A Simultaneidade em Bergson: entre a ciência e a filosofia

Abstract

This thesis deals with the changing function of the concept of simultaneity in Henri Bergson's philosophy between 1889 and 1922. The research starts with the work “Essay on the immediate data of consciousness” (1889), where Bergson introduces the idea of duration as a subjective and qualitative temporal experience, contrasting it with quantified and spatialised time. Simultaneity is presented as an intersection between time and space. To do this, it was necessary to analyse the historical and scientific context of the time, showing Bergson's critical approach, which opposed the naturalisation of psychological phenomena by experimental psychology from the outset. From this perspective, we also tried to show that it is possible to integrate science and philosophy for a more complete understanding of reality. Bergson emphasises that his metaphysics and Einstein's physics are neither in conflict nor in harmony. Instead, they are fundamentally different approaches: Bergson's metaphysics is based on the concrete experience of time as duration, while Einstein's physics treats time as a purely mathematical reality, which cannot be perceived directly in experience. Finally, in the book “Duration and Simultaneity” (1922), we try to analyse the french philosopher's reflexive position between scientific simultaneity, which fragments time into measured instants, and intuitive simultaneity, which encompasses the lived experience of duration. Simultaneity is absolute and not subject to quantitative measurement, while scientific simultaneity is relative and depends on measurements. We found that this distinction reflects the tension between Bergson's view of the concept of simultaneity, which emphasises subjective experience, and Albert Einstein's view of scientific objectivity.