Da realidade à verdade: a crítica de Martin Heidegger a fundamentação metafísica da verdade proposicional

Abstract

This dissertation holds as a central theme the investigation of Martin Heidegger s thesis with respect to the derivative character of propositional truth in relation to what is considered by him as the originary phenomenon of truth. The interrogation about a more originary horizon of the notion of truth arises from Heidegger s certitude in respect to the negligence of the authors of philosophical tradition towards the necessity of an ontological grounding to propositional truth. The metaphysical roots of propositional truth would be in the Aristotelian presumption of substance (ou)si/a) as fundamental category of the being of entities in general. Therefore, Heidegger will try to deconstruct the notion of a constant and self-subsistent reality as an ontological ground to the hegemonic conception of truth. The substantiality of being, till then, unquestionable evidence, is now articulated by the historically situated human being. It means that, somehow, the conception of being as substance, or constant presence, should have been established by human beings and incorporated in the history of philosophy in such a way that it became a metaphysical grounding of truth. Nevertheless, Heidegger warns that the establishing of the ontology of substantiality is not the result of a simple theoretical human choice. On the contrary, this theoretical grounding would be conditioned by the very mode of being of humans as existents in the world.