A fundamentação afetiva da metafísica: medo da morte e ressentimento com o tempo

Abstract

This paper aims to investigate the affective grounding of classical metaphysics from the considerations made by Nietzsche, Bergson and Heidegger. In this perspective, the investigation proceeds to a research of the origin of the word and its historical development materialized in the speculations of Plato and Aristotle as well as those that preceded them philosophically. The installation of a transcendent and intelligible idea of Being opposed to a conception of the real as physical and, above all, temporal, shows itself as the measure of the emergence of metaphysical thought. In order to understand the reasons for this configuration, the investigation turns to the scrutiny of the main conceptions of time observed in classical metaphysics. The desire to tame time to dominate reality, understood from the operation of this will as a permanent presence, that is, as a kind of timeless present, is identified as the origin of the separation of time and Being that will determine metaphysics. On the basis of this desire, one observes, with Bergson, that the metaphysical permanent present is nothing more than a jagged past fixed by reason, that is, of the artificial immobilization of the moving reality in intelligible, having Zeno and Plato as the main artificers of the expedient. This configuration is explained by Heidegger as resulting from a change in the original relationship of man with the real from Plato. On the basis of this change, however, the action of an affect: the fear of death. Fearing its disappearance, metaphysical man founds a beyond in order to defend itself from finitude and relegates temporality to the status of error, since it is responsible for the ending of existence. Plato's Phaedo will prove to be the hallmark of this configuration, since from it emanates the contempt of life from the thesis of the immortality of the soul, the main metaphysical argument for postmortem transcendence. Being the origin of becoming and, obviously, of death, time, from the establishment of metaphysics, is despised and understood as harmful, being, as Nietzsche demonstrates, an object of resentment. In this way, metaphysical thinking is presented affectionately as the consolidation of the fear of death driven by resentment against time.