O problema da não-identidade: um estudo a partir da visão de Derek Parfit

Abstract

The present work aims to evaluate whether the non-identity problem and its possible consequences, as proposed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons, remain a relevant topic for recent moral investigations. In this sense, the question lies in determining whether, on the one hand, the topic is still capable of producing significant insights for the moral field and, on the other hand, whether the proposed solutions to address the non-identity problem and its paradoxes are satisfactory. Many attempts have been made to solve the non-identity problem and some of its paradoxes, such as the repugnant conclusion and mere addition. From this, one might perceive that the problems proposed by Parfit have been overcome. Simultaneously, it might be understood that solving the problems posed by Parfit should not constitute a primary goal for population axiologies. These perceptions highlight the need for such an investigation. The objective, therefore, becomes a deeper understanding of part four of Reasons and Persons, examining how questions can challenge traditional moral theories and whether the proposed solutions are indeed capable of overcoming the problems Parfit presented. The justification for this dissertation lies in the understanding that such an investigation can contribute to enhancing the philosophical and moral framework often used to address various urgent moral issues. The methodology employed was bibliographical research, with an emphasis on part four of Reasons and Persons and the literature produced by authors who engaged with Parfit on non-identity issues. As attempts to resolve problems related to non-identity, various proposals were evaluated, such as the application of rights theories as sufficient for the non-identity problem; the notion of harm without the idea of “worse than”; the use of person-affecting principles in the non-identity problem; the dissolution of the repugnant conclusion due to a lack of clarity regarding the meaning of lives worth living; and the application of lexicality in the continuity argument of the repugnant conclusion. It was concluded that these attempts were not satisfactory. Consequently, it is possible to understand that the non-identity problem and its paradoxes, as formulated by Parfit, remain unsolved. The dissertation allowed for the conclusion that the debate surrounding the issues raised by Parfit can generate significant insights that may contribute to refining the moral principles used in recent population axiologies. Throughout the dissertation, there was a deepening of the understanding of what lies behind the non-identity problem, namely, a greater perception of how an action can cause someone's existence while simultaneously being seen as the cause of something considered negative in the final outcome. Additionally, an analysis was conducted of Parfit’s second temporal dependency claim, which led to the suggestion of a third temporal dependency claim.