Federalismo fiscal e eficiência tributária: Contribuições para um modelo mais eficiente de federalismo fiscal no Brasil

Abstract

Fiscal iniquity and the low quality of social spending have made Brazil one of the most inefficient and unequal countries in the world. The necessary tax reform arises from the junction of the concepts of fiscal federalism and optimal taxation. Fiscal Federalism is the way tax revenues are broken down into a federation. Optimal taxation is the result of the balance between efficiency and equity. The expected tax reform should provide for a more efficient arrangement of distribution of the bases of incidence between the entities of the federation, respecting their respective vocations and financial needs, together with a new system of intergovernmental transfers. The change must be structural and constitutional amendment, given the need to reduce and redefine tax competencies. Although much awaited by society and business, the constitutional tax reform is encountering political, legal and economic difficulties, which can not hamper its approval. The reform must preserve the financial autonomy of subnational entities, albeit through intergovernmental transfers. It is suggested the creation of Dual VAT, replacing the current taxes levied on consumption (ICMS, IPI, ISS, PIS and Cofins), and the increase in taxes on capital and income. The Dual VAT comes from the sharing of the tax base consumption between the Union and the States, making autonomy, neutrality and harmonization compatible. To reduce the regressivity of the system, there should be a reduction in the tax burden on consumption and an increase in taxation on income and equity. The reform should also relead the contributions to the purpose for which they were created, in order to avoid compromising the finances of subnational entities, by the artificial centralization federative caused by the abusive use of contributions.