Nonhuman animals and the limits of contractualism

Abstract

Contractual theories of justice often argue that nonhuman animals fall outside their scope. Furthermore, they usually look for morally relevant characteristics to define the proper reci-pients of justice. In this dissertation, I argue that the criteria typically used to specify the be-neficiaries of social justice in contractualism are either overly restrictive or unduly arbitrary. The structure of the study is divided into three parts. Since contemporary political philosophy— particularly contractualist theories of justice — engages with fundamental concepts articu-lated by Kant’s practical philosophy, the first segment details the value and role of autonomy in demarcating the sphere of moral and political duties. Second, the extent of contractualism re-garding the constituents of political concern is examined in the particular works of John Rawls (justice as fairness) and Brian Barry (justice as impartiality). The idea of citizens as free and equal, the central value of reciprocity, the elemental view of society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, and the very idea of a hypothetical contract are all identified as sources that hinder the incorporation of animals in justice as fairness. Further, contractualism as a political conception of justice starts with reasonable adult citizens and expands from them. In justice as impartiality, the emphasis on impartial rules rather than on the principle of reciprocity and the absence of mutual advantage may appear more promising to the fundamental interests of nonhuman animals. Yet, I contend that justice as impartiality still begins from a ratiocentric conception of persons, relies on a contractual description of justice, and is ultimately concerned with neutrality between persistently conflicting doctrines among reasonable human citizens. Lastly, the final segment applies eminently political concepts such as coercion, domination, and legitimacy in human- nonhuman exchanges. It is argued that species membership or rational na-ture are unsuitable characteristics to satisfactorily delimit those concepts. I advance the notion of legitimacy as responsiveness to fundamental interests and the idea of domination as disregard for interests in the context of abuses of power.