Diálogo Constitucional e Correção Legislativa da Jurisprudência no Direito Tributário Brasileiro

Abstract

In a constitutional democracy that adopts judicial review, the Judiciary branch always have the power to fulfill the role of ultimate constitutional arbiter ? This research investigates the legislative alternatives that Congress can adopt to overrides brasilian Supreme Court constitutional decisions, specially in tax law. It discuss arguments against judicial supremacy, especially in the United States doctrine, and defends that the theorie of constitutional dialogue can have an important role to play in constitutional interpretation, because underlines the fact that the legislative branch have an important role in the work of say what the Constitution means. It also examineds theories of political science that works with the approach that the lines between the powers in the principle of separation of powers have become blurred. In this sense, legislative overrides can fulfill an important role in a democracy, because represents an relevant form of inter-branch feedback and allows that interest groups defeated in the judiciary branch can presents new arguments in another branch.