A proposição de um modelo neutralizador das disfuncionalidades consectárias da excessiva rigidez orçamentária e da supervinculação de receitas

Abstract

The excessive degree of budget rigidity is indicative of a budget process incapable of reflecting the choices of the population, exacerbated by a budget structure in which there is not a sufficiently clear distinction of powers, in a scenario of exacerbated dispersion of parliamentary interests. Such a configuration, giving a peculiar shape to the brazilian budget process, prevents us from forging a minimally strategic planning based on the notion of pluriannuality, at the same time hindering us from equating issues that go beyond the annual budget cycle and impelling us to allocate of resources in which the contempt for efficiency prevails. For this reason, the present thesis will be dedicated to scrutinizing the idiosyncrasies of the budget constraint – so important to the necessary generation of primary surpluses –, not without exploring the imbalance of forces prevailing between the Executive and Legislative Powers, from whose consequence it extracts the budget is mischaracterized as a programmatic instrument in a context in which the clear primacy of parochial interest groups ends up capturing the budget to the detriment of society's choices.