Tributação ótima do consumo com agentes desatentos: evidências e prescrições.

Abstract

Evidence indicates that consumers have high levels of inattention to taxes levied on goods and services that are not sufficiently perceived, which leads them to make choices that are inconsistent with the classical postulates of the Theory of Optimal Consumption Taxation. These static, normative, general equilibrium models, which exert great influence on modern tax systems, by dealing with the collection of taxes for individuals with different income levels, on intermediate goods, on the uniformity of rates, and on the functions of consumption and labor income taxation, implicitly assume the perfect attention of individuals to taxes. On the other hand, optimal taxation has been going through a process of methodological revision, introducing hypotheses that are more adherent to reality. It is in this perspective that we analyzed the implications of incorporating behavioral inattention in the theoretical models of optimal taxation of consumption of goods and services and the repercussions for tax policy in practice, especially for the current debate about tax reform in Brazil. Thus, it was found that the misperception causes several modifications in the optimal tax rule with rational agents, changing from the general rule of uniformity of rates with few exceptions to the selectivity of taxes, following recommendations that were overcome in the course of the theory's development, added to the weighting of individuals' attention.