A dimensão epistêmica do juízo por jurados: perspectivas para a racionalização das decisões do júri a partir dos fundamentos da concepção racionalista da prova

Abstract

The present study starts from the premise that the choice of a system to institute a jury trial does not imply in assuming a diverse ideology as to the ends of adjudication in the sense of departing from the truth as a core value for guaranteeing justice in decision-making. In this regard, it seeks to deconstruct the idea that the lay character of citizens or the lack of reasons of the verdicts invariably lead to irrational and unaccountable judgements on questions of fact. The analysis of the Brazilian jury in the context of its procedural dynamics, in contrast to the established Anglo-American experience, allows us to associate such deviations to the embracing of a model of procedure incapable of providing the bases for adequate cognition, which seems to translate into an indifference to the result of a judgment which is supposed to be based on inner conviction. In view of this, adopting as theoretical reference the general assumptions about the forms of procedure and evidentiary practices that converge to what William Twining refers to by Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Schollarship, it is hypothesized that the jury decision-making must be more rational and subject to a control, which is considered possible through a model of procedure epistemologically oriented to provide jurors with knowledge of the facts from a rational evaluation of the evidence. To this end, with a focus on bibliographical research of national and foreign legislation, doctrine and jurisprudence, it is proposed a series of measures aimed at making the Brazilian jury procedure capable of performing an epistemic function.