Sucessos de governo no Brasil: habilidades ou instituições?

Abstract

The literature on presidentialism in Political Science is largely in agreement. However,doubts remain on which factors most influence presidents to get their bills approved. Contributing to the literature on presidentialism, this paper examines the approval of Executive bills in Brazil, observing the effect on bill approval of presidential prerogatives, policy domains and political contexts. The findings suggest that exclusive prerogatives such as medidas provisórias, shortening the time of bills appreciation by Congress and exclusive policy domains (administrative and budget) along with economic bills owing to Executive's informational advantages over Congress due to institutions such as Central Bank and Finance Ministry positively influence the approval rate of Executive bills. Additionally, government success is better during the honeymoon period and has a significant positive correlation with the size of the government coalition. However, the results show that "skill" does not significantly affect on success and, the president's popularity negatively affects the approval rate of presidents bills, counter to expectations.