Uma análise econômica dos modelos de contrato de concessão e partilha de produção no setor petrolífero no Brasil

Abstract

The main objective of this dissertation was to analyze the exploratory petroleum bloc auctions, given changes in the Brazilian regulatory mark that are taking place in recent years, as well as to exam the best auction design to treat this matter, taking into consideration its asymmetric information nature. Additionally, the scope of the research was also to evaluate the impact of the first bidding round under the production share regime. To accomplish the proposed objectives of this dissertation the concession and production share contracts were evaluated, as well as the laws that established it, emphasizing their relevant aspects. Furthermore, the auction theory was examined, since the evaluation of the adopted auction design for the exploratory bloc supply is essential to understand the dynamics of the petroleum sector and its related problems. The analysis of the bid rounds promoted by the National Petroleum Agency (ANP) concluded that the adopted auction model favors the winner's curse problem and that the share regime presents failures in its formulation, because of its complex rules and does not support competition. Finally, the main results were detached and some policy suggestions, such as, the utilization of economic experiments were proposed.