A Desvinculação das Receitas da União: um estudo sobre suas (in)constitucionalidades

Abstract

This research aims to analyze the phenomenon of the untying of the Union s revenues, known as DRU, and its possible (un)constitutionality, with a special emphasis on the untying of revenues from special contributions and rates, as well as on the violation of the Federal Pact. To do so, it presents DRU s characteristics as a financial instrument for untying revenues and places the discussion in the constitutional level, bringing elements for the interpretation of the actual content and extent of the constitutional immutable clauses. It analyzes the characteristics of special contributions and rates as tax species in order to investigate whether the specific destination of the proceeds of their collection constitutes an essential element of such taxes. Furthermore, it considers if the absence of the specific destination implies unconstitutionality of contributions and taxes, showing the consequences of such diverts. It studies the main aspects of Brazilian Federalism and, in particular, of its fiscal federalism in order to study DRU s impacts on the constitutional sharing of revenues, subnational entities s financial autonomy and, therefore, on the Federal Pact.