Da práxis ao conhecimento: um diálogo entre Quine e Wittgenstein acerca do lugar do conhecimento na linguagem

Abstract

The epistemological question essentially seeks not only certainty, but also the desire for objectivity. The concept of knowledge, then, revolves around producing knowledge that is as clear and distinct as possible, to use Descartes, but also obeys certain criteria that minimize the chances of error and that, when followed, bring the maximum possible objectivity. Discussions about the concept, however, have been guided, for the most part, by the tripartite, which makes up the classic definition of knowledge: Belief, Truth and Justification. The tripartite was already presented as the core of epistemological discussion, which intensified after Gettier's: Is justified true belief knowledge? which would lead to revisions and direct rejections of the definition or one of its parts. This dissertation will not aim to analyze the problems concerning the tripartite and its dismemberments or the epistemic scenarios associated with the tripartite, which are generally characterized by cognitive acquisitions and perceptions. The objective will be to seek a change of perspective, understanding knowledge as a human practice and, therefore, constructed and developed equally in practice. To this end, we seek to rediscover the roots of the concept from the beginning: understanding how the practice of language is established and how an ordinary discourse is distinguished from an epistemic discourse, through the investigation of Quine's work, which already has as one of its central concerns "from the stimulus to theory" and of Wittgenstein's work - more precisely the second Wittgenstein - and his study of language games and the distinction between knowledge and certainty.