Compliance penal nos partidos políticos: possibilidades e limites

Abstract

Considering the essentiality of political parties for the functioning of Brazilian democracy, the study has sought to evaluate the adequacy of criminal compliance to the structure of such entities. Based on the notion that the capture of public agenda by the practice of crimes involving party activity weakens the deliberation and compromises the quality of democracy, the use of this tool in the prevention of crimes related to the fundraising of the parties has been analyzed. It has been pointed out how compliance, originally intended for corporate governance, can take on public-interest features and in agreement with the hybrid essence of political parties. Based on the theoretical framework of regulated self-regulation, and on the studies of Manuel Maroto Calatayud and Adán Nieto Martín, the need for parties to adhere to criminal compliance has been supported as a complementary means of rendering accountability and transparency towards society. Throughout the work, the fragility of the current system of accountability of the parties, the pertinence and limits of future political-criminal option of attribution of criminal capacity, and the possibility of criminalization of illegal funding as an autonomous criminal offense have been problematized. For the development of the argument, criminal proceedings that illustrated the relationship between the funding of political activity and the practice of crimes have been analyzed. It has also been indicated the tensions that the Criminal Law inserts in the political dynamics when it needs to be activated and the precedence of the prevention so that the functionality of the political parties in the democratic regime is preserved