Instituições, interesses e tributação no Brasil e na Argentina : o novo desenvolvimentismo e os conflitos em torno da agenda tributária

Abstract

This thesis addressed as central themes state tax capacity and distributive conflicts inherent to the effective tax collection. We aimed at analyzing the processes behind disputes over taxation in the New Developmentist phase in Brazil (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva government, 2003-2010) and Argentina (Néstor Kirchner, 2003-2007, and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner administrations, 2007-2011), identifying the impacts from previous institutional path legacies on the definition of their tax agendas, as well as the strategies adopted by ruling and opposing coalitions to promote changes in tax institutions. We focused our analysis on the conflicts around CPMF, in Brazil, and retenciones on exports, in Argentina. We argued that the emergence of developmentalist coalitions explains the construction of consensus around strengthening state capacity to raise taxes and thus the capacity to invest and promote social expenditures. The observed differences in tax capacity in Brazil and Argentina are explained, fundamentally, by the maintenance of a long-term consensus around developmentalism in Brazil, in contrast to a trajectory characterized by disputes around development strategies in Argentina. Furthermore, the building of coalitions that support particular tax agendas must be understood in the context of disputes around the distribution of costs and benefits associated to these policies. Therefore, we analyzed both countries economic elites articulation in the defense of their interests: even though Brazilian and Argentine business elites (industrial or agricultural) present historical difficulties in promoting collective action for positive agendas, they are capable of organizing their actions around negative interests, aiming to hinder tax policies that were against their interests.