Os ciclos políticos: uma análise empírica fiscal e contábil para os municípios do estado do Rio de Janeiro-1998-2006

Abstract

The dissertation analyzes municipal public expenditures likely to be favorably perceived by voters. Data relate to the municipalities belonging to the state of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and cover the period 1998 2006, so that mu nicipal elections in 2000 and 2004 are included. The main purpose of the research is to investigate the existence of cyclical behavior along the electoral periods in terms of fiscal and budgetary policies. In order to detect electoral manipulations in specific items of municipal budgets and balance sheets the econometric approach via panel data has been adopted. Findings suggest that the electoral agenda indeed influences mayors behavior for sampled municipalities, even after specific features (e. g. population or geographic situation) have been discounted for. Cyclical effects also appeared in specific classes of expenditures in the years 2002 and 2006, indicating political initiatives by mayors to help their parties in both state and national elections, either legislative or executive. In addition some results show that mayors provoke financial superávits in the years preceding elections so thatthe surplus may be utilized along the electoral year in the form of additional credits. In what concerns the register of Pending Debts, findings indicate that those mayors looking forward to be reelected are concerned both with the negative effects of increased debt and with specific legislation in Brazil (namely, the so-called Law of Fiscal Responsibility LRF); in o ther words, those mayors may well become more conservative in expenditure terms. Electoral manipulation has also been uncovered in the item Current Debtors, since there has been a decrease of municipal debtors in electoral years (2000 and 2004). Public transport expenditure has received the biggest reduction, in contrast to what happened to other, more visible expenditure items. Partisan coincidence between mayors and either the governor or the president has indicated an inverse relation, that is, a decrease in municipal expenditure, suggesting that some kind of fiscal adjustment pact may be in place. As long as the so -called Law of Fiscal Responsibility LRF) is concerned, several statistically significant evidences have been found, confirming that LRF indeed affects the behavior of municipal management.