Comércio Agrícola Internacional: os subsídios e os direitos compensatórios na teoria, na regulação e na prática sob o viés da análise econômica do direito

Abstract

The purpose of this research is to conduct an analysis of the granting of subsidies and compensatory rights to the trade defense of countries suffering from subsidies in international trade, especially in the agricultural sector of the world market. From the premise that the granting of subsidies from the market failure to a market failure, uses the methodology of economic analysis of law (AED), to size the arguments treated throughout the proposed analysis. The argument is that the current World Trade Organization (WTO) regime is unfit to control the indiscriminate use of domestic support measures for agriculture by granting subsidies to certain sectors and needs revision leading to the conclusion that the rules of the Agreement on Agriculture (AsA) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASMC) are ineffective, in particular, when considering the weaknesses in the policy monitoring mechanism and the adequacy and follow - up of the international agreements signed . Thus, a second thesis argument emerges, that the two trade policy instruments end up generating a vicious cycle, where the practice of subsidies by one country, generates the imposition of tariffs in another. This led the country to grant more subsidies to producers in sectors suffering from the imposition of tariffs. Thus, the exercise of countervailing duties on subsidies does not tend to balance the world market, on the contrary, it appears to generate an even greater imbalance.The final argument of this work is that the WTO's rules governing international agricultural trade in force under the AoA and ASMC are unfit to control the indiscriminate use of domestic support measures for agriculture. The granting of subsidies to certain strategic sectors of the international agricultural trade needs to be reviewed, with the conclusion that the rules of both trade agreements are ineffective, especially if one considers the flaws in the policy monitoring mechanism and the adequacy and follow-up of the agreements signed international agreements.