Deliberação e barganha nas audiências públicas das comissões permanentes da Câmara dos Deputados

Abstract

This paper seeks information on the public hearings of the Chamber of Deputies from the point of view of deliberative theory. That is, it seeks to verify whether hearings are instruments used by deputies to make their decisions based on the best justifications. But the political game based on pure and simple bargaining will not be left out. One of the premisses of the study is that explanations based on the new institutionalism of rational choice, which works with agents motivated by fixed preferences within restrictive institutional rules, explain part of the political results. Deliberative theory, as a critical theory, would enter to indicate institutional designs more favorable to democracy. A database was prepared with information on all the public hearings of the standing committees held in the years 2005, 2009 and 2013. From this bank, it was possible to withdraw, for example, that the segments of society (invited to the hearings) are well distributed over the years; although there is a preponderance of executive authorities. The main motivation for the hearings is precisely the supervision of this power. An analysis of two topics discussed in public hearings was also carried out during the period chosen: student half-admission and pre-salt exploration, in order to verify the quality of the discussion from the point of view of deliberative theory. The results show that about 20% of the topics discussed in hearings are relative to projects in process; which reduces the deliberative character of the discussion. The partisan strand of the new institutionalism better explains the use of hearings as part of the struggle between government and opposition. The debates analyzed show deliberative characteristics such as the use of several arguments in the defense of positions and the call for agreement attempts; but there is ample scope for improving the quality of the discussion.