Lobbying na regulação contábil: descrição da posição de diferentes agentes econômicos impactados pela norma de macro hedge proposta pelo IASB

Abstract

This study aims to describe the position of economic agents affected by the macro hedge standard in relation to the proposals presented in the Discussion Paper Accounting for Dynamic Risk Management issued by IASB. With the proposal that the objectives were achieved, a qualitative survey was conducted with the discussion paper’s respondents, identifying through contents analysis, the characteristics as the agreement or disagreement regarding the new approach and their mandatory use. We also analyzed the answers provided by respondents to the 7 key issues where the normalizing addressed issues relating to the environment, introduction, scope, application to other risks and alternative approach to the PRA. The descriptive analysis showed that 45% of respondents belong to the financial sector, with its share related to the impact that the new proposal has on the sector. Overall, 72% of respondents were opposed to approach, where banks, in isolation, had an 89% rejection rate, a fact that corroborates the studies developed by Watts and Zimmerman (1978) on corporate lobbying. By analyzing the comments on the context and applicability of the PRA, it is concluded that the predominant positioning with respect to the presented proposal is to maintain the current situation of hedge accounting to avoid providing loopholes that enable implementation of accounting models containing very bold proposals.