A questão da natureza e do controle das crenças na perspectiva de Espinosa

Abstract

This research aims to examine the nature and control of beliefs from Spinoza’s perspective, as well as some of their repercussions in contemporary psychological literature. To this end, we will begin our study with Descartes, since the French philosopher exerted a highly significant influence on Spinoza’s philosophy, although, from the outset, this influence was characterized by a critical perspective. In this sense, we will provide a brief reconstruction of the argumentative and conceptual structures of Cartesian philosophy that underpin its voluntarist conception of belief, prioritizing the elements essential to understanding Spinoza’s critique and, consequently, the way he interprets Descartes. In this way, we will analyze the Cartesian conception of idea, the theory of judgment, the issues of error and freedom, and the doxastic voluntarism that characterizes its epistemological conception. Next, we will present Spinoza’s metaphysical and epistemological conception, examining his deconstruction of the Cartesian theory of judgment, the holistic nature of his theory of ideas, and his defense of the thesis that every idea necessarily involves the affirmation of its content, so that affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea. Finally, we will discuss some applications of Spinoza’s theory of belief in empirical studies conducted by psychologist Daniel Gilbert, who argues that believing is an automatic tendency of the human mind, while disbelief constitutes a secondary psychological act that is cognitively costly. In this way, we aim to demonstrate the relevance of Spinoza’s reflections for understanding the involuntary mechanisms involved in the formation of beliefs.