Legitimidade constitucional da cognição sumária: limites impostos pelo contraditório participativo.

Abstract

The thesis aims to structure the constitutional assumptions imposed by the current and humanized content of the adversarial principle to the cognition summarization techniques. The first part of the study is turned to envisaging the role of the adversarial principle in the civil procedure system, of its minimum current content, as from the international experience, especially of the Courts for protecting human rights, in opposition to the evolutive stage of Brazilian case law. The second part studies the pressures exerted by expeditiousness on the borderlines of the adversarial principle, by way of the review of the data made available by the National Justice Council and by other institutes, by content of the law to the reasonable duration of the procedures, also with support in the experience of the international Courts for protection of human rights, with accurate review of the condemnations imposed upon Brazil by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and of internal case law on the theme, which denies those injured the right of reparation of damage suffered by unjustified delays. The bases being defined, there follows the analysis of techniques for summarizing cognition, its grounds, objectives and species. Summary cognition is defined in counterpart to full cognition, according to which the parties may exercise, fully, in Court, the rights inherent to adversarial principle. The last quadrant is turned to the structuring of the constitutional assumptions legitimating the use of the techniques of cognition summarization, imposed by the adversarial principle as a brake to the constant pressures of expeditiousness. The legitimate use of the differentiated relief techniques employing summary cognition to expedite results assumes, in the current constitutional outlook, (i) compliance with the essential core of the adversarial principle, identified in the bilateral hearing, throughout the entire procedure, (ii) the legislative predetermination, so that the cognitive cuts may not be casuistically performed, (iii) the opportunity, assured to the parties, to integrate the current content of the adversarial principle in another phase or process, in full cognition, as well as (iv) the upkeep of the balance in the stabilization of the results, summary cognition not being, because it is highlighted by incompletion, exhaustive in itself. Finally, following review of the renounceable character of the guarantees, the analysis of a number of some standing procedural institutes, in which it is possible to ascertain traces of cognition summarizat ion, followed by the indication of the legislative corrections needed to the forming of models to the legitimating standards, rebalancing the bases of the civil procedure system.