O segundo Wittgenstein e o problema das outras mentes

Abstract

This dissertation aims to expose and critically analyze the later Wittgenstein's thought concerning the so called "problem of other minds", exploring through this work the whole development of an argumentation that leads to his position. First chapter fulfils the role of explaining what is the problem of other minds, according to the current bibliography about this theme. Indeed, we notice that that there are two different problems, yet we could consider they are connected: there is an epistemological problem and a conceptual problem. So we present different versions both of these problems, versions of the epistemological one and versions of the conceptual one. In the second chapter we contextualize philosophically and historically the Wittgenstein's late thought. We start with a brief exposition of his intellectual trajectory covering early and intermediate phases, including both general aspects as also those which are related to the main theme of this dissertation. Then we discuss the general aspects of late Wittgenstein's thought including his criticism towards the Augustinian picture of the language and also what he thought as being an adequate philosophical methodology. In the third chapter we go deep into late Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, explaining in details the "rule-following problem" and the controversies among scholars concerning the right interpretation of the author's position. In the fourth and last chapter we carefully discuss the Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychological language. We begin presenting the private language argument subject that is the turn point from philosophy of language to philosophy of mind in the Philosophical Investigations and so we explain the Wittgensteinian positive point of view about philosophy of mind and psychological language. Eventually, we explain the solution that could be inferred from later Wittgenstein's work both for epistemological and conceptual problems in their manifold presented versions. In a nutshell, Wittgenstein's attack on other minds skepticism depends on importantly of his attack on the dominant understanding about the meaning of the psychological vocabulary words, namely, that such words denote phenomenological objects directly accessible only for the subject of this experience, as well as also his rejection of the idea that psychological concepts are learned by introspection.