Os limites do mundo: Wittgenstein e a natureza da necessidade

Abstract

In all the phases of Wittgenstein s writings, the matter of necessity was under the focus of his analysis. As much in the Tractatus as in the considerations post-Tractatus, it holds the idea that there is a difference of nature between propositions like the ones of the logic and the propositions of the natural sciences, and tries to explain what makes such difference, explaining that so-called necessary propositions describe or represent nothing, and are, thus, an expression of the linguistic rules which determines the limits of the sense. The reason of this work is to provide a clarification to Wittgenstein s reflections about the nature of the necessity. When I was doing it, I tried to indicate the continuing points and the rupture ones between the explanation given in the Tractatus and the other one provided in the writings of the so-called later Wittgenstein . I also tried to highlight how a discussion about Wittgenstein s considerations over the nature of the necessary truth might bring a more enlightened thought to a wider debate between the ontological conceptions and the linguistic conception of the necessity.