Os limites à cognição nas ações probatórias e seus reflexos na solução de questões pelo juiz

Abstract

The CPC/2015 reconfigured the autonomous collection of evidence (arts. 381 to 383), broadening its scope and extending to this procedure cognitive restrictions that, under the CPC/1973, were exclusive to a specific form of collection of evidence, known as "ação de justificação" (arts. 861 to 866). These cognitive restrictions essentially prohibit the assessment of evidence value, forbid pronouncements on the legal consequences of the facts being proven, and limit the audiatur et altera pars principle, precluding any addressing of the underlying substantive legal relationships pertinent to evidence collection. These cognitive limitations pose a significant challenge to the judgment on the admissibility of evidence collection claims, since this assessment takes into account the substantive legal relationship. For instance, Article 370 of the CPC/2015 determines that the judge must order the execution of evidence deemed necessary for the ruling on the merits and must reject any claim for producing superfluous evidence. This raises the question: how should this assessment be conducted if the right to evidence within the autonomous evidence collection procedure is exercised independently of the substantive legal relationship? This dissertation investigates whether the cognitive restrictions specific to the autonomous evidence collection procedure are justified and to what extent they compromise the judge's autonomy in evaluating the admissibility of the claim, a critical technique to deter frivolous litigation.