Causalidade psíquica em Freud

Abstract

The aim of the dissertation is to board the causal theory of mental Freud and their use in explanation of psychic conflict. It highlighted the double dimension of Freud's psychic causality dangling from a mechanistic causality to an intentional causality. It is considered that the most coherent way to support the thesis of psychic causality is to describe it as intentionally using psychological vocabulary. To support this idea, the strict conception of causality sustained by Wittgenstein is waived, and the idea of ​​mental cause in Davidson is endorsed as one that can be more easily articulated to the Freudian hypotheses. This is analyzed in three stages of Freud's work. The first topical Freud uses a hybrid vocabulary describing the psyche in terms of cause and in terms of rational intentional causes. In the second model, the psyche takes increasingly an intentional description, and the cause arational of instinctual energy, originally submitted as an engine of the psyche, gives rise to anxiety as an intentional affection that obliges me to find a solution to unresolved conflicts.