A prova do dolo

Abstract

The work aims to scrutinize the criminal law s methods of proof of intent (dolus or dolo), in order to assess whether these methods are efficient and, finally, to determine, if it s possible to prove the intent; we investigate, even if it is necessary or possible to change the very concept of intent. The first part presents the concept of intent, based on the principal authors of the criminal law, in order to define the central object of study. To this end, the various conceptual controversies are analyzed in accordance with the system to which they belong: the classical school; the causalism; the teleological theory; the functionalism. The remaining divergences are grouped into two major blocs - the intellectual theories and volitional theories - in accordance with the approach that is given by the authors who defend this or that concept of intent. At the heart of the work, we present the psychoanalytic method of measurement of human consciousness and human will, to then carry out the study of the methods of proof adopted in the criminal law, always collating with the respective psychoanalytic analysis, to provide the reader a multidisciplinary view of the subjective phenomena of mind. It will be noted the inadequacy of the criminal law methods of proof of intent. The third part is a study of the Brazilian jurisprudence, in regard to how the courts tend to prove intent in order to assess whether the judicial practice is consistent with the doctrine. It is concluded that there is indeed a mismatch between what the doctrine meant as a viable method and what really is adopted by the courts.