ai conduit ma certification sans tenir compte des méthodes initiées et des résultats proclamés par la CEI et le Conseil constitutionnel »

### Illustration 9 - UNOCI deployment in 2010



Map No. 4220 Rev. 30 UNITED NATIONS  
November 2010 (Colour)

Department of Field Support  
Cartographic Section

*Source: UNITED NATIONS, Department of Field Operations 2010.*

#### 4.4 Conclusion

UNOCI experience in Côte d'Ivoire highlighted complexities associated with contemporary peace operations. Complexity becomes even more significant when the mission is confronted with several external elements that prevent the smooth running of the mission. Especially when the context continually changes, and the mission is obliged to change its mandate as well to be able to have the capacity to accomplish its mission. It becomes even more complicated when the mission's ability to do its job is tied to the goodwill of the parties to the conflict, the resources provided by UN member states and its relationship with other operations that are not UN peacekeeping force.

UNOCI was in a problematic situation from the beginning of its mandate. Indeed, by creating its mission based on an agreement that was likely to fail because of its flawed basis, the UN fragilised the operation. Because on the LMA Gbagbo said: "Well, at Marcoussis France made me an armed opposition... with which I was asked to govern" (GBAGBO; MATTEI, 2018). International recognition and legitimacy had, therefore, been given to an armed dissident group attacking a democratically elected regime. Consequently, it raises the problem of the applicability of an agreement that gives rise to a peacekeeping mission. Indeed, the United Nations was not involved directly in the negotiations for the settlement of the Ivorian conflict. However, ONUCI endorsed the result of negotiation led by France because UN derogated this task to France.

The LMA struggled to be implemented, first because of spoilers and the ambiguous France position in the Ivorian crisis. And second, due to the content of LMA. From there, ONUCI was between legitimisation and criticism. The mandate of the mission evolved during these years but, really, it did not appear clear. The line between state building, state fixing, and peacebuilding has never been clearly delimited. During its first period mandate, ONUCI actions raised many questions at national and international level underlying many dissatisfactions around 21<sup>st</sup> century peace mission.

UNOCI and the Licorne Force were deployed based on the consent of the Ivorian Government. But when President Laurent asked the United Nations to intervene, he expected maybe that UNOCI would be impartial as stipulated in the mission road map. Here again two other problems are raised: the consent of the government and the freedom of action of UNOCI. Concerning consent, which is the cornerstone of any peacekeeping operation, the issue was not an issue since Gbagbo had appealed to the UNSC. However, does the host country renounce to its consent during a mission? Should a host country contest a presence of former coloniser troop

on its territory when this troop is going beyond its prerogatives? About UNOCI's freedom of action, throughout the crisis, we noted that "France repeatedly intervened as a peace-broker, peacekeeper and peace-enforcer." (WYSS, 2014). Several observers, therefore, wondered whether this was a UN mission or a French operation. The French presence and involvement in the crisis were therefore controversial and contradictory.

Meanwhile, regional organizations such as ECOWAS and the AU were either being side-lined or spreading their inability to manage crises at the regional level. From time to time they were consulted to legitimise some actions on the part of UNOCI and the Force Licorne. For a long time, it was believed that the Ivorian problem would be solved by organising elections. But holding an election is not exactly a simple matter in Africa. UNOCI, in anticipation of a possible election-related crisis, was provided with election certification by UNSCR 1765 (2007). The SRSG has elaborated a five-criteria framework for certifying all stages of the electoral process. However, several studies have shown that "the risk of elections contributing to the flare-up of conflict is higher when they are held in post-conflict situations, characterised as they are by mutual distrust [...] Elections cannot settle a military conflict that negotiations or victory have failed to end" (SIDIBE, 2013, p 4).

Was this certification relevant to UNOCI's mandate? Which we know for sure, the SRSG pronounced Ouattara the winner of the 2010 presidential elections with different figures from those of the IEC and the CC. Yet Gbagbo had proposed a recount of the votes, rejected by Young-jin Choi, the UN SRSG in Côte d'Ivoire, who said he had already counted three times. Shortly afterwards, on the order of UNOCI, all the ballot papers and all the documents relating to the vote were destroyed (GBAGBO; MATTEI, 2018). With Gbagbo and Ouattara winning on their respective sides, the situation escalated, and UNOCI was given a robust mandate to carry out its mission. In 2011, the crisis achieved its peak, and the country sank into unprecedented violence.

## 5 UNOCI AFTER THE 2010'S ELECTION

The results of the 2010 elections gave rise to disputes between the two candidates in contention. It plunged the country into an unprecedented situation with two Heads of State. This state of affairs degenerated and gave free rein to deadly confrontations.

### 5.1 The Ivorian Civil War and the end of UNOCI's mission

Since the UNOCI was created in 2004, it was the first time it was confronted with a highly complex situation because Côte d'Ivoire was facing an imminent threat caused by the prospect of renewed civil war. The fact was that there was a consensus within UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, France, USA which recognised Alassane Ouattara as a president democratically elected. Supporting the view of his Special Representative for Côte d'Ivoire, the Secretary-General urged the Council to strengthen UNOCI by requesting the deployment of Ukrainian helicopters (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2012).

Through its decision to make a political point about the election result, the Council wanted to avoid any power-sharing agreement such as those negotiated in the wake of disputed elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe (MCGOVERN, 2011). This election should be an historical moment – that of a presidential election open to all candidates since the independence of Côte d'Ivoire. After years of postponement, the first and second-round elections were expected to open a new page in Côte d'Ivoire's history (SEELow, 2010). But as always, the announced elephant arrived with both legs broken.

On 4 December, Laurent Gbagbo sworn in as president of Côte d'Ivoire, while Alassane Ouattara, confined to the Hôtel du Golf, did the same. It was thus the preamble to a new political crisis that degenerated, in four months, into armed conflict (SEELow, 2011).

#### 5.1.1 The post-electoral crisis of 2011: a hymn to decadence

The first strategy adopted by the Gbagbo camp was to try to weaken the UNOCI mission. Indeed, UNOCI was operating in an openly hostile environment and was subject to constant direct threats from regular and irregular forces loyal to Laurent Gbagbo. There were some specific threats to the Mission included logistical threats, such as the denial of customs

clearance of necessities at the port; instructions to vendors to not sell fuel and supplies to UNOCI and its personnel; and obstruction of the delivery of goods to UNOCI personnel and sites through, in particular, roadblocks (UNSC, 2011a).

In addition to the logistical blockage, crowds of Young Patriots and other elements loyal to “former” President Gbagbo physically obstructed UNOCI patrols and hampered the work of civilian personnel. Besides, there have been reports of serious human rights violations, both in Abidjan and in other regions, particularly in the West of the country. Inter-ethnic tensions have also increased in Côte d’Ivoire. UNOCI was therefore obliged to reinforce its military and police elements in Abidjan by redeploying more troops and police from the North and East of the country. (UNSC, 2011a)

The UNSC decided to authorise the deployment of 2,000 additional troops to UNOCI until 30 June 2011 and the temporary redeployment of UNMIL to UNOCI, including the temporary reassignment from UNMIL to UNOCI of three infantry companies and an aviation unit consisting of two military transport helicopters (UNSC, 2011b). Facing the repeated attacks and threats against UNOCI, the UNSC decided to assume its responsibility to protect the mission’s personnel to the best of its ability. Beyond the protection of its staff, the UNSC wanted above all to protect the Ivorian population against the abuses of the parties to the conflicts.

The battle between Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara was not only a military one, the two rivals also fought a fierce struggle financially. For example, on 24 January 2011, Alassane Ouattara ordered a halt to cocoa exports – the country is the world’s leading producer. This tactic aimed at financially strangling Gbagbo, who for his part took control of the purchase and export of cocoa on 8 March (GOUËSET, 2011). On 22 February Ouattara obtained the forced departure of the Ivorian governor of *Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest* (BCEAO), who was close to Laurent Gbagbo. Laurent Gbagbo then ordered the “requisition” of BCEAO’s agencies in Côte d’Ivoire, but Ouattara replied by announcing their “closure”. This strategy of asphyxiation ended up blocking the country’s financial system (GOUËSET, 2011).

On the military level, in late February, the *Forces Nouvelles* seized Zouan Hounien and Binhouye in the West of the country. On 17 March, Côte d’Ivoire security forces supposedly shelled a market in Abidjan, precisely in Abobo a pro-Ouattara part of the city. A statement from the UNOCI said that about hundred peoples were killed or maimed by at least six 81mm mortar shells (BBC NEWS, 2011a). The UNOCI indicated that “Such an act, perpetrated against civilians, could constitute a crime against humanity” (BBC NEWS, 2011a).

Many people have been obliged to flee clashes in Côte d'Ivoire's main cities, Abidjan and many from the Abobo district (see Map 10).


ECOWAS Assembly of Heads of State and Government due to the resurgence of violence and abuses against the population asked the Security Council: (a) to strengthen the mandate of UNOCI to enable it to use all necessary means to protect the population and property and to facilitate the immediate transfer of power to Mr Ouattara; (b) to take stronger international sanctions against Mr Gbagbo and his supporters (UNSC, 2011c). The post-electoral political violence escalation had resulted in at least 462 deaths by 25 March and likely many more (COOK, 2011). The *Forces Nouvelles* renamed *Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire* (FRCI) seized multiple towns in West, North, central and eastern Côte d'Ivoire after a massive offensive on 28 March 2011.

Forces associated with the FRCI massacred between 800 and 1,000 civilians in Duékoué's town (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2012). The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights spokesman Rupert Colville affirmed that more than 100 bodies had been found in the cities of Guiglo and Bolequin, Liberians mercenaries were thought responsible for the massacre (BBC NEWS, 2011b). However, both parties rejected the responsibilities on each other. On both sides, regionalism and ethnicity were used to perpetrate horrible and despicable crimes. In Abidjan, as in the rest of the country, pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara fought each other, leaving hundreds of dead and thousands displaced.

The French Embassy reported that heavy-weapon fire from pro-Gbagbo forces targeted the French ambassador's residence, which is near Mr Gbagbo's bunker in the compound of the presidential palace in Abidjan (BBC NEWS, 2011b). The balance of power between the two parties also opposed two former secretaries of the Student Federation of Côte d'Ivoire (FESCI), Soro Guillaume and Charles Blé Goudé. Charles Blé Goudé and his young patriots threatened several times to storm the Hôtel du Golf headquarters of President Ouattara, forcing UNOCI to progressively reinforce its military and formed police units in and around the hotel compound.



### Illustration 10 - Côte d'Ivoire Population Movements and violences



Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination Humanitarian Affairs 2011.

Guillaume Soro, who became Prime Minister of the Ouattara Government, called on President Ouattara's supporters to march on the premises of RTI in Abidjan to take control of it and, the following day, on the Prime Minister's Office. However, forces loyal to Mr Gbagbo caught them by surprise by sealing off the areas considered to be strongholds of President Ouattara, including Abobo, Adjamé, Koumassi and Treichville, thus preventing their inhabitants from taking part in the march. In the incidents that followed, at least 50 people were killed and more than 200 injured (UNSC, 2011d).

On 7 March, in Anonkoua-Kouté, the Ebrié ethnic group village, which is considered to be supporters of Mr Gbagbo, was attacked by armed individuals allegedly supporting the "invisible commandos", resulting in the displacement of most of the approximately 5,000 inhabitants of that locality on the periphery of Abidjan. On 11 March, in Abobo, eight civilians, including three children, were reportedly killed when elements of the forces loyal to Mr Gbagbo

fired heavy weapons, including tube grenades and mortars. On 15 March, unidentified persons threw a grenade into a densely populated area of the Attécoubé neighbourhood in Abidjan, killing one person and injuring at least eighteen. On 17 March, in Abobo, more than 25 people were killed and more than 40 wounded by mortar shells fired by forces loyal to Mr Gbagbo (UNSC, 2011d).

The UNSC, therefore voted unanimously Resolution 1975 (2011) (UNSC, 2011e). This resolution was not very special. It called on all parties to recognise Ouattara as president while condemning Laurent Gbagbo's refusal to negotiate a way out of the crisis. But the critical point of this resolution is that it reiterates UNOCI's mandate to use all necessary means to protect civilians and mainly to prevent the use of "heavy weapons" against civilian populations. The use of the term "heavy weapons" is unusual, especially when it refers to a mandate to protect civilians. Some would have seen the use of these terms as a strategy by France to justify the bombing of the Gbagbo residence that took place later.

At the time, UN Member States offered different interpretations of this authorisation, for example, the UK stated that the resolution reaffirmed and strengthened UNOCI's existing mandate to use military force to protect civilians. It already existed, and therefore it does not alter the robust mandate of UNOCI under which the operation is already authorised to use all necessary means to protect civilians. The new fact in this resolution is that UNOCI's have a role in protecting civilians and preventing the use of heavy weapons against them (UNSC, 2011f). Ms Susan Rice, the representative of the United States, welcomed "the unanimous adoption of a strong resolution" on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire. "We urge President Gbagbo to step down so that Mr Ouattara can begin to lead the country. [...] This resolution sends a strong signal that Mr Gbagbo and his supporters must reject violence and respect the will of the Ivorian people." (UNSC, 2011f) she said.

Mr Miguel Berger, the representative of Germany, regretted an increase in violence in Côte d'Ivoire, which was on the brink of civil war. He justified his vote by the fact that the Security Council was sending a strong signal to President Gbagbo to withdraw and encouraged the UNOCI to make full use of its mandate to protect civilians (UNSC, 2011f). Concerning Mr Philip Parham, representative of the United Kingdom, he said that the vote on the resolution and its adoption responded to an urgent situation that was continually deteriorating. Mr Parham recalled that the resolution expressly called for the removal of Laurent Gbagbo from power while strengthening measures to protect civilians. In this regard, he reaffirmed the essential role of the UNOCI, which must use all necessary means to protect the Ivorian civilian population (UNSC, 2011f).

Mr Nelson Messone, representing Gabon, said that Gabon had always sought a peaceful solution to the crises in Côte d'Ivoire, recalling his country's long-standing support for firmer measures against all those who hampered the peace process. It is imperative to protect the civilian population that explains Gabon's vote today, he continued. Finally, he reiterated that the measures contained in the resolution should aim at a comprehensive political outcome that would preserve peace and democracy in Côte d'Ivoire and promote national reconciliation (UNSC, 2011f). Ms Joy Ogwu of Nigeria said that the resolution had been drafted in the light of developments in Côte d'Ivoire, "particularly the humanitarian situation, which has been steadily worsening since 28 November." "The unthinkable is happening before our eyes," she said, referring to "the killings, rapes and indoctrination of young militiamen targeting civilians with heavy weapons." (UNSC, 2011f)

However, China and India were more cautious. They remembered that United Nations peacekeepers should draw their mandate from the relevant resolutions of the Security Council by avoiding being partial or instruments of regime change. UNOCI should also not get involved in a civil war but carry out its mandate with impartiality and while ensuring the safety and security of peacekeepers and civilians (UNSC, 2011f). Mr Hardeep Singh Puri India's Representative expressed his delegation's deep concern at the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, reiterating India's appeal to the parties to show the utmost restraint. He went on to state that peacekeepers should under no circumstances be used as an instrument of regime change in Côte d'Ivoire. The UNOCI must carry out its mandate impartially and not be a party to the fighting, he added, recalling that a UN Mission helicopter had come under fire two days ago. These shots came from troops of the "*Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire*", Mr Puri said. He then expressed concern that the resolution was adopted too quickly. Delegations should be given more time to consider and debate such a text. More time should be devoted to consultations, which would allow troop-contributing countries in particular to give their views on the use of their troops (UNSC, 2011f), the representative said.

Mr Baso Sangqu of South Africa, for his part, said that "only a political solution can be envisaged to restore national unity, which is the objective to be achieved to ensure long-term stability in Côte d'Ivoire". He then advocated the appointment of a High Representative by the African Union Commission "to find a way out of the crisis". Finally, he called on all parties to the crisis to respect the terms of the resolution adopted by the Security Council, "taking into account the will of all Ivorians" (UNSC, 2011f). The Chinese representative Mr Li Baodong called on the parties to the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire to put an end to the confrontation and violence "and to settle their differences through dialogue and negotiation". After commending

the “commendable” efforts of the African Union and ECOWAS to find a negotiated solution to the crisis, he recalled China’s view that “United Nations peacekeeping forces must apply the principle of neutrality”. “UNOCI must, therefore, avoid becoming a party to the Ivorian conflict or giving the impression of supporting one of the camps,” he stressed (UNSC, 2011f).

Mr Néstor Osorio from Colombia said that UNOCI must impartially protect civilians and respect for their fundamental rights in Côte d’Ivoire.

The sanctions we have just decided to impose must be applied, and the international community must guarantee their full implementation, [...] the need to find a political solution to the Ivorian crisis. [...] Any negotiated solution must first be based on the recognition of the results of the 2010 presidential election, he said (UNSC, 2011f).

Ms Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti Representative from Brazil stated that the increasing human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire were “an unacceptable consequence of the post-electoral crisis. [...] All parties must respect the authority of UNOCI to enable it to carry out its mandate impartially” (UNSC, 2011f). She concluded by noting that her country supported the mediation efforts of the African Union and all diplomatic parties working towards lasting reconciliation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNSC, 2011f).

Gbagbo’s stubborn refusal to leave the power after the presidential election, Ouattara’s supporters became exasperated, and the failure of international diplomats to resolve the crisis plunged Côte d’Ivoire in a post-electoral crisis without precedent. After the clashes at Duékoué that left more than 800 dead, pro-Ouattara forces launched offensives on Abidjan. The Chief of Staff, General Philippe Mangou, in charge of the pro-Gbagbo forces threw in the towel on 31 March 2011. He took refuge with his family at the residence of the South African ambassador in Abidjan.

On the same day, columns of FRCI all-terrain vehicles enter Abidjan, Ouattara declared a three-day curfew. Some FRCI soldiers were sent to the Hotel du Golf to ensure better security for its occupants. UNOCI took control of the airport following the departure of the Ivorian security forces. Abidjan, the city, nicknamed little Paris, has been transformed into a battlefield. It was the beginning of the battle known as the battle of Abidjan. Pro-Ouattara forces launched an assault on the fortified presidential residence, and a plume of smoke has been seen rising from the house, which is located on a peninsula in Abidjan’s lagoon (BBC NEWS, 2011d).

On 5 April 2011 intense negotiations took place between representatives of the Gbagbo and Ouattara camps without much success:

The negotiations that took place for hours the day before (Tuesday 5 April) between Laurent Gbagbo's entourage and the Ivorian authorities failed in the face of Laurent Gbagbo's intransigence, [...] "They were interrupted, and President Ouattara has decided to ask his armed forces, the FRCI to resume the offensive against the presidential reduction, which is underway right now in Abidjan, said the head of French diplomacy, Alain Juppé (RTS, 2011a).

The day before, i.e., on 4 April, the UN evacuated its civilian personnel and the French army, and UN helicopters attacked a military camp favourable to Gbagbo and destroyed much of its heavy weapons and weapons stockpiles. The justification was that they were responding to the repeated targeting of civilians and their peacekeepers by heavy weapons fire according to resolution 1975. The attack undermined the defence system of the forces loyal to Gbagbo, the leaders of his army called for a ceasefire, and many of his loyalists defected. More than four months after the start of a post-electoral crisis that degenerated into civil war, UNOCI and the former French colonial power targeted four sites that the forces of Alassane Ouattara, the internationally recognised president, had failed to take in recent days.

Once again, as in 2004, France put forward the pretext of attacking its nationals - in this case, the French Embassy in Abidjan - to justify shooting and bombing the presidential residence. In a report by the Swiss TV channel RTS, which clearly mentions "Côte d'Ivoire: the French army has fired on pro-Gbagbo at the request of the UN. A commitment backed by Washington, in order to definitively oust the outgoing president." (RTS, 2011b) According to this report, the France opened fire on the orders of the UN and therefore not to protect its citizens as the French authorities had announced.

RTI, which had ceased broadcasting since the FRCI offensive in Abidjan at the end of March, resumed broadcasting but claimed that President Gbagbo's regime was still in place and called on the population to mobilise in support of the outgoing president. During these years of crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, the press - newspapers, television - was used as an instrument of propaganda and incitement to ethnic and regional hatred. The UNSC had already condemned such actions several times in its various resolutions.

This war of information often gave rise to contradictory reports on both sides. For example, after the UN and the Force Licorne destroyed the Camp Gbagbo's heavy weapons, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy said that Gbagbo's forces had complete control of the Plateau and Cocody neighbourhoods, where his residence was located, and they were moving towards the Hotel du Golf with heavy weapons (L'EXPRESS, 2011). "As we speak, they could be very close to the Hotel du Golf" (L'EXPRESS, 2011), said Mr Alain Le Roy. However, Toussaint Alain, an adviser to the

outgoing president in Paris, denied this information, telling Reuters: “These are false allegations. The military capabilities of the Ivorian army were wiped out by the Licorne bombing this week.” (L’EXPRESS, 2011)

At this stage of the battle, i.e., 8 April 2011, of the ten communes of Abidjan, six were being secured by the FRCI, and three in the hands of pro-Gbagbo forces – Cocody, Plateaux and Yopougon – are the main battlegrounds. The commune of Abobo remained under the control of the *Commando Invisible*<sup>91</sup> despite the fighting. On 9 April 2011, it was announced that the *Hôtel du Golf*, Alassane Ouattara’s headquarters in Abidjan, was under attack by pro-Gbagbo forces. It is the first attack directly targeting the hotel where Ouattara and his government have been holed up for the past four months. The pro-Gbagbo fighters were only a few hundred meters from the hotel. The FRCI and peacekeepers returned fire and machine-gun, and mortar fire moved from the Hotel du Golf to the positions of the Po-Gbagbo forces (RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONALE, 2011a).

Meanwhile, UNOCI and the French force Licorne positioned themselves in the strategic port of Abidjan after the lifting of European sanctions, decided Friday, 8 April<sup>92</sup>. On 10 April 2011, heavy weapon fire resumed in the presidential palace district of Abidjan. The Plateau and Cocody neighbourhoods, controlled by forces loyal to Laurent Gbagbo, were the scene of violent fighting against pro-Ouattara forces. Helicopters from UNOCI and the French Licorne forces fired on tanks inside the presidential palace and in the vicinity of Laurent Gbagbo’s residence in the Cocody district (RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONALE, 2011a). During the night of 10-11 April, UNOCI and the French Force Licorne fired missiles at the presidential palace and destroyed any means of resistance by Gbagbo. On 11 April at about 1 p.m., Laurent Gbagbo and his wife were arrested in their bunker and taken to the Hotel du Golf

---

<sup>91</sup>The “commando invisible”, a mysterious armed group of five hundred men opposed to the forces loyal to Laurent Gbagbo and which had taken control of the Abobo district in northern Abidjan, appears in January 2011 in Abidjan during the post-election crisis and is led by Ibrahim Coulibaly alias IB one of the instigators of the rebellion of September 2002. But IB soon came into conflict with Guillaume Soro, and the clashes between IB and Soro supporters resulted in the latter’s victory. IB fled to France but, in August 2003, was arrested for attempted coup d’état before being released on bail the following month. In April 2011, after Laurent Gbagbo’s military defeat, President Alassane Ouattara summoned the “commando invisible” to lay down their arms now that the Gbagbo regime is no longer in power. IB then reportedly requested an audience with Ouattara without success, and failing to disarm, Ouattara’s forces went on the offensive against the rebel leader’s troops. On 27 April 2011, during these military operations, IB, who had, according to the FRCI, “taken a whole family in hostage” and “reacted with heavy fire”, was killed, which seems likely to be an execution.

<sup>92</sup>The European Union is lifting its sanctions against ports in Côte d’Ivoire. A response to Alassane Ouattara’s request to the EU the previous day concerning the ports of Abidjan and San Pedro, the Ivorian Refining Company and the Management Committee of the Coffee and Cocoa Sector have also been removed from the list of entities subject to an asset freeze by the European Union. A fast-track procedure between Governments has enabled this swift decision by the European Union. Commercial flights serving Abidjan and ui, which had been suspended since 1 April, are also resuming, the Force Licorne said.

unharmful. But the big question remains about those who arrested Gbagbo. Was it the FRCI or the Force Licorne that arrested Gbagbo?

### Illustration 11- The Abidjan's battle in 2011



Source: OpenStreetMap

Toussaint Alain, the representative for Europe of the outgoing Head of State, told Reuters: “Laurent Gbagbo was arrested by French special forces and handed over to rebel leaders”. (RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONALE, 2011b) The French ambassador in Abidjan said it was the FRCI and not French forces that arrested Gbagbo. Even if the French defence minister, Gérard Longuet, had acknowledged at a press conference in Paris that “the objective (set) by the international community was to ensure that the President-elect could preside”, describing the commitment of UNOCI and Licorne as “*a support*” to the pro-Ouattara offensive (JOURNAL LE MONDE AFRIQUE, 2011). While it was difficult at this time to know exactly who arrested Gbagbo, we were sure that the nightmare of the Ivorians seems to be over, at least for the time being. On 4 May 2011, the FRCI finally took control of the vast commune of Yopougon, the last district held by militiamen loyal to the former president and Liberian mercenaries. On the same day, a decision of the Ivorian Constitutional Council proclaimed Alassane Ouattara President of the Republic.



French Authorities seemed to have used false pretexts for bombing the forces remained loyal to Gbagbo armament. According to France with UK and US support, the troops remained loyal to Gbagbo were the only ones perpetrating atrocities and killing civilians. However, as India's representative to the Security Council had pointed out, helicopters and peacekeepers had come under fire from the FRCI. Also, during their descent from north to south, these FRCIs committed crimes, and the civilian populations were also massacred. The role of France and UNOCI was very unclear. Was it not UNOCI's mission to protect civilians? Was UNOCI not tasked with DDR? But how is it that the dissident forces were still powerfully armed? To answer this last question, we have two possibilities: the first is that the dissident forces rearmed after they were disarmed. It seems unlikely given the time lapse between the DDR and the organisation of the elections and also because Côte d'Ivoire was under an arms embargo. The second possibility would be that the dissident forces did not disarm. And in both cases, it was a failure on the part of UNOCI and the Licorne Force, part of whose mission was to ensure DDR and monitor the arms embargo.

Amnesty International in a report published said that forces allied with former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo and those supporting his successor Alassane Ouattara committed war crimes and crimes against humanity during the six months of deadly violence that followed the disputed elections. An Amnesty International delegation that spent more than two months in Côte d'Ivoire collected more than 100 testimonies from survivors of a massacre on 29 March 2011 in Duékoué – around 500km west of Abidjan – and neighbouring villages. All of them report a series of targeted and systematic killings committed by uniformed officers of the FRCI, – who executed hundreds of men of all ages based on political and ethnic considerations (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2011).

A woman told Amnesty International: “I went to the UNOCI people to tell them that our men and boys were being massacred and that we had to intervene, and they did nothing” (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2011). Although a UNOCI battalion was conducting two patrols a day in the area, reports indicate that UN forces vehicles were speeding through ghost villages and did not stop to inquire about the situation of internally displaced persons (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2011). In this region known for its instability and recurrent inter-communal clashes, UNOCI had only 200 troops deployed in the area. UNOCI's concern seemed to lie elsewhere. The UN Force was stationed in Abidjan, helping the FRCI to bring down Gbagbo. Unfortunately for the people of Duékoué and Guiglo who were left to their own devices, yet resolution 1975 gave UNOCI a robust mandate to protect civilians. Worst of all for those who believed the rhetoric of France, the USA and the UK on their concern for civilians



and unanimously adopted this resolution. In addition to having received no attention during their lifetime, the deads of the West were not even given a dignified funeral. UNOCI seemed to have reduced the number of the body, maybe to mask its inability to fulfil part of its mandate.

The number of people killed in Duékoué and the identity of the perpetrators has been the subject of intense controversy. The International Committee of the Red Cross publicly reported on 1 April 2011 that “at least 800 people” had been killed on 29 March in “inter-community violence”. The UNOCI Human Rights Division said that “330 people were killed” between 28 and 30 March 2011 in Duékoué, and stated that “of the 330 deaths, most were executed by Dozos – traditional hunters – of the FRCI”. UNOCI added that the victims were “militiamen and civilians, including women and children”. Amnesty International, for its part, was able to meet in Duékoué in April 2011 with a person who took part, together with Moroccan UNOCI soldiers, in the counting of those killed at Quartier Carrefour and helped the Red Cross to bury some of the bodies. The person reported that 817 bodies had been counted (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2011). It made observers even more sceptical about the role played by UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire.

#### 5.1.2 UNOCI: between satisfaction and scepticism

As provided by the law, Gbagbo contested the fairness of the elections, especially in the north of the country. These complaints were rightly or wrongly accepted by the Constitutional Council, which identified other “irregularities,” and then annulled the votes in some districts, and declared Gbagbo victorious. The chairperson of the IEC and the UN Special Representative did not take these alleged irregularities into account and decided that Ouattara had won (MBEKI, 2011). The UN Special Representative of Secretary-General (SRSG) Young-jin Choi also determined that Ouattara had won but based on fewer votes than those announced by the IEC, that determined that some of the complaints made by Gbagbo were legitimate. Also, the IEC, the Constitutional Council, and the UN SRSG made three different determinations in terms of the votes cast for the two candidates (MBEKI, 2011).

To resolve this matter, Gbagbo proposed an establishment of an international commission to verify the election results. However, his proposal was rejected by the international community (MBEKI, 2011). Even though the Ivorians were more than a week away from a recount, and although some observers decried certain irregularities in the elections

in northern Côte d'Ivoire<sup>93</sup>. Although a recount could have prevented a civil war in Côte d'Ivoire, the international community had already chosen its side.

Despite the notification of these irregularities by ECOWAS observers, none of these reports appears in the documents submitted by the UN and the International Community to justify their attacks on outgoing President Laurent Gbagbo. In addition to this, the SRSB took the unilateral decision to proclaim the result of the elections overriding the prerogatives entrusted to him by the UNSC. Besides, UNOCI went against the principle of impartiality, which is one of the three pillars of a peacekeeping mission. It is true that resolution 1975 gave UNOCI full authority, and rightly so, to prevent the use of heavy weapons against civilians and the massacre of the population. Yet UNOCI did nothing to stop the descent of FRCI tanks on Abidjan. Also, the mission sent no force to Duékoué, where hundreds of civilians were massacred. It recalls the United Nations's failure to end the more catastrophic murder and abuse of civilians in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (MBEKE, 2011).

France played an essential role in the establishment of a regime in Africa. After the independence of France colonies, France established a neo-colonial system of influence. France remained active in the political and economic affairs of these countries. Several defence and cooperation agreements were signed, and it was established a *pré carré* or zone of influence. France turned itself an interventionist actor in Africa and allows itself of doing what it wants and when it wants in the African continent. France also secured domestic power for France-friendly leaders (BROSIG, 2015). France used its privileged place in the Security Council to play an important role in determining the future of Côte d'Ivoire (BROSIG, 2015). UNOCI, which was supposed to be impartial concerning its mandate, became a warring party choosing its side among the belligerents. The AU and ECOWAS, as usual, show their inability to manage crises in Africa and as a result once again favoured the intrusion of the West and former colonial powers into the internal affairs of African countries. The mistake UNOCI made was to have allowed itself to be helped by France and then to have been influenced by France. Indeed, France was not impartial in the resolution of the Ivorian crisis.

Former President Thabo Mbeki was not alone in his criticism of UNOCI's attitude. The then Russian Foreign Minister openly criticised the role of the United Nations in its management of the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Mr Sergey Lavrov argued that:

---

<sup>93</sup>For instance, reporting on the elections in the north, the election observer mission of the AU led by Joseph Kokou Kofigoh, former prime minister of Togo, the independent civil society Société Civile Africaine pour la Démocratie et l'Assistance Electorale led by Seynabou Indiegoune of Senegal, and the Coordination of African Election Experts (CAEE) from Cameroon, Senegal, Benin, Mali, Morocco, Gabon, and Togo led by Jean-Marie Ongjibange of Cameroon, all sounded the alarm about the elections in the north.

The UN peacekeepers and supporting French forces in Cote d'Ivoire started military action, taking the side of Ouattara, carrying out airstrikes on the positions held by supporters of Gbagbo. We are now looking into the legality of this situation because the peacekeepers were authorised to remain impartial, nothing more. We've requested an emergency briefing in the UN Security Council. We will keep looking into the matter, (RT, 2011)

While UNOCI has been severely criticised for its actions in April 2011, it is essential to recall that since its establishment in 2004, UNOCI mostly contributed to the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire. It has provided all the necessary technical and logistical assistance for the organisation of the 2010 elections. Also, the UN presence made it possible to avoid a bloodier conflict between the belligerents. UNOCI's work from the outset looked difficult and not at all restful. The mission had to face hostility on the ground with attacks against its personnel, the death of some peacekeepers and its employees such as the young Swedish woman who was shot during the clashes in April 2011.

UN former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon insisted rebuffed the idea that the UN had taken sides in the conflict by arguing: "In line with its Security Council mandate, the mission took this action in self-defence and to protect civilians" (BBC NEWS, 2011c). UNOCI in the framework of the protection of civilians and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and also acting in self-defence of the attacks – allegedly by pro-Gbagbo Forces – of 31 March 2011 on its base and convoys had to retaliate. The UN spokesman Hamadoun Toure said "In conformity with our mandate to protect the Golf Hotel where President Ouattara and his team are, the peacekeepers responded by targeting the origin of the firing coming from the other side of the lagoon. We intentionally avoided the residence of President Gbagbo" (BBC NEWS, 2011c). However, UNOCI response was disproportionate and did not respond to the reality on the ground. FRCI have also target UNOCI helicopters and soldiers, but the retaliation was directed to the Gbagbo's forces.

In its resolution 1981 (2011), the UNSC decided to extend the mandate of the UNOCI set out in its resolutions 1975 (2011), 1962 (2010) and 1933 (2010) until 31 July 2011 (UNSC, 2011g). In his report, the United Nations Secretary-General stated that the security situation in the country, particularly in Abidjan and the West, remained extremely precarious. The risk of a resumption of armed conflict was still acute, and attacks against the civilian population continued (UNSC, 2011h). Because of the fragile security situation in Côte d'Ivoire, the UNSC further decided to extend the mandate of UNOCI until 31 July 2012, while maintaining the existing staffing levels with a slight increase in police personnel up to 205 additional qualified and specialised police advisers (UNSC, 2011i). In addition to this, UNOCI's mandate has been

restructured and divided into two main branches: (1) protection and security and (2) peace and elections (UNSC, 2011i).

#### a) - Protection and Security

The first point of this component concerned the protection of civilians. This point was aimed at protecting the civilian population from the imminent risk of physical violence and at reviewing the overall strategy for the protection of civilians. The second point related to the remaining security threats and border issues. Here, the objective was to assist the national authorities in stabilising the security situation in the country, to continue to monitor and deter the activities of militias, mercenaries and other illegal armed groups and to assist the Government in ensuring security at the borders and border areas. The third point concerned the monitoring of the arms embargo. The fourth point dealt with the collection of weapons. The aim was to ensure that the weapons collected were not dispersed or reused for rebellion purposes.

The fifth point is related to the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme. The sixth point concerned the rebuilding and reform of institutions guaranteeing security and the rule of law. The purpose was to assist the Government in reviewing all security sector institutions and in developing a comprehensive national security strategy and plans for the reform of its institutions. The seventh item dealt with support for the promotion and protection of human rights by contributing to the promotion and protection of human rights in Côte d'Ivoire, with particular attention to grave violations and abuses committed against children and women, including sexual and gender-based violence. The eighth point was support for humanitarian assistance to help the Ivorian authorities prepare for the voluntary, safe and sustainable repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, in cooperation with the relevant humanitarian organisations, and to create security conditions conducive to such return.

#### b) - Peace and election

To contribute effectively to the post-electoral crisis peace process, the UNSC decided to include a peace and election component as a new UNOCI mission in the light of the latest election-related events. The first point of this section was support for the organisation and new holding of open, free, fair and transparent parliamentary elections. The objective was to promote an inclusive political process and to assist in creating a political environment

conducive to the holding of the forthcoming elections, to assist in the organisation and conduct of open, free, fair and transparent parliamentary elections and also to provide the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with the necessary assistance to fulfil his role of certifying the parliamentary elections.

The second point in this section was about information. Indeed, during the campaign of the second round of the presidential elections, the media was used as a tool for hate propaganda and incitement to violence. UNOCI would, therefore, be mandated to continue to use UNOCI broadcasting facilities, through UNOCI-FM and to monitor all public incidents of incitement to hatred, intolerance and violence. The third point was the redeployment by the State of its administration and extension of its authority throughout the territory by helping the Ivorian authorities to extend and re-establish competent State authority and to strengthen public administration in critical areas throughout the territory, at the national and local levels, as well as to implement the final components of the Ouagadougou Agreements relating to the reunification of the country.

The fourth point concerned Mediation. It involved, in coordination with the Facilitator and his Special Representative in Abidjan, assisting the Government in carrying out the remaining stages of the peace process, as appropriate and within available means, including through the provision of logistical support to the Office of the Special Representative, as required. The last point was on the protection of United Nations personnel. UNOCI must protect United Nations personnel, facilities and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel.

President Ouattara, after his investiture, advocated reconciliation while avoiding witch hunts and other forms of revenge. His first government was an inclusive one composed of the main parties to the Ivorian crisis except for the FPI, the party of former President Laurent Gbagbo, which decided to boycott the government of national unity. Laurent Gbagbo and his wife have been transferred to two securitised prisons in northern Côte d'Ivoire pending trial, with President Ouattara personally seeing to it that nothing happens to them. However, Gbagbo claims that he and his doctor were in complete isolation under electric light or darkness and without permission to go outside for eight months. The media argued that UN forces protected Gbagbo in their mission, but it was false. The international forces were officially in charge of the prisoner but had knowingly abandoned him to Fofié's men, according to Mattei. UNOCI, therefore, did not seem to be concerned about the violations of the prisoner's rights, despite the fact that he was detained without a warrant, in defiance of Ivorian law (GBAGBO; MATTEI, 2018).

The AU Peace and Security Council announced its readiness to use the necessary means to support peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. In this respect, the Council requested the Commission, as well as all its partners, to immediately dispatch a mission to assess the situation of Ivorian refugees in the countries neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire and to provide support for post-conflict reconstruction and development. A plea has been made to help Côte d'Ivoire obtain debt cancellation, and efforts have been made to support cooperation and joint action among the countries of the region to deal with security problems, including those posed by the presence of mercenaries and other armed elements (UA, 2011).

On 29 November 2011, former President Laurent Gbagbo was transferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague to face charges of crimes against humanity as an "indirect co-perpetrator" of murder, rape, persecution and other inhumane acts. Gbagbo had been detained in the north of the country since April 2011 and was charged on 18 August with "economic crimes" that included his alleged looting of half a billion dollars from the state treasury (UNSC, 2012a). His transfer to The Hague was also in violation of all the rules of law. After a sham trial in which his lawyers had difficulty speaking, he was told that he had to return to the house where he was being held. Still, on the way back the vehicle drove by Kouakou Fofié headed straight for Korhogo airport where Gbagbo was boarded for The Hague in one of the presidential planes of Côte d'Ivoire. Once again UNOCI, France and its allies show that respect for the law is valid only when they are the ones who dictate the rules. The following day, Gbagbo's FPI Party announced that it was withdrawing from the legislative elections, as well as from the country's national reconciliation process, as a result of what it considered Gbagbo's illegal transfer to the ICC (UNSC, 2012a).

For the legislative elections, and to help stave off election-related violence, the UN positioned 7,000 troops in Abidjan and the western part of the country. In the event, few incidents of violence were reported during the polling. According to election results, Ouattara's RDR party won 127 out of 255 seats in the legislature, and the PDCI, which is in coalition with Ouattara's party, won 77 seats, giving the government a formidable 80 per cent control of parliament (UNSC, 2012a).

Intending to organise local elections, which constitute the last two links in the Ivorian electoral cycle that has been underway since 2007, and to avoid a new post-electoral crisis, the Ivorian Government requested the renewal of the mandate of UNOCI, which was due to end on 31 July 2012, in all its components: political, technical – legal, logistical and human resources assistance – and security, to enable Côte d'Ivoire to ensure, once again, the successful conduct of the local elections (UNSC, 2012b).

Despite the presence of UNOCI, the security situation remained of concern, especially in western Côte d'Ivoire along the border with Liberia. This precarious situation sharply deteriorated with the attack of 8 June 2012 directly targeting UNOCI peacekeepers during which seven Nigerian soldiers were killed. Other attacks against the FRCI have also been recorded. Civilian-to-civilian violence involving Dozo hunters also resulted in numerous casualties (CSNU, 2012c). Accordingly, the UNSC decided to extend the mandate of UNOCI as set out in paragraphs 7 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (h), (j), (k) and (m) of resolution 2000 (2011) until 31 July 2013 (CSNU, 2012d).

However, the security situation remained precarious and even deteriorated between August and October when attacks against national security forces in and around Abidjan and along the borders with Ghana and Liberia. These attacks aimed at destabilising the government of President Alassane Dramane Ouattara and left more than 60 people dead, many injured, including civilians, and thousands temporarily displaced (CSNU, 2012e). After its creation the Commission Dialogue, vérité et réconciliation<sup>94</sup> has encountered many difficulties in its implementation and progress on the complex issues of reconciliation, and social cohesion remains slow.

Despite all the efforts made, the security situation in Côte d'Ivoire was still very precarious, which led the UNSC initially to extend UNOCI's mandate until 30 June 2014. The UNSC adjusted ONUCI strength so that by 30 June 2014, the Operation's troop strength would reach a maximum of 7,137 troops, including 6,945 soldiers and staff officers and 192 military observers (CSNU, 2013). UNOCI's new mandate, contrary to resolution 2000 (2011), no longer contains: (a) facilitation; (b) support for the organisation and conduct of open, timely, free, fair and transparent legislative elections; (c) collection of weapons; and (d) monitoring of the arms embargo.

The UNSC, considering that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continued to endanger international peace and security in the region, decided to extend the UN mandate until 30 June 2015 by including certain new items in its mission. These include (a) the provision of good

---

<sup>94</sup>The Commission Dialogue, vérité et réconciliation (CDVR) (English: Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission) was sworn in by President of Ivory Coast Alassane Ouattara on September 28, 2012 in response to the post-election violence of the 2010-2011 Ivorian Crisis. The 11-member Commission, led by former Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny, consisted of religious leaders, regional representatives and Ivorian Chelsea soccer player Didier Drogba. The Commission was modelled on the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and given two years to complete its mandate to investigate past human rights violations and provide recommendations on how to prevent future abuses and provide reparations to victims. In addition to gathering private statements from victims, the CDVR organised public hearings, during which victims confronted perpetrators in front of CDVR commissioners. However, the lack of television broadcasts from the commission and minimal media coverage meant that powerful witness statements had little impact across the country.

offices and political support to the Ivorian authorities in their efforts to address the root causes of the conflict and bring lasting peace and security to Côte d'Ivoire and to assist them in preparing the presidential election scheduled for 2015. Also, (b) weapons collection has been associated with DDR. And finally, (c) monitoring of the arms embargo was reintroduced (CSNU, 2014).

It is important to underline that the UNSC wished the protection of civilians to remain the priority of UNOCI, under paragraph 17 (a) of resolution 2162 (2014), to gradually transfer the UNOCI security mission to the Government of Côte d'Ivoire (CSNU, 2014). The UNSC intended, until 30 June 2015, a further reduction of two battalions and decides that the uniformed personnel of UNOCI shall consist of up to 5,437 military personnel, comprising 5,245 contingent and staff officers and 192 military observers (CSNU, 2014). Besides, the UNSC decided to extend until 30 June 2015 the authorisation it gave to the French Forces to support UNOCI within the limits of their capabilities and in their areas of deployment (CSNU, 2014).

The peace process in Côte d'Ivoire was still unstable four years after the fall of Laurent Gbagbo. Security in the western region of Côte d'Ivoire remained extremely precarious, and the DDR process, as well as the collection of weapons, had not yet been completed. The UNSC had urged the Ivorian government to end the DDR process before the 2015 presidential elections. Concerning national reconciliation and social cohesion, the dialogue between the Government and the political opposition was stalled and marked by continuous interruptions. The mandate of UNOCI has therefore been extended once again until 30 June 2016 and with the same mission as the previous mandate (CSNU, 2015).

On 10 March 2015, the Abidjan assise court has sentenced Simone Gbagbo, the wife of former President Laurent Gbagbo, to 20 years in prison for conspiring against state authority, participating in an insurrectional movement and disturbing public order. Other political cadres and militiamen who were supporters of the former regime were sentenced to prison terms, as was the son of the former president, Michel Gbagbo, even though he's never been involved in political activities. Laurent Gbagbo at that time was awaiting his trial at the International Criminal Court in The Hague (ENCYCLOPÆDIA UNIVERSALIS, 2015a). In October 2015 after the presidential elections, the outgoing president Alassane Ouattara, candidate of the *Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix* (RHDP), was re-elected to the presidency in the first round with 83.7 per cent of the votes. Former Prime Minister Pascal Affi N'Guessan, the candidate of the FPI, obtained 9.3 per cent of the vote. His candidacy was



not unanimously supported by his party, whose leaders called for a boycott of the elections. The turnout was 54.6 per cent (ENCYCLOPÆDIA UNIVERSALIS, 2015b).

In March 2016 a fact that had nothing to do with the Ivorian crisis occurred. Indeed, an armed commando attacked three hotels in the seaside resort of Grand-Bassam, near Abidjan, killing at least eighteen people, including four Frenchmen. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb claimed responsibility for the operation, claiming to be targeting France “and its interests in the countries participating in Operations Serval – in Mali – and Barkhane – in the Sahel”. It was the first jihadist attack in the country (ENCYCLOPÆDIA UNIVERSALIS, 2016a). A few months later, a text of the new Constitution modifying the criteria of “*Ivoirité*” of the candidates for the presidency of the Republic – they will no longer have to have two Ivorian ancestors, but to be “born of Ivorian father or mother of origin” – was approved by referendum at 93.4 per cent of the votes. It is important to recall that this criterion of “*Ivoirité*” was at the root of the deep crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. However, the turnout for the referendum was 42.4 per cent – the opposition had called for a boycott of the ballot. The new text amends the Constitution to create the position of Vice-President and a Senate.

In the legislative elections, the RHDP, even in a downturn, won 167 seats out of 255 with 50.3 per cent of the vote. In the independent camp there was a steady progression, they cumulated 38.5 per cent of the votes or 76 elected. The FPI – whose hard wing boycotted the elections – won 5.8 per cent of the votes with three deputies and made its significant comeback in parliament. The participation rate was 34.1 per cent (ENCYCLOPÆDIA UNIVERSALIS, 2016b). The political situation in Côte d’Ivoire remained tense even though the spectre of a resumption of hostilities was far away. In a bid to calm the situation, Ms Simone Gbagbo was acquitted of crimes against humanity and war crimes after President Alassane Ouattara refused to transfer her to the ICC. She was amnestied a year later for the crime of undermining state security. She was one of about eight hundred people convicted following the crisis following the November 2010 presidential election who were amnestied on the eve of Independence Day as is customary.


Because of the successful conduct of the presidential elections and the easing of tensions between the parties, the UNSC in its resolution S/RES/2284 (2016) decided to extend UNOCI’s mandate for a final period until 30 June 2017 (CSNU, 2016). The UNSC welcomed the overall progress made in Côte d’Ivoire, in particular concerning the capacity of the Ivorian Government to assume the security mission of UNOCI. UNOCI, until 30 April 2017, would carry out the following mandate: (a) protection of civilians; (b) political support; (c) support to security institutions and border issues; (d) support for compliance with international

humanitarian and human rights law; (e) support for humanitarian assistance; (f) public information; and (g) protection of United Nations personnel. From 1 May to 30 June 2017, the mandate of UNOCI would be to complete the closure of the Mission (CSNU, 2016). (see map 12 and 13).

From 2004 to 2017, the UNOCI experience in Côte d'Ivoire highlights many of the complexities associated with contemporary peace operations. The Ivorian context was a difficult and complex one, with a conflict which left more than 3,000 dead (see the graphs below). The mission was confronted to many changes in the political and social environment in Côte d'Ivoire, and to ensure a well going of its mission, the ONUCI mandate has been changed too to have the capacity to do its job. This capacity was tied to the will of the parties, the resources provided by the UN's the Member States and its relationship with a non-UN peacekeeping Force Licorne. However, both UNOCI and the French Operation Licorne were deployed based on the consent of the Côte d'Ivoire government. The lines of consent and coercion were blurred almost from the outset – most notably in the use of force by France – and regional arrangements – especially ECOWAS and the AU – played crucial political roles in defining the scope and direction of the mission (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2012). How can we evaluate the ONUCI during these thirteen years? On the one side, ONUCI has proved to be useful, but on the other side, ONUCI has shown a partiality that undermined the smooth running of the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire. In the following section, using the elements of the Diehl-Druckman framework and conflict resolution effectiveness indicators, we will analyse the impact of UNOCI in Ivorian conflict resolution.

#### **Chart 8 - Côte d'Ivoire: Number of Deaths from 1995 to 2018**


■ State-Based Violence ■ Non-State Violence ■ One-Sided Violence



Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2018

- \* *State-based Violence*: It is violence between the government of Côte d'Ivoire and FDSI-CI, MPCI, FRCI, MJP, and MPIGO.
- \* *Non-State Violence*: It is a violence between ethnical groups in Côte d'Ivoire, rebels' groups, and supporters of Laurent Gbagbo and supporters of Alassane Ouattara.
- \* *One-Sided Violence*: It is violence perpetrated by the FRCI, MPCI, MPIGO, AJPSN, the Ivorian government against civilians


**Chart 9 - Côte d'Ivoire: Number of Deaths from 2002 to 2018**



Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2018

- \* *State-based Violence*: It is violence between the government of Côte d'Ivoire and FDSI-CI, MPCI, FRCI, MJP, and MPIGO.
- \* *Non-State Violence*: It is a violence between ethnical groups in Côte d'Ivoire, rebels' groups, and supporters of Laurent Gbagbo and supporters of Alassane Ouattara.
- \* *One-Sided Violence*: It is violence perpetrated by the FRCI, MPCI, MPIGO, AJPSN, the Ivorian government against civilians

**Chart 10 - Côte d'Ivoire one-Sided Violence from 2002 to 2018**



*Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2018*

**Illustration 12 - UNOCI's deployment in 2015**



Source: United Nations, Department of Field Support 2015

**Illustration 13 - UNOCI's deployment 2017**



Source: United Nations, Department of Field Support 2017

## 5.2 The Diehl-Druckman framework to evaluate peacekeeping missions

UNOCI represents one of the paradoxes of peace missions in Africa, a paradox because it took sides when the essence of its mandate is impartiality. The mission has been completely overwhelmed by the 2011 post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. UNOCI, therefore, presented a contrasted and paradoxical assessment at the end of its mandate. On the one hand, we noted UNOCI's substantial participation in the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire. In the sense that it was able to prepare the ground for the organisation of the 2010 presidential elections and on several occasions prevented the resumption of hostilities that would have plunged the country into much higher chaos. On the other hand, the mission has been severely criticised by the UN member states themselves for its inappropriate military involvement in the post-electoral crisis by exceeding its mandate and failing miserably to protect civilian supporters of Laurent Gbagbo.

It is to understand the real impact of UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire between 2004 and 2017 that we will apply the framework proposed by Diehl and Druckman. This framework is composed of Core Goals, Non-traditional Goals, and Peacebuilding Goals.

### 5.2.1 Core Goals of peacekeeping

Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman (2010) called core goals of peacekeeping, those which are shared by virtually all peace operations (DIEHL; DRUCKMAN, 2010). The Diehl and Druckman framework divides the core goals into three parts: violence abatement which consists in a reduction in violence; conflict containment aimed at preventing the spread of conflict, and conflict settlement which is about the resolution of disputes between parties.

In the world of peacekeeping, abatement, containment and settlement are considered generic goals, then UNOCI had a partial mandate concerning these three elements (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2012). About the abatement, the UNSC in its resolutions S/RES/1528 (2004) and S/RES/1609 (2005) mandated the ONUCI to prevent, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment, any hostile action, in particular within the *Zone de Confiance*, and to investigate violations of the ceasefire. The UNSC, therefore, authorised UNOCI to act within a well-delimited area and not beyond such area. Its mission was not to operate with a view to a reduction of military activities or an escalation of violence in general, but to enforce the ceasefire and avoid spillover into the *Zone de Confiance*.



This limitation of UNOCI's activity was based on the assumption by the UNSC that the various parties to the conflict were committed to the ceasefire. Therefore, there will be no escalation of violence. It is important to recall that the deployment of UNOCI was based on the LMA which is a prerequisite for any peacekeeping operation, a credible ceasefire is a crucial feature of Council decision-making on the deployment of peacekeepers (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2012). As regards containment, The UNSC in its resolution S/RES/1633 (2005) about ONUCI, urged countries neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire to prevent any cross-border movement of combatants or arms into Côte d'Ivoire, and its resolution S/RES/1609 (2005) installed monitoring of arms embargo. The DDR and Disarmament and dismantling of militias were a containment mission too, but they were very complexes and difficult to execute.

MHS and perception of the way out in the crisis can also play a crucial role in conflict containment. When the parties are in a stalemate and they perceive that the victory cannot be achieve through military means, they are more willing to negotiate. And when the parties are negotiating a way out to the crisis, we may observe a de-escalation in violence. In the case of the Ivorian conflict, for example, clashes have greatly diminished and were almost non-existent during periods of negotiation. There were sporadic clashes that mostly stemmed from dissatisfaction with the content of the agreements.

With the settlement, Diehl and Druckman correctly noted that settlement is an area in which peacekeepers have limited influence, and not all operations have this goal (DIEHL; DRUCKMAN, 2010). Bellamy and Williams (2012) argued that most of the conditions identified for judging the ONUCI's contribution to "settlement" were not relevant because negotiations, mediation and agreements preceded the deployment of UNOCI. According to them, UNOCI was one of those operations not mandated to pursue conflict settlement, AU, ECOWAS, France and the parties themselves did such tasks. The role of UNOCI was to assist the parties in implementing their owns agreements.

Referring to Diehl and Druckman's analytical framework, the UNOCI mission raised other issues. Concerning violence abatement, the key measures are related to the levels of violence. As a result, Bellamy and Williams raised two problems. The first, as they said, Jeremy Farrell points out, the analytical framework assumes that the violence continued. If the peacekeepers have been deployed, that means that the violence stopped, or at least there is a ceasefire. The UNSC considers any prior agreement to be a prerequisite for the implementation of a peacekeeping operation. In this case, it would be entirely appropriate, as Farrell suggests, to measure success in terms of *prevention* rather than *abatement* (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2012). By focusing on prevention, another question is raised. Where violence occurs, is that a

failure of peacekeepers, and how do we know whether or not there would have been more violence in the absence of those peacekeepers (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2012)? To this question, Diehl and Druckman's analytical framework proposes that the overall level of violence will decline over time with the deployment of peacekeepers.

During its mandate from 2004 to 2017, and concerning the security aspect, UNOCI maintained a buffer zone that separated the Government-held part from the dissident-controlled part, thus preventing a systematic resumption of hostilities. Also, after the post-electoral crisis of 2011 and until the end of its mandate in 2017, UNOCI joined forces with the Force Licorne and Government troops to secure the country and facilitate the free movement of goods and persons. With regard to the overall level of violence, it remained relatively low at the beginning of the Ivorian conflict before the deployment of the UN mission and during the upsurges in violence in 2004 and 2011.

The country did not escalate into full-scale civil war as feared by Ivorian and International Community. The upsurge in 2004 resulted from the dissidents' decision to not disarm due to the lack of trust in Gbagbo's promise to hold elections, and Gbagbo's distrust of dissidents whom he suspected of resuming hostilities if their presidential candidate was defeated. "If the final result had been a victory for Gbagbo, the rebels would have taken up arms against him anyway," said Jean-Marc Simon, former French ambassador to Abidjan (GBAGBO; MATTEI, 2018).

The upsurge in violence in 2011 just show two important things. First, both sides were right not to trust each other. Laurent Gbagbo was not wrong when he insisted on disarmament – which was a *sine qua non* – before the presidential elections. The dissident forces were also not wrong when they said they did not believe in Laurent Gbagbo's good faith to organise fair and transparent elections. Indeed, the Constitutional Council - which was composed of people close to Laurent Gbagbo – wrongly or rightly – annulled more than 600,000 votes in the North of Côte d'Ivoire, which allowed Gbagbo to be declared the winner by the same Council. Gbagbo always knew that the dissidents were not been disarmed and would not be. Second, elections organisation was not the principal and unique way out to the Ivorian crisis.

There are so many ways to prevent escalation in conflict. France played an essential role in preventing the escalation of violence, not politically but on the military level by helping FRCI to defeat Gbagbo. France's intervention was decisive in ending the post-election conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. The criticism levelled at France and UNOCI is that they militarily resolved a conflict by becoming a party to it. The conflict that followed the presidential elections long presented by France and UNOCI as the only way to resolve the Ivorian crisis.

However, by allying itself with France – even going beyond its mandate – UNOCI worked to ensure that the President declared elected by France, the IEC and the International Community could assume power. It is possible that such intervention diminished the length of the conflict and provided for Côte d'Ivoire to avoid a long and bloody civil war. ONUCI participated in the Ivorian conflict and chose a side. By acting like that, UNOCI ran a high risk that, in the long run, this could lead to the resurgence of a sense of injustice in Laurent Gbagbo's camp. An injustice that we know was at the root of the instability in which Côte d'Ivoire had been plunged since 2002, if not long before.

Although Gbagbo was defeated, the situation in Côte d'Ivoire remained of concern. The unforgettable events in the post-electoral crisis period were the attacks on the town of Duékoué and the Niambly refugee camp, neighbouring Duékoué and home to mostly indigenous people of Guéré ethnicity, which resulted in several deaths. The period from 2004 to 2010 was marked by sporadic violence mainly due to incitement to violence and ethnic hatred on the part of both parties through the media. The period from 2011 to 2017 also saw a low-level of violence marked especially by banditry, clashes with knives and light weapons and attacks on civilians.

Concerning containment, it is more complex and mixed since it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of UNOCI by what has been achieved or not. What we need to look at here is all that would have been avoided and prevented by UNOCI (BELLAMY, WILLIAMS, 2012). There were doubts about the participation of Liberian and Sierra Leonean mercenaries in the clashes in Côte d'Ivoire. Also, the involvement of several actors in Côte d'Ivoire in the illegal arms and diamond trade forced the UNSC to establish an embargo on the sale of weapons and diamonds through Kimberly's process<sup>95</sup> in Côte d'Ivoire. This illicit practise was already known in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which cast doubt on the causes of the conflict and the resources of the belligerents.

However, UNOCI was tasked to support United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and Governments concerned, to monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 7 of resolution 1572 (2004) including by inspecting, as they deem it necessary and without notice, the cargo of aircraft and any transport vehicle using the ports, airports, airfields, military bases and border crossings of Côte d'Ivoire (UNSC, 2005e). The UNOCI mission was monitoring not ending the transnational flows of arms and diamonds, even if several violations were reported. Liberia's

---

<sup>95</sup>The Kimberley Process was adopted by the UNSC to prevent the sale of rough diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire to prevent income from funding war efforts.

participation in the Ivorian crisis was often mentioned. First, several facts were attributed to Liberian mercenaries, including murderers, then certain armed elements who remained loyal to Laurent Gbagbo at the end of 2011 attacked the FRCI from Liberia. Supposedly pro-Gbagbo militias from Liberia also attacked two villages in Côte d'Ivoire in September 2011, resulting in reprisals against Gbagbo supporters.

With regard to conflict settlement, UNOCI's track record can be characterised as failure concerning the delegation of Mediation and Negotiation to France in pre -2011 and mixed after 2011. A failure because France mediation did not help to resolve politically the Ivorian crisis. One can argue that UNOCI did not participate directly in mediation and negotiation, but that is the first failure of the mission. UNOCI could use one of its organs, UNDP, as an important argument to play the role of mediator. Indeed, the economic crisis created a development problem in Côte d'Ivoire, so UNDP was a key element as a means to help the country to overcome this problem. In the long term, economic development would prevent unemployed young people from taking up arms.

For the first time after 2011 post electoral crisis mediation became officially part of UNOCI mandate. It involved, in coordination with the Facilitator and his Special Representative in Abidjan, assisting the Government in carrying out the remaining stages of the peace process with more or less success. Indeed, the non-resumption of hostility must be to the Ivorians' own willingness to stop fighting among themselves. In Bouaké, the former capital of the rebel-controlled zone, for example, talking about war became a taboo subject because people no longer want to hear about conflict.

## Board 10 - Core Goals

Goal	Measures of Progress	Assessment
Violence Abatement	Level of violence Conflict-related casualties	Mixed Short-term failure Long-term success

Goal	Measures of Progress	Assessment
Conflict containment	Location of violent incidents	Success
	Size of the demilitarised zone	Failure
	Number of combatants	2004-2010 failure
		Post-2011 Success
	Involvement of neighbours	Success
	Involvement of great powers	Failure
	Financial flows to combatants	Mixed
	Arms control	Failure
Conflict settlement	Commencement of negotiations	n/a
	Commencement of mediation	Pré - 2011 n/a
		Post-2011 mixed
	Delegation of mediation to France	failure
	Progress reports	(Insufficient data)
	Reunification	Pré - 2011 failure
		Post - 2011 Success

*Source: Table based upon Bellamy and Williams model*

### 5.2.2 Non-Traditional Goals

During its mission, UNOCI has been assigned various mandates which it has attempted to implement within its capabilities. Previously we have discussed the core goals of the mission. In this section, we will discuss the goals that vary from mission to mission.

One of the more sensitive UNOCI's non-traditional goals was the Disarmament, demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). In the first phase of its mandate, from 2004 to 2010, UNOCI had the arduous task of assisting in the collection of weapons and the reintegration of ex-combatants. It was a complicated task because it had to enable the organisation of free and transparent elections. The problem with this DDR is that there was a lack of trust on both sides. First of all, Laurent Gbagbo did not trust the dissident forces because he thought that even if he won the elections, he would still be attacked by a new rebellion. The round table organised at Linas-Marcoussis is the starting point for this thought by Laurent Gbagbo. Indeed, the French initiative to restore peace and proceed with disarmament was carried out without inviting the principal person concerned. Laurent Gbagbo said "I am not invited, i.e., the Ivorian State is not invited to a discussion on the future of Côte d'Ivoire. [...] I am not participating, I have no say in the matter, but I am asked to come and sign ..." (GBAGBO; MATTEI, 2018). Gbagbo saw

this act as an attempted coup d'état by France. Therefore, if he agreed to organise elections without prior disarmament, he would be left at the mercy of the dissident forces. Even worse, a democratically elected government is being asked to give in to blackmail by an armed group trying to destabilise its authority.

Secondly, the dissident forces did not trust in Laurent Gbagbo's ability to relinquish power in the event of defeat in a free and transparent election. The 2010 elections did not make them lie, at least according to the results proclaimed by the IEC and the International Community. Added to this, a series of local clashes in the West and North of the country and the proliferation of armed groups have made the DDR process difficult. UNOCI, therefore, failed to carry out DDR before the 2010 elections.

However, after the transfer of power to the declared winner of the 2010 elections, Mr Ouattara, and until the end of the UNOCI mission, DDR was less difficult than in the first phase. Nonetheless, the problems persisted, as UNOCI reported that several groups kept their weapons, mainly pro-Gbagbo forces that continued to have access to new weapons, which considerably slowed down DDR (UNSC, 2011j). It was reported that in western Côte d'Ivoire, the presence of mercenaries, militias, self-defence groups and dozos – traditional hunters, as well as large numbers of arms, produced a significant number of violent incidents. A high level of banditry, armed robbery and racketeering by unidentified armed elements were typical in that area (UNSC, 2011j).

On 7 November 2013, with support from UNOCI, the government launched an operation to tackle insecurity by dismantling armed groups and removing illegal checkpoints. Still, the delays in disarming former combatants presented security risks. Indeed, the convoy of the head of the National Authority for DDR was attacked while travelling from Ferkessédougou to Kong in northern Côte d'Ivoire (UNSC, 2013b). In January 2017, the national authority for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, reported that a total of 69,506 former combatants, including 6,105 women, entered the national program for disarmament and demobilisation that had been implemented from 2012 to 2015, including 66,216 who were reinserted with the support of UNOCI. However, the reinsertion of an outstanding caseload of 4,769 ex-combatants remained, out of which 3,015 ex-combatants had not been processed because they had stable jobs or were employed, already enrolled in training activities, not interested in the program or unreachable (UNSC, 2017a). Also, A total of 43,510 armaments, including 14,121 weapons, were collected throughout the DDR period from 2012 to 2015, even if the number of collected weapons and items of explosive remained low due to the significant number of weapons still hidden within communities (UNSC, 2017a).

Another non-traditional purpose that has been entrusted to UNOCI is the supervision of the elections. For the 2010 presidential election, UNOCI's mission was to provide logistical support to the IEC. The peacekeepers also transported equipment such as ballot boxes, voting booths and other kits to ensure the smooth conduct of the election. On election day, peacekeepers and observers were dispatched to several polling stations to supervise the voting. Despite intimidation and some clashes between rounds, and the difficulties and other political violence, the 2010 presidential elections were declared fair, free and transparent. AU, ECOWAS, and the UN Development Program also played a significant role in facilitating this election. If the elections took place in a relatively calm and peaceful atmosphere, it is mostly because of UNOCI. UNOCI played the same role during the 2011 legislative elections, the 2012 local elections and the 2015 presidential elections.

As for the (re) democratisation of the country, it has been done progressively with the organisation of several elections without clashes or exclusion of candidates or political parties. If some political parties did not participate in the elections, it was because they were simply boycotting. UNOCI, the Licorne Force and government forces shared security tasks during the elections, with government forces providing security in most polling stations. In contrast, UNOCI provided security in vulnerable areas that were located mainly in western Côte d'Ivoire. UNOCI was supported in its mission by UNMIL forces. The big enigma of these elections concerns the rate of participation, in 2010 the turnout was about 80%, in 2011 about 37% for the legislative elections, and about 54% for the presidential elections of 2015. The 2011 legislative elections, the 2012 local elections, the 2015 presidential elections and the 2016 legislative elections were one of the main reasons for the extension of UNOCI's mandate until 2017. What we see is that the UN presence enabled Côte d'Ivoire to organise free and transparent elections. UNOCI certified the elections.

Nonetheless, such certification gave so much credit to UNOCI which went beyond its prerogative by announcing results of the 2010 presidential election and therefore proclaiming ADO the winner of this election. The Constitutional Council, which is the Supreme organ in Côte d'Ivoire for certifying the election, has seen its authority flouted by SRSR Mr Choi. It was indeed necessary to have a winner in the 2010 elections for Côte d'Ivoire to regain its stability but to do so only reinforces the thesis of neo-colonialism in Africa and thus undermines the legitimacy of future missions of UN in the world.

It is important to recall that Alassane Ouattara was declared the winner in the first round of the 2015 presidential election with more than 83% of the votes cast. The candidate

Pascal Affi N'Guessan, who did not receive unanimous support within the FPI – which had called for a boycott – had 9% of the votes.

Concerning humanitarian assistance, UNOCI had the role of protection and return of internally displaced persons in the West and North of the country. Already in 2009, the protection and return of war-displaced persons were identified as a high priority by the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Coordination Committee for Côte d'Ivoire (BELLAMY, WILLIAMS, 2012). Given the relatively short real periods of fighting in Côte d'Ivoire, the delivery of humanitarian assistance did not pose serious problems. However, malnutrition in the North and conflicts in the west of the country created a very high demand for humanitarian aid. UN humanitarian agencies primarily took over the malnutrition component, allowing UNOCI to deal with other aspects of the humanitarian crisis.

Inter-community violence was displacing more people than the conflict itself. United Nations agencies, funds and programmes helped the government to meet the humanitarian needs of some 3,500 people displaced by the intercommunal violence in Bouna in March 2016 (UNSC, 2017a). By 31 July, the last of some 25,000 illegal occupants of the Mont Péko National Park were moved from their settlements, completing a government-led evacuation. Notwithstanding a year-long awareness-raising campaign, the removal created humanitarian needs for those displaced, including 18,300 children and 24,000 people from receiving communities (UNSC, 2017a). The Ebola crisis exacerbated the gravity of an already precarious humanitarian situation in Côte d'Ivoire. From December 2015 to 15 January 2017, UNHCR facilitated the return of 20,376 refugees, mainly from Liberia. Some 20,000 Ivorian refugees remain in Liberia (UNSC, 2017a).

The issue of human rights is the last non-traditional goal addressed by Diehl-Druckman's analytical framework. In times of conflict, there is a systematic violation of human rights, especially of children and women, who are the most vulnerable in this kind of situation. Measures are, therefore taken to protect these groups exposed to physical violence. The protection of civilians against the use of heavy weapons was invoked in resolution 1975 (2011). Nevertheless, the inaction of ONUCI against the massacre of the population in western Côte d'Ivoire as revealed by Human Right Watch and Amnesty International weakened the ONUCI as far as human right protection concern. During the eight years of crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, many violations were recorded, especially with the use of children as soldiers and rapes perpetrated against women. After 2011, the number of exactions fell and remained at a relatively low-level. UNOCI's mandate about human rights, i.e., promotion and protection human rights was



interpreted mainly to mean monitoring and reporting on abuses and facilitating human rights training (BELLAMY, WILLIAMS, 2012).

UNOCI recorded the lowest number of cases of violations against children, from 1 April 2016 to 15 January 2017. The number of reported cases of sexual and gender-based violence has progressively decreased, owing in part to the concerted awareness-raising efforts by UNOCI and United Nations partners with the Ivorian military, communities and schools (UNSC, 2017a). For example, from 180 sexual and gender-based violence cases noted in a report of 12 December 2014, the ONUCI reported 34 cases in January 2017 (UNSC, 2017a). Therefore, human rights violations decreased from the post-election crisis of 2010 and 2011, from 1,726 cases noted in a report of 30 March 2011 to 88 documented between 1 April 2016 and 15 January 2017 (UNSC, 2017a).

UNOCI provided technical assistance to strengthen the capacity and effectiveness of the National Human Rights Commission and supported the Commission in developing its complaints management manual and its strategic plan for the period 2017-2020 (UNSC, 2017a). In 2016, UNOCI and OHCHR released a joint report on crimes of rape and their prosecution in Côte d'Ivoire, following which two ministerial circulars were adopted on the trial of rape and the registration of complaints about gender-based violence (UNSC, 2017a).

To Diehl-Druckman framework, we added as a non-traditional goal, information. Indeed, in several of its resolutions, the UNSC referred to media control due to the use of the media to incite violence, ethnic hatred and religious intolerance. In this context, UNOCI was mandated to promote understanding of the peace process and the role of UNOCI among local communities and the parties, through the Mission's public information capacity, including its radio broadcasting capability and to monitor the Ivorian mass media, in particular with regard to any incidents of incitement by the media to hatred, intolerance and violence (UNSC, 2005e).

Each of the parties during the crisis period used the media favourable to them to manipulate opinion and circulate information that was mostly false and unfounded. For example, there were several ethnic and religious clashes because of the information relayed by the local and international press. The role of the media, both locally and internationally, was fundamental to the Ivorian crisis. UNOCI was therefore tasked with monitoring this use of the press as a weapon of war, a mission that it has more or less fulfilled.

## Board 11 - Non-Traditional Goals

Goal	Measure of Progress	Assessment
Election Supervision	Violent Events	Mixed
	Registration	Success
	Voter turnout	Mixed
	Certification	Mixed
	Recognition by states	Success
	Protests by losers	Failure
Democratisation	Participation level	Mixed
	Voter turnout at successive elections	Mixed
	NGOs	Mixed
	Multiple political parties	Success
	Variety of view	Success
	Number of free elections	Success
	Public attitude	Mixed
	Absence of coups	Success
Humanitarian Assistance	Opinions of agencies	n/a
	Amount of aid	Success
	Reduction of landmines and bombs	n/a
	Reduction in epidemics, malnutrition	Success
	Reduction in infant mortality etc.	Mixed Insufficient data
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration	Observations	Pré 2011 Failure Post-2011 Success
	Certification by combattants	Pré 2011 Failure Post-2011 Success
	Number of ex-combattant repatriated	Pré 2011 Failure Post-2011 Success
	Prevention in violent incidents	Mixed
	Weapon collection	Pré 2011 Failure Post-2011 Success
Human Rights Protection	Number of major abuses	Pré 2011 Failure Post-2011 Mixed
	Atrocities	Pré 2011 Failure Post-2011 Mixed
	Number and scale of abuses in protected areas	Mixed (during the pos electoral crisis - failure)
	Number of deaths of protected persons	Mixed during the pos electoral crisis - failure)

Goal	Measure of Progress	Assessment
Informations	Informations about the mission Use of the media for incitement to violence and ethnic hatred	Success Pré 2011 Failure Post-2011 Success

*Fonte: Table based upon Bellamy and Williams model*

### 5.2.3 Peacebuilding Goals

Since the beginning of the crisis in 2002 and its resolution by arms in 2011, the central issue that led Côte d'Ivoire to this state of affairs always remained unresolved. In facts, the Ivorian problem goes back well beyond the 2002 crisis, as discussed in Chapter 2, and therefore no progress had been made in terms of peacebuilding before 2011. It was only after the post-electoral crisis that things began to be done in that direction in an even more tense contest and a divided country where hatred and sentiment were at their height, well helped by France and UNOCI in their way of managing the crisis. It was, therefore, necessary to rebuild everything and start again in a context where justice for the victor is always the best. Soro Guillaume said in an interview with the Cameroonian channel STV: "Where have you seen that justice for the defeated ever existed?" (GBAGBO; MATTEI, 2018)

It is this justice "made in France" sold by the former colonial power and bought by the International Community where UNOCI, unfortunately, played its role of puppet that Côte d'Ivoire was going to have to fight to rebuild its pillars for peace. Stephan Oberreit, director of Amnesty International France, said: "Once everyone recognises that there were abuses on both sides, but that only one side was prosecuted...it creates a feeling of imbalance and biased justice, which is detrimental to national reconciliation" (GBAGBO; MATTEI, 2018). But it was without counting on the determination of the Ivorians to get themselves out of this trap, as we say in local jargon "discouragement is not Ivorian". For that, we would still need UNOCI, which, when not manipulated by France, played its role as a peacekeeping mission in a perfect way.

As the country is considerably divided, progress on peacebuilding remained elusive. About peacebuilding goals, Diehl-Druckman's analytical framework identifies as the first, two elements which are local security and the rule of law. With these two elements, ONUCI

mandate was limited to assisting the government to re-establish civilian police and the judiciary across the country (BELLAMY, WILLIAMS, 2012). This task assigned to UNOCI presupposed a prior agreement on the control of the entire national territory by the government, this not being the case before 2010, the assistance function of UNOCI was thoroughly difficult to implement.

As the country was divided in two, it was somewhat difficult to establish the rule of law and local security, resulting in the persistence of low-level violence between 2004 and 2010. After the transition in 2011, the security sector was divided between those who pledged allegiance to the new President Ouattara and those who remained loyal to his predecessor. As a result of this state of affairs, there have been permanent and persistent tensions in the security sector, mainly in Abidjan. In Abidjan as well, a large number of weapons remained in circulation, and the majority of the 12,000 prisoners who escaped from custody during the crisis are still at large. That situation has contributed to relatively high levels of crime and security incidents involving armed elements (UNSC, 2011j).

A new military programming law (2016-2020) launched by the Ministry of Defence and other related institutions was tasked to the operationalisation of a new organisational structure for the Ministry, the reorganisation of human resources, the adjustment of the command-and-control structure and the strengthening of operational capabilities (UNSC, 2017a). Besides, under the law on the organisation of the armed forces, FRCI was officially renamed the Forces Armées de Côte d'Ivoire (UNSC, 2017a). Much progress has therefore been made in the area of local security and the rule of law. The security situation is stable, and the institutions of the republic are functioning throughout the country. However, protests by soldiers in January 2017, show that serious challenges remain concerning the status of security sector reform, including cohesion, discipline, training and conditions of service in the army. There is also a need to enhance the operational capacity of the police and gendarmerie through the provision of adequate equipment (UNSC, 2017a).

With local governance, UNOCI had a mandate to facilitate, with the assistance of the African Union, ECOWAS and other international partners, the re-establishment by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire of the authority of the State throughout Côte d'Ivoire and of the institutions and public services essential for the social and economic recovery of the country (UNSC, 2007a). This mission at the beginning was almost impossible since at the time the country was divided into two and the UN troops were stationed along the *Zone de Confiance* which later became the *Ligne verte*. Local politics between 2004 and 2010 was almost non-existent, especially in the Centre-North-West zone under the administration of the dissidents.

Local governors were maintained by default and in the absence of elections and depended on the political camp or militia controlling the zone. The practices were not very democratic, let alone state sponsored.

After his election, President Ouattara and his Government made considerable efforts to ensure that the legislative and local elections were held as scheduled. They undertook necessary steps to ensure that the polls were inclusive, by encouraging all parties, particularly the former ruling FPI party to participate in the electoral process (UNSC, 2011j). But the FPI, undermined by internal problems, decided to boycott these elections calling for Gbagbo's release by the ICC. UNOCI did not have the mandate to play a direct role in local governance or politics. Its role was to help to ensure that the legislative elections, and later local and presidential elections, would proceed in a manner that contributed to securing lasting stability for Côte d'Ivoire. UNOCI assisted in the re-establishment of Government institutions and in the timely organisation of all elections, thus facilitating the democratic process in Côte d'Ivoire.

About national reconciliation, UNOCI did not have a specific mandate per se. President Ouattara took initiatives to restore normalcy in Côte d'Ivoire and promote national reconciliation. Nonetheless, the present government has indicted several individuals associated with the former regime. Still, it has been slow in addressing violations committed by its forces, which has been perceived as the winner's justice by parts of the population (UNSC, 2011j). A Commission on Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation was created, and UNOCI supported the Commission in developing a programme of work. At the same time, the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund has allocated \$1 million to joint United Nations efforts in support of the Commission (UNSC, 2011j).

## Board 12 - Peacebuilding Goals

Goal	Measure of Progress	Assessment
Local Security	Training programs	Success
	Freedom of Movement	Success
	Perceptions of safety	Medium
	Level of violent crime	Weak

Goal	Measure of Progress	Assessment
Rule of law	Constitution supported by parties	Success
	Judicial Coverage	Success
	Judicial Functioning	Mixed
	Protections to detainees	Mixed
	Effective prison system	Weak
	Rehabilitation system	Medium
Local Governance	Local elections/officials	Success
	Civilian control of the military	Mixed
	Government capacity	Medium
	Government independent of foreign powers	Weak
	Government corruption	Medium
Reconciliation Nationale	Past crimes addressed	Failure
	Displaced people returned	Success
	Improved relations between conflicting parties	Mixed
	Institution promotes culture and peace	Mixed

*Fonte: Table based upon Bellamy and Williams model*

The Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, presented to the President on 15 December 2014 its final report. However, this report was only released on 25 October 2016. The report was not made public before the end of the UNOCI mission. It included a consolidated list of victims of crises in Côte d'Ivoire from 1990 to 2012, a proposal for national reparations and a draft reconciliation action plan (UNSC, 2017a). UNOCI, in partnership with the United Nations country team, supported ten capacity-building workshops on conflict prevention for sous-préfets and traditional chiefs. Also, UNOCI and the Government developed a transition framework for a social cohesion strategy for conflict prevention. They trained 584 government administrators, including 190 women, at the National School of Administration on mediation and conflict prevention (UNSC, 2017a). President Ouattara amnestied Mrs Simone Gbagbo, wife of Laurent Gbagbo who had been sentenced to 20 years in prison for undermining state security. Other prisoners from the Gbagbo camp were also released, many Ivorians have seen this act as a significant step towards national reconciliation.

### 5.3 Analysing ONUCI impact in the resolution of Ivorian crisis

As a general rule, ending a conflict can take place in three phases. The first phase is negotiation between the parties to the conflict. The second phase is the resolution of the conflict and the last phase is the transformation of the conflict. A conflict can be considered resolved if all three phases are successfully completed. International actors intervening in an internal conflict must therefore ensure that these different phases are effective. The following section is an analyse of ONUCI mandate and the indicators of effectiveness of these three phases.

#### 5.3.1 ONUCI and the negotiation phase

A conflict can be resolved by force of arms or by negotiation. Vettovaglia (2014, p 18) stated “A Military victory can be effective in the short term, but it is rather through the peaceful ways mediation that most recent conflicts have been resolved”. Negotiation therefore seems to be the preferred way of dealing with conflict. But for this negotiation to take place, certain preliminary elements must be met. Zartman ripeness theory propose some effectiveness indicators for the negotiation phase. The (a) ripe moment – perception of impasse, possible solution to the crisis –; and (b) Seizure of the parties or persuasion of an external actor.

The UN constitute a special actor in international conflicts management field. With a legitim and international global organisation status, the UN can adopt resolutions and make them effective. However, as the UN do not have its own army, it depends on the support of its members to implement its peace mission mandates. The UN’s most used conflict management strategy is the mediation (FRETTER, 2016). The UN utilise the mediation as a pacific mean to facilitate – and not impose – a solution between warring parties. From 1945 to 1995, the UN has been involved in 86 (29%) out of 295 international conflicts with different roles (FRETTER, 2016).

It is important to note that The Security Council has less flexibility than individuals States in deciding whether to engage in mediation and how to approach its task. Its ability to make collective decisions is facilitated by international norms and legal requirement, strict adherence to such norms and rules constrains its ability to act (TOUVAL, 1995). The negotiation between members of the Security Council to mediate a dispute is different to the mediation of disputants. The members of the Council decide whether they want the UN to play

a peace-making role (TOUVAL, 1995). The flexibility of the Security Council may have a direct impact to the flexibility of disputants during the mediation.

In the case of the Ivorian conflict, the UN before sending its peacekeeping mission had already tried several times to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Even if the organisation was not directly involved – leaving the manoeuvring to France – in the negotiations for the peace talks, it sent observers who brought their expertise and kept the UN informed of developments in Côte d'Ivoire. After the failed coup d'état of September 2002 and the events that followed, the UN and many international observers perceived the urgency of negotiating a way out of the crisis. Indeed, the parties to the conflict had reached an impasse, which had to be taken advantage of in order to start mediation.

The UN has therefore to some extent delegated its role as international mediator to France in the Ivorian crisis. Thus, France was able to take up the Ivorian case, first as a former colonial power and then under the endorsement of the United Nations. The Security Council therefore applauded France's initiative for the LMA. This agreement served as a basis for launching the various negotiations during the Ivorian crisis. The Linas-Marcoussis negotiations took place at a time when the parties to the conflict were at an impasse and had the perception of a possible way out of the crisis through negotiations. This moment coincided with the persuasion of external actors – UN and France.

In the aftermath of the LMA, MINUCI was set up with a view to maintaining the peace obtained through the political agreement and above all to continue UN mediation in the Ivorian conflict. MINUCI was transformed in UNOCI in 2004. For the UN, the LMA has been the key point of its mediation in the Ivorian conflict. Members of the Security Council have stated “No progress in the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement can be made without the will and commitment of all Ivorian actors themselves. It is up to them first and foremost to ensure, without conditions, the full implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement as they committed themselves to do in January 2003” (CSNU, 2004g). These same members also declared that “This political agreement is the only way out of the crisis for Côte d'Ivoire” (CSNU, 2004g).

Such statement leads us to ask the following question. Was the LMA the only way out of the crisis for Côte d'Ivoire? If the content of the agreement was respected, it would have led to the definitive de-escalation of violence between the parties. The dissident forces and political parties present at the signing of the agreement would have won their case and the peace process would have led Côte d'Ivoire to a peaceful way out to the conflict. As a result, the UN would have participated in some way in the resolution of the Ivorian crisis by having encouraged the



parties to take part in negotiations and by showing them that the only way out of the crisis was the implementation of a political agreement guaranteeing a peaceful outcome to the conflict.

However, the French authorities that convened the Linas-Marcoussis talks should have suspected at some point that the incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo, given his non-convocation to the round table and his subsequent reaction to it, would not be in favour of implementing such an agreement. President Laurent Gbagbo long expressed his dissatisfaction with the attitude of the French authorities because of the little consideration given to his position as president of Cote d'Ivoire. He criticised the French authorities for having considered him less in relation to a group of insurgents who were trying to destabilise a democratically elected regime.

Referring to conflict settlement, Diehl and Druckman noted that settlement is an area in which peacekeepers have limited influence, and not all operations have this goal (DIEHL; DRUCKMAN, 2010). Bellamy and Williams (2012) argued ONUCI's contribution to "settlement" was not relevant because negotiations, mediation and agreements preceded the deployment of UNOCI. According to them, UNOCI was one of those operations not mandated to pursue conflict settlement, AU, ECOWAS, France and the parties themselves did such tasks. The role of UNOCI was to assist the parties in implementing their own agreements.

However, I argue that the multidimensional aspect of ONUCI may contradict such a statement. Indeed, the UNSC associated UNOCI with the Force Licorne to try to resolve the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. All initiatives taken by France were buried by the Security Council. From then on, if France participated in the negotiations, UN participated in a way because the mission never dissociated itself from France from its implementation until its withdrawal. France took the initiative to summon the parties to the conflict to talks that led to the creation of UNOCI. Immediately the UNSC took a position stating that the LMA was the only way out of the crisis for the Ivorians. It seems clear that the multidimensional nature of the intervention in Côte d'Ivoire associated France with UNOCI and vice versa.

In this way, the UN participated in the negotiations even if indirectly. Bellamy and Williams (2012) have raised the question about the issue of responsibility in such a situation. They argued that most of the peace operations, including ONUCI, are mandated to assist the parties to implement their agreements and then, the primary responsibility of the implementation of the accords lays on the parties themselves. Peacekeepers can only achieve as much as the parties themselves want to achieve (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2012). Moreover, as is often the case in contemporary multidimensional operations, UNOCI was one of several actors charged with assisting the cause of peace. Like in modern multidimensional operations,

UNOCI was supported in its peace mission by France, which had a robust military capability, ECOWAS, which contributed both politically and militarily, and the AU, which was not to be outdone. In such a situation, it is a little difficult, if not hazardous, to determine precisely who was responsible and for what in this kind of situation. Nonetheless, ONUCI had more influence and more capacities to lead its mission, and all the key elements of this peace process were the responsibilities of ONUCI. The multidimensional mission was led totally by France and UNOCI which put themselves above the regional organisations which are ECOWAS and the AU and took more or less into account their considerations.

If the application of LMA lies upon the warring parties themselves, it was the mediator's responsibility to provide ideal conditions for the negotiations and thus get the parties to sign an agreement that would be beneficial to both, which would allow a resolution of the conflict. Did France/UN provide ideal conditions for negotiation? Zartman (2016) argue that the key to the successful resolution of conflict lies in the content of the proposals. If both parties agree to the content of the proposal and they think that the agreement is fair, they will commit easily to implement such an agreement. However, if the balance of power is unequal, it may not be possible for the parties to negotiate a fair result. LMA struggled to be implemented because one of the warring parties argued that France partiality threw the balance of power out of balance.

Druckman (1997) stated game and decision theorists think of negotiation as a puzzle to be solved and recommend solutions based on the preferences of the parties. LMA and other agreement which attempted to modify the content of LMA failed to be implemented because they did not recommend solutions based on the preferences – most of them – of the warring parties. Yet UNOCI/France have insisted that LMA and its derivatives should be the basis for the resolution of the Ivorian conflict. On this point, the mission therefore failed in its attempt to bring a political solution to the conflict. The unique agreement that led to a real attempt to resolve politically the conflict was the OPA. The fact is that OPA was a negotiation as a puzzle to be solved and the recommended solutions were based on the preference of the parties. The content of the proposal was therefore fair for both parties. There was no imbalance in the balance of power. Both parties talked about an African solution for an African problem.

Organisational theorists see negotiation as a process of consensus-building among several constituent groups with shares in the result, negotiation is therefore an organisational management. The parties to the conflict must be able to gradually build a consensus around the content of the agreement that will allow the conflict to be resolved. The mediator must be impartial in this case and not direct them towards the solution he thinks is the right one but

direct them towards a fair solution for both. The French mediation – supported by the United Nations – in Linas Marcoussis was more like an arbitration where the mediator's recommendations should be strictly applied. Since the United Nations endorsed the French mediation as a basis for the political resolution of the Ivorian conflict, The UN failed to offer to the warring parties an opportunity for a consensus-building process.

While mediation has been widely practised in inter-state wars, it is less popular in intra-state conflicts, which are apparently difficult to mediate (KEMPER, 2007). Bercovitch and Derouen (2004) argued that track-one actors<sup>96</sup>, who have the power to influence or to put pressure on the parties, were the more effective mediators. In the Ivorian case many mediations were led by Head of State or Government, but the most influent was France Head of State. France led a capacity-based mediation because economically and politically it had the capacity to use threat to obtain an agreement. Laurent Gbagbo several times said that Dominique De Villepin and Chirac threatened him to obtain a signing of the LMA. Siegel and Fouraker (1960) found that the best result is obtained in negotiation when (1) there is a prominent ideal result; (2) there is complete information on the identification of the noticeable result; (3) each party has a veto power ensuring that the result is mutually acceptable; and (4) there are only two parties involved.

Diehl and Druckman's analytical framework applied to UNOCI mission raised other issues. Concerning violence abatement, the key measures are related to the levels of violence. Where violence occurs, is that a failure of peacekeepers, and how do we know whether or not there would have been more violence in the absence of those peacekeepers? (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2012) To this question, Diehl and Druckman's analytical framework requests that the global level of violence will decrease over time with the deployment of peacekeepers.

I argue that peacekeepers deployment can increase the resistance in applying political agreement if one of the warring parties think that the peacekeepers or one of the members of the multidimensional mission are not impartial. During the Ivorian crisis, Laurent Gbagbo saw the France's implication in Ivorian crisis excessive and as neo-colonialism. Bercovitch (2004) stressed States show a tendency to reject track-one mediation efforts because of their fear of losing sovereignty and autonomy. That is why mediation initiatives by nongovernmental actors gain increasing attention. Nongovernmental actors play an important role in high-level violent

---

<sup>96</sup> The term track-one is use for "official representatives of a state or state-like authority and involves interaction with other states or state-like authorities" (Nan 2003: 1)

conflicts in track-two diplomacy<sup>97</sup> due to successful mediation activities of nongovernmental religious organisations, such as the Quakers, Sant Egidio, or the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All-African Conference of Churches (AACC) (KEMPER, 2007).

For Mitchell (1981), mediation appears as a kind of intermediary activity undertaken by a third party which has the primary intention of achieving agreement of the issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive conflictual behaviour. I argue that France/ONUCI mediation increased the warring parties' disruptive conflictual behaviour in many ways. France/ONUCI's mediation in several respects had the effect of increasing the resistance of the parties to the conflict to apply the different peace agreement. Camp Gbagbo repeatedly condemned the imitation of international actors in the internal affairs of Côte d'Ivoire. The dissidents for their part made a case for the ambivalent character of France and UNOCI in the resolution of the Ivorian crisis.

Moore (2003, p 15) emphasises that mediation consists "of including a third party – a mediator – in the negotiations who is accepted by the adversaries as an impartial and a neutral subject". Impartiality remains the most important aspect in a mediation. I argue that France/ONUCI's partiality in the way of Ivorian conflict resolution undermined the smooth running of the peace process. In 2011, both France and ONUCI took side in the Ivorian conflict becoming a warring party. UNPKO prohibited a mission to be warring party and then the mission has to remain impartial. If any warring party perceive such partiality, it can use it to spoil the peace process by questioning the role of the mediator or the international actors intervening in the crisis.

Maoz and Terris (2009, p. 88) state when mediation takes place, mediator's credibility is a feature that "increases the likelihood of a partial or full settlement". Walter (1997) added that to be credible, a mediator must fulfil at least three basic conditions: a) have a specific self-interest; b) must be willing to use force if; c) have determination. Vukovic (2014, p. 7) argue:

The significance of a third party's interest in finding an adequate solution through a mediation procedure is that it makes a third party's presence stronger, which directly affects the quality of the agreement, due to third party's position as a credible and mutually acceptable guarantor of the contract.

If the mediator is not credible due to his partiality, it is therefore impossible to reach a quality, credible and mutually acceptable agreement.

---

<sup>97</sup>The track-two level of a society refer to its middle-range actors, such as academics, religious or ethnic leaders (Lederach 1997: 27)

After the deployment of ONUCI peacekeepers, we can note two majors' outbreak in the Ivorian crisis. From 2004 to 2017, the number of deaths was 1886. The total number of deaths was 3596 from 1989 to 2017 (UCDP, 2019). The casualties were high after the implementation of ONUCI, but it does not mean that the presence of ONUCI increased the number of deaths.

In practice, the LMA was difficult to implement because one of the parties to the conflict felt biased by the agreement. Should the UN have delegated this negotiation task entirely to France? After 1989, members of the Security Council were the first to encourage this kind of initiative where a "Great power" leads a coalition in one part of the world, as Britain did in Sierra Leone, Australia in East Timor and France in Côte d'Ivoire (BERGAMASCHI, I.; DEZALAY, 2005). This practice is therefore not new. Not having its own army, the UN relies on the human and material contributions of its members. Nonetheless, this form of "delegation" in Côte d'Ivoire is a disavowal of the entire international community (SMITH, 2003).

For a long time, Gbagbo was considered by the French authorities as an insurgent. His nationalist side did not have good echoes on the French side. He represented for some a threat to French interests in Côte d'Ivoire. Druckman (1997) underlined negotiation as diplomatic policies. This approach sees negotiation as another scenario for developing the international policy game. On the other hand, for the decision-maker, negotiation is just one element of several tools for the implementation and development of external policies. I argue that France partiality during the resolution of Ivorian crisis was the continuity and development of its external policies. If the situation in Côte d'Ivoire remained in stalemate, it would have endangered all the west African side and that would have a direct repercussion on France interests in the region. In Mali for example, French intervention and the conflict in Mali have wider implications not only for Mali and its neighbours, but also for Africa, the international community, and France's national security and strategic interests at home and abroad (FRANCIS, 2013)

After the implementation of UNOCI, it was France that led the operations in Côte d'Ivoire even though they were coordinated in a more or less vague manner by the peacekeeping forces. Because of its difficulty in having the force of law, the LMA has given way to various agreements described as African agreements for an African crisis. If the LMA served as a soft base for the Accra and Pretoria agreements, the Ouagadougou agreement that led to the organisation of the 2010 elections has wiped out the previous agreements and appeared to be the Ivorians' agreement to the Ivorian crisis.

The organisation of the elections, which had been the arm of France and the UN to bring peace to Côte d'Ivoire, did not have the desired effect. The violence that followed the proclamation of the results on 28 November 2010 showed that the Ivorian problem was far from being resolved and that a simple election would not be enough to address the deep wounds of Ivorians. The parties to the conflict were once again at an impasse, and the post-electoral crisis degenerated into a deadly conflict.

That is why it is important to define a standard problem before starting negotiation. An essential step for the negotiations is to get the parties to agree on a standard definition of the problem. A standard definition of the problem in Ivorian case should be **to avoid the discrimination between Ivorians created by the introduction of the concept of ivoirité, which will allow for a national cohesion that is imperative for the country's economic recovery and the resolution of the land problem. This economic revival requires the reunification of the country, DDR and the organisation of free, fair and transparent elections without ethnic or regional discrimination. In short, national reconciliation.** OPA was closer to this definition than the LMA. The lack of democracy is not always at the root of the outbreak of conflict. Each conflict has its own dynamics and therefore need an appropriate solution when it comes to resolving it.

During this period of post-electoral crisis, UNOCI has multiplied its mediation attempts for a non-military outcome to the conflict. However, the French presence and involvement in the crisis were contradictory and controversial in many of its aspects. It made it difficult for the UN to remain neutral or even impartial, and France's presence and interests left the UN in the back seat in the areas of mediation and security (NOVOSSELOFF, 2015). But at the same token for many observers, UNOCI never would have succeeded without Licorne, and Licorne never would have succeeded without UNOCI (NOVOSSELOFF, 2015).

Another striking fact in the attempt to resolve the Ivorian conflict was the absence of sanctions due to the non-implementation of the peace agreements signed by the parties. Most of the time, the UNSC brandished the threat of sanctions against any spoiler in the peace process. However, these threats did not frighten the parties, which repeatedly continued to not implement the resolutions of the agreements. This raises the question of the binding force of the peace agreements. Should the parties be obliged to implement the agreements they signed? Will forcing them to implement peace agreements not reduce the likelihood of negotiating political agreements?

The negotiation between the warring parties in the post electoral crisis failed and the Ivorian crisis was "resolved" by the military way. France Licorne helped the ADO's army to

defeated Laurent Gbagbo five months after the proclamation of the second turn results. The Negotiation phase during the Ivorian crisis led us to the following statements.

First, Zartman ripeness theory provided us a substantial framework to understand “why”, “how” and “when” the warring parties start to negotiate, but do not guarantee the result or the success of the negotiation. In the Ivorian case for example different effectiveness indicators were present to start a negotiation, nonetheless, the crisis was “resolved” military but not politically. The ONUCI incited the parties for negotiation at all stage of the conflict, but France/ONUCI ambiguous position combined with many spoilers undermined the smooth running of such mediation for a political way out of the crisis.

Second, mediation in general affects the flexibility of disputants, therefore, the flexibility on the part of mediator impacts directly the process of negotiation. ONUCI and France insisted at the beginning on a strict and regulated application of the LMA, which confirmed Laurent Gbagbo in his theory of neo-colonialism. And the consequence was he refused to apply part of the content of the agreement.

Finally, because of the negotiation of Linas-Marcoussis round table, the ONUCI was implemented and such implementation reduced drastically the number of clashes and death during the crisis. That meant that the negotiation was a success to stop the fight between warring parties. ONUCI intermediate in many ways in the political resolution of the Ivorian conflict. Notwithstanding, the growing dependence of the UN on multilateral operations may, however, seriously undermine the international credibility of the organisation (FRETTER, 2016). Luck (1992, p 148) stated that “If the major powers use international organisations only as public relations vehicles [...], the credibility of these organisations, nor that of collective standards and decisions, will be damaged.” (LUCK, 1992)

### 5.3.2 ONUCI in the conflict resolution

In the chapter two of our thesis, we underlined the root and deep causes of the Ivorians crisis. Land crises, social discrimination, decrease in the income of the citizens and the State, political instability, etc. How UNOCI dealt with these causes of the Ivorians crisis?

UNOCI had a specific mandate, that of peacekeeping, even if the mission gradually took on a multidimensional character. The mission therefore focused on its mandate which was: Monitoring of the ceasefire and movements of armed groups, Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement, Protection of UN personnel,

institutions and civilians, Support for humanitarian assistance, Support for the implementation of the peace process, Assistance in the field of human rights, Public information, Law and order, election certification.

As its core goals, UNOCI had violence abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement. In the light of what has been said above, it seems that UNOCI core goal focused on the conflict itself and not on its causes. The mission had a clear mandate about reducing level of violence, casualties, arms control, involvement of neighbours, demilitarised conflict zone, etc. Based upon its core goals, I could argue that UNOCI did not have a mandate to address the roots causes of Ivorian conflict. As a peace mission, UNOCI had to focus on its mandate, which it did.

However, peace mission's core goals alone cannot determine the effectiveness of a mission. Indeed, each conflict has its own dynamics and therefore requires a different approach. If we ignore that specificity, we run the risk of not resolving the conflict. That is why in addition to core goals, non-traditional goals are important to analyse the impact of peace missions in conflict resolution. Therefore, the pursuit of non-traditional goals by peace operations is equivalent to the observation of conflict resolution effectiveness indicators. Indeed, the effectiveness indicators of the resolution phase comprehend the identification of the causal factors behind the conflict and the pursuit of ways to deal with them. Did ONUCI non-traditional goals deal with the roots of Ivorian crisis?

Many of the UNOCI non-traditional goals such as human rights protection, humanitarian assistance, election supervision are consequences of the Ivorian crisis. Accordingly, they are not the causes of the conflict. However, they are important in the Ivorian conflict resolution. The non-traditional goals may vary from one mission to another. It is the place to incorporate some goals which would help a good running of the mission. In this section for example, the mission can identify the deep causes of the conflict and introduce some of them in its operation road map. In the Ivorian case, the land crisis should have been one of the causes that the UNOCI could have aggregated to its mandate. The land question appeared in the LMA as an issue to be resolved but nothing more. We argue that non-traditional goals are the section where peace mission could find ways of dealing with some causal factors behind conflicts.

But, UNOCI non-traditional goals were not limited to human rights protection, humanitarian assistance, election supervision, democratisation, DDR, and information were part of them. DDR has emerged as a major pillar for post-conflict peace consolidation in Africa and the quality of its implementation ranks high on the list of the criteria against which the



probability of a country recovering from crisis to relapse into violence is assessed (AYISSI, 2021). DDR is a crucial point of the non-traditional goals since it avoids resumption of hostilities and therefore a beginning of the conflict resolution. Ayissi (2021, p 142) stated “Successfully implemented DDR programs, however, give the stronger chances to conflict resolution and post-conflict peace”.

DDR influence is visible in the enduring conflicts in Africa. The pastoral or religious militias in the Sahel; the contested elections in Kenya (2007-08), Zimbabwe (2008), and Côte D'Ivoire (2010-11); and in the high incidence of political violence in areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, and Somalia are some examples (MUNIVE; STEPPUTAT, 2015). DDR is the largest intervention in nearly all of the UN's ongoing peacekeeping missions and it is a key importance as a field in which peacebuilding can make a direct contribution to restoring public security, law, and order (BERDAL; UCKO, 2013).

I argued that in the Ivorian crisis DDR should have been more important than election supervision and organisation. The fact is that ONUCI focused more on election organisation and supervision and relegated DDR into second plan. The consequence was that there were more weapons circulating in 2010 than at the outset of the conflict in 2002. This important aspect of the resolution of the Ivorian conflict has been flawed in many ways. First of all, it was a sine qua non for the organisation of the elections. On this point, UNOCI proved to be a great failure and then the elections took place, but the dissidents did not disarm. Then there was an arms embargo in Côte d'Ivoire which was supposed to prevent belligerents from rearming.

As far as democratization concern, many debates have focused on whether democracy can be imposed through outside intervention, either through unilateral or multilateral mission (HELDT, 2005). Democracy is in many ways used as a criterion for measuring the success of peacekeeping operations (HELDT; WALLENSTEEN, 2005). The United Nations is frequently the main candidate to intervene in violent conflicts and provide international peace and security (PUSHKINA, 2006).

According to former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1995, p. 3), liberal democracy is “one of the pillars on which a more peaceful, more equitable and more secure world can be built”. With the publication of its “Agenda for Democratization”, the UN further consolidated its role in advocating a global culture of democracy (STEINERT; GRIMM, 2015). As Boutros-Ghali (1996, p. 7) describes “Democracy within states thus fosters the evolution of the social contract upon which lasting peace can be built. In this way, a culture of democracy is fundamentally a culture of peace”. As a consequence, UN peace operations started to include liberal state-building and democracy promotion among their objectives.

Since post-colonial African states are portrayed as weak states and incapable of maintaining themselves democratically, peace missions turn into a real campaign for the promotion of liberal democracy, forgetting even the precepts of “peacebuilding and peacekeeping”. We sometimes see a promotion of liberal democracy through the peacebuilding missions, that is a global culture of peacebuilding practice and theory based on the liberal peace (PARIS, 2003). Peacebuilding mission should not be transformed in a single attempt to “repair” broken states, but it should be a mission that reflect the needs of the country in conflict. Johnstone (2016, s.n.) stressed that “the practical challenge is not to envision some ideal end state and design a mission to achieve that, but to determine what is achievable in light of conditions on the ground”.

I argue that ONUCI has not made Côte d’Ivoire more democratic than it was before its arrival. The verdict of the 2010 elections was handed down by force of arms, there has never been a political transition or a transfer of power between the outgoing president and the elected president. President ADO had run for a third term in 2020 while the constitution of Cote d’Ivoire allows only two terms. The question of a third term has been subject to several interpretations. The constitution was amended in 2016 which opens the debate on the resetting of mandates, i.e., mandates before 2016 are taken or not taken into account. The new peace operation agenda seems to create an ideal type of society built upon the western one. Democracy has not the same meaning for all of the countries.

Michael Barnett (2006) attacks the Western peacebuilding agenda that in his view seeks to create an “ideal society” defined by the rule of law, markets and democracy. He takes the lack of institutional and cultural prerequisites for liberal statehood as a starting point of his point of view since “liberal peacebuilders” are doing “more harm than good”. On the same way, Taking the same critique even further, Bain (2006) argues that it is sheer “folly” to think the West is capable of running other peoples’ states and societies by means of a benevolent despotism called “transitional administration”.

On several occasions France and UNOCI insisted on the rapid holding of elections. These elections should have been an important step towards a definitive resolution of the Ivorian conflict. However, the question arises as to whether the conditions were in place for such elections. The representative of France at the United Nations expressed dissatisfaction several times about the slow running of election process. International community was worrying about such slowness and were looking for open, free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections, in accordance with international standards. But did the international

community create conditions to organise elections in accordance with international standards? And what do international standards mean?

These questions open the debate about ideal end states and achievable goals. Peace mission should be a reflection of what is happening on the ground and not how the things should be on the ground. Johnstone (2016, s.n.) stressed that “The real challenge is not to articulate some ideal of peace and fashion new templates for how to get there, but to grasp what is achievable in the particular circumstances of a crisis and to design a mission accordingly”. It was noted that this was not always the case with UNOCI’s mandate in the field.

If democratisation was a huge aspect of the resolution of the Ivorian conflict, it is important to take into account that there are many aspects behind democratisation which, when addressed, facilitate the democratisation process. Democratisation in a post-colonial Africa is a long process that involve many aspects of social life. For example, social process theories treat conflict and conflict resolution as processes which cannot be explained entirely in terms of either individual behaviour, or social structures. Social process theorists may focus on such issues as patterns of conflict escalation, the role of conflict in society, or the relation between conflict and competition (SCHELLENBERG, 1996).

As far as the resolution of Ivorian is concerned, UNOCI executed the road map that was elaborated by the UNSC. The mission has seen its mandate renewed and adjusted according to the evolution of the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. The mission can be evaluated only on the basis of its mandate, that means what it had to do and not what it should have done. However, the post UNOCI events may question the content of the mandate used to resolve the crisis and the changes that could be made in the future. In the preceding chapters, UNOCI’s shortcomings and inconsistencies have been pointed out, not in order to discredit the mission, but to underline what it could do better or avoid for the conflict resolution. For example, it was the first time that a UN mission had the mandate to certify a presidential election. First of all, we saw that the data put forward by the SG’s special representative in Côte d’Ivoire were different from those of the IEC and the Constitutional Court. Secondly, UNOCI’s certification reinforced the feeling of nationalism and neo-colonialist intrusion into the ranks of Laurent Gbagbo’s supporters and thus exacerbated an already deleterious situation.

### 5.3.3 UNOCI and the Ivorian conflict transformation

Since 1946 Côte d'Ivoire has experienced intrastate, non-state and one-sided organised violence. With the death of Felix Houphouët-Boigny and the ethnical tensions, the introduction of multi-party politics, the introduction of austerity's measures and the economic recession, the political dynamics changed substantially in the country. The Ivorian crisis therefore has its roots in the facts mentioned. In order to try to resolve it, it was necessary to identify these underlying causes and try to find a solution, so that the dynamics of the conflict could be changed, and the conflict transformed. How UNOCI has worked to transform the dynamics of the Ivorian conflict?

To answer this question, we will look at UNOCI's peacebuilding goals. This section included local security, rule of law, local governance and *reconciliation nationale*. To measure progress in the field of local security we used indicators such level of violence, level of safety and freedom of movement. These indicators are consequences of the conflict but not the causes. In other words, this aspect of peacebuilding goals focuses on the phase during and after the conflict.

The rule of law concern judicial coverage, judicial functioning, protection of detainees after the outbreak of the conflict. Local governance is about local elections, civilian control of the militaries, government capacity and independence of foreign powers. It is noticeable that it is not what led to the conflict but what follows from the conflict. These indicators are essential for preparing the post-conflict period but may be insufficient if the causes of the conflict remain latent.

UNOCI worked to transform the Ivorian crisis by modifying the destructive consequences of the conflict. That is a key effectiveness indicator of the transformation phase. However, the other key effectiveness indicator of conflict transformation is to improve relationships and social structures. This brings us back to national reconciliation. National reconciliation will make it possible to re-establish trust and the relationship destroyed by the conflict.

The conflict according to Gatelier (2014) is the manifestation of the multitude that compose a society, and which naturally expresses itself through the same diversification of points of view, interests and objectives that can be contradictory and incompatible. The conflict is then born of this incompatibility and this fact is normal in the life of societies. Conflict transformation highlights the need for long-term structural, relational and cultural changes (DIJKEMA; GATELIER; MOUAFO DJONTU, 2014). The mandate of UNOCI as far as national reconciliation concern was about past crimes, displaced people returned, improve


relations between conflicting parties and promote peace. To improve relations between warring parties means to deal with the ethnical tensions, political, social and economic crises.

This task was left to the Ivorians through their *Commission Dialogue Vérité et Réconciliation* (CDVR). Indeed, to address their traumas, this CDVR was set up in 2011. Its objective was “to work independently for national reconciliation and the strengthening of social cohesion between all communities living in Côte d’Ivoire through traditional justice mechanisms”. Charles Konan Banny was appointed president (IHEJ, [2015?]). Despite the positive official discourse on the work of the CDVR, the merits attributed to it are now much more nuanced. Many observers today agree that the work of reconciliation in Côte d’Ivoire is far from over. Its action carried out from 2011 to 2014 were not completely useless, but they were largely insufficient according to many observers, notably human rights NGOs such as the FIDH (IHEJ, [2015?]).

The peacebuilding goals appeared in 2008 in the Capstone Doctrine<sup>98</sup> which identifies four elements of sustainable peace and therefore a focus for early peacebuilding: a) restoring the state’s ability to provide security and maintain public order; b) strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights; c) supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes; d) promoting social and economic recovery and development, including the safe return of refugees and IDP (JOHNSTONE, 2016). The four elements are interlinked, and the fourth element is part of national reconciliation. National reconciliation is the most important element in the peacebuilding phase. Indeed, it allows easy implementation of the three other and therefore promote economic recovery and development. UN at this stage can use the UN peacebuilding triangle – DPKO – OCHA – UNDP summarised as follow.

---

<sup>98</sup> This term refers to the principles and guidelines for U.N. peacekeeping operations, as set out in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines of 18 January 2008. It is a key document that provides the guiding principles and core objectives of United Nations peacekeeping operations. It identifies the primary factors that contribute to effective field operations and clarifies the responsibilities of peacekeepers at nearly every level, as well as the Organisations’ expectations. Aside from codifying the key lessons learned from previous experience in UN peacekeeping, it is to remain a living document that will continue to be reviewed and updated. (POM, 2020)

**Figure 2 – UN Peacebuilding Triangle**

Source: Benner; Binder; Rotmann, 2006.

UNOCI's track record is very mixed. The mission has struggled to implement its mandate for thirteen years. ONUCI left Côte d'Ivoire but many things remain to be done: social cohesion, security sector reform, unification of Côte d'Ivoire, etc. The task will be very difficult and the events that accompanied the presidential elections of 2020 have shown us that the Ivorian crisis is far from being resolved. Even though UNOCI has completed its mandate, its track record does not improve the doubts surrounding peace missions in the 21st century. But what needs to be done for more effective missions?

#### 5.4 Rethinking peace operations in the 21st century

UN peace operations are in controversy, sadly illustrated by its failure to adequately address contemporary conflicts, such as in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. In the years immediately following the end of the Cold War, there was a consensus in the international community that peace operations needed to address root causes of conflicts and thus have broad mandates, including the rebuilding of a liberal state. In recent years, this consensus has waned, and different approaches to peacebuilding compete. This turning point in UN peacebuilding can be used to rethink the conception of peace operations and its impact on world politics. The

increasing influence of Russia and China, as well as other rising powers, such as Brazil, India, and Turkey, is a massive opportunity for decentralisation in a UNSC for suitable peace missions.

#### 5.4.1 Peace missions or states “fixing”: the blurred line

The way the UNSC’s traditional powers members, France, UK and USA conceptualise security, sovereignty, and institutions have to be challenged. Our perceptions can influence the way we understand and resolve conflicts. Therefore, we do not share the same perceptions of the meaning of conflict and peace at the local and international level (HELLMÜLLER, 2013). As a result, the various peacebuilding initiatives are perceived differently, firstly by the United Nations Security Council, which must deploy its peace mission, and the failed or weak states, which must give their consent for the implementation of the said mission. Many scholars and academics works have portrayed the post-colonial African States as weak States, devoid of any legitimacy and incapable of maintaining themselves democratically (HAGMANN; PÉCLARD, 2010). It is therefore not surprising to see peacebuilding missions turn into a real campaign for the promotion of liberal democracy, forgetting even the precepts of “peacebuilding and peacekeeping”.

Challenging the established order in the design and materialisation of peace missions means rethinking the very essence of a peace mission. Indeed, since the objective is to (re)build a peace that has been destroyed by the advent of conflict, it would be wise to look at the root of the problems that led to the war. A peace mission must not turn into an imperialist conquest operation or a conflict of ideologies. In Côte d’Ivoire, for example, the problem of land tenure only appears very briefly in the debates; it is included in the program section of the government’s national reconciliation program discussed during the Marcoussis negotiations. In this document, it is stated:

The Round Table considers that Law 98-750 of 23 December 1998 on Rural Land tenure, adopted unanimously by the National Assembly, constitutes a reference in a field that is legally difficult and economically crucial. Nevertheless, the Government of National Reconciliation: (a) will support the progressive implementation of this regime by carrying out a campaign to explain it to the rural populations in such a way as to work toward true security of tenure. (b) will submit an amendment to better protect acquired rights under article 26 of the law on heirs of landowners holding rights predating the

enactment of the law but not fulfilling the condition of ownership set out in Article 1.<sup>99</sup>

Such an important and sensitive point appears only in the LMA, but not in UNOCI's mandate. The issue of the organisation of the elections seemed to be much more important than the fate of the indigenous, non-indigenous and non-Ivorian people. The case of UNOCI is an example of the difference of perception in the way of understanding and resolving conflicts. UNOCI primary mission evolved to include organisation and certification of elections and logically restore a democracy. However, the result was a bloody and deadly post-electoral conflict. We could therefore ask ourselves this question: If safeguarding democracy was so important, why was there so little interest in helping the Laurent Gbagbo regime, which was democratically elected even though the elections were truncated because of the exclusion of ADO and HKB? France argued the principle of non-interference when the dissidents tried to destabilise the power in place. But eight years later, France was at the forefront, using military means to restore justice to the ballot boxes that had brought ADO to the supreme magistracy.

France interventions in Africa are very controversial. In an allocution in Mali in 2013, the French President Hollande claimed to put an end to the Sarkozy era and the neo-colonial and sometimes mafia practices of *françafrique* (BERGAMASCHI, 2013). For information, Nicolas Sarkozy was the French President during the bombing by France of Gbagbo's residency in 2011. France assistance to its formers colonies is extremely selective. On 11 January 2013, the Malian authorities asked France for its support in stopping the advance of terrorist groups towards Bamako and pushing them back north. Within a few hours, France launched a military operation – Serval – in support of the Malian armed forces. Although, in Mali, the authorities were in interim and did not enjoy full democratic legitimacy precisely because they had not been elected (BERGAMASCHI, 2013). What was the difference between the attack suffered by the democratically elected Laurent Gbagbo in 2002 and the interim President Traoré in 2013?

Operation Serval received a great deal of support, both nationally and internationally. This French intervention seemed to be most popular than the French *Opération Licorne* in Côte d'Ivoire for example. This consensus can be explained by the dramatic turn of events that legitimised the intervention, and the fact that the consensus was reached through legal and political arguments, and communication strategies deployed both in Mali and in France

---

<sup>99</sup>Cf UN Security Council S/2003/99. Annex 1 to the letter dated 27 January 2003 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. Section IV, point 1 and 2. p. 6-7.



(BERGAMASCHI, 2013). Later, the Security Council has adopted resolution 2100 authorising the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) for an initial period of 12 months. As in Côte d'Ivoire, France laid the foundations for a peace mission. But as in Côte d'Ivoire, important aspects of the crisis were omitted. The UNSC in its resolutions did not take into account the post "Ivorian miracle" economic crisis, the social crisis and the land crisis. We sometimes see a promotion of liberal democracy through the peacekeeping missions, that is a global culture of peacebuilding practise and theory based on the liberal peace (PARIS, 2003).

To motivate, shape and legitimise intervention, France alleged interference motivated for restoring the democracy in Côte d'Ivoire and "Islamist threat" in Mali. However, the reasons that pushed the Touareg to rebel themselves were left out. Structural inequalities in the distribution of assets and privileges among identity groups are central forces of contention (CEDERMAN; GLEDITSCH; BUHAUG, 2013). These inequalities added to some grievances are real-time bombs in countries where ethnopolitical division is accentuated. In a multi-ethnics' country like Côte d'Ivoire, ethnopolitical discrimination and a considerable drop in income of some ethnic groups can be aggravating circumstances for the outbreak of a conflict. Economic differences have in many cases been extended to political inequalities, shaped by the geostrategic rivalry between competing ethnic groups, as well as by discriminatory colonial powers (WUCHERPFENNIG; HUNZIKER; CEDERMAN, 2016).

Nonetheless, conflict theories increasingly see state weakness as a cause for an outbreak or continuation of the conflict (NEWMAN; PARIS; RICHMOND, 2009). In this perspective, the best way to resolve such a conflict is to repair these weak states (KAPLAN, 2009). Failed States are defined not by what they are, but what they are not (HAGMANN, T.; PÉCLARD, 2010), such distinction occurs following a Western model of a legal-rational Weberian State (KABAMBA, 2010). We must, therefore, help the failed states by instilling in them the values of the great liberal democracies. It is the only way to solve the problem of increasing intra-state conflict. It is with this in mind that Fukuyama (2005, p IX) asserted: "state-building is one of the most important issues for the world community because weak or failed states are the source of many of the world's most serious problems."

From this vision, the line between "state-building" and "peacebuilding" becomes wholly blurred. This perceptual framework of "state failure" as a conflict cause influence international analysis of conflict and therefore, the implementation of peace operations. As a result, peace operations become generic, the measures applied generic, elections as the most appropriate peacebuilding tool, and the results leave something to be desired. If we take the example of the conflict in Ituri, a district in the north-eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,

despite the numerous international and local peacebuilding interventions in the district (HELLMÜLLER, 2014), we can notice that the war, which lasted from 1999 to 2003, led to the death of more than 50,000 people and displaced more than 500,000 (VAN WOUDENBERG, 2004).

In Many cases, interventions are not sufficient. Bergamashi (2013) argued that Opération Serval would not suffice to resolve the Malian crisis successfully. UNMISMA, despite its robust mandate, remains the most dangerous UN mission with a high death toll of peacekeepers due to the lack of coordination with Malian forces, the G-5 Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad) and Barkhane (France) in the field. Assumptions, when they come to deal with conflicts in Africa, are reducible to states failure and sometimes to barbarism. Indeed, a stable state is generally not a victim of internal conflict. The State will weaken if political, economic and social problems internally undermine it. To build and keep the peace without addressing the core issue of the crisis can lead to the resumption of the hostilities and failure of the mission. It raises the question of a settlement of the conflict in the short term or a definitive solution to the conflict in the long term. Lederach (1997) saw the need to resolve the dilemma between short-term conflict management and long-term relationship building, as well as the resolution of the underlying causes of conflict, by building long-term infrastructure for peacebuilding, supporting the potential for social reconciliation.

The United Nations has gone through several phases in its existence during the Cold War period, the post-Cold War period, and the multipolar world we are living in today. However, one thing that often came back when we study the UN evolution is the predominant role played by the P5s – USA, UK, France, China and Russia – especially the first three. Even if through the years, we can note the structural, methodological and institutional changes in the UN, the operating system remains virtually the same.

That is why many peace operations are characterised by the presence of the former colonisers in the missions. For countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Sierra Leone, which are former British and French colonies, France and Great Britain easily manage to impose their will. The other members of the Council most of the timeline up behind them. For example, France used its privileged place in the Security Council to play an important role in determining the future of Côte d'Ivoire (MBEKI, 2011). Mr Hardeep Singh Puri India's Representative expressed concern that the resolution which led to use of force to neutralise "Gbagbo army" heavy weapon was adopted too quickly. He claimed that delegations should be given more time to consider and debate such a text and more time should be devoted to consultations, which

would allow troop-contributing countries in particular to give their views on the use of their troops.

Conflicts with geopolitical significance to or the direct involvement of one or more P5 countries influence the conception and execution in peacebuilding, and also for future missions. In Libya, the United Nations Mission of Support in Libya – UNMIL – was unanimously established on 16 September 2011 by UN Security Council Resolution 2009. Its main mission was to support the new Libyan authorities in restoring public security and the rule of law with a view to future elections and the drafting of a constitution. However, it was the United Kingdom, co-author of the text with the United States and France, that initiated it. The representative of South Africa expressed disappointment that the Security Council had not been able to include a call for a cessation of hostilities in the text. The representative of the Russian Federation regretted the fact that “the Council’s mandate for conducting the operation in Libya was disregarded, resulting in airstrikes that also targeted civilian facilities and killed civilians” and the China Representative argued that “Libya’s sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity must be genuinely respected” (UNSC, 2011k).

The increasing influence of countries such as Russia and China, as well as other rising powers, such as Brazil, India, and Turkey, can create a counterbalance in the UNSC. Still, it can also be a hindrance to setting up a peace operation. Brazil, India, and Turkey can create a counterbalance because of their position of Global South actors and their non-former colonisers’ positions. Their vision would be a little closer to the so-called “weak” states, which is an asset in the conception and execution of peace missions. On the other hand, the increasing influence of Russia and China can be a hindrance in the conception and implementation of peace operations.

The most striking case is that of Syria. In Syria, the escalation of violence and the growing protests of the international community are forcing the UN Security Council to take up the Syrian case. But the NATO bombing fiasco in Libya had consequences for the setting up of a UN mission Syria, China and Russia have blocked any draft resolution aimed at condemning the Syrian regime’s repression of its population (TRUYOL, 2016). During the draft session, the Russian Federation Representative claimed that “violence by all sides must cease, and the crisis can be resolved only through a Syrian-led inclusive political process”. Chinese Representative spoke immediately after the Russian one and stressed China’s support to the draft resolution proposed by Russia on the Syrian issue.

The Representative of India underlined the fact that a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political solution can be found in an atmosphere free of violence and bloodshed. He also pointed

out the convergence of point of view of India along with its IBSA – India, Brazil and South Africa – partners. Even if the United States of America Representative argued “I know that some members here may be concerned that the Security Council could be headed towards another Libya. That is a false analogy. Syria is a unique situation that requires its approach, tailored to the specific circumstances occurring there” (UNSC, 2012f), the Chinese and Russian Representatives maintained their initial position. French Representative called “to put an end to the scandalous silence of the Security Council” and United Kingdom Representative announced that “the draft resolution does not propose imposing change on Syria from outside” (UNSC, 2012f).

The Security Council sometimes turns into a place of war of ideologies. In the Syrian case, the doubts expressed by the Chinese and Russian representatives were justified, but the situation in Libya was different from that in Syria, so the approaches had to be different. Russia is defending its interests in Syria and is therefore blocking the implementation of actions to reduce violence against civilians. The Chinese and Russian opposition is far from being a selfless act, it is more in line with the logic of the war of ideologies and the pursuit of the interests of the member states of the UNSC. This makes the question of the implementation of peace missions in the world even more complex.

The Secretary-General of the Arab League, Nabil el-Arabi, after failing to find a way out of the Syrian crisis, including the departure of President al-Assad, therefore presented a proposal to the UN Security Council. Despite tough negotiations, China and Russia vetoed a “lighter” version of the Arab League’s proposal. However, the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the resignation of Bashar al-Assad (TRUYOL, 2016). Meanwhile, the US accused Russia of holding the Security Council hostage. From this situation, we can draw three conclusions. The first is that the presence of Russia and China is now preventing the systematic imposition of liberal peace in countries in conflict. The second is that the conception and execution of peace missions for emergencies such as Syria are delayed and have disastrous consequences. Third China and Russia are like UK, France and USA, since they are pursuing their own interest and doing so, they left behind the importance to resolve the Syrian case. Hence the need to have case-by-case peace missions and not pre-established peace missions with always the same objectives and the same type of implementation.

The case-by-case is crucial to the effectiveness of peace missions. Some important questions pointed out by Johnstone (2016) should be asked before starting any peace mission. What is the status of the political process? Is it viable, nascent or non-existent? What is the geographic scope of conflict? Is it local, national, regional, or global? Who are the targets of

violence? Is it against other combatants, political opponents or civilians? What are the reasons for the violence? Is the objective to take over the government, control territory and resources, secure a seat at the negotiation table, or to terrorise a population? What is the capacity and perceived legitimacy of the state? Are the national government and institutions strong or weak? Are they legitimate in the eyes of the local population? What is the scope of consent to and cooperation with a UN presence? What type of UN presence with what mandate will the host government accept? What will the other parties to the conflict accept? What role do neighbours, regional actors and global powers play? The answers to these questions can provide valuable insight into the design of a peace operation (JOHNSTONE, 2016).

One can easily add a third element relating to the geostrategic position of the country in Conflict. The geostrategic aspect is a determining factor in the conception and execution of peace missions. The empirical manifestations of multipolarity characterised by the geopolitical competition and decline of liberal normative order truly influence the conceptualisations of security, sovereignty, and institutions by the P5 members and the other actors of the international politics. Each country, according to the geopolitical era, local politics and system of governance, tried to impose its point of view on the conception and materialisation of a peace mission. The success of the peace operations, therefore, lays on the perception of the conflict, attempts to co-opt peace approaches, and recourse to power politics to resolve conflicts (SHERIFF, A. et al., 2018). Despite the fact that powers such as China, Russia, and Global South actors are challenging the unipolar world dominated by the Western-led liberal international order, the UN system needs to be rethought.

We also noted that P5 members have a constant and almost permanent view of their roles within the organisation despite a change in president or head of government. On the other hand, in the countries of the Global South, the tendency is more towards a change of vision depending on the government in power, which in practice translates into a systematic alignment behind the significant powers or an attempt to challenge the established order. Brazil is one of the most relevant cases. The country has long campaigned to be the representative of the countries of the Global South in the UNSC during the left-wing governance before completely aligning itself behind the USA with the current government.

The Global South actors have been seen as subordinates than partners in the UN system. The UN is not a static force that does not evolve, but a dynamic global force that is continuously changing. This dynamic force, therefore, needs to be harnessed, especially with the emergence of actors from the Global South such as Brazil, South Africa, India, Turkey, etc. Countries like Brazil and India can play such a significant role in a peace operation.

Nevertheless, they are too subordinated to the great powers in UNSC. Blanco and Oliveira (2017) stressed that Brazil's participation in international peacekeeping is short-sighted and subservient. On the one hand, it is reduced to a mere dispatch of troops to the field to contain the most superficial manifestations of violence. On the other hand, it is subordinate in the sense that Brazil limits itself to the role it is given in peace operations as an instrument for maintaining a (neo)liberal international order.

So, it is a common fact that seeing a peace mission being used out of context. International peacebuilding actors' priorities can be different from local authorities and local actors. The international peacebuilding missions may vary according to the priorities of the peace-broker, and policy concepts often shape these priorities. In the Democratic Republic of Congo – DRC – for example, three concepts influenced the international reading of the crisis as Hellmüller (2013) underlined. The first one was Kaplan (1994) narrative of violence in DRC as a result of new barbarism based on essentialist portrayals of ethnicity (HELLMÜLLER, 2013). The second one was the hypothesis developed by Collier and Hoeffler (2000) arguing that civil war is more a result of greed and the looting attempts of rebel group than grievances or ethnic hatred. The third one concern the state failure. Many scholars establish the systematic link between a failed state and armed conflict because ethnic violence was inherent to the context. As soon as the State would lose its grip, greed would come to the fore, and warlords would start to fight over natural resources (HELLMÜLLER, 2013).

Once the source of conflicts in Africa has been detected, international interventions must, therefore, be legitimised. The international press, therefore, has the task of relaying official speeches and reporting on current events in weak states. International public opinion must consequently be formatted so that it sees the justification for intervention. The international press, therefore, makes a partial and sometimes partisan reproduction of the facts related to the conflict. In Mali, for example, the international media focused on the Islamist threat in the Sahel to justify the setting up of the French operation Serval and international intervention. As we know, the aftermath of the Libyan intervention proved to create more destruction and violence, and the spillover of the Jihadist actions in Mali proved to be one component of the Libyan intervention (CAMPBELL, 2014). France intervened in Mali justifying its intervention on the grounds of fighting the very same elements that NATO had empowered in Libya (CAMPBELL, 2014).

Media developments in the Ivorian crisis were reduced to a conflict arising from the divorce between a Muslim North and a Christian South. The New York Times in the United States and Libération in France kept referring to the civil war in religious terms (BASSET,

2003). In an article that appeared in the New York Times on 12 January 2003, we could read: “[...] a government-held area in the Christian and animist south and a rebel-held area in the Muslim north” (SCIOLINO, 2003). In the same article, we can read the former French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin statements: “France accepts its responsibilities. [...] This is the country that does so much for Africa [...] I believe it is important that French people understand the vocation of France, the example we set with our action in the Ivory Coast and Africa” (SCIOLINO, 2003). But as we know, more than 70 per cent of the Muslim are living in southern Côte d’Ivoire, how this division can be between the Christian South and the Muslim North? We also know that France refused to apply its 1961 military agreement with Côte d’Ivoire when the rebellion started in 2002. In another article that appeared in the editorial of the same newspaper on 17 March 2011, it was written “Ivory Coast, an autocrat’s desperate bid to hang on to power has led to unspeakable atrocities and hundreds of deaths. [...] The international community recognised Alassane Ouattara as the legitimate president” (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 2011). A few days later the military vehicles and the air fleet of the Defence and Security Forces of Côte d’Ivoire were bombed by France and UNOCI. But who cares about the Ivorians who voted and elected their President? What matters is what the international community thinks. Maybe if ADO did not have the support of the international community, even if he had won the elections, he would have had the same fate and destiny as Laurent Gbagbo, because what seemed to count was the opinion of the international community, not that of the Ivorians.

In the newspaper Liberation, we can read the same thing in one of its publications:

It seems to us urgent and essential that France, beyond its support for the ECOWAS appeal to the United Nations Security Council, should play its full weight as a permanent member. It must act within the Security Council to ensure that an effective and concrete international resolution is taken on the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and on the means of resolving it by supporting dialogue between political parties (CHAUVEAU; DOZON; LOSCH, 2002).

The International Community, particularly the former colonisers, seem to ever decide without consulting at the local level. International interventions and sometimes peace talks are from outside to inside, that means that all decisions are made internationally, but they have to be applied internally. In the Ivorian case, for example, that appears clearly. Herman J. Cohen, a former United States assistant secretary of state for African affairs criticised the French for giving the rebels equal footing with the Ivoirian government during the Ivorian crisis. He said: “The French have decided not to use decisive force and get boxed in and have told rebels not to go further. But to treat them as equals in negotiations undermines the whole idea of

democratically elected regimes. In effect, the message to other countries is, ‘Any bunch of guys with guns can shoot their way into power’” (SCIOLINO, 2003).

It is therefore not surprising that the Ivorian government did not take it well. As Laurent Gbagbo pointed out, Dominique de Villepin accorded him no respect as Head of State and treated him on an equal footing with the rebels (GBAGBO; MATTEI, 2018). This configuration has made Laurent Gbagbo and his supporters more hostile to the presence of the UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire and continued to see the ONUCI as a threat to his power. Due to the difference of perception between international peace mission actor and local actors, any political process is biased from the start, in particular, if undertaken by external actors without any local consulting, as the host state would see it as a threat (NOVOSSELOFF, 2018).

#### 5.4.2 ONUCI: an atypical case

Civil wars do not only destroy existing political orders, but they also contribute to shape new ones and thereby play a crucial role in the dynamics of state formation (PÉCLARD, D. et al., 2019). Usually, seen as a result of a collapse states and armed groups’ economic or personal interests, civil wars contribute to reshaping and producing new political orders. That is why the peacebuilding processes are crucial in post-war countries. Violence serves as a means to address grievances legitimising the actions of armed groups. However, the use of violence also has delegitimising effects for them (PÉCLARD, D. et al., 2019). It creates suffering and destruction upon the very population whose interests they claim to defend (SCHLICHTE, 2009).

In a divided country ruled in the North by the dissident force with Bouaké as capital and in the South by the Laurent Gbagbo’s government with Abidjan as capital, Côte d’Ivoire seemed to be a country in secession which forgot its capital Yamoussoukro. At the beginning of the conflict in 2002, Bouaké was the victim of repeated looting and theft. The population was, therefore, on the edge of survival. On the one hand, the spectre of an imminent attack by government forces and on the other, highway banditry. The dissident troops occupying the city to avoid robberies decided to introduce a rule that anyone caught stealing or looting would be executed immediately. This new measure had the effect of calming the population and considerably reducing acts of banditry. Indeed, the number of thefts and looting has been drastically reduced. If a large part of the population had already joined the cause they were



defending by rebelling, they were building an even stronger image among this population by sending them back a feeling of security and confidence.

The dissidents articulated their legitimising discourse around marginalisation and discrimination of the Northerner on the part of the central government in Abidjan. The marginalisation was at the economic and political level (FÖRSTER, 2010), and the discrimination was due to the concept of *ivoirité* introduced by HKB. Peacebuilding in Côte d'Ivoire, therefore, involves addressing political, economic and social problems, as outlined in Chapter 2. What were the UNOCI's peacebuilding goals? These goals were local security, the rule of law, local governance and national reconciliation.

In resolution 1528, establishing UNOCI, the peacebuilding goals already appeared in the *Law-and-order* section. ONUCI would assist the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international organisations in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout Côte d'Ivoire and on the restructuring of the internal security services (UNSC, 2004b). In the section *Support for the implementation of the peace process*, ONUCI should provide oversight, guidance and technical assistance to the Government of National Reconciliation, with the help of ECOWAS and other international partners, to prepare for and assist in the conduct of free, fair and transparent electoral processes and the re-establishment of the authority of the State throughout Côte d'Ivoire (UNSC, 2004b). The protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment, appeared at the section *Protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians* (UNSC, 2004b).

But which was less apparent was the Reconciliation section. There was indeed talk of a government of national reconciliation, but it was put in place to satisfy the parties politically after the LMA. As regards the improvement of relations between the parties in conflict, particularly the social breakdown between the population, it did not appear in this resolution at the beginning of the mission. Also, the creation of institutions to promote the culture of peace was not mentioned. The implementation of the peace process was resumed to the organisation of free and fair elections and the re-establishment of the authority of the State throughout the country. There was no section to address past crimes, and the most important reconciliation aspect remained a secondary issue for ONUCI.

Hellmüller (2018) discussed five key aspects to consider while operating for a peace operation: (1) the perception matters. It is crucial to understand and to acknowledge that different actors have different perceptions of armed conflict, on peace and peacebuilding priorities. (2) Not only international actors build peace. When talking about peacebuilding, the

focus is still very often on international peacebuilding actors. Local peacebuilding actors are usually subsumed under the broader category of local actors in general. (3) Peacebuilding approaches and actors are not static. Both domestic and international peacebuilding actors and their programs change in their interaction and over time. (4) Focus on comparative advantages. Both international and local actor have specific comparative advantages. For instance, international peacebuilding actors have more monetary resources, while local peacebuilding actors are more cost-effective. (5) Partners for peace. Local and international peacebuilding actors have complementary priorities; the cooperation between them can increase the effectiveness of their programs.

As far as the first aspect concerns, international peacebuilders' interpretation of the conflict and the priorities of peacebuilding are different from what Ivorians could do with regard to the causes of the conflict. At the meeting of 30 April 2004 on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, the Chairman of the UNSC M. Pleuger, representative of Germany, stated: "The Security Council recalls that it endorsed the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, which remains the only possible solution to the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire." (UNSC, 2004h) The only way out of the crisis, according to Mr Pleuger, is to implement an agreement that took place between the political parties and a group of dissidents without the presence of the democratically elected President of the Republic and under the auspices of the former colonial power. Even if the LMA remained the basis for the peaceful resolution of the Ivorian conflict, it was not the only way out of the crisis. Indeed, the agreement that led to the organisation of elections in 2010 was the OPA that seemed closest to the reality of the Ivorian crisis.

There is, however, a gap between what is meant by peacebuilding and what should be meant by peacebuilding. The meaning and scope of peacebuilding, particularly in policy formulation and implementation, remains ambiguous. Variations in definitions and understandings of peacebuilding can be identified along with several spectrums (SHERIFF, A. et al., 2018), as illustrated in the following table.

### **Board 13 - Meaning in peacebuilding terminology**

Liberal Peacebuilding Model	Effective Peacebuilding Model
Narrow focus on specific kinds of activities	Broad focus on a range of activities including peacekeeping, human rights monitoring, mediation, development, education, governance.

Focus on the post-conflict span	Focus on all stages of conflict
Immediate focus on ending direct violence	Long-term focus on addressing the root causes of violence, including structural injustices.
Outcome-oriented focused on solutions	Process-oriented focus on transformation
Focus on the role of outside experts “intervening” in local conflict.	Focus on the role of insiders and increasing their capacity for building peace. Not only international actors build peace. Local and international peacebuilding actors have complementary priorities. The cooperation between them can increase the effectiveness of their programs.
Focus on high level national and international interventions	Focus on all levels of interventions, from the community, regional, and national levels
Focus on military peace operations	Focus on non-military approaches to building peace and security.

*Source. Hellmüller (2018) and Sheriff et al. apud Shcirch (2008) p.4*

The most eagerly awaited was that of 2020 when incumbent President Ouattara decided not to run. But the recent death of the RHDP designated candidate, Mr Ahmadou Gon Coulibaly, who was to succeed ADO as a presidential candidate, has put the cards back in the presidential race. As a result, ADO ran to the presidential election for a third term that is prohibited by the constitution. The question of his third term held the political class in suspense. Also, the refusal to grant Laurent Gbagbo a passport to return to Cote d’Ivoire has awakened strong tensions and bloody demonstrations in the country. The French president initially welcomed the fact that ADO would not be standing for re-election.

But the silence of the French authorities after ADO’s announcement to finally stand for re-election in 2020 left more than one perplexed. Violent clashes broke out all over the country and several people were killed. Opponents decided to boycott the elections and ADO won the first round with more than 94%. His contested re-election created riots in Côte d’Ivoire and some opponents were arrested. The situation seems to be calmer after a few weeks of unrest. The government finally gave Laurent Gbagbo an ordinary and a diplomatic passports to return to Cote d’Ivoire

## 5.5 Conclusion

UNOCI experienced in Côte d'Ivoire different kinds of mandates. The mission started with a light mission to monitor the ceasefire and help to apply the LMA. At the beginning of 2011, ONUCI had a robust mandate to protect civilians against the use of heavy weapons. But the robustness of UNOCI's mandate raised the question of the impartiality of the mission. Indeed, UNOCI and the Force Licorne openly chose their side by bombing the Gbagbo residence and destroying the military arsenal of the Government forces. This use of force by UN peacekeepers and French troops blurred the lines between civilians protection and impartiality.

From its creation in 2004 to its completion in 2017, UNOCI evolved in two phases: the pre-2011 phase and the post-2011 phase. Throughout its mandate, UNOCI helped to prevent the escalation of violence and to protect vulnerable populations, in particular children, women and displaced people. UNOCI protected by patrolling and deterring escalation and monitoring cross-border transactions and peacekeepers cooperated with the French force to resolve problems early, sometimes using power. Licorne and UNOCI prevented the two parties from advancing beyond the *zone de confiance*, thereby preventing the continued resumption of hostilities. UNOCI facilitated humanitarian operations by identifying and securing roads and camps for internally displaced persons.

UNOCI's management of the post-electoral crisis enabled it to stabilise a country that was in the throes of violent unrest. It would be a little too early to make any progress towards a definitive resolution of the conflict, but Côte d'Ivoire was not the same before and after UNOCI. Several elections were held in a transparent and disciplined manner after 2011. Disarmament, which before 2011 was a dismal failure turned into a success, with several weapons taken out of circulation. Nonetheless, there are still weapons in circulation.

A peace operation always has to leave someday, but when it does, it does not mean the country has no more challenges to face. The Diehl-Druckman analytical framework certainly helped to draw out some of the UNOCI's critical issues and to identify important areas where progress has been made. Notwithstanding, we noted particular areas that might need reconsideration in the framework. The separation between human rights and civilian protection should be revised and the latter should be incorporated into core goals. Conflict resolution must include the UN at the beginning of the negotiation and mediation process if it is to be a real core goal. It is also crucial to incorporate information as a non-traditional goal. Indeed, many

of the peace operations taking place in Africa, and as we know, on the continent the press plays a significant role in ethnic and religious manipulation and incitement to violence.

Although the framework addresses the levels of aggregation problem, it runs the risk of holding peacekeepers accountable for things that are the responsibilities of others (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2012). In the Ivorian case, for example, the French forces had a more robust security mandate than UNOCI, and France acted with or without UNSC endorsement. Perhaps it would be necessary to be more specific in allocating the roles of the parties when the colonising power decides to join the peacekeepers. Such overlapping mandates and complex partnerships are becoming a more common feature of UN peace operations (BALAS, 2011).

UNOCI has been involved in three different phases of the Ivorian conflict, the negotiation phase, the resolution phase and the transformation phase. There are indications that the UN mission played a very active role in the attempt to resolve the Ivorian crisis. However, its assessment remains very mixed in terms of what has been done and its impact on the way out of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. The mission has been marked by many irregularities and ambiguities. Above all, the mission botched the conflict transformation and negotiation and resolution phase. The reasons that led to the conflict were evaded and proposals to address the underlying causes were insufficient. The manner in which the mission was conducted leads us to believe that many of the crucial questions underlined by Johnstone were not taken into account. The mission ended in 2017, however, several issues remain unattended. The pre- and post-electoral events in 2020 prove us right in many ways. Nonetheless, the mission was able to survive many tumults and carried out its mandate for thirteen years.

## FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Independent since 7 August 1960, Côte d'Ivoire was for a long time a model in Africa both economically and politically. Houphouët-Boigny's policies helped to attract human resources both internally and externally during years. That allowed Côte d'Ivoire to achieve a significant economic growth qualified as the Ivorian miracle. However, Houphouët-Boigny strategies raised the discontent of some Ivorians, and the commodities crisis and the deterioration in terms of trade has plunged the country into a crisis in the early 1980s. Cocoa prices have fallen sharply, cash inflows were becoming increasingly scarce, and the country was unable to pay its external debt. Therefore, the Bretton Woods institutions placed the country under structural adjustment, asked to reduce public spending and the privatisation of companies. The well-oiled system that favoured clientelism came to a halt.

At the death of Houphouët-Boigny, a succession crisis opposed ADO to HKB. An open war raised between HKB and ADO who left the PDCI and joined the RDR, party created by Djeni Kobina. The political discrimination of RDR was extended to religious and ethnic groups. The crisis that was already latent during HB's reign became more palpable when he died. HKB's concept of *ivoirité* as more xenophobic than nationalist worsened relations between Ivorians. Côte d'Ivoire saw the crisis take on other dimensions until it exploded in 2002. After 2002 failed coup d'état that led to a conflict, several means were used to resolve the Ivorian crisis. This attempt to resolve the conflict took place in several stages, the first and most important of which was negotiation.

Different works and theories make it possible to understand the importance of negotiation in the political and peaceful resolution of interstate or intra-state conflict. The psychological approach helped us to capture the behaviour of the individuals during the Ivorian crisis negotiation phase. We noted that negotiation must follow a particular procedure for greater efficiency to satisfy the negotiating parties, thus facilitating the implementation of the peace agreement. Since negotiation is a crucial part and first stage of conflict resolution process it needs to be conducted carefully to avoid any form of resumption of hostilities. Many scholars works dealt with the importance of negotiation in a peace process. We used Zartman's ripeness theory as a theoretical framework to be able to analyse and understand the different stages that led to the negotiations in the Ivorian conflict and the motivations of the parties behind these negotiations.

Zartman's ripeness theory served as a basis for the empirical analysis of the different peace agreements in a tentative resolution of the Ivorian crisis. The analyses allowed us to

underline the key agreements in the Ivorian peace process and how these agreements impacted the resolution of the Ivorian crisis. We used the different agreements to analyse and highlight the role of the regional and international organisations in the Ivorian peace process. With this theoretical literature, we have found in the Ivorian case the indicators or measures of effectiveness in the negotiation phase. These indicators were the ripe moment and the apprehension of the parties or the persuasion of an external actor to start negotiation. Beyond the negotiation phase, we looked for conflict resolution indicators such as identifying the causal factors behind the conflict and finding ways to deal with them.

The Ivorian conflict that started in September 2002 extended well beyond the time that we thought it would take to be able to resolve it. The crisis led the protagonists to start negotiations through mediators at both regional and international level. But several endogenous and then exogenous elements have come to disrupt the smooth running of the peace process. ECOWAS, having neither elements nor coercive force, has never been able to impose its authority and to enforce the agreements, despite the spectrum of a sanction. The AU which has the objectives of peace promotion, security and stability on the continent, completely gone astray in the Ivorian case.

On the other hand, the attitude of the warring parties towards the peace agreements has underlined the limits of the MHS and the ripe moment. The Theory explains thoroughly what we need to have before joining the negotiating table but does not explain how to act when the parties to the conflict refuse to apply the agreement. The limits of the theory allow us to think about other possibilities and alternatives for better analysis and practice. For example, concerning the Ivorian case, we can add another element which is the psychological availability of the actors to negotiate and apply the agreements. We can also add the availability to negotiate an agreement which is mutually “satisfactory” and attractive for both parties.

In their attempt to mediate a conflict, the position of third parties must be completely impartial. Impartiality is an essential element in mediation and negotiation to avoid resistance reactions. In the Ivorian crisis, we noticed that France played a great role in the attempt to resolve the conflict. Such implication raised the problem between capacity-based mediation and legitimacy-based mediation. The legitimacy-based mediation proved to better work to manage the Ivorian crisis. Even if the mediators have limited resources, theirs reached better results than France mediation, which was a capacity-based mediation. The need of African solutions for African problems is crucial. That does not mean that people should reject the non-African third-party mediation, but people should not accept a conflict-of-interest mediation such as France mediation. A conflict-of-interest can be defined as a situation where a person or

persons, an institution or several institutions are at the center of a decision-making process where their objectivity, their impartiality can be called into question. Since all African countries except Liberia and Ethiopia are former colonies, the former coloniser should not intervene either as a mediator or as an intervention force. The objective here is to avoid bias and the questioning of the impartiality of the mediator. These tasks could be entrusted to other countries that do not have a coloniser-colonised link with the State in conflict.

The analysis of UN resolutions, meeting minutes, press releases and an official statement shows how the different actors involved in the Ivorian crisis in particular UN dealt with Ivorian crisis and what was the impact of ONUCI in the resolution of Ivorian crisis. We tried to find out how these resolutions took into account the effectiveness indicators of negotiation, resolution and transformation phases. We used conflict resolution and peace operation theories to analyse impact of ONUCI on the Ivorian crisis.

UNOCI experience in Côte d'Ivoire highlighted complexities associated with contemporary peace operations. Complexity becomes even more significant when the mission is confronted with several external elements that prevent the smooth running of the mission. Especially when the context continually changes, and the need of mandate modification is crucial. UNOCI was in a problematic situation from the beginning of its mandate. The implementation of the mission was based upon the LMA which struggled to be applied. Talking about LMA Gbagbo said: "Well, at Marcoussis France made me an armed opposition... with which I was asked to govern". International recognition and legitimacy had, therefore, been given to an armed dissident group attacking a democratically elected regime.

Also, UNOCI and the Licorne Force were deployed based on the consent of the Ivorian Government. When President Laurent Gbagbo asked the United Nations to intervene, he expected that UNOCI would be impartial as stipulated in the mission road map. Throughout the crisis, we noted that "France repeatedly intervened as a peace-broker, peacekeeper and peace-enforcer,". Several observers, therefore, wondered whether this was a UN mission or a French operation. The French presence and involvement in the crisis were therefore controversial and contradictory.

Meanwhile, regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the AU were either being sidelined or spreading their inability to manage crises at the regional level. Many international observers believed that the Ivorian problem would be solved by organising elections. But holding an election is not exactly a simple matter in Africa. UNOCI, was provided with election certification by UNSCR 1765 (2007). The SRSG has elaborated a five-criteria framework for certifying all stages of the electoral process. However, several studies have shown that "the risk



of elections contributing to the flare-up of conflict is higher when they are held in post-conflict situations, characterised as they are by mutual distrust [...] Elections cannot settle a military conflict that negotiations or victory have failed to end”.

Was this certification relevant to UNOCI’s mandate? What we know for sure is that the SRSB pronounced Ouattara the winner of the 2010 presidential elections with different figures from those of the IEC and the CC. UN should consider whether multiple mandates reinforce or undermine each other. Multiple mandates may be compatible in one context but not another. Choosing to prioritise mandates can help by assigning missions tasks that are achievable in light of conditions at a particular moment.

UNOCI experienced in Côte d’Ivoire different kinds of mandates. The mission started with a light mission to monitor the ceasefire and help to apply the LMA. At the beginning of 2011, ONUCI had a robust mandate to protect civilians against the use of heavy weapons. But the robustness of UNOCI’s mandate raised the question of the impartiality of the mission. Indeed, UNOCI and the Force Licorne openly chose their side by bombing the Gbagbo residence and destroying the military arsenal of the Government forces. This use of force by UN peacekeepers and French troops blurred the lines between civilians protection and impartiality.

From its creation in 2004 to its completion in 2017, UNOCI evolved in two phases: the pre-2011 phase and the post-2011 phase. Throughout its mandate, UNOCI helped to prevent the escalation of violence and to protect vulnerable populations, in particular children, women and displaced people. UNOCI protected by patrolling and deterring escalation and monitoring cross-border transactions and peacekeepers cooperated with the French force to resolve problems early, sometimes using the power. Licorne and UNOCI prevented the two parties from advancing beyond the *zone de confiance*, thereby preventing the continued resumption of hostilities. UNOCI with its humanitarian operations helped to identify and secure roads and camps for internally displaced persons.

UNOCI’s management of the post-electoral crisis enabled it to stabilise a country that was in the throes of violent unrest. The Ivorian crisis which should be resolved politically has been resolved militarily in 2011. Disarmament was a great failure at first instance, ONUCI and France focused too much in the organisation of elections and did not manage efficiently the roots cause of Ivorians conflict. When a peace operation leaves a country, it does not mean that the country has no more challenges to face. We used Dielh-Druckman framework to draw out some of the UNOCI’s critical issues and identify important areas where progress have been

made. Notwithstanding, we noted particular areas that might need reconsidering in the framework. Conflicts are dynamic and we need to extend UN peace missions toolkit.

The need to design a mission appropriate to the context on the ground is crucial. Johnstone already provided seven questions to be asked to design an efficient peace mission. Also, it would be necessary to be more specific in allocating the roles of the parties when the colonising power decides to join the peacekeepers since such overlapping mandates and complex partnerships are becoming a more common feature of UN peace operations.

Since UN peace missions mainly occur in Africa, some modifications should be made to turn these missions more efficient. Firstly, it is imperative not to transform peace missions into new forms of implementation of liberal democracy. The building or keeping peace must be distinguished from state-building. It is essential to UN peace missions' efficiency to stop confusing the construction of sustainable peace with "fixing" a "broken State". Secondly, in a joint multidimensional peace operation with a joint mission, the UNSC must clearly delimit the responsibilities of each of the participant in such mission by elaborating an understandable road map. Thirdly, priority should be given to regional organisation such as ECOWAS, AU on the criterion of legitimacy-based in the UN peace missions. However, the UN can furnish all its support by collaborating with the regional organisations to achieve reliable and efficient peace missions.

Fourthly, the concept of conflict of interest should be taken into account when dealing with a mission in a former colony. For example, in the Ivorian case, France, as a former coloniser, should not have an active role in UNOCI. France should not have a predominant role in peace missions when it comes to its former colonies. This responsibility should be delegated to other members of the Security Council which do not have a colonial past with the country where the mission is to take place. The same applies to other colonising countries. Also, when one of the members of the Security Council has a clear interest in a country in a conflict where a mission is to be implemented, it should not have the initiative for draft resolutions. However, it can bring its expertise and contribution, which will be essential for the future mission. Thus, the question of subordination in the Security Council can be addressed progressively by delegating more and more competences and power of action to emerging members of the United Nations.

Finally, the UN peace operation should remain peace operation under the aegis of the UN without the use of violence as a means for conflict resolution. In the Ivorian case, for example, the line was blurred between a UN peace mission or France peace mission. People did not clearly know if the mission was for the UN or France. France took all of the crucial

decisions in the ONUCI case. The UN must oppose any use of force as means of conflict resolution when it comes to peace missions or the protection of civilians. During Côte d'Ivoire post-electoral crisis, France and ONUCI use military force to oust Laurent Gbagbo. UN peace mission should not be confused with a regime change mission.

These five recommendations are important for implementation of other peace mission. However, will they be taken into account? Does the UN learn from its previous missions? One of the most comprehensive studies of UN peacebuilding operations to date asserts that "learning has not ... been one of the strengths of the United Nations" (CHESTERMAN 2004, p.256). That leads us to the following questions. Does it exist a learning process structure at UN DPKO? Further studies must focus on UN DPKO bureaucracy to better understand how peace mission are elaborated and how they are implemented. Understanding UN DPKO bureaucracy could help peace studies scholars to better analyse UN peace mission on the field.

## REFERENCES

- ACHANKENG, F. I. **Conflict and conflict resolution in Africa**: Engaging the colonial factor, p 11-38, 2013.
- ACCRA I Extraordinary Summit Final Communiqué. 2002
- ADEBAJO, A. The Security Council and Three Wars in West Africa. In: LOWE, V. et al., (eds.), **The United Nations Security Council and War**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- ADEBAJO, A. **Building Peace in West Africa**. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004.
- AGENCE FRANCE PRESS -AFP- 17-05-1992
- AGENCE FRANCE PRESS “**UN peacekeepers dismantle Ivory Coast buffer zone,**” AFP, (17.09.2007)
- AGGESTAM, K. Enhancing Ripeness: Transition from Conflict to Negotiation. In: ZARTMAN, I. W. and Faure G. O. (Eds) **Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts**. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- AGGESTAM, K.; JÖNSSON, C. (1997). (Un)Ending Conflict: Challenges in Post-War Bargaining. Millennium: **Journal of International Studies**, v.26, n. 3, p. 771 -793.
- AHOUEGAN, A. L. Estado e crises políticas na África Subsaariana: Benim um exemplo de democracia? **Revista Mural Internacional**, Rio de Janeiro, v. 9, n. 2, p 221-235, Juillet - Décembre 2018.
- AHOUEGAN, A. L. The UN Peacekeeping Operation Conflict Resolution in Côte d’Ivoire. **Revista E-IR**, publié le 26 février 2019. Available from: <https://www.e-ir.info/2019/02/25/conflict-resolution-and-the-un-peacekeeping-operation-in-cote-divoire/>
- AKINDÈS, F. Côte d’Ivoire since 1993: The risky reinvention of a nation. In: MUSTAPHA, A. R.; WHITFIELD, L. (Eds). **Turning points in Africa democracy**. Suffolk, 2011.
- AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. « Ils ont regardé sa carte d'identité et l'ont abattu. » Retour sur six mois de violences post-électorales en Côte d'Ivoire. AI, 25 mai 2011. Available from: <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/documents/AFR31/002/2011/fr/>. Accessed on 28 June 2020.
- ATCHE, B. R. **Les conflits armés internes en Afrique et le Droit International**. 2008, 457 f. Thèse de doctorat, Faculté de droit, Université Cergy-Pontoise, 2008.
- AYISSI, A. Three Decades of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Africa: Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead. In: MCNAMEE, T.; MUYANGWA, M. (Eds.). **The State of Peacebuilding in Africa: Lessons Learned for Policymakers and Practitioners**. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. p. 141–162.

BAH, T.M. Addressing Côte d'Ivoire's Deeper Crisis. **Africa Center for Strategic Studies**, 12 March 2012. Available From <https://africacenter.org/publication/addressing-cote-d-ivoire-deeper-crisis/>. Accessed on 20 May 2020.

BAHI, A. A. « La Sorbonne d'Abidjan: rêve de démocratie ou naissance d'un espace public », **Revue Africaine de Sociologie**, v. 7 n. 1, p. 1-18, 2003

BAIN, W. 'In praise of folly: international administration and the corruption of humanity' **International Affairs** v. 82, n.3, p 525-538, 2006.

BALAS, A. 'It Takes Two (or More) to Keep the Peace: Multiple Simultaneous Peace Operations', **Journal of International Peacekeeping**, v. n.15, n. 3-4, p. 384-421, 2011.

BANDES DESSINEES N° 002 - Janvier 2006, Available from: [https://onuci.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old\\_spip/bd/bouche2.pdf](https://onuci.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_spip/bd/bouche2.pdf). Accessed on 21 March 2020.

BANÉGAS, R. **La Côte d'Ivoire**. Available from: <http://www.universalis-edu.com/encyclopedie/cote-d-ivoire/>. Accessed on 23 April 2020.

BANEGAS, R.; OTAYEK, R. Le Burkina Faso dans la crise ivoirienne: Effets d'aubaine et incertitudes politiques. **Politique africaine**, v.89, n.1, 2003, 71-87.

BARNETT, M. 'Building a Republican Peace Stabilizing States after War' **International Security** 30:4, 2006, p 87-112.

BASSETT, T. J. "Nord musulman et Sud chrétien" : les moules médiatiques de la crise ivoirienne », **Afrique contemporaine**, v. 206, n. 2, 2003, p. 13-27.

BAUMANN J.; GOVINDA, C La médiation des conflits violents. **Politique de sécurité: analyses du CSS**, v.11, 2017, p. 1-4.

BBC News. **Ivory Coast shelling in Abidjan 'a war crime' – UN**. (18 March 2011). (2011a) Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12787015> Accessed on March 26, 2020,

BBC News (2011b). Ivory Coast: More than 100 bodies found, says UN. **BBC** (8 April 2011). Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13013082> Accessed on 26 March 2020.

BBC News. (2011c) Ivory Coast: UN forces fire on pro-Gbagbo camp. **BBC News** (05.04.2011). Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12960308> Accessed on 30 March 2020.

BBC News Ivory Coast: Gbagbo troops 'hit' Ouattara hotel HQ. **BBC News** (10.04.2011) Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13026923>. Accessed on 30 March 2020.

BBC News. Ivory Coast: Gbagbo and Ouattara in Abidjan battle. **BC News** (1 April 2011). Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12929625> Accessed on 28 March 2020

BBC News. Ivory Coast: More than 100 bodies found, says UN. **BBC** (8 April 2011). Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13013082> Accessed on 26 March 2020.

BBC News. Ivory Coast: UN forces fire on pro-Gbagbo camp. **BBC News** (05.04.2011). Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12960308> Accessed on 30 March 2020.

BELLAMY, A. J.; WILLIAMS, P. D. Local Politics and international partnerships: the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). **Journal of International Peacekeeping**, v.16, 2012, p. 252-281.

BERCOVITCH, J. "International Mediation and Intractable Conflicts". Beyond Intractability, In: BURGESS, G ; BURGESS, H (Eds.). **Conflict Research Consortium**, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: Jan. 2004,

\_\_\_\_\_. Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A Review of Practice. In: ZARTMAN, I. W. (org.). **Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques**. Washington: United States Institute of Peace. 2007.

\_\_\_\_\_. A mediação em conflitos internacionais - Panorama teórico e revisão das práticas. In: HERZ, M.; SIMAN, M.; DRUMOND, P. (orgs.). **Mediação Internacional**. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes; Editora PUC-Rio, 2016. p. 26-56.

\_\_\_\_\_. The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations. In: BERCOVITCH, J.; RUBIN, J. Z. (eds.). **Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management**. Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1992.

BERCOVITCH, J.; DEROUEN, C. Mediation in Internationalized Ethnic Conflicts. Assessing the Determinants of a Successful Process. **Armed Forces & Society**, v. 30, n. 2, p. 147-170, 2004.

BERCOVITCH, J.; KADAYIFCI-ORELLANA, S. A. Religião e mediação: O papel dos atores religiosos em conflitos internacionais. In: HERZ, M.; SIMAN, M. ; DRUMOND, P. (orgs.). **Mediação internacional**. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes; Editora PUC-Rio, 2016.

BERDAL, M.; UCKO, D. H. Introduction to the DDR Forum: Rethinking the Reintegration of Former Combatants. **International Peacekeeping**, v. 20, n. 3, p. 316–320, 1 jun. 2013.

BERGAMASHI, I. French Military Intervention in Mali: Inevitable, Consensual yet Insufficient. **Stability: International Journal of Security & Development**, v. 2, n. 20, p. 1–11, 2013.

BERGAMASCHI, I.; DEZALAY, S. Dilemmes et ambiguïtés de la sortie de crise par la voie multilatérale en Afrique : le cas de l'Organisation des Nations unies en Côte-d'Ivoire. **Les Champs de Mars**, v. n. 17, n. 1, p. 53–73, 2005.

BERTHÉLEMY, J.-C.; F. BOURGUIGNON. **Growth and crisis in Cote d'Ivoire**. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996. 240 p.

BIGOT, L. Côte d'Ivoire : mais qui a gagné la présidentielle de 2010? **Le Monde. Afrique**  
Available from: [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/05/27/cote-d-ivoire-mais-qui-a-gagne-la-presidentielle-de-2010\\_4927642\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/05/27/cote-d-ivoire-mais-qui-a-gagne-la-presidentielle-de-2010_4927642_3212.html) Accessed on 25 March 2020.

BINGHAM, G. **Resolving**. Environmental Disputes. Washington: The Conservation, 1985.

BLANCO, R.; OLIVEIRA, G. A paz por meios pacíficos: o Brasil como um ator singular na paz internacional. **Le monde diplomatique Brasil**, 22 November 2017. Available from: <https://diplomatie.org.br/o-brasil-como-um-ator-singular-na-paz-internacional/>. Accessed on 08 May 2020.

BOUTROS-GHALI, B. **An Agenda for Democratization**. New York: United Nations. 1996

\_\_\_\_\_. Democracy: A newly recognized imperative. **Global Governance**, v.1, n.1: 3, 1995.

BROSIG, M. **Cooperative Peacekeeping in Africa Exploring Regime Complexity**. 1st. ed. London: Routledge, 2015. 274p.

BURTON, J.W. **Conflict and communication**: The use of controlled communication in international relations. London: Macmillan. 1969.

BURTON, J. **Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict**: A Handbook. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987.

CAMPBELL, H. G. France and Mali: The War on Terror in Africa in Theory and Practice. In: KITISSOU, M.; GINSBERG, P. E. (eds.): **The Sahel**: Focus of Hope, Focus of Fear. London: Adonis and Abbey Publishers Ltd, 2014, p. 9-32

CAMPBELL, J. **Successful Negotiation**: Trieste. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

CARNEVALE, P.J.; ARAD, S. Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation. In: BERCOVITCH, J. (org.). **Resolving International Conflict** - The Theory and Practice of Mediation. Boulder/Londres: Lynne Rienner, 1996. p. 39 -53

CEDERMAN, L.-E; KRISTIAN S. G.; AND HALVARD B. **Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War**. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

CEDERMAN, L.-E.; GLEDITSCH, K. S.; BUHAUG, H. **Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War**. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

CHAMPIN, C. Côte d'Ivoire: Tentative de coup d'Etat. **RFI**, 08 January 2001. Available from: [http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/013/article\\_5381.asp](http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/013/article_5381.asp). Accessed on 01 May 2020.

CHAUVEAU, J-P. BOBO, S. K. Crise foncière, crise de la ruralité et relations entre autochtones et migrants sahéliens en Côte d'Ivoire forestière, **Outre-Terre**, v. 11, n. 2, p. 247-264, 2005.

CHAUVEAU, J.-P. Question foncière et construction nationale en Côte d'Ivoire. Les enjeux silencieux d'un coup d'Etat. **Politique Africaine**, n.78, spécial Côte d'Ivoire, p 94-125, 2000.

CHAUVEAU, J.-P.; DOZON, J.-P.; LOSCH, B. Côte-d'Ivoire: l'urgence internationale. **Libération**, 26 Décembre 20. Available from : [https://www.liberation.fr/tribune/2002/12/26/cote-d-ivoire-l-urgence-internationale\\_425823](https://www.liberation.fr/tribune/2002/12/26/cote-d-ivoire-l-urgence-internationale_425823). Accessed on 20 May 2020.

CLAUSEWITZ, C. V. *et al.* **On war**. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984.

COGNEAU, D. ; MESPLÉ-SOMPS, S. La Côte d'Ivoire peut-elle devenir un pays émergent? **Centre de Développement OCDE**, Programme "Emerging Africa", Etude Côte d'Ivoire, juin 1999.

COLEMAN, P. Intractable Conflict. In: DEUTSCH, M.; COLEMAN, P. (orgs.). **The handbook of Conflict resolution: Theory and Practice**. San Francisco: Josey-Bass, 2000.

COLLIER, P.; HOFFLER, A. 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War'. **The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2355**, 2000.

CÔTE D'IVOIRE Conseil Constitutionnel. **Résultats définitifs de la présidentielle 2010 proclamés : le 2ème tour fixé au 21 novembre 2010 entre Laurent Gbagbo et Alassane Ouattara**. Available from : <http://www.gouv.ci/actualite-article.php?d=1&recordID=1292&p=3> Accessed on 24 March 2020.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Accord de cessez-le-feu entre les FANCI et les FN**. Abidjan, le 3 mai 2003.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Loi N° 2000 - 514 du 1er août 2000 portant Code Electoral**. Journal Officiel de la République, Abidjan, 1er Août 2000. Article 71.

\_\_\_\_\_. **LOI N°2000-513 Du 1er Août 2000 portant constitution de la Côte d'Ivoire**. Journal Officiel de la République, Abidjan, 1er Août 2000. Titre III, article 35.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat (RGPH) 1998**. Volume IV: Tome 1 Etat et structures de la population, 1998, p 54 -55

CÔTE D'IVOIRE TOURISME. **Groupes ethniques**. Available from <https://www.cotedivoiretourisme.ci/index.php/culturel/589-groupes-ethniques>. Accessed on 27 April 2020

COTTEREAU G. **Côte d'Ivoire: l'impossible alternance pacifique**. In *Annuaire français de droit international*, volume 57, 2011. p. 23-55.

CRISIS GROUP. **Côte d'Ivoire: No Peace in Sight**. Dakar/Brussels: Crisis Group, 12 July 2004

CROCKER, C. **High Noon in Southern Africa**. New York: Norton, 1992.

CSNU. S/2003/99, **Lettre datée du 27 janvier 2003, adressée au Président du Conseil de sécurité par le Représentant permanent de la France auprès de l'Organisation des Nations**



**Unies.** UNSC, 2003a. Available from: <https://undocs.org/fr/S/2003/99>. Accessed on 07 May 2020.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Rapport de la mission du Conseil de Sécurité en Afrique de l'Ouest**, 20-29 juin 2004, UN Doc. S/2004/525, 2004d

\_\_\_\_\_. **Résolution adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 5118 séance**, le 1 février 2005. UN Doc. S/RES/1584, 2005a.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Résolution adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 5159 séance**, le 4 avril 2005. UN Doc. S/RES/1594, 2005b.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Résolution adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 5173 séance**, le 4 mai 2005. UN Doc. S/RES/1600, 2005c.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Résolution adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 5194 séance**, le 3 juin 2005. UN Doc. S/RES/1603, para. 7, 2005d.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Résolution adoptée par le Conseil de Sécurité, à sa 5354 séance**, le 24 janvier 2006. UN Doc. S/RES/1652, 2006a.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Résolution adoptée par le Conseil de Sécurité à sa 5366 séance**, le 6 février 2006. UN Doc. S/RES/1657, 2006b.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Résolution adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 5716 séance**, le 16 juillet 2007. UN doc. S/RES/1765, para. 1 et 6, 2007b.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Rapport du Secrétaire général sur les enfants et le conflit armé en Côte d'Ivoire**. UN Doc. S/2007/515, August 2007, para. 2, 2007c.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Dix-huitième rapport du Secrétaire Général sur l'Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire**. UN Doc S/2008/645, 2008c.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Vingt-sixième rapport du Secrétaire général sur l'Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire**. UN Doc. S/2010/ 600 (2010), November 2010, para. 8 and 9, 2010f.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Couverture des Réunions et communiqué de presse**. UN Doc. CS/10102 (2010), December 2010, 2010g.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Résolution adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 6458 séance**, le 20 décembre 2010. UN Doc. S/RES/1962, 2010h.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Trentième rapport périodique du Secrétaire général sur l'Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire**. UN Doc S/2012/506, 2012c.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Résolution Adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 6817 séance**, le 26 juillet 2012. UN Doc. S/RES/2062, para. 1, 2012d.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Trente et unième rapport périodique du Secrétaire général sur l'Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire**. UN Doc. S/2012/964, 2012e.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 7012 séance**, le 30 juillet 2013. UN Doc. S/RES/2112, 2013a.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Résolution adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 7207 séance**, le 25 juin 2014 UN Doc. S/RES/2162, 2014.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Résolution adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 7471 séance**, le 25 juin 2015. UN Doc. S/RES/2226 (2015)

DAKOURI, G. À propos du rôle de la religion dans la crise ivoirienne. **La Dépêche d'Abidjan**, 04 October 2011. Available from: [https://www.ladepechedabidjan.info/A-propos-du-role-de-la-religion-dans-la-crise-ivoirienne\\_a4551.html](https://www.ladepechedabidjan.info/A-propos-du-role-de-la-religion-dans-la-crise-ivoirienne_a4551.html). Accessed on 28 May 2020.

DAOUDI, M. Côte d'Ivoire : ACCRA III un accord a été signé, **RFI** (31-07-2004). Available from : [http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/055/article\\_29608.asp](http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/055/article_29608.asp) . Accessed on 26 February 2020

DAVID, C.-P. **La guerre et la paix : Approches contemporaines de la sécurité et de la stratégie**. Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, 2006.

DAVIS J-M. The Economic Effect of Windfall Gains in Export Earnings. **World Development**, v.11, n. 2, p. 119-139, 1983.

DEMBÉLÉ, O. "La construction économique et politique de la catégorie "étranger" en Côte d'Ivoire". In : LE PAPE, M.; VIDAL, C. (dir.). **Côte d'Ivoire : l'année terrible, 1999-2000**, Paris, Karthala, 2002. p. 123-171.

DENG, F. "Negotiating a Hidden Agenda, Sudan's Conflict of Identities". In: ZARTMAN, I. W. (org.). **Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars**. Washington: The Brookings Institution 1995.

DIEHL, PAUL F. **International Peacekeeping**. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1993.

DIEHL, P. F.; DRUCKMAN, D. **Evaluating Peace Operations**. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010.

DIKEMA, C.; GATELIER, K.; MOUAFO DJONTU, H. **Transformation de conflit: Retrouver une capacité d'action face à la violence**. Editions Charles Léopold Mayer, 2014. Accessed on 18/02/2019, available from 978-2-84377-188-0. <<http://www.eclm.fr>>. <hal-01615224>

DIOP, M. Côte d'Ivoire: économie la plus dynamique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest. **Le 360**, 26/02/2017. Available from: <http://afrique.le360.ma/cote-divoire/economie/2017/02/26/10004-cote-divoire-leconomie-la-plus-dynamique-de-lafrique-de-louest-10004>. Accessed on 02 June 2020

DOKKEN K. **African Security Politics Redefined**. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

DOZON J-P. L'étranger et l'allochtone en Côte-d'Ivoire. In : CONTAMIN, B.; MEMEL-FOTÊ H. (eds.) **Le modèle ivoirien en questions: crises, ajustements, recompositions**. Paris: Karthala;Orstom, 1997. p. 779-798.

DRUCKMAN, D. Negotiating in the international context. In: ZARTMAN, I. W.; RASMUSSEN, J. L. (Eds.), **Peacemaking in international conflict: methods and techniques**. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997. p. 81-123.

DRUCKMAN, D. et al. Evaluating PeaceKeeping Missions. **Mershon International Studies Review**, v. 41, n. 1, p. 151–165, 1997.

DU BOIS DE GAUDUSSON, J. L'accord de Marcoussis, entre droit et politique. **Afrique contemporaine**, v. 206, n. 2, p. 41-55, 2003.

DUURSMA, A. African Solutions to African Challenges: The Role of Legitimacy in Mediating Civil Wars in Africa. **International Organization**, v. 74, n. 2, p. 295–330, ed 2020.

ECOWAS. **Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of October 17, 2002**. Available from: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/199>. Accessed on 1 June 2020.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Extraordinary summit of heads of State and of Government on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire**. Final Communiqué. Accra, September 29, 2002, point 7.

EMILY PADDON RHOADS. Interviewed by Alexandra Novosseloff on August 23, 2016 on her book “Taking Sides in Peacekeeping: Impartiality and the Future of the United Nations”. Available from: <https://peaceoperationsreview.org/interviews/emily-paddon-rhoads-taking-sides-the-challenges-of-impartiality-in-un-peacekeeping-operations/> Accessed on March 17, 2020.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA UNIVERSALIS «**11-27 décembre 2002 - Côte d'Ivoire**. Enlèvement du conflit », *Encyclopædia Universalis*. Available from: <http://www.universalis.fr/evenement/11-27-decembre-2002-enlèvement-du-conflit/>. Accessed 13 February 2020 [201-]

\_\_\_\_\_. 2-27 janvier 2006 - Côte d'Ivoire. Troubles violents fomentés par les partisans du régime . **Encyclopædia Universalis**. Available from: URL : <http://www.universalis.fr/evenement/2-27-janvier-2006-troubles-violents-fomentés-par-les-partisans-du-regime/>. Accessed on 07 March 2020.

\_\_\_\_\_. 25 août 2003 - Côte d'Ivoire. Coup de force déjoué . **Encyclopædia Universalis**. Available from: <http://www.universalis-edu.com/evenement/25-aout-2003-coup-de-force-dejoué/>. Accessed on 25 February 2020. [201-]

\_\_\_\_\_. 1er-10 décembre 2000 - Côte d'Ivoire. Victoire du parti du président Laurent Gbagbo aux élections législatives, **Encyclopædia Universalis**. Available from: <http://www.universalis.fr/evenement/1er-10-decembre-2000-victoire-du-parti-du-president-laurent-gbagbo-aux-elections-legislatives/> . Accessed on 1 Mai 2020.

\_\_\_\_\_. 25 mars 2001 - Côte d'Ivoire. Victoire du parti d'Alassane Ouattara aux élections municipales , **Encyclopædia Universalis**. Available from:

<http://www.universalis.fr/evenement/25-mars-2001-victoire-du-parti-d-lassane-ouattara-aux-elections-municipales/>. Accessed on 04 May 2020.

\_\_\_\_\_. 13 mars 2016 - Côte d'Ivoire. Attentat djihadiste. , **Encyclopædia Universalis**. Available from: <http://www.universalis.fr/evenement/13-mars-2016-attentat-djihadiste/> Accessed on 02 April 2020

\_\_\_\_\_. 18 décembre 2016 - Côte d'Ivoire. Victoire du pouvoir aux élections législatives. **Encyclopædia Universalis**. Available from: <http://www.universalis.fr/evenement/18-decembre-2016-victoire-du-pouvoir-aux-elections-legislatives/> Accessed on 02 April 2020

\_\_\_\_\_. 25 octobre 2015 - Côte d'Ivoire. Réélection d'Alassane Ouattara à la présidence. », **Encyclopædia Universalis**. Available from: <http://www.universalis.fr/evenement/25-octobre-2015-reelection-d-lassane-ouattara-a-la-presidence/> Accessed on 02 April 2020

\_\_\_\_\_. 10 mars 2015 - Côte d'Ivoire. Condamnation de Simone Gbagbo. **Encyclopædia Universalis**. Available from : <http://www.universalis.fr/evenement/10-mars-2015-condamnation-de-simone-gbagbo/> Accessed on 06 April 2020.

\_\_\_\_\_. 1er-27 février 2003 Côte d'Ivoire. Refus du président Laurent Gbagbo d'appliquer les accords de Marcoussis. **Encyclopædia Universalis**. Available from: <http://www.universalis-edu.com/chronologie/cote-d-ivoire/> Accessed 16 February 2020.

\_\_\_\_\_. 3-18 mai 2004 - Côte d'Ivoire. Condamnation par l'O.N.U. du régime de Laurent Gbagbo . **Encyclopædia Universalis** . Disponible from: <http://www.universalis.fr/evenement/3-18-mai-2004-condamnation-par-l-o-n-u-du-regime-de-laurent-gbagbo/>. Accessed on 26 February 2020

\_\_\_\_\_. 3-31 janvier 2003 - Côte d'Ivoire. Conclusion d'un accord de sortie de crise sous l'égide de Paris. **Encyclopædia Universalis**. Available from: <http://www.universalis.fr/evenement/3-31-janvier-2003-conclusion-d-un-accord-de-sortie-de-crise-sous-l-egide-de-paris/> . Accessed on 16 February 2020.

\_\_\_\_\_. 6-26 avril 2005 - Côte d'Ivoire. Signature d'un accord de paix », **Encyclopædia Universalis**. Available from : <http://www.universalis.fr/evenement/6-26-avril-2005-signature-d-un-accord-de-paix/>. Accessed on 4 March 2020.

\_\_\_\_\_. 10 mars 2015 - Côte d'Ivoire. Condamnation de Simone Gbagbo. **Encyclopædia Universalis**. Available from : <http://www.universalis.fr/evenement/10-mars-2015-condamnation-de-simone-gbagbo/> Accessed on 06 April 2020. (2015a)

\_\_\_\_\_. 25 octobre 2015 - Côte d'Ivoire. Réélection d'Alassane Ouattara à la présidence. **Encyclopædia Universalis**. Available from: <http://www.universalis.fr/evenement/25-octobre-2015-reelection-d-lassane-ouattara-a-la-presidence/> Accessed on 02 April 2020. (2015b)

\_\_\_\_\_. 13 mars 2016 - Côte d'Ivoire. Attentat djihadiste. **Encyclopædia Universalis**. Available from: <http://www.universalis.fr/evenement/13-mars-2016-attentat-djihadiste/> Accessed on 02 April 2020. (2016a)

\_\_\_\_\_. 18 décembre 2016 - Côte d'Ivoire. Victoire du pouvoir aux élections législatives. **Encyclopædia Universalis** Available from: <http://www.universalis.fr/evenement/18-decembre-2016-victoire-du-pouvoir-aux-elections-legislatives/> Accessed on 02 April 2020. (2016b)

EUROPEAN UNION. **Côte d'Ivoire, Rapport final élection présidentielle 31 Octobre et 28 Novembre 2010**. Mission d'Observation Electorale de l'Union Européenne, 2010.

FERRARI, S. Religions et conflits. In : VETTOVAGLIA, J.-P. (dir.). **Déterminants des conflits et nouvelles formes de prévention**. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2013.

FÖRSTER, T. 'Maintenant, on Sait Qui Est Qui: Statehood and Political Reconfiguration in Northern Côte d'Ivoire'. **Development and Change** v. 41, n. 4, p 699–722, 2010.

FOTE, M. Un mythe politique des Akans: le sens de l'Etat. In : VALSECCHI (ed.). **Monde akan, Identité et pouvoir en Afrique occidentale**. Paris: l'Harmattan , 2000.

FRANCE 24 (11.2004), Interview accordé à la chaine de télévision française après les attaques de Bouaké qui ont tué 9 soldats français et un américain.

FRETTER, J. Organizações internacionais e gestão de conflitos: A ONU e a mediação de conflitos internacionais. In: HERZ, M.; SIMAN, M.; DRUMOND, P. (orgs.). **Mediação Internacional**. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes; Editora PUC-Rio, 2016. p. 213-246.

FREUDENSCHUSS-REICHL, I. Agreement making and implementation: An analysis of international negotiations. **Non-State Actors and International Laws**, v. 2, n.1, p 119 -139, 2002.

FUKUYAMA, F. **State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century**. London: Profile Books, 2005.

GARRETT, J. L. Beagle Channel Dispute: Confrontation and Negotiation in the Southern Cone. **Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affair**, v. 27, n. 3, p. 81-109, 1985.

GATELIER, K. **Transformation de conflit: Retrouver une capacité d'action face à la violence**. Editions Charles Léopold Mayer, 2014. Available from: [http://www.irenees.net/bdf\\_fiche-notions-239\\_fr.html](http://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-notions-239_fr.html). Accessed on 3 October 2018.

GBAGBO, L.; MATTEI, F. **Libre pour la vérité et la justice**. Paris: Max Milo, 2018.

GHORBAL, S. **Bienvenue au pays des frères ennemis**. JA (20.09.2004). Available from: <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/88660/archives-thematique/bienvenue-au-pays-des-fr-res-ennemis/> Accessed on 26 February 2020

GOERTZ, G., DIEHL, P., AND BALAS, A. **The Puzzle of Peace**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

GOMBEAUD, J.-L.; MOUTOUT, C.; SMITH, S. **La guerre du cacao**. Histoire secrète d'un embargo. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1990. 217p

GOUËSET, C. La chute de Gbagbo en huit actes. **Journal l'Express** (11.04.2011). Available from : [https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/la-chute-de-gbagbo-en-huit-actes\\_947063.html](https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/la-chute-de-gbagbo-en-huit-actes_947063.html) Accessed on 26 March 2020.

GOULDING, M. **Enhancing the United Nations Effectiveness in Peace and Security**. New York: UN, 1997.

GREIG, M. "Stepping into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?" **American Journal of political Science**, v. 49, n. 2, p. 249-266, 2005.

GREIG, J. M.; OWSIAK, A. P.; DIEHL, P. F. **International Conflict Management**. Polity press, 2019.

GRIM, B. J.; FINKE, R. Religious persecution in cross-national context: Clashing civilizations or regulated religious economies? **American Sociological Review**, v. 72, n.4, p 633–658, 2007.

GUEÏ, R. Discours à la Nation décembre 1999. **RTI**, 26 décembre 1999. Available from: <https://youtu.be/zbvyaBpFYFc>. Accessed on 29 April 2020.

HAGMANN, T.; PÉCLARD, D. 'Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Power and Domination in Africa'. **Development and Change**, v. 41, n. 4, 2010

HAMPSON, F.O.; AALL, P. Why mediation matters: Ending Intractable Conflicts. In: BERCOVITCH, J.; KREMENYUK, V.; ZARTMAN, I.W. **The sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution**. Londres: Sage, 2009.

HELDT, B. Can Peacekeeping Operations Promote Democracy? **International Studies Review**, v. 7, n. 2, p. 304–307, 2005.

HELDT; W. **Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948-2004**. Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy Publications, 2005.

HELLMÜLLER, S. A story of mutual adaptation? The interaction between local and international peacebuilding actors in Ituri. **Peacebuilding**, v. 2, n. 2, p. 188–201, 2014.

HELLMÜLLER, S. The Power of Perceptions: Localizing International Peacebuilding Approaches. **International Peacekeeping**, v. 20, n. 2, p. 219–232, 1 abr. 2013.

HERZ, M.; SIMAN, M.; DRUMOND, P. Debates contemporâneos e tópicos especiais em mediação internacional. In: HERZ, M.; SIMAN, M.; DRUMOND, P. (orgs.). **Mediação internacional**. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes; Editora PUC-Rio, 2016.

HOFNUNG, T. Attaque de la force Licorne en 2004 : silence dans les rangs. **JL** (05.11.2014). Available from: [https://www.liberation.fr/societe/2014/11/05/attaque-de-la-force-licorne-en-2004-silence-dans-les-rangs\\_1137137](https://www.liberation.fr/societe/2014/11/05/attaque-de-la-force-licorne-en-2004-silence-dans-les-rangs_1137137) Accessed on 29 February 2020

HOLBROOKE, R. **To End a War**. New York: Random House, 1998

HOPMANN, T. P. The changing international environment and the resolution of international conflicts: Negotiations on Security and Arms Control in Europe. In: KRIESBERG, L.;

THORSON, S. J. (eds.). **Timing the de-escalation of international conflicts**. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991.

IKLE, F.C. **How Nations Negotiate**. New York: Harper & Row. 1964

INSTITUT D'ETUDES DE SECURITE. Rapport sur l'Afrique de l'Ouest: La Côte d'Ivoire est-elle confrontée au radicalisme religieux ? **ISS**, N°15, juin 2015. Available from: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/192446/ECOWAS13.pdf>. Accessed on 28 May 2020.

INSTITUT DES HAUTES ÉTUDES SUR LA JUSTICE (IHEJ). **La Commission Dialogue Vérité et Réconciliation ivoirienne : une belle coquille vide ?** Accessed on 18/01/2021, available from <https://ihej.org/programmes/justice-penale-internationale/la-commission-dialogue-verite-et-reconciliation-ivoirienne-une-belle-coquille-vide/>

INTERPEACE, INDIGO. "L'étranger ne peut pas venir se cacher derrière une termitière et vouloir que sa tête la dépasse". **IICI**, January 2018. Available from [http://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2018-Cote\\_dIvoire-DEVCO-Fr-Web-single.pdf](http://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2018-Cote_dIvoire-DEVCO-Fr-Web-single.pdf). Accessed on 20 May 2020.

JEUNE AFRIQUE. Choi Young-jin défend sa méthode de certification. **JA**, 08 Décembre 2010. Available from: <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/183353/politique/choi-young-jin-d-fend-sa-m-thode-de-certification/>. Accessed on 26 June 2020.

JOHNSTONE, I. **between bureaucracy and adhocracy: crafting a spectrum of un peace operations**. (31.03.2016). Available from : <https://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/from-bureaucracy-to-adhocracy-crafting-a-spectrum-of-un-peace-operations/>. Accessed on 07 February 2021.

JOLIVET, E. **L'ivoirité**. De la conceptualisation à la manipulation de l'identité ivoirienne. 2003. 71f. Dissertation Master en Service Public, EHESS, 2003.

JOSHI, M.; QUINN, J. M.; REGAN, P. M. Annualised implementation data on comprehensive intrastate peace accords, 1989–2012. **Journal of Peace Research** v. 52, p. 551-562, 2015.

JOURNAL LACROIX. En Côte d'Ivoire, Guillaume Soro sort indemne d'une attaque à Bouaké. **JLC** (29.06.2007). Available from : <https://www.la-croix.com/Actualite/Monde/En-Cote-d-Ivoire-Guillaume-Soro-sort-indemne-d-une-attaque-a-Bouake-NG-2007-06-29-523910> Accessed on 10 March 2020.

JOURNAL LE MONDE. Les protagonistes de la crise ivoirienne réunis à Pretoria. **Le Monde Afrique** (28.06.2005). Available from: [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2005/06/28/les-protagonistes-de-la-crise-ivoirienne-reunis-a-pretoria\\_666911\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2005/06/28/les-protagonistes-de-la-crise-ivoirienne-reunis-a-pretoria_666911_3212.html) Accessed on 06 March 2020.

JOURNAL LE MONDE AFRIQUE. **Côte d'Ivoire : confusion après l'annonce de la victoire de Ouattara**. Available from: [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2010/12/02/cote-d-ivoire-ouattara-proclame-vainqueur-de-l-election-presidentielle\\_1448227\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2010/12/02/cote-d-ivoire-ouattara-proclame-vainqueur-de-l-election-presidentielle_1448227_3212.html). Accessed on 25 March 2020.

KABAMBA, P. ‘Heart of Darkness’: Current Images of the DRC and their Theoretical Underpinning’. **Antropological Theory**, v. 10, n. 3, p. 265–301, 2010.

KALDOR, M. **New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era**. 3 ed. Polity Press, 2012.

KAPLAN, S. D. **Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development**, Westport. CT: Praeger Security International, 2009.

\_\_\_\_\_. **The Coming Anarchy**. Available from: <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/>. Accessed on 19 May 2020.

KAUDJHIS-OFFOUMOU, F. Les Elections Ivoiriennes de l'An 2000. **Journal of African Elections**, v. 1, n.1, May 2001.

KELMAN, H. C. Compliance, identification, and internalization: Three processes of attitude change. **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, v. 2. n. 1, p. 51-60, 1958.

\_\_\_\_\_. Transforming the relationship between former enemies: A social-social-psychological analysis. In: ROTHSTEIN, R. L. (ed.). **After the peace: Resistance and reconciliation**. Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner, 1999. p. 193-205.

\_\_\_\_\_. The Political psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: How can we overcome the barriers to a negotiated solution? **Political Psychology**, v., n. 3, p. 347-363, 1987.

\_\_\_\_\_. **US gestures that could help in Iran**. Christian Science Monitor. 1979.

KELMAN, H. C.; BLOOM, A. H. Assumptive Frameworks in International Politics. In: KNUTSON, J. N. (ed). **Handbook of Political Sociology**. San Francisco, 1973.

KEMPER, B: **Mediation in Intrastate Conflicts**. The Contribution of Track-Two Mediation Activities to Prevent Violence in the Aceh Conflict. With a Foreword by Prof. Ian Macduff. Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen (INEF Report, 88/2007).

KONATÉ, Y. Les enfants de la balle. De la Fesci aux mouvements de patriots, **Politique Africaine**, v. 89, p. 49-70, 2003.

KOUROUMA, A. **Quand on refuse on dit non**. Paris: Paris Seuil, 2014.

KPATINDÉ, F. Le coup d'Etat de Noël à Abidjan : le film des événements. **Jeune Afrique** 23 December 2009. Available from: <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/206509/politique/le-coup-d-etat-de-no-l-abidjan-le-film-des-v-nements/>. Accessed on 28 April 2020

\_\_\_\_\_. Qui était Robert Gueï ? **Jeune Afrique** , 23 décembre 2009. Available from: <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/206507/politique/qui-tait-robert-guee/>. Accessed on 29 April 2020.



KREMENIUK, V. A. **International negotiation:** Analysis, approaches, issues. In: KREMENYUK, V. A. (ed); editorial committee, Guy-Olivier Faure et al. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991.

KRIESBERG, L. **International Conflict Resolution:** The U.S.-USSR and Middle East Cases. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992.

\_\_\_\_\_. **The State of the Art in Conflict Transformation.** Advancing Conflict Transformation. The Berghof Handbook II, 2011.

KUNDE, E. SLATEAFRIQUE. France-Côte d'Ivoire : histoire d'un couple aux relations ambiguës (1/4) | Slate Afrique. **Slate Afrique**, 9 février 2012. Available from: <http://www.slateafrique.com/82237/france-cote-divoire-histoire-colonisation-relation-ambigue> Accessed on 16 March 2020. (2012a)

\_\_\_\_\_. SLATEAFRIQUE. France-Côte d'Ivoire : histoire d'un couple aux relations ambiguës (2/4) | Slate Afrique. **Slate Afrique**, 9 février 2012. Available from: <http://www.slateafrique.com/82333/france-cote-divoire-relations-francafrique> Accessed on 16 March 2020. (2012b)

L'EXPRESS. Le camp Gbagbo reprend du terrain à Abidjan. **L'Express** (12.04.2011). available from: [https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/le-camp-gbagbo-reprend-du-terrain-a-abidjan\\_981104.html](https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/le-camp-gbagbo-reprend-du-terrain-a-abidjan_981104.html) Accessed on 30 March 2020.

LAROUSSE. **La Côte d'Ivoire.** Available from [https://www.larousse.fr/encyclopedie/divers/Côte\\_d'Ivoire%C2%A0\\_population/187415](https://www.larousse.fr/encyclopedie/divers/Côte_d'Ivoire%C2%A0_population/187415). Accessed on 03 May 2020.

LE CONSEIL DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE. L 341/45 DÉCISION 2010/801/PESC DU CONSEIL du 22 décembre 2010

LE MONDE AFRIQUE. **Côte d'Ivoire** : confusion après l'annonce de la victoire de Ouattara. (2010) Available from: [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2010/12/02/cote-d-ivoire-ouattara-proclame-vainqueur-de-l-election-presidentielle\\_1448227\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2010/12/02/cote-d-ivoire-ouattara-proclame-vainqueur-de-l-election-presidentielle_1448227_3212.html). Accessed on 25 March 2020.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Côte d'Ivoire** : les ingrédients de la crise. (2011). Available from: [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2010/12/03/cote-d-ivoire-les-ingredients-de-la-crise\\_1448699\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2010/12/03/cote-d-ivoire-les-ingredients-de-la-crise_1448699_3212.html). Accessed on 26 March 2020.

LEDERACH, J. P. **Building Peace.** Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. 1997.

\_\_\_\_\_. Preparing for Peace: **Conflict Transformation Across Cultures.** Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 1995.

LEROY, M. et al. La loi foncière en Côte d'Ivoire. 2012, p 1-7

Lettre adressée au Président du Conseil de Sécurité par le Secrétaire Général - **Communiqué de la 9ème réunion ministérielle du Groupe de Travail International** – UN Doc. S/2006/584

LES GARAGISTES. **Titrologues**. Performed by les garagistes. Dynamite Ivoire Vol 1, 2010. Apple Music.

LIEBERFIELD, D. “Conflict ‘Ripeness’ Revisited: South African and Israeli/Palestinian cases”. **Negotiation Journal**, v. 15, n. 1, p. 63-82, 1999.

LMA **propositions** disponible at <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/cote-d-ivoire/colonne-droite/documents-de-reference/article/accord-de-linas-marcoussis>

LOME Agreements. **Spokespersons for peace at Lomé**: Here is the text of the first Agreement on the liberation of civilian and military prisoners, 1 November 2002. Available from: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/208>. Accessed on 1 June 2020.

LUCK, E.C. Making Peace. **Foreign Policy**, n. 89, p. 137-155, 1992.

LUDOVICO A.; HALEY J. S.; JEROEN S. Discrimination and ethnic conflict: a dyadic analysis of politically-excluded groups in sub-Saharan Africa. **International Interactions**, 2020.

MAOZ, Z. and TERRIS, L.G. “Credibility and strategy in international mediation”, In : BERCOVITCH, J. ; GARTNER, S.S. (Eds), **International Conflict Management: New Approaches and Findings**. London : Routledge, 2009. p. 69-95.

MARIE, A. Une anthropo-logique communautaire à l’épreuve de la mondialisation: de la relation de dette à la lutte sociale (l’exemple ivoirien). **Cahiers d’études africaines**, v. XLII-2, n.166, p 207-255, 2002.

MARSHALL, R. La France en Côte d’Ivoire : l’interventionnisme à l’épreuve des faits. **Politique africaine**, v.98, n. 2, p. 21-41, 2005.

MAS, M. Côte d’Ivoire : Nouveau bain de sang dans l’Ouest. **RFI** (02.06.2005). Available from: [http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/066/article\\_36580.asp](http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/066/article_36580.asp) Accessed on 06 March 2020

\_\_\_\_\_. Paris plaide la “légitime défense élargie”. **RFI** 1.12. 2004). Available from: [http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/059/article\\_32141.asp](http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/059/article_32141.asp) Accessed on 3 March 2020

MBEKI, T. What the World Got Wrong in Côte D’Ivoire. **Foreign Policy**, 29 April 2011. Available from : <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/29/what-the-world-got-wrong-in-cote-divoire/>. Accessed on 10 March 2020

MCGOVERN, M. “The Ivorian Endgame”, **Foreign Affairs**, v. 90, n. 2, 2011.

MIGNOT, F. **Côte d’Ivoire : les Baoulé, Henri Konan Bédié et la crise ivoirienne**. Montreuil Sous-Bois: La Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, 4 June 2005. Available from [http://www.commission-refugies.fr/IMG/pdf/Cote\\_d\\_Ivoire-les\\_Baoule\\_Henri\\_Konan\\_Bedie\\_et\\_la\\_crise\\_ivoirienne.pdf](http://www.commission-refugies.fr/IMG/pdf/Cote_d_Ivoire-les_Baoule_Henri_Konan_Bedie_et_la_crise_ivoirienne.pdf). Accessed on 12 May 2020.

MITCHELL, C. "Cutting Losses". Fairfax: Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution/George Mason University Press, **Working Paper**, v.9, 1995.

\_\_\_\_\_. **The Structure of International Conflict**. London: MacMillan, 1981, 287p.

MOORE, C.W. **The Mediation Process. Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict**. San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons, 2003, 599p.

MUCHLINSKI, D. **The Politics and Effects of Religious Grievance**. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.

MUNDT, R. J.; et al. Côte d'Ivoire. **Encyclopædia Britannica**, 04 October 2019. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. Available from: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cote-d'Ivoire>. Accessed on 03 May 2020.

MUNIVE, J.; STEPPUTAT, F. Rethinking Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs. **Stability: International Journal of Security and Development**, v. 4, n. 1, p. Art. 48, 26 out. 2015.

N'GUESSAN, K. Le coup d'État de décembre 1999 : espoirs et désenchantements. Marc Le Pape, M. (éd.). **Côte d'Ivoire**. L'année terrible 1999-2000. Paris: Editions Karthala, 2003, p. 51-80.

NATHAN, L. "Sob pressão" A mediação internacional no âmbito de guerras civis na África. In: Herz, M. ; Siman, M. & Drumond, P. (orgs). **Mediação Internacional**. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes; Editora PUC-Rio, 2016.

NATIONS UNIES **Le Conseil de sécurité demande aux parties ivoiriennes de servir les intérêts de la Côte d'Ivoire**. 2004g. Accessed on 14 January 2021. Available from: <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2004/03/46422>

NATIONS UNIES. **Rapport sur la situation des Droits de l'Homme en Côte d'Ivoire**, mars–avril 2005, 2005.

NATIONS UNIES **Conseil de Sécurité** S/PV.4700, 4700e Séance, 04 février 2003.

NATIONS UNIES **Conseil de Sécurité**. CS/2494. Le Conseil de Sécurité crée la Mission des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) pour une période initiale de six mois. Communiqué de presse de la 4754e séance. UNSC. Available from: <https://www.un.org/press/fr/2003/CS2494.doc.htm>. Accessed on 7 May 2020.

NATIONS UNIES Conseil de Sécurité. **Quinzième rapport du Secrétaire général sur l'Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire**. UN Doc S/2008/1.

NATIONS UNIES Conseil de Sécurité. **Trente et unième rapport périodique du Secrétaire général sur l'Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire**. UN Doc. S/2012/964 (2012)

NATIONS UNIES Conseil de Sécurité. **Trentième rapport périodique du Secrétaire général sur l'Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire**. UN Doc S/2012/506 (2012)

NATIONS UNIES Conseil de Sécurité. **Vingt-sixième rapport du Secrétaire général sur l'Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire**. UN Doc. S/2010/ 600 (2010), November 2010,

NATIONS UNIES. Conseil de Sécurité. CS/2494. **Le Conseil de Sécurité crée la Mission des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire** (MINUCI) pour une période initiale de six mois. Communiqué de presse de la 4754e séance. UNSC, 2003. Available from: <https://www.un.org/press/fr/2003/CS2494.doc.htm>. Accessed on 7 May 2020.

NEWMAN, E.; PARIS, R.; RICHMOND, O. P. **New perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding**. New York: United Nations University Press, 2009.

NOVOSSLOFF, A. **The Many Lives of a Peacekeeping Mission: The UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire**. New York: International Peace Institute, June 2018.

\_\_\_\_\_. United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). In: KOOPS, J. et al (eds.). **The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

OFUATEY-KODJOE, P. "Regional Organisations and the resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. **International Peacekeeping**, v. 1, n.3, Autumn 1994.

OHLSON, T.; STEDMAN, S.J. **The New is Not Yet Born**. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1994;

OKOYO, M. Africa and political stability. **Africa**, v. 9, n. 74, 1977, p. 93-96.

ONUCI. **Rapport sur la situation des Droits de l'Homme en Côte d'Ivoire** Mai – Juin – Juillet 2005

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES. **Opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies: Principes et Orientations**, Nations Unies Département des opérations de maintien la paix, Département de l'appui aux missions, 2008.

OUEDRAOGO M.D. "Burkina Faso: Compaoré, faiseur de paix ou marchand de guerre?", **Slate Afrique**, 2012 Available from: <http://www.slateafrique.com/91955/burkina-faso-blaise-compaore-faiseur-de-paix-ou-perturbateur> . Accessed on 08 March 2020.

PAFFENHOLZ, T. **Community-based Bottom-up Peacebuilding**. The development of the Life and Peace Institute's approach to peacebuilding and Lessons Learned from the Somalia experience (1990-2000). Uppsala: Life & Peace Institute, 2003.

\_\_\_\_\_. Understanding peacebuilding theory: Management, resolution and transformation In Conflict Transformation: three lenses in one frame. **New Routes**, v. 2, n.1, p 3-9, 2009.

PAFFENHOLZ, T.; SPURK, C. **Civil Society, Civic Engagement and Peacebuilding**. Social Development Papers, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Paper No 36. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 2006.

PARIS, R. 'Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture'. **European Journal of International Relations**, v. 9, n. 3, p. 441–473, 2003.

PÉCLARD, D. et al. Civil Wars and State Formation. Violence and the Politics of Legitimacy in Angola, Côte d'Ivoire and South Sudan. **Geneva**: Swiss Network of International Studies, 2019.

PICCOLINO, G. The Dilemmas of Consent in UN Peace Operations: the case of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire. In: WYSS, M.; TARDY, T. (eds). **Peacekeeping in Africa**: the Evolving Security Architecture. London: Routledge, 2014. p. 226-244.

PRESIDENT de la Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest. **UN Doc. S/2011/200**, March 2011.

PROTEAU, L. De la « guerre scolaire » au conflit armé en Côte-d'Ivoire. Entretien avec Laurence Proteau réalisé par Laurent Bazin. **Journal des anthropologues**. Association française des anthropologues, n. 100–101, p. 249–263, 1 jun. 2005.

PRUITT, D. G. "Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks". **International Negotiation**, v.2, n.2, p. 237-250, 1997.

PRUITT, D. G.; OLKZAK, P. V. "Approaches to resolving Seemingly Intractable Conflict". In: BUNKER, B.; RUBIN, J. (orgs.). **Conflict, Cooperation and Justice**. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass., 1995.

PUTMAN, R. D. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. In: EVANS, P. B.; JACOBSON, H. K.; E PUTMAN, R. D. (eds.). **Double-Edged Diplomacy**: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Bekerley, CA: University of California Press, 1993. p. 431-468.

RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONALE. Crise ivoirienne: chronologie des événements du 8 au 10 avril. **RFI** (26.02.2020), 2011a. Available from: <http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20110411-crise-ivoirienne-chronologie-evenements-8-10-avril> Accessed on 30 March 2020.

RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONALE. Les événements des 11 et 12 avril en Côte d'Ivoire, minute par minute. **RFI** (14.04.2011), 2011b. Available from: <http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/5min/20110407-suivez-situation-cote-ivoire-minute-minute> Accessed on 30 March 2020.

RÉSEAU DE RECHERCHES SUR LE OPÉRATIONS DE PAIX (20.10.2010). Génération des opérations de paix. **ROP**. Available from: <http://www.operationspaix.net/60-resources/details-lexique/generations-d-operations-de-paix.html>. Accessed on 13 March 2020.

ROQUAIN, J. Le miracle ivoirien et ses conséquences sur la situations actuelle du pays. **Les yeux du monde.fr**. 15 march 2016. Available from: <https://les-yeux-du-monde.fr/histoires/25493-le-miracle-ivoirien-et-ses-consequences-sur-la-situations-actuelle-du-pays>. Accessed on 20 April 2020.

RT. Russia lashes out at UN military action in Cote d'Ivoire. **RT** (05.04.2011) Available from: <https://www.rt.com/news/cote-ivoire-gbagbo-un/> Accessed 30 March 2020.

RTS. Laurent Gbagbo reste inflexible dans son bunker. **RTS** (06 April 2011), 2011a. Available from: <https://www.rts.ch/info/monde/3063774-laurent-gbagbo-reste-inflexible-dans-son-bunker.html> Accessed on 28 March 2020.

RTS. Côte d'Ivoire: l'armée française a fait feu sur les pro-Gbagbo à la demande de l'ONU. **RTS**, 2011b <https://www.rts.ch/play/tv/19h30/video/cote-divoire-larmee-franaise-a-fait-feu-sur-les-pro-gbagbo-a-la-demande-de-lonu?urn=urn:rts:video:3062938>

RUBIN, J. Z. "Conclusion: International Mediation in Context". In: BERCOVITCH, J.; RUBIN, J. Z. (orgs.). **Mediation in International Relations**. New York: St.Martin's Press, 1992.

RUBIN, J. Z. **Negotiation Theory and practice**. Cambridge: Program on Negotiation Books, 1993. p 3-13.

RUBIN, J. Z.; PRUITT, D. G.; KIM, S. H. **Social Conflict**. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994.

RUEFF, J. Putsch raté en Côte d'Ivoire: le Nord montré du doigt. **Journal Libération**, 10 January 2001. Available from: [https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2001/01/10/putsch-rate-en-cote-d-ivoire-le-nord-montre-du-doigt\\_350528](https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2001/01/10/putsch-rate-en-cote-d-ivoire-le-nord-montre-du-doigt_350528). Accessed on 01 May 2020.

RUPESINGHE, K. **Conflict Transformation**. New York: St. Martin's., 1995.

SADA Le conflit ivoirien : enjeux régionaux et maintien de la paix en Afrique. **Politique étrangère**, n. 2 - 68<sup>e</sup>année, p. 321-334, 2003.

SAMSON, D. Côte d'Ivoire : Faire respecter les engagements. **RFI** (24.06.2004). Available from: [http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/054/article\\_28894.asp](http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/054/article_28894.asp) Accessed on 26 February 2020

SARGSYAN, E. **International mediation in theory and practice**: lessons of nagorno-karabakh. Armenian Center for National and International Studies, 2003, p 1-62.

SAUNDERS, H. H. "We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of Pre-Negotiation Phases,". In: BRESLIN, J. W.; RUBIN, J. Z. (eds.). **Negotiation Theory and Practice**. Cambridge: The Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 1991. p. 57-70.

SCHELLENBERG, J. **Conflict Resolution**: Theory, Research, Practice. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996, 247 p.

SCHLICHTKE, K. **In the Shadow of Violence**: The Politics of Armed Groups. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 2009.

SCIOLINO, E. The World; Out of Africa? Not Yet. These Are the French. **The New York Times**, 12 January 2003 Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/12/weekinreview/the-world-out-of-africa-not-yet-these-are-the-french.html>. Accessed on 20 May 2020.

SEELow, S. Côte d'Ivoire : les ingrédients de la crise. **Le Monde Afrique** (2011). Available from: [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2010/12/03/cote-d-ivoire-les-ingredients-de-la-crise\\_1448699\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2010/12/03/cote-d-ivoire-les-ingredients-de-la-crise_1448699_3212.html). Accessed on 26 March 2020.

SHERIFF, A. et al. **Supporting peacebuilding in times of change: a synthesis of 4 case studies**. Ecdpm. Available from: <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/ecdpm-2018-supporting-peacebuilding-times-change-synthesis-report.pdf>. Accessed on 11 May 2020.

SHULTZ G. “**This is the plan**”. The New York Times, 18/03/1998 cited by Zartman.

SIDIBÉ, D. “Peace Processes in Côte d’Ivoire: **Democracy and Challenges of Consolidating Peace after the Post-electoral Crisis**,” ACCORD, 2013, p. 4–7.

SKOGSETH, G. **Côte d’Ivoire: Ethnicity, Ivoirité and Conflict**. Oslo: Landinfo, 2 november 2006, pp. 1-35.

SMITH, S. La politique d’engagement de la France à l’épreuve de la Côte-d’Ivoire, **Politique africaine**, n. 89, mars 2003.

\_\_\_\_\_. Mission impossible pour la France en Côte d’Ivoire, **Le Monde**, 3 décembre 2004.

SORO, G. **Pourquoi je suis devenu un rebelle** - la Côte-d’Ivoire au bord du gouffre. Hachette Littératures, 2005. 173p.

STEDMAN, S. J. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”. **International Security**, v. 22, n. 2, 1997, 5–53.

STEDMAN, S. J. Peace Processes and the Challenges of violence. In: DARBY, J.; MACGINTY, R. (eds). **Contemporary Peace Making: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes**. Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

STEIN, J. **Getting to the table**. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.

STEINERT, J. I.; GRIMM, S. Too good to be true? United Nations peacebuilding and the democratization of war-torn states. **Conflict Management and Peace Science**, v. 32, n. 5, p. 513–535, 2015.

TARDY, T ‘A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in Contemporary Peace Operations’. **International Peacekeeping**, v. 18, n. 2, p. 152–167, 2011.

THE NEW HUMANITARIAN Formerly the IRIN News. **Report publish on 23 December, 2002**. Available from: <http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2002/12/23/lome-talks-suspended> Accessed on 13 February, 2020

THE NEW HUMANITARIAN. L’année 2005 en Bref- Chronologie des événements clés. **TNH** (12.06.2006). Available from: <http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/feature/2006/01/12/l’année-2005-en-bref---chronologie-des-événements-clés>. Accessed on 07 March 2020.

THE NEW YORK TIMES. Horrors in Ivory Coast. **The NYT editorial**, 17 March 2011. Available from:

<https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/opinion/18fri4.html?searchResultPosition=8> Accessed at 20 May 2020.

THÉROUX-BÉNONI, L.-A.; BAH, A. A. “À propos du rôle des médias dans la crise ivoirienne”. In : OUÉDRAOGO, J.-B.; SALL, E. (dir.). **Frontières de la citoyenneté et violence politique en Côte-d’Ivoire**. Dakar: CODESRIA, 2008. p. 199-217.

THORIN, V. Côte d’Ivoire « Préférence nationale. **Jeune Afrique**, 15 March 2004. Available from: <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/104444/archives-thematique/c-te-d-ivoire-pr-f-rence-nationale/>. Accessed on 25 April 2020.

THIJS, V. Accord à Pretoria sur la crise ivoirienne. **JL** (07.04.2005). Available from: [https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2005/04/07/accord-a-pretoria-sur-la-crise-ivoirienne\\_515589](https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2005/04/07/accord-a-pretoria-sur-la-crise-ivoirienne_515589) Accessed on 5 March 2020

TILLY, C. **From Mobilization to Revolution**. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2018. UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia. Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Available from: [www.ucdp.uu.se](http://www.ucdp.uu.se). Accessed on 04 May 2020.

TOUVAL, S. Dilemas éticos da mediação internacional. In: HERZ, M.; SIMAN, M. ; DRUMOND, P. (orgs.). **Mediação Internacional**. Petrópolis ,RJ: Vozes; Editora PUC-Rio, 2016.

\_\_\_\_\_. Mediator’s Flexibility and the U.N. Security Council. **The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science**, v. 542, n. 1, p. 202–212, 1995.

\_\_\_\_\_. **The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979**. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.

TOUVAL, S.; ZARTMAN, I. W. **International Mediation in Theory and Practice**. Boulders:Westview, 1985.

TRICHET, P. En Côte d’Ivoire, le Forum des Confessions Religieuses. In : EYEZO’O, S.; ZORN, J.-F. (dir.). **Concurrence en mission: Propagandes, conflits, coexistence (XVI - XXI siècle)**. Paris: Karthala, 2011. 396 p.

TRUYOL, M.-L. Historique de l’opération UNLOS. **ROP**, 15 Juin 2016 Available from :<http://www.operationspaix.net/170-historique-unlos.html>. Accessed on 08 May 2020.

TURAY, T. M. Civil society and peacebuilding: The role of the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone. **Accord**. Londres: Conciliation resource 2000. Available from: <https://www.c-r.org/accord/sierra-leone/civil-society-and-peacebuilding-role-inter-religious-council-sierra-leone>. Accessed on 4 June 2020.

UA Conseil De Paix Et De Sécurité. **Communiqué de la 288ème reunion du Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité**. UA Doc. PSC/PR/2(CCLXXXVIII) (2011), para. 5

UN Press Release. **Security Council: Laurent Gbagbo has been held at the head of Côte d’Ivoire at the side of a prime minister with all the powers up to 31 October 2006**. UN Doc SC/8532, 21 October 2005.



UNITED NATIONS (2004) **Côte d'Ivoire – MINUCI – Mandate**. UN. Available from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/minuci/mandate.html> Accessed on March, 15, 2020.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Charter of United Nations 1945**

\_\_\_\_\_. Terminology. UN Available from : <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/terminology>. Accessed on 20 March 2020.

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING. **Principles of Peacekeeping**. UNPK, Available from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping> Accessed on 17 March 2020. UNSC. Annex II to the letter dated 27 January 2003 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. UN Doc. S/2003/99. Available from: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/473>. Accessed on 1 June 2020.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Ceasefire agreement between the Government of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, the Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest and the Mouvement pour la justice et la paix**. UN Doc. S/2003/51.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Joint Declaration of the Defence and Security Forces of Côte d'Ivoire and the Armed Forces of the Forces Nouvelles**. UN Doc. S/2003/704, July 2003.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 4918th meeting, on 27 February 2004**. UN Doc S/RES/1528 (2004). Available from: [https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/1528%20\(2004\)](https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/1528%20(2004)). Accessed on 21 May 2020

\_\_\_\_\_. S/2004/3 **Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire** submitted pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1514 (2003) of 13 November 2003, 2004a.

\_\_\_\_\_. **4918th meeting Friday, 27 February 2004, 10 a.m. New York**. Un Document S/PV.4918, 2004b. Available from: <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.4918>. Accessed on 21 May 2020..

\_\_\_\_\_. **First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNOCI**, UN Doc. S/2004/443, June 2004, para. 12, 2004c.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNOCI**, UN Doc. S/2004/697 August 2004, para. 36, 2004e.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 5078 séance S/RES/1572 (2004)**, le 15 novembre 2004 sur l'embargo des armes en Côte d'Ivoire, 2004f.

\_\_\_\_\_. **4959th meeting**. UN Doc S/PV.4959, Friday, 30 April 2004, 12.15 p.m. New York, 2004h. Available from: <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.4959>. Accessed on 21 May 2020.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Adopted by the Security Council at its 5213th meeting**, on 24 June 2005. UN Doc. S/RES/1609 (2005), para. 2, 2005e.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Adopted by the Security Council at its 5288th meeting**, on 21 October 2005. UN Doc. S/RES/1633 (2005) para. 3 and 4, 2005f.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Reunion Minute of the 5314th meeting**. Wednesday, 30 November 2005, 1.25 p.m. New York. UN Doc. S/PV.5314., 2005g.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Adopted by the Security Council at its 5327th meeting**, on 15 December 2005. UN Doc S/RES/1643 (2005), para 5, 2005h.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Tenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNOCI**, UN Doc. S/2006/821 October 2006, para. 3, 2006c.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Adopted by the Security Council at its 5561st meeting**, on 1 November 2006 UN Doc. S/RES/1721 (2006), para 5 and 6, 2006d.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Adopted by the Security Council at its 5617th meeting**, on 10 January 2007. UN Doc. S/RES/1739 (2007), para. 2, 2007a.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Meeting minute of the 5676th meeting Friday**, 18 May 2007, 10 a.m. New York. UN Doc. S/PV. 5676, 2007d.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Meeting minute of the 5765th meeting Monday**, 22 October 2007, 10.20 a.m. New York. UN Doc. S/PV. 5765, 2007e.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire**. UN Doc. S/2007/593, 1 October 2007, para. 59, 2007f.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Fifteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNOCI**. UN Doc. S/2008/1, January 2008, para. 8, 2008a.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Adopted by the Security Council at its 6004th meeting**, on 29 October 2008. UN Doc S/RES/1842, para. 1, 2008d.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Meeting minute of the 6014th meeting**, Friday, 7 November 2008, 5.20 p.m. New York. UN Doc. S/PV.6014, 2008e.

\_\_\_\_\_. S/2008/250, **"Sixteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire,"** April 15, 2008, 2008f.

\_\_\_\_\_. S/2008/645, **"Eighteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire,"** October 13, 2008, 2008g.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Meeting minute of the 6071st meeting**, Wednesday, 21 January 2009, 10.45 a.m. New York. UN Doc. S/PV.6071, 2009a.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Résolution Adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 6076 séance**, le 27 janvier 2009. UN Doc. S/RES/1865, para. 17, 2009b.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Meeting minute of the 6113th meeting**. Tuesday, 28 April 2009, 10 a.m. New York. UN Doc S/PV.6113, 2009c.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Meeting minute of the 6168th meeting.** Thursday, 23 July 2009, 11 a.m. New York. UN Doc S/PV.6168, 23 July 2009, 2009d.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Meeting Minute of the 6209th meeting.** Thursday, 29 October 2009, 11.50 a.m. New York. UN Doc S/PV.6209, 29 October 2009, 2009e.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Twenty-fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNOCI.** UN Doc. S/2010/245 (2010), Mai 2010, para. 2, 2010a

\_\_\_\_\_. **Adopted by the Security Council at its 6267th meeting, on 28 January 2010.** UN Doc S/RES/1911 (2010), 28 January 2010, para. 4 and 14, 2010b.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Meeting Minute of the 6284th meeting.** Wednesday, 17 March 2010, 10 a.m. New York. UN Doc. S/PV.6248, 17 March 2010, 2010c.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Meeting Minute of the 6329th meeting.** Thursday, 3 June 2010, 10.55 a.m. New York. UN Doc. S/PV.6329, 3 June 2010, 2010d.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Rapport du Secrétaire général sur l'Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire.** UN. Doc. S/2010/537, October 2010. Para. 11, 2010e.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Lettre datée du 7 janvier 2011, adressée au Président du Conseil de sécurité par le Secrétaire général.** UN Doc. S/2011/5 (2011), January 2011, 2011a.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Résolution adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 6469 séance,** le 19 janvier 2011. UN Doc. S/RES/1967, 2011b.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Lettre datée du 25 mars 2011, adressée au Secrétaire général,** 2011c.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Vingt-septième rapport du Secrétaire général sur l'Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire.** UN Doc. S/2011/211. March 2011, 2011d.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Résolution adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 6508 séance,** le 30 mars 2011. UN Doc. S/RES/1975, 2011e.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Meeting minute of the 6508th meeting.** Wednesday, 30 March 2011, 5 p.m. New York. UN Doc. S/PV.6508, 30 March 2011, 2011f.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Résolution adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 6535 séance,** le 13 mai 2011. UN Doc. S/RES/1981, 2011g.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Vingt-huitième rapport du Secrétaire général sur l'Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire.** Un Doc. S/2011/387, June 2011, 2011h.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Résolution adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 6591 séance,** le 27 juillet 2011. UN Doc. S/RES/2000, 2011i.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Twenty-ninth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire.** UN Doc. S/2011/807(2011), 30 December 2011, para 3, 2011j.

\_\_\_\_\_. **S/PV.6620. 6620th meeting Friday**, 16 September 2011, 3.55 p.m. New York. UNSC 2011k. Available from: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206620.pdf>

\_\_\_\_\_. **Report Monthly January 2012 Forecast**. This report is available online and can be viewed together with research studies and Update Reports at [www.securitycouncilreport.org](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org). Accessed on 12 June 2020, 2012a.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Lettre datée du 25 mai 2012**. Adressée au Secrétaire général par le Premier Ministre de la Côte d'Ivoire. UN Doc. S/2012/430, 2012b.

\_\_\_\_\_. **S/PV.6710. 6710th meeting**. Tuesday, 31 January 2012, 3 p.m. New York. UNSC, 2012f. Available from: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20SPV%206710.pdf>. Accessed on 1 May 2020.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Thirty-third report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire**. UN Doc. S/2013/761, 24 December 2013, 2013b.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Final progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire**. UN Doc. S/2017/89, 31 January 2017. Para. 29, 2017a.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire**. UN Doc S/2007/275, May 14, 2007

\_\_\_\_\_. **"Twenty-second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire"**, UN Doc S/2009/495, September 29, 2009.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Document addressed to the president of the UNSC**. UN Doc S/2003/1081

\_\_\_\_\_. **Draft Resolution**. UN Doc S/2003/140, 4 February 2003, para.5.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Annex 1 to the letter dated 27 January 2003** from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2003/99. Section IV, point 1 and 2. p. 6-7.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Adopted by the Security Council at its 6402nd meeting**, on 15 October 2010. UN Doc S/RES/1946 (2010).

UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM. **Côte d'Ivoire**. UCDP. Available from: <https://www.ucdp.uu.se/nonstate/5561>. Accessed on 04 May 2020.

VAN WOUDEBERG, A. 'Ethnically Targeted Violence in Ituri'. In: **Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**. 2004.

VETTOVAGLIA, J.-P. Conflits et médiation internationale. **Etudes**, v. mars, n. 3, p. 17–27, 2014 Available from: <https://www.cairn.info/revue-etudes-2014-3-page-17.htm>. Accessed on 1 June 2020.

VUKOVIC, S. International mediation as a distinct form of conflict management. **International Journal of Conflict Management**, v. 25, 4 fev. 2014.

WALTER, B.F. The critical barrier to Civil War settlement, **International Organization**, v. 51, n. 3, p. 335-364, 1997.

WEHR, P.; LEDERACH, J. P. "Mediating Conflict in Central America". In: BERCOVITCH, J. (org.). **Resolving International Conflict** - The Theory and Practice of Mediation. Boulder/Londres: Lynne Rienner, 1996. p. 54-74.

WORLD BANK. **World Development Indicators**, 1997.

WUCHERPFENNIG, J.; HUNZIKER, P.; CEDERMAN, L.-E. Who Inherits the State? Colonial Rule and Postcolonial Conflict. **American Journal of Political Science.**, v. 60, n. 4, p. 882-898, 2016.

WYSS, M. "Primus inter Pares? France and Multi-Actor Peacekeeping in Côte d'Ivoire,". In: TARDY, Thierry; WYSS, Marco, eds. **Peacekeeping in Africa: The Evolving Security Architecture**. New York: Routledge, 2014

YABI, G. Côte d'Ivoire In: ANTONINI, B. (ed.). **Security Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII: Design, Implementation and Accountabilities**. Madrid: FRIDE, 2009.

YEO, L. L'ethnie, la religion et la région dans le processus de construction de la nation ivoirienne. Plaidoyer pour une paix durable en Côte d'Ivoire, p 70. In : KONATE, A. S.; YEO, L. **Crise Ivoirienne Et Religion: Réflexions Pour Un Nouveau Contrat Social Ivoirien**. Abidjan: Editions INIDAF, 2015. 154 p.

ZAHAR M-J. Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes. In DARBY, J.; MACGINTY, R. (eds). **Contemporary Peace Making: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes**. Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

ZARTMAN I. W. **Negotiation and Conflict Management: Essays on theory and practice**. New York: Routledge, 2008.

\_\_\_\_\_. The timing of peace initiatives: Hurting stalemates and ripe moments. **The Global Review of Ethnopolitics**, v. 1, p 8-18, 2001.

\_\_\_\_\_. Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations. **International Organization**, v. 21, n. 3, p. 545-564, 1967.

\_\_\_\_\_. Amadurecimento do conflito - Para além do impasse mutuamente insustentável. In: HERZ, M.; SIMAN, M.; DRUMOND, P. (orgs.). **Mediação internacional**. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes; Editora PUC-Rio, 2016. p. 75-105.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Elusive Peace: Negotiating and End to Civil Wars**. Washington, D.C.: The brooking Institution 1995.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond. In: STERN, P.C. ; DRUCKMAN, D. (eds). **International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War**, Committee on International Conflict Resolution, National Research Council. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000. p. 225-250.

\_\_\_\_\_. Negotiations to End Conflict in South Africa. In: ZARTMAN, I.W. (org). **Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars**. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995.

ZARTMAN, I. W.; FAURE G. O. The Dynamics of Escalation and Negotiation. In: ZARTMAN, I. W. AND FAURE G. O. (Eds). **Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

ZARTMAN, I. W.; AURIK, J. Power Strategies in De-Escalation. In: KRIESBERG, L.; THORSON, S. (orgs.). **Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts**. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991.

ZARTMAN, I. W.; BERMAN, M. **The Practical Negotiator**. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982.

ZARTMAN, I. W.; TOUVAL, S. International mediation in the Post-Cold War Era. In: CROCKER, C.; HAMPSON, F.O.; AALL, P. (orgs). **Managing Global Chaos**. Washington: US Institute of Peace, 1997.